SUPPLEMENTS TO
VIGILIAE CHRISTIANAE

Physicalist Soteriology in Hilary of Poitiers

ELLEN SCULLY

BRILL

Physicalist Soteriology in Hilary of Poitiers

Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae

TEXTS AND STUDIES OF EARLY CHRISTIAN LIFE AND LANGUAGE

Editors

J. den Boeft
B.D. Ehrman
K. Greschat
J. Lössl
J. van Oort
D.T. Runia
C. Scholten

VOLUME 130

The titles published in this series are listed at *brill.com/vcs*

Physicalist Soteriology in Hilary of Poitiers

By

Ellen Scully

BRILL

LEIDEN | BOSTON

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Scully, Ellen.
Physicalist soteriology in Hilary of Poitiers / by Ellen Scully.
pages cm. — (Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae, ISSN 0920-623X ; volume 130)
Revision of the author's thesis (Ph.D.)—Marquete University, 2011.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-90-04-29020-4 (hardback : acid-free paper) — ISBN 978-90-04-29081-5 (e-book) 1. Salvation—Christianity—History of doctrines—Early church, ca. 30–600. 2. Hilary, Saint, Bishop of Poitiers, –367? I. Title.

BT751.3.S38 2015
234.092—dc23

2015004855

This publication has been typeset in the multilingual 'Brill' typeface. With over 5,100 characters covering Latin, IPA, Greek, and Cyrillic, this typeface is especially suitable for use in the humanities.
For more information, please see www.brill.com/brill-typeface.

ISSN 0920-623X
ISBN 978-90-04-29020-4 (hardback)
ISBN 978-90-04-29081-5 (e-book)

Copyright 2015 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands.
Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Hes & De Graaf, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Rodopi and Hotei Publishing.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher.
Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change.

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Contents

Acknowledgements IX

Introduction 1

PART 1
Hilary a Latin Non-Platonic Physicalist

1 **Revising the Lens through which Hilary is Read** 11
The Scholarly Controversy Surrounding Physicalism in Hilary 11
The Waxing and Waning of Harnack's Influence on Hilary Scholarship 14
Excursus: Poor Scholarship has Fueled the Fire 18
Incorrect Reading of Erasmus Sets the Stage 18
Misinterpretations and Inaccuracies Regarding the Critique of Harnack and the German Liberal Protestants of the Nineteenth Century 21
The Dominant Paradigm of Accepting Hilary's Physicalism Lacks an Argued Rationale for Its Rejection of Harnack 23

2 **Hilary's Use of Language and Rhetoric** 25
What Does Hilary Mean by the Assumption of All Humanity? 26
Hilary's Use of Non-Metaphorical Rhetoric to Speak of Christ's Assumption of All Humanity 29
Case Study: Hilary vs. Tertullian 37
Does Hilary's Insistence on "Physicality" Make the Assumption of All Humanity Impossible? 40
Conclusion 42

3 **The Context of, and Influences upon, Hilary's Soteriology** 43
Hilary's Appropriation of Greek Philosophy 44
Prior to His Exile 44
After His Exile 51
Hilary's Relationship with Greek Theology 52
Irenaeus and Athanasius 52
Origen and Eusebius of Caesarea 54
Stoic Contributions to Hilary's Soteriology 62
The Stoic Conception of Human Unity 63

Stoic Anthropology and Psychology 70
The Complementarity of Body and Soul 70
Pain vs. Suffering 71
Stoic Physics and Mixture Theory 73
The Transmission of Plato's Theory of the Forms via Latin Stoicism 79
Latin Theological Context for Hilary's Physicalist Model of Redemption 83
Conclusion 90

4 **Proof of Hilary's Physicalism** 92
Problems of Terminology 94
The Definition of Physicalism 95
The Physicalist Model in the *In Matthaeum*: Refutation of Platonic Influence 100
The Physicalist Model in the *Tractatus super Psalmos* 105
Latin Atonement Theory? The Importance of the Suffering and Death of Christ in Hilary's Redemption Model 107
Conclusion 115

PART 2
The Ramifications of Physicalism on Hilary's Theological System

5 **Christological Ramifications: Sublimation of Christology into Soteriology** 119
"Christology" as a Double Category 121
Hilary's Three-Stage Christology in the Framework of Philippians 2:6–11 124
Hilary's Use of Forma *to Mean Both Nature and Condition* 128
Stage One: The Son of the Father 130
Stage Two: The Incarnate Christ's Reception of All Humanity 130
Stage Three: The Glorification of Christ and All Humanity in Him 132
Conclusion 134

6 **The Assumption of All Humanity as Definitive of Hilary's Physicalist Soteriology** 135
The Prerequisite: The Anterior Unity of Humanity 136
The Pauline Adam-Christ Parallel 138
Birth from a Virgin 145
The Conditional Universality of Salvation: Given to All but Rejected by Many 147

Christ the Mediator and the Double Creation of Man 154
Conclusion 163

7 **Eschatological Ramifications: Eternal Life in Christ** 165
Hilary's Use of *Adsumere* Manifests the Connection between Soteriology and Eschatology 165
The Contours of Hilary's Eschatology 166
Christ's Inheritance 173
1 Corinthians 15:21–28 as the Scriptural Frame for Hilary's Eschatology 174
The Eternal Priesthood of Christ 179
The Resurrection of the Body: From Corruption to Incorruption 180
Salvation is of Both Body and Soul 183
The Heavenly City of Jerusalem; The Celestial Zion 186
Heaven and the Divine Indwelling 189
Conclusion 191

8 **Ecclesiological Ramifications: The Church is the Body of Christ** 193
The Development of Hilary's Ecclesiology and Its Dependence on the Assumption of All Humanity 193
The Relationship of Soteriology and Ecclesiology in the *In Matthaeum* 195
Ecclesial Images in the *In Matthaeum* 196
The Younger Supplants the Elder in the *Tractatus super Psalmos*: The Universality of the Church 200
The Creation of Eve as Prefigurement of the Church in the *Tractatus mysteriorum* and the *Tractatus super Psalmos* 203
The Church as Body of Christ in the *Tractatus super Psalmos* 207
The Expansion of Hilary's Christocentric Soteriology to Include the Holy Spirit 215
Conclusion 220

9 **Hilary's Patercentric Theology: The Relationship between Physicalism and Trinitarian Theology** 222
Hilary's Trinitarian Vocabulary: *Persona, Nomen*, and *Natura* 226
The Place of the Holy Spirit in Hilary's Trinitarian Theology 237
The Eternal Relationship of the Father and the Son in the *De Trinitate* and the *Tractatus super Psalmos* 239
The Temporal Mediation of the Son 249

The Implications of the Assumption of All Humanity in Hilary's Trinitarian Theology: Seeing God 256
Hilary's Patercentric Theology 262
Conclusion 267

Conclusion 270
Hilary's Teaching of Christ's Assumption of All Humanity is Neither Imported from the East nor Inherited from the West 270
Hilary's Teaching of Christ's Assumption of All Humanity Demonstrates the Unified Nature of His Theological System 271
The Standard Scholarly Perception of Hilary is Driven by a Divisive Method of Study 272
A New (Unified) Method Leads to a New Perception 274
What does Hilary Have to Offer? 275
Hilary's Contribution to the Historian 275
Hilary's Contribution to the Theologian 277

Bibliography 279
Index 294
Scripture Index 298

Acknowledgements

This book is a revised version of the doctoral dissertation I wrote at Marquette University, directed by Michel Barnes. I would like to thank here all those who had a hand in this book by shaping me as a scholar.

I am grateful on many levels to the Theology Department at Marquette, not least because of the generous five year funding I received as a recipient of the Ignatius scholarship. Marquette is, quite simply, a wonderful place to study theology and especially patristics. I had the good fortune of studying under the two great lights Michel Barnes and Bishop Alexander Golitzin. I have since learned that from the day I set foot on campus, Dr. Barnes set himself the task of entirely breaking apart my approach to scholarship and then rebuilding from the ground up. Though the process was not entirely smooth, I offer this book as grateful testimony to its effectiveness. I count myself very lucky to have received this formation by Dr. Barnes because I can think of no other scholar whose work I admire more. While I was, according to Bishop Alexander, "the worst TA he ever had," (largely based on my refusal to clean his office), we have a mutual appreciation for the stubborn strength of each other's characters. He is a man of ascesis and wisdom and his love for me and my husband is a pearl beyond price.

Other professors in Marquette's Theology Department are deserving of my thanks. Ralph Del Colle was a reader of my dissertation and taught me to think in unexpected ways. I am not over-exaggerating when I say that Fr. Joseph Mueller has taught me how to be a teacher, a scholar, and, frankly, a good person. As his TA, I learned how to grade papers and run a classroom; as a member of his freely-given language groups, he gave me an example of the never-ending pursuit of learning (even in its most arduous and boring components); through his comments on my dissertation, he manifested the exquisiteness of careful diligence; as the priest in charge of my marriage preparation, he taught me how to take joy in the innumerable compromises that make up a marriage. I admire him beyond compare and treasure his friendship.

Two professors from the University of Notre Dame must also be included here. Fr. Brian Daley started me on my path of Hilary scholarship. I was looking for a translation project and Fr. Daley suggested Hilary's *Tractatus super Psalmos*: little did I realize that my translation work was embarking me on the decade-long project of Hilary scholarship that culminated in this book. I freely admit that while I was a master's student at Notre Dame, I was a member of the "John Cavadini fan club." I do not know anyone who can inhabit the patristic worldview more fully, and this ability, presented with his distinctive combination

of humility and humour, makes Dr. Cavadini a fantastic teacher. I was very delighted when he agreed to be the outside reader for my dissertation.

I began work on this project while I was living at St. Cecilia's monastery in Ryde, England (a Benedictine community in the Solesmes tradition). My days there were spent in the lengthy intricacies of performing the *opus Dei* in Latin Gregorian chant, reading through the 900 pages of Latin text of Hilary's *Tractatus super Psalmos*, and learning the humility of silence, obedience to bells, and joy of community. I believe that my understanding of Hilary's Psalm commentaries owes much to the environment of prayer in which I first encountered them. I am grateful to Mother Abbess Ninian Eaglesham, Sr. Mary David Totah, Sr. Margaret Ross, and all the sisters who welcomed me into their home.

Two Hilary scholars have helped me along the way. First, Paul Burns generously gave me a manuscript copy of what has since become his wonderful book *A Model for the Christian Life*. Mark Weedman, another former Michel Barnes student, has exchanged many emails with me over the years, both of encouragement and theological clarification.

In the process of changing this dissertation into the present book I would like to thank first the editorial staff of Brill and the series Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae. Thanks also to Anthony Briggman who, one year ahead of me in the program at Marquette, has always gone ahead of me and never stinted in showing me the way, including reading and commenting on chapters, and offering advice on how to write a book proposal. Immaculate Conception Seminary School of Theology at Seton Hall University has provided a wonderful environment—in terms of time, support, and encouragement—for me to complete this book.

Finally, I can never thank my husband Jason Scully enough. There are many practical downsides to the marriage of two patristics scholars (finding a school that wants to hire the both of us being the main) but there are many benefits as well. Scholarship can be a lonely and alienating task, but having a husband who can not only sympathize with, but truly understand, every difficulty—from the struggle of acquiring lesser-known sources, to formatting footnotes, to understanding the nuances of fourth century soteriology—helps me remain happy and human through it all. Jason and I serve as the second set of eyes for all of each other's work. Not only has my work benefitted enormously from this practice, but both my gratitude and humility have grown exponentially.

This book was accepted for publication when my firstborn son Eamon Macarius was two months old. In working on the revisions, infant in hand, I came to respect Hilary—husband, father, and bishop—even more.

Introduction

A fundamental tenet of Christian theology is that adherents are saved by Christ, but one aspect of this salvation by Christ that has received remarkably little attention is *how* Christ saves, in particular the mechanism or means of transferring salvation from the person Jesus Christ to individual humans.

Some of Christ's saving work affects elements external to human nature: for example he opens the gates of heaven once and for all or he defeats the power of the devil. The person Jesus Christ accomplished these results and anyone who comes after him reaps the benefits. However, a large part of the Christian understanding of salvation is that the incarnation also affects human nature by transforming or healing it. The words of Gregory of Nazianzus that "what is not assumed is not healed" have become a christological and soteriological adage. Christians have a basic conception that the assumption of a human nature by the Son of God affects all human nature. These transformative effects of Christ's work on human nature include anything from the victory over incorruption and death, to the rectification of the will, to participation in divine life.

But when Christ assumes an individual human nature and transforms it, how does the transformation of this nature have an effect on any other individual human being? If a human being benefits from the transformation of Christ's humanity, then there exists some method of transferring the transformative effects from Jesus Christ to that person.

As a sidenote, a purely external and forensic soteriology—in which salvation, understood as God's positive judgment of a person, is not necessarily connected with an internal transformation—has no need for a method, in this life at least, of transferring the transformative effects that the Son of God had on his human nature to the nature of individual believers. But, none of the Fathers found themselves in this camp.

The Fathers have many different ways to explain the process of transferring these transformative effects from Christ's nature to other individual humans. Some emphasize the work of the Holy Spirit, others baptism or reception of the Eucharist as the means whereby individual humans have their nature conformed to the transformed nature of Jesus Christ. These answers presuppose a sequence of events: first, Christ transforms and glorifies his own individual human nature;[1] second, through the workings of the Holy Spirit or participation

1 When not prompted by biblical texts declaring the Father as the initiator of the resurrection, Hilary often insists that Christ works his own resurrection by his own power. See, for

© KONINKLIJKE BRILL NV, LEIDEN, 2015 | DOI 10.1163/9789004290815_002

in the sacraments, individual humans can receive what the humanity of Christ already possesses: incorruption, rectification of the will, participation in divine life, etc. Notice that this is a multi-stage process that requires the mediation of the Holy Spirit or the sacraments before individual humans are able to reap the nature-transforming benefits of the incarnation.

This book outlines the thought of Hilary of Poitiers as a representative of one particular and less well known answer to the question of how individual humans experience the transformation of nature accomplished in the incarnate Jesus Christ. There is an entire trajectory of patristic thought—found most notably in Irenaeus, Athanasius, Gregory of Nyssa and Cyril of Alexandria—in which individual humans benefit from the transformation of Christ's human nature without any method of transferring these benefits. In other words, in this trajectory, the incarnation has a direct—we can even say automatic—effect, unmediated by the Holy Spirit or the sacraments, on all human nature.

Scholars have given this trajectory various names in the past; most commonly, it has been called the "mystical model of redemption," following Albert Ritschl,[2] or the "physical" model or "physicalism," following Harnack.[3] In this

---

example, Hilary *De Trin.* 9.11 (CCL 62A 382.23–383.25): Spoliata enim caro Christus est mortuus, et rursum Christum a mortuis excitans idem Christus est carne se spolians. See also *De Trin*. 2.24. All Latin text from the *De Trinitate* is taken from: *De Trinitate*, ed. Pieter Smulders, CCL 62 (books 1–7) and 62A (books 8–12) (Brepols Publishers: Turnhout, 1979–1980). See also the discussion in Luis Ladaria, *La Cristología de Hilario de Poitiers* (Rome: Editrice Pontificia Università Gregoriana, 1989), 223–224.

2 For example, Albrecht Ritschl, *A Critical History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation*, trans. H.R. Mackintosh and A.B. Macaulay (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1900), 8: "Hilary of Poitiers enables us to see this kernel of the 'mystical-atonement doctrine.' " See also Raymond Schwager's recent dictionary entry "Salvation" in the *Encyclopedia of Christian Theology*, vol. 3, ed. Jean-Yves Lacoste, (New York: Routledge, 2005), 1421–1434, wherein he follows Ritschl's terminology.

3 Adolph von Harnack speaks of "a physical and magical redemption accomplished at the moment of the incarnation" (*History of Dogma*, vol. 2, trans. from the 3rd ed. by Neil Buchanan, [Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1907], 223). Both Gustaf Aulen and Martin Werner follow Harnack's terminology of "physical." Aulen: "Irenaeus has been commonly interpreted by theologians of the Liberal Protestant School as teaching a 'naturalistic' or 'physical' doctrine of salvation" (*Christus Victor*, trans. A.G. Hebert [London: SPCK, 1950], 34–35). Werner: "Athanasius, in the struggle against the Arians, became an effective defender of the new 'physical' doctrine of the Redemption" (*The Formation of Christian Dogma: A Historical Study of its Problem*, trans. S.G.F. Brandon [London: Adam & Charles Black, 1957], 168).

J.N.D. Kelly reproduces both Ritschl's terminology of "mystical" and Harnack's of "physical" or "physicalist". For "physical" see J.N.D. Kelly, *Early Christian Doctrines*, 5th ed. (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1977), 173, where he outlines Irenaeus' theory of redemption,

book, I have chosen to use the term "physicalism" because it most clearly conveys Hilary's insistence on the physicality of human incorporation into Christ's body.[4] According to physicalism, there is no need for a multi-step process—requiring the mediation of things like faith, the sacraments, or the Holy Spirit—to convey the salvific power of the incarnation to individual human beings because Christ's human nature somehow touches all human nature. When his human nature is transformed, all human nature, that is, the human nature of every individual, is immediately transformed.

I want to note that while this book will analyze Hilary's physicalism as an independent theological strand, physicalism is a soteriological principle that, in practice, can never stand on its own. There is danger in a purely physicalist soteriology: if the incarnation has an immediate and automatic effect on all humanity, and if this effect is fully sufficient for salvation, then the result is universalism, and a very impersonal universalism at that. A 100% physicalist soteriology offers a one-size-fits-all salvation in which all humanity is transformed by the incarnation and therefore saved. However, all the theologians that are labeled as physicalists, including Hilary, offer physicalism as only one part, though a definitive part, of their wider soteriology. For Hilary, as well as for the more famous physicalists such as Athanasius or Gregory of Nyssa, the effect of the incarnation on all humans is only the first step toward attaining salvation. Nevertheless, the first step is the necessary pre-requisite for all the other—likewise necessary—steps of faith, baptism and other sacraments, grace, and acts of Christian service.

While all patristic authors interpret Paul's words in 1 Corinthians 15:22 as saying some variation of "we live in Christ," scholars, beginning in the nineteenth century, have recognized that Hilary means something different than his Latin patristic counterparts when he says humans live in Christ. As we will see in Chapter 1, the nineteenth century German Protestant theologians argued that Hilary believes human presence in Christ is physical, with the result that salvation is an automatic physical process: physical contact with the divine cannot help but transform humans into what they touch. This idea of "automatic salvation" is so theologically troubling that many 20th century scholars

---

which is "technically known as the 'physical' theory of atonement." Later, he introduces the term "mystical" as a synonym for "physical": "First, there was the so-called 'physical' or 'mystical' theory (we have already come across it in Irenaeus) which linked the redemption with the incarnation" (375).

4 For a longer discussion on the name of this redemption model see Chapter 4 "Problems of Terminology." For a study of Hilary's meaning for terms such as "body" and "physical," see Chapter 2 "Case Study: Hilary vs. Tertullian."

rejected the premise that Hilary speaks about human presence in Christ in a fashion different from his contemporaries. However, recent scholarship on Hilary's soteriology is returning to the initial insight of the nineteenth century German theologians: Hilary is a "physicalist" in that he does indeed have an unusual insistence on humanity's physical presence in Christ's body, first in its incarnate state and then in its glorified state. However, recent scholarship is reevaluating the theological ramifications of this insistence and recognizing, unlike the Germans, that though physicalism argues that the incarnation itself—apart from any mediation by the Holy Spirit or sacraments—initiates a transformation that affects the nature of the entirety of humanity, nevertheless, it does not demand a completely mechanistic view of salvation. Furthermore, physicalism offers positive theological insights.

This book serves as the first comprehensive outline of the theological ramifications of Hilary's physicalist insistence that Christ assumes all humanity into his body at the incarnation. In following the recent trajectory, laid out most prominently by Paul Burns, Luis Ladaria, and Antonio Orazzo, that argues for the central importance of Christ's physical assumption of all humanity in Hilary's theology, I offer in this book the first systematic study of this importance in all the areas of Hilary's theology: christology, soteriology, eschatology, ecclesiology, and Trinitarian theology.

Hilary's physicalism enters into each of these theological areas through his exegesis of Scripture, which consistently provides the terminology and framework for his thought. The Pauline epistles are particularly influential. Hilary uses Philipians 2:6–11 to shape a dynamic christology whose key moments of the incarnation and Christ's glorification include the presence of all humanity in Christ's body. He bases his soteriological reflections on the unity of all humanity in Paul's Adam-Christ parallel found in 1 Corinthians 15:20–22, 45–49 and Romans 5:12–21. 1 Corinthians 15:20–28 also provides the scriptural framework for Hilary's eschatology: God will be all in all only when Christ, himself the kingdom, gathers humanity into his body and then subjects himself, and all humanity in him, to the Father. Furthermore, since humans exist within the kingdom of Christ's body, Ephesians 3:6 provides Hilary with his favored description of human eschatological life, namely that humans will be coheirs, concorporeal, and coparticipators in Christ's life. Another Pauline analogy—the Church as the body of Christ, as found in 1 Corinthians 12:12–27 and Colossians 1:18, 24—frames Hilary's ecclesiology. In Trinitarian theology, Hilary turns to the gospel of John, in particular the combination of John 14:9–11 and John 10:30, to reveal both the Son's equal nature with the Father and his role as temporal revealer and mediator, a role that he fulfills through the

mediation accomplished between God and all humanity in his incarnate body. Scripture provides the structure and language for Hilary's physicalism.

We can be sure that Hilary means something different by the scriptural words "we dwell in Christ" than his Latin predecessors such as Tertullian or Novatian because Hilary's physicalist understanding of these words leads him to theological conclusions not shared by other Latin theologians. In other words, the theological ramifications are the "proof" of Hilary's physical understanding of Christ's assumption of all humanity. For example, Hilary is clear that humanity's eschatological hope is not simply to see God or dwell with the angels, rather it is to live eternally in the body of Christ. According to Hilary, a snapshot of all the inhabitants of heaven would show only the Father, Son, Holy Spirit, and the angels. Where are the humans? Hilary is explicit that humanity's presence in heaven will be in the glorified body of the Son. Hilary has unique conclusions because of his unique physicalist starting point.

This book has two parts. The First Part (Chapters 1 through 4) will demonstrate that Hilary is a Latin non-Platonic physicalist. The Second Part (Chapters 5 through 9) will outline the ways in which physicalism affects and defines Hilary's entire theological system. While I take into account all of Hilary's major works in this book, I focus on the *Tractatus super Psalmos* since it is one of Hilary's most mature works and in it, correspondingly, Hilary shows the greatest clarity concerning physicalism and its theological repercussions.

Chapter 1 will analyze the ambivalence of 20th century scholarship, which is characterized by more scholars ignoring or denying the presence of physicalism in Hilary's thought than advocating it. I will suggest that the variations in scholarly opinion, as well as the recently shifting consensus toward a recognition of physicalism in Hilary, manifest the waxing and waning of Harnackian influence.

The question of whether or not Hilary is a physicalist has been the subject of a large scholarly disagreement. In three chapters, I will address this question from three different angles: linguistic in Chapter 2, historical in Chapter 3, theological in Chapter 4. First, on the level of linguistics, scholars who believe Hilary is a physicalist read Hilary's statements about Christ's assumption of the body of all humanity literally while scholars who do not believe Hilary is a physicalist argue that Hilary intends such statements to be read metaphorically. Chapter 2 addresses the question of Hilary's use or non-use of metaphor by studying Hilary's application of technical terminology and rhetorical strategies. The classical rhetoric in which Hilary was educated offers standard conventions and terminology to present metaphorical arguments. I conclude that Hilary's conscious neglect of these rhetorical conventions signals his intention

to convey non-metaphorical meaning in his teaching of Christ's assumption of all humanity.

Second, on the historical level, scholars have often attributed or denied physicalism to Hilary based on an inaccurate or incomplete picture of the possible sources for Hilary's physicalist teaching. The theological similarity of Hilary's physicalist teaching to the soteriology of Greek physicalists such as Athanasius or Gregory of Nyssa led to nearly a hundred years of scholarship that mistakenly argued that Hilary's physicalism shared the philosophical source of Greek physicalism, namely Platonism. Now that scholars have recognized Hilary's independence of Platonism, there is a new difficulty in finding a more viable theological or philosophical source trajectory for Hilary's thought. Chapter 3 will present the contributions of several different theological and philosophical sources and conclude that Tertullian and Stoicism have the strongest influence on Hilary's physicalism.

Third, on the level of theology, a scholarly argument either for or against the presence of physicalism in Hilary's teaching must be prepared to demonstrate or deny that Hilary's soteriology fulfills all the criteria of a physicalist soteriology. However, scholars on both sides of the issue have neglected this necessary methodological step of defining parameters with the result that their conclusions—either for or against physicalism in Hilary's thought—cannot participate in useful scholarly dialogue. In Chapter 4, I offer a theological definition of physicalism and demonstrate that Hilary's soteriology, in both his early and later career, sufficiently meets these theological criteria.

Once Hilary's unique Latin physicalism has been sufficiently demonstrated in Part One, Part Two of this book analyzes the widespread effects of physicalism on all areas of Hilary's theological enterprise. Chapter 5 focuses on christology and offers a general reflection on the relationship between the scholarly categories of christology and soteriology. Hilary's physicalism serves to subsume the category of christology into other categories such as soteriology and eschatology because, since all humanity exists in Christ's body, the events in Christ's life are also events in the salvific trajectory of humanity. Chapter 6 follows the nuances of Hilary's emphasis on Christ's physical assumption of all humanity and then shows how this emphasis, the result of a specific exegesis of the Pauline Adam-Christ parallel, molds Hilary's entire soteriological picture. Chapter 7 addresses the eschatological implications and shows that Hilary believes that physicalism has eternal effects: eschatological life takes place in the body of Christ. Chapter 8 turns to ecclesiology where Hilary's primary understanding of the Church is as the body of Christ, which functions as a city in which humans dwell. Chapter 9 explains that Hilary's Trinitarian conception of the Son as the eternal mediator of the Father is best expressed temporally in Christ's physical assumption of all humanity because physicalism

is the only soteriological system that does not posit additional levels and instruments of mediation thereby undermining Christ's unique mediation.

An additional value in interpreting Hilary's theology of the incarnation as asserting the physical presence of humanity in Christ's body lies in its utility for understanding Hilary's theological project. In this work, I use a physicalist understanding of Christ's assumption of all humanity as the lens with which to view Hilary's entire theology. The detailing of these ramifications will show that the end result of viewing Hilary as a physicalist is a picture of Hilary's theology as a rich, consistent, logical, and unified thought system. Scholars—including the Protestants of the nineteenth century, and more modern Hilary scholars such as Gottardo Blasich and Phillip Wild—who have repudiated this lens find Hilary's theology to be less rich, less consistent, less logical, and less unified. This negative perception of Hilary's theology results in Hilary being accorded a relatively small place in the history of theology.

Nevertheless, we should not, as readers, overlook the real ambiguity that is present in Hilary's theology. There are two distinct layers of ambiguity in Hilary's teaching of Christ's assumption of all humanity. First, there is the initial ambiguity of whether to read Hilary as intending a physical or a (non-physical) spiritual presence of humanity in Christ. While some scholars have chosen to read Hilary's language metaphorically as intending a non-physical presence, this study interprets Hilary's words at face value as insisting on a physical presence of humanity in Christ.

There is a second layer of ambiguity associated with interpreting Hilary's statements as referring to the physical presence of humans in Christ. This second layer of ambiguity is the result of Hilary's silence as regards the manner of this physical presence. How can all humans be present in Christ's body? Is every human body in the historical, incarnate body of Christ and, if so, how does this presence actually work? How can Christ be a particular person if he has, in some sense, every other human within him as part of his own constitution? How can humans be both in Christ and in their own bodies? Hilary offers very few guidelines as to how to answer these questions.

This second layer of ambiguity exists because Hilary presents a physicalist soteriology without connecting it to any metaphysical logic to give his theology a philosophical and logical foundation. To offer a comparison, Hilary's rough contemporary Marius Victorinus teaches a physicalist soteriology undergirded by Platonic metaphysics by saying that the human nature of Christ is the Platonic form of humanity.[5] For Victorinus, when Christ's human nature

5 Victorinus lived in Rome and converted to Christianity (as narrated by Augustine in Book 8 of the *Confessions*) c. 355. Although already at an advanced age, according to Jerome, Victorinus wrote all his Christian works between this date and his death around 370. For Victorinus'

is glorified, both the Form and all human beings who are patterned after this Form, are likewise glorified. In contrast, Hilary offers a version of physicalism that is independent of Platonic metaphysics. However, Hilary does not supply a replacement metaphysic to explain *how* physicalism acutally works. Either Hilary found the philosophy to which he had access insufficient to fulfill this role or he simply was not concerned with supplying a philosophical framework. The Trinity was believed long before any adequate or philosophically-savvy logic was offered. It could be that Hilary is at a similarly early phase as regards physicalist soteriology in that the inability of human reason to comprehend *how* Christ can assume all humanity does not deter Hilary's faith that Christ *does* assume all humanity.

As modern readers, we can view this lack of metaphysical support for Hilary's physicalist soteriology in a negative or positive light. Negatively it is true that Hilary's physicalism is less complete and less rationally convincing than Platonic physicalism. We may even lay the blame for the nearly complete lack of a reception history for Hilary's physicalism on its metaphysical weakness. However, positively, this metaphysical lack should make Hilary's theology doubly interesting to readers in a post-Platonic world. Platonic physicalism is a historical artifact that is of interest only to archeologists of the intellectual past, but the very incompleteness of Hilary's theology allows it modern relevance. Hilary's theology is open to being filled in by a modern metaphysical system.

Platonic physicalism, see, for example, Victorinus, *Against Arius* 3.3 (CSEL 83.1 196.30–32): Sed, cum carnem sumpsit, universalem λόγον carnis sumpsit. Nam idcirco omnis carnis potestates in carne triumphavit et idcirco omni subvenit carni. Also, Victorinus, *Against Arius* 3.3 (CSEL 83.1 197.49–50): et haec in crucem sublata atque purgata sunt per salutarem deum λόγον, universalium omnium universalem.

PART 1

Hilary a Latin Non-Platonic Physicalist

CHAPTER 1

Revising the Lens through which Hilary is Read

This book is based on the premise that Hilary teaches a physicalist soteriology and, furthermore, that this physicalism is such a central part of Hilary's theological understanding that it has ramifications that extend beyond soteriology into the areas of christology, eschatology, ecclesiology, and Trinitarian theology. If physicalism is as important to Hilary's theology as I claim, we might expect there to be widespread scholarly agreement on its presence, if not its importance, in Hilary's theology. However, this is not the case.

The Scholarly Controversy Surrounding Physicalism in Hilary

Certainly this book's argument for the importance of physicalism in Hilary's thought follows in a trajectory of scholarship that is recently gaining ground. The first scholar to notice and study Hilary's physicalism was Pierre Coustant, the editor of the 1693 Maurist edition of Hilary's works.[1] Following Coustant, not much attention was given to Hilary's physicalism until Harnack noticed and condemned it in 1889.[2] Between Harnack and 1980, four scholars devoted attention to Hilary's physicalism: Émile Mersch,[3] Joseph Lécuyer,[4] Albert Charlier,[5] and Jean-Pierre Pettorelli.[6] Since 1980, all studies—with the prominent

1 *Sancti Hilarii Pictavorum episcopi opera ad manuscriptos codices gallicanos, romanos, belgicos, nec non ad veteres editiones castigata, aliquot aueta opusculis*, Pierre Coustant, ed. (Paris: Excudebat Franciscus Muguet, 1693).

For Coustant's comments on Hilary's physicalism, see his *Praefatio generalis* to the PL edition (*Patrologia Latina*, ed. Jacques-Paul Migne, vol. 9, ed. Pierre Coustant [Paris, 1845]).

2 Adolph von Harnack, *History of Dogma*, vol. 3, trans. from the 3rd ed. by Neil Buchanan, (Boston: Roberts Brothers, 1897), 301, 287.

3 Émile Mersch, *Le Corps mystique du Christ: Études de théologie historique* (Louvain: Museum Lessianum, 1933), vol. 1, 340–367.

4 Joseph Lécuyer, "Le Sacerdoce royal des chrétiens selon saint Hilaire de Poitiers," *L'Année théologique* 10 (1949): 307–308.

5 Albert Charlier, "L'Église corps du Christ chez saint Hilaire de Poitiers," *Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses* 41 (1965): 451–477.

6 Jean-Pierre Pettorelli, "Le Thème de Sion, expression de la théologie de la rédemption dans l'œuvre de saint Hilaire de Poitiers," in *Hilaire et son temps. Actes du Colloque de Poitiers* (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1968), 213.

© KONINKLIJKE BRILL NV, LEIDEN, 2015 | DOI 10.1163/9789004290815_003

exception of the work of Jean Doignon[7]—on Hilary's soteriology have recognized, at least in cursory form, Hilary's physicalist teaching of Christ's assumption of all humanity. Furthermore, since 1980, Hilary's physicalism has been a topic of direct interest in the work of Paul Burns,[8] Marie-Josèphe Rondeau,[9] Luis Ladaria,[10] Bertrand de Margerie,[11] Guillermo Colautti,[12] and Antonio Orazzo.[13]

However, on the other side of the spectrum, there is some explicit rejection of physicalism in Hilary's theology, as well as a very wide-spread silence on the topic of physicalism in connection with Hilary. Yves Congar,[14] Phillip Wild,[15] and

7 Jean Doignon is perhaps the greatest, and certainly the most prolific, Hilary scholar of the 20th century.

8 Paul Burns, *The Christology in Hilary of Poitiers' Commentary on Matthew*, Studia Ephemerides Augustinianum 16 (Rome: Institutum Patristicum Augustinianum, 1981), 97–112. Burns is the only one of these scholars to explore possible historical precedents for this aspect of Hilarian thought. For a discussion of the debate concerning the presence of this teaching in Hilary's work and its relationship (or rather, lack thereof) to Greek theological and philosophical thought, see Burns, *Christology in Hilary*, 97–101.

9 Marie-Josèphe Rondeau, *Les Commentaires patristiques du Psautier* (*IIIe–Ve siècles*), vol. 2 (Rome: Pontificium Institutum Studiorum Orientalium, 1982–1985), 353–364.

10 Luis Ladaria, "Adán y Cristo en los *Tractatus super Psalmos* de san Hilario de Poitiers," *Gregorianum* 73/1 (1992): 97–122; "Adán y Cristo: Un motivo soteriológico del *In Matthaeum* de Hilario de Poitiers," in *Pléroma. Salus carnis. Miscelánea en homenaje al P. Antonio Orbe*, ed. E. Romero Pose (Santiago de Compostela: Publicaciones Compostellanum, 1989), 443–460; *La Cristología de Hilario de Poitiers*, (Rome: Editrice Pontificia Università Gregoriana, 1989), 87–103.

11 Bertrand de Margerie, *The Latin Fathers*, vol. 1 of *An Introduction to the History of Exegesis*, trans. Pierre de Fontnouvelle and Paul Duggan (Petersham, MA: Saint Bede's Publications, 1994), 70–71.

12 Guillermo Bruno Colautti, *Las Figuras eclesiológicas en san Hilario de Poitiers*, (Rome: Editrice Pontificia Università Gregoriana, 2005), 25 no. 56.

13 Antonio Orazzo, trans. *Ilario di Poitiers: Commento ai Salmi*, Collana di testi patristici 185–187 (Rome: Città Nuova, 2006), 31–32; "Ilario di Poitiers e la *universa caro* assunta dal Verbo nei *Tractatus super Psalmos*," *Augustinianum* 23 (1983): 399–419; *La Salvezza in Ilario di Poitiers: Cristo Salvatore dell'uomo nel Tractatus super Psalmos* (Naples: M. D'Auria, 1986), 84–105.

14 Yves Congar, "Sur l'inclusion de l'humanité dans le Christ," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 25 (1936): 495. Congar concludes that the physicalist notion of the inclusion of humanity in Christ must be understood to be an inclusion of humanity in love and knowledge—not ontologically. In this way, Congar does not say Hilary is not a physicalist, rather he argues that no physicalist actually teaches the physical inclusion of humanity in Christ's body.

15 Philip Wild, *The Divinization of Man according to St. Hilary* (Mundelein: Facultas Theologica seminarii sanctae Mariae ad Lacum, Dissertationes ad lauream 21, 1950), 57–67.

Gottardo Blasich[16] explicitly deny that Hilary teaches that Christ assumes all humans in the incarnation. Most importantly, Wild, in the only scholarly study devoted to the topic of Hilary's relationship to Greek physicalist teaching, concludes that Hilary is not a physicalist because he does not share with these physicalists the premise of the presence of all humanity in Christ. The studies of Paul Galtier,[17] John McHugh,[18] Alfredo Fierro,[19] Néstor Gastaldi,[20] Roberto Iacoangeli,[21] Gilles Pelland,[22] Akkanamdi Anyanwu,[23] Jean Doignon,[24] and

16 Gottardo Blasich, "La Risurrezione dei corpi nell'opera esegetica di S. Ilario di Poitiers," *Divus Thomas* 69 (1966): 76.

17 Paul Galtier, "La *Forma Dei* et la *forma servi* selon saint Hilaire de Poitiers," *Recherches de science religieuse* 48 (1960): 101–118; *Saint Hilaire de Poitiers; le premier docteur de l'Église latine*, Bibliothèque de théologie historique (Paris: Beauchesne et ses fils, 1956).

18 John F. McHugh, *The Exaltation of Christ in the Arian Controversy: The Teaching of St. Hilary of Poitiers*, (Shrewsbury: Pontificia Università Gregoriana, 1959).

19 Alfredo Fierro, *Sobre la Gloria en san Hilario: Una síntesis doctrinal sobre la noción bíblica de "Doxa,"* Analecta Gregoriana 144 (Rome: Librería editrice dell'Universita Gregoriana, 1964).

20 Néstor Gastaldi, *Hilario de Poitiers exégeta del Salterio: Un estudio de su exégesis en los Comentarios sobre los Salmos* (Paris-Rosario: Institut Catholique de Paris, 1969).

21 Roberto Iacoangeli, "Il Linguaggio soteriologico in Ilario di Poitiers," in *Cristologia e Catechesi Patristica* (Biblioteca di scienze religiose 31), ed. S. Felici (Rome: Libreria Ateneo Salesiano, 1980), 121–148; " 'Sacramentum Carnis, Sanguininis, Gloriae' in S. Ilario di Poitiers," in *Sangue e Antropologia biblica nella Patristica*, 1, ed. F. Vattioni (Rome, 1982), 503–527.

22 Gilles Pelland, "La 'Subiectio' du Christ chez saint Hilaire de Poitiers," *Gregorianum* 64 (1983): 423–452; "Le Thème biblique du Règne chez Hilaire de Poitiers," *Gregorianum* 60 (1979): 639–674.

23 Akannamdi Gerard Stephen Anyanwu, *The Christological Anthropology in St. Hilary of Poitiers' Tractatus on the Psalms* (Rome: Olimpica, 1983).

24 Jean Doignon, " 'Adsumo' et 'adsumptio' comme expression du mystère de l'Incarnation chez Hilaire de Poitiers," *Archivium Latinitatis Medii Aevi* 23 (1953): 123–135; "Comment Hilaire de Poitiers a-t-il lu et interprété le verset *Philippiens* 3,21," *Vigiliae Christianae* 43 (1989): 128–137; "Deux approches de la résurrection dans l'exégèse d'Hilaire de Poitiers," *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 54 (1987): 5–12; *Hilaire de Poitiers avant l'exil: Recherches sur la naissance, l'enseignement et l'épreuve d'une foi épiscopale en Gaule au milieu du IVe siecle* (Études Augustiniennes: Paris, 1971); *Hilaire de Poitiers: Disciple et témoin de la vérité* (*356–367*), ed. Marc Milhau (Paris: Insitut d'Études Augustiniennes, 2005); "La Scène évangélique du Baptême de Jésus commentée par Lactance (*Divinae institutiones* 4,15) et Hilaire de Poitiers (*In Matthaeum* 2,5–6)," in *Epektasis: Mélanges patristiques offerts au cardinal Jean Daniélou*, ed. Jacques Fontaine and Charles Kannengiesser (Paris: Beauchesne, 1972), 68–73; ed. and trans., *Sur Matthieu*, Sources chrétiennes, 254, 258 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1977).

Thomas Buffer,[25] whose purview should have included Hilary's teaching on Christ's assumption of all humanity, simply ignore the presence of this teaching in Hilary's thought. All of these scholars present studies addressing the contours of Hilary's soteriology. Out of these, some do not mention this teaching (Galtier, McHugh, Gastaldi, Iacoangeli, Pelland, Doignon),[26] while others allow that Hilary does indeed teach Christ's assumption of all humanity but do not consider it worthy of much attention (Fierro, Anyanwu, Buffer).

The Waxing and Waning of Harnack's Influence on Hilary Scholarship

In this brief run-through of scholars, we can see that there are more scholars who deny or ignore physicalism in Hilary's thought than who accept and study it. However, there has been a shift in scholarship such that recent scholarship (since 1980) almost universally accepts Hilary as a physicalist. This scholarly history leads to two questions. First, what is the explanation for the scholarly divide on the issue of whether or not Hilary teaches a physicalist soteriology of Christ's assumption of all humanity in the incarnation? Second, what has caused the shift in scholarly opinion that has led recent scholarship to come down much more heavily of the side of advocating the presence and importance of physicalism in Hilary's thought?

I believe that the answer to both these questions can be found in the waxing and waning of the influence of Adolph von Harnack. Harnack believed that Hilary was a physicalist with a teaching that was both similar to, and dependent on, the physicalism of Greek fathers, including Gregory of Nyssa.[27] However, Harnack's position did not encourage a widespread acceptance of Hilary's physicalism: quite the opposite, in fact. Harnack's argument for the presence of physicalism in Hilary's thought was bound up with three other

25 Thomas Buffer, *Salus in St. Hilary of Poitiers* (Rome: Pontificia Università Gregoriana, 2002).

26 Doignon does translate an ambiguous passage from the *In Matthaeum* in a way that may indicate, not only indifference, but even denial of the presence of this teaching in Hilary's thought. He translates "Erat in Iesu Christo homo totus . . ." as "Il y avait en Jésus-Christ totalement un homme" (SC 254, p. 109). Doignon's translation eliminates the ambiguity and possible physicalist interpretation of the Latin *homo totus* by rendering it as "an entire man" rather than something like "the entirety of humanity."

27 Harnack, *History of Dogma*, vol. 3, 301: "The thought that Christ assumed the general concept of humanity occurs, though mingled with distinctive ideas, in Hilary, who was dependent on Gregory [of Nyssa]." This dependence is, however, chronologically impossible.

claims that made subsequent Hilary scholars hesitant to ascribe physicalism to Hilary.

Harnack's ascription of physicalism to Hilary is accompanied by three other claims. The first two are historical claims: Harnack first argues that physicalism is a theology typical of the Greeks and second that it is always indebted to Platonism. The third is a confessional claim: Harnack argues that physicalism is heterodox.[28] These three claims have had a strong influence on 20th century Hilary scholars and this influence can be seen both in those scholars who advocate physicalism in Hilary's thought and those who deny it.

Harnack's first claim, that physicalism is a Greek phenomenon, has led 20th century Hilary scholars to largely divide into two camps. Those who believe that Hilary does teach a physicalist soteriology feel compelled to argue that Greek forms of physicalism influenced Hilary's teaching. Those who do not believe Hilary was influenced by these Greek forms of physicalism deny, for this reason, that he could teach physicalism at all. Scholars such as Mersch, Malevez, and Lécuyer manifest the first trend. A look at the table of contents of Mersch's book will show that his treatment of Hilary takes place in Part II concerning the Greek Fathers, rather than in Part III on the Western tradition. He considers Hilary's theology to be on the Greek trajectory and basically that of Athanasius.[29] Malevez says that while Hilary is a Westerner, he is entirely nourished by Greek theology.[30] Lécuyer argues that the physicalist teaching of Christ's assumption of all humanity is extremely important in Hilary and manifests the influence of Athanasius and especially Irenaeus.[31] Wild is a representative of the opposite trend of denying Hilary's physicalism because of the lack of Greek influence. Wild is clear that direct Greek influence upon Hilary must be restricted to after his exile. Therefore, Wild applies an a priori

28 Harnack believes that physicalism's connection with Platonism necessarily makes it heterodox: "But a theological system constructed by the aid of Platonism could not fail at that time to become equally heterodox" (*History of Dogma*, vol. 3, 287). However, he also believes that physicalism is heterodox because salvation is no longer dependent on the individual will.

29 "Il reprend, sans qu'il l'ait su peut-être—mais qu'importe?—la théologie d'Athanase; il y ajoute même d'importants compléments, et ces compléments sont précisément ceux qu'on retrouvera plus tard chez Cyrille d'Alexandrie" (Mersch, *Corps mystique du Christ*, vol. 1, 341). Despite this fault, Mersch's book remains an excellent presentation of Hilary's understanding of Christ.

30 Leopold Malevez, "L'Église dans le Christ," *Recherches de science religieuse* 25 [1935]: 259: "Hilaire de Poitiers, Occidental tout nourri de théologie grecque. . . ."

31 Lécuyer, "Le sacerdoce royal," 307.

conclusion, based on Harnack, that Hilary's pre-exilic texts simply cannot manifest physicalism.[32]

Harnack's second claim, that physicalism is always indebted to Platonism, has led to a wide-spread assumption that if Hilary is a physicalist, he must be influenced by Platonism. Such is the argument of Jossua, Kelly, and Anyanwu. Jossua believes that Hilary is a physicalist and therefore the Platonism that is explicit in other physicalists must be implicit in Hilary. He argues that Hilary has a strong realism concerning the idea of all humanity present in Christ, and his formulas, despite being without any clear philosophical reference, must have a platonic foundation.[33] Kelly quotes Hilary's statement that "by taking a single flesh to himself [God] should inhabit flesh in its entirety,"[34] and explains that "The Platonic conception of human nature as a universal clearly lies in the background."[35] Anyanwu, in his 1983 monograph, also explicitly claims that Hilary's physicalism is dependent on Platonism.[36]

Harnack's third claim, that physicalism is heterodox, has had the deepest and yet most subtle effect on Hilary scholarship. For scholars after Harnack, physicalism, as a theological premise was tainted. I believe that a well-intentioned desire to "protect" Hilary's orthodoxy has motivated many Hilary scholars to deny or ignore the presence of physicalism in Hilary's teaching. A generous Hilary scholar was not inclined to try to find such an unwelcome theology in Hilary's works. Wild, for example, is explicit in his perception of the need to "defend" Hilary from too close a connection with the Greek Fathers and, especially, Platonism: "Saint Hilary teaches a doctrine similar to the 'physical' theory. He too has been accused of teaching the incarnation of the Word with human nature in general and has been defended in much the same fashion as his Eastern colleagues." In the footnote to this sentence, Wild outlines this defense as offered by J. Beumer: according to Beumer, Hilary's "theological ideas concerning the unity of man with Christ are of such a nature that they can be understood without the help of platonic philosophy." To which

---

32 Wild, *Divinization of Man*, 59. See Burns' discussion of Wild in *Christology in Hilary*, 98–103.

33 Jossua, *Salut: Incarnation ou mystère pascal*," 19.

34 *De Trin*. 2.5.

35 J.N.D. Kelly, *Early Christian Doctrines*, 5th ed. (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1977), 386.

36 Akannamdi Gerard Stephen Anyanwu, *Christological Anthropology in St. Hilary* says: "Apparently the holy Doctor, in this concept of the universality of Christ's body, follows the Platonic pre-comprehension of a universal nature, prescinding however from the pregnostic and gnostic notions of a hypothesized humanity and Church . . ." (97).

statement, Wild concludes: "From our study of Hilary we are inclined to agree wholeheartedly with Beumer."[37]

The number of scholars who present Hilary as a physicalist is steadily growing and this growth manifests the waning of Harnack's influence. Unlike the older generation, such as Mersch, Lécuyer, or Kelly, for whom Hilary's physicalism is only explainable as a result of the influence of Greek physicalism or Platonism, recent proponents of Hilary's physicalism make no assumptions about Hilary's dependency on Greek theology or philosophy. Pettorelli begins this new generation of Hilary scholars. In 1968 Pettorelli argues that the connection of physicalism with Platonism has complicated the study of physicalist theology.[38] Pettorelli highlights Mersch as a scholar who has interpreted Hilary's physicalism in light of Platonism. In the case of Hilary, Pettorelli believes that this connection is unwarranted and the search for philosophical influence on Hilary's teaching should center on the eclectic Stoicism presented by Cicero and Seneca. In 1981, Burns takes up Pettorelli's position and highlights conceptions within the secular Latin tradition, such as the varied understanding of *corpus*, which are more likely influences on Hilary's development of a physicalist soteriology.[39] Burns concludes "Hilary extends the use of traditional incarnational language to include all mankind. Christ takes up (*adsumere*) the whole of mankind. There is no need to appeal to Greek traditions to account for this concept in the Commentary."[40] While Pettorelli was concerned with the problematic connection between physicalism and Platonism that he traced back to Mersch, Burns highlights the connection of physicalism with heterodoxy that he traces back to Harnack and Ritschl, and even to Erasmus.[41] Two years later in 1983, Orazzo writes the first article dedicated to Hilary's physicalist premise of Christ's assumption of all humanity, wherein he validates both Pettorelli and Burns and places his work in the same trajectory.[42] While Pettorelli highlighted the problem of connecting physicalism with Platonism, and Burns highlighted the problem of its connections with heterodoxy, Orazzo focuses on the problem of connecting Hilary's physicalism with the theology of Greek physicalists such as Irenaeus, Athanasius, and

37 Wild, *Divinization of Man*, 58.

38 Pettorelli, "Le Thème de Sion," 213.

39 Burns, *Christology in Hilary*, 103–112.

40 Burns, *Christology in Hilary*, 135.

41 Burns, *Christology in Hilary*, 97–98.

42 Orazzo, "Ilario di Poitiers e la *universa caro*." Validation of Pettorelli on p. 409 and of Burns on p. 400.

Gregory of Nyssa.[43] He traces this problem back through Harnack and Ritschl to Coustant. Taken together, these three scholars highlight the problems that each of Harnack's three claims have introduced into Hilary scholarship.

In 1989, the study of Hilary's physicalism enters a new stage in which scholars no longer feel a need to refute or even mention the problematic history of assertions related to Hilary's physicalism. In this year, Ladaria explains Hilary's physicalist teaching of Christ's assumption of all humanity as an exegetical expansion of the Pauline Adam-Christ parallel.[44] While Ladaria cites Pettorelli, Burns, and Orazzo, he makes no mention of a scholarly controversy, nor the Harnack-derived claims of Platonism, Greek influence, or heterodoxy associated with Hilary's physicalist teaching.[45] Collauti's 2005 book on Hilary's ecclesiology likewise confidently asserts that the teaching of Christ's assumption of all humanity is one of the foundations of Hilary's ecclesiology, with no mention of a scholarly controversy and simply a reference to Orazzo and Ladaria.[46]

Excursus: Poor Scholarship has Fueled the Fire

Incorrect Reading of Erasmus Sets the Stage

The question of whether or not Hilary teaches a physicalist soteriology traces, according to Mersch, McMahon, and Burns, all the way back to Erasmus, who, they allege, charged Hilary's understanding of the incarnation with heterodoxy precisely because of its physicalism. However, this presentation of history is an instance of mistaken scholarship repeated from one scholar to another. Erasumus does critique Hilary but not on account of his physicalism.

In the 1523 preface to his edition on Hilary, Erasmus points out several passages in Hilary's works that teach ideas of questionable orthodoxy. One of these passages is from Book 8 of the *De Trinitate* and has to do with the unity between Christ and human beings. Erasmus says: "Among other places, in the eighth book of the *De Trinitate*, he [Hilary] defends with great vehemence that we also are one with the Son and the Father by nature, and not by adoption or consensus alone."[47] In the context of Erasmus' text, the critique is centered

43 Orazzo, "Ilario di Poitiers e la *universa caro*," 399–400.

44 Ladaria, "Adán y Cristo: Un motivo soteriológico del *In Matthaeum*."

45 For Ladaria's citation of Pettorelli, Burns, and Orazzo, see "Adán y Cristo: Un motivo soteriológico del *In Matthaeum*," 454–455 no. 31.

46 Colautti, *Las Figuras eclesiológicas*, 25 no. 56.

47 Erasmus, "Letter to John Carondelet," in *Opus epistolarum Des. Erasmi Roterodami*, vol. 5, 172–192, eds. P.S. Allen, H.M. Allen, and H.W. Garrod (Oxford: Oxford University Press,

upon Hilary's explanation in *De Trinitate* 8 of human unity with Christ in the Eucharist. Erasmus is worried that Hilary's explanation of the benefits of the Eucharist undermines a proper understanding of the Trinity. The pro-Nicene emphasis on *homoousios* demands that the union of Father and Son be understood to be on the level of nature and not merely on the level of will (i.e. consensus or adoption). The problem, according to Erasmus, is that Hilary argues that the Eucharist creates between humans and Christ the same sort of natural union as that which the Son shares with the Father. In Erasmus' eyes, Hilary does not properly differentiate between the consubstantiality of the Father and the Son and the union between humans and God that is obtained through partaking in the Eucharist. When Hilary says that humans obtain a natural union with God via the Eucharist, the result, according to Erasmus, is that he undermines the uniqueness of the relationship between the Father and Son and so lowers the Son to the level of any human being.

The scholarly confusion of Erasmus' critique finds its impetus in Coustant's edition of Hilary's works in 1693.[48] Coustant quotes the above citation from Erasmus and then proceeds to defend Hilary from the charge of heterodoxy. In the context of this defense Coustant provides a rebuttal to Erasmus that expands beyond the topic of the Eucharist.[49] Coustant argues that Hilary correctly says that humans have a natural union with the Father (though only mediately via the Son)[50] and they have this union not only by partaking in the Eucharist but also as a result of Christ's physical assumption of all humanity in the incarnation and human glorification in Christ's body.[51] I must note that

---

1924), 184.520–522: Et quum alias, tum libro De Trinitate octauo, magna contentione defendit, nos quoque cum Filio et Patre unum esse natura, non adoptione, neque consensu tantum.

48 Pierre Coustant, *Praefatio generalis* 76, PL 9 43B.

49 Coustant correctly highlights Erasmus' concern: Qua in censura dupliciter potissimum peccat, primo quod non attendens quid Hilarius *natura unum* definiat, de his vocabulis ex nostro usu dijudicet: deinde quod qua ratione cum Patre, qua cum Filio nos natura unum senserit, non distinguat (Coustant, *Praefatio generalis* 76, PL 9 43B–43C).

50 Coustant, *Praefatio generalis* 77, PL 9 43C–43D: Primum igitur observare juverit Hilarium non una ratione nos cum Patre et Filio, sed proxime cum Filio, eoque tantum mediante cum Patre natura unum dicere, quod ex sequentibus perspicuum fiet.

51 Coustant, *Praefatio generalis* 79, PL 9 44C–44D: Minus tamen ad Spiritum, quam ad corpus Christi rationem habet Hilarius, cum naturalem illam hominum cum Christo unitatem considerat. Ac sicut triplex quodam modo Christi corpus est, naturale videlicet, quod sumpsit ex Virgine; sacramentale, quod nobis in Eucharistia reliquit; et gloriosum, quod in coelum revexit: ita ex triplici illo capite nos cum Christo natura unum esse ostendit, dum et ille naturam nostram assumit in Incarnatione, et nos veram illius carnem

Coustant both believes that Hilary teaches that Christ assumes all humanity, and is concerned to demonstrate that Hilary does so in a way that participates in a fully orthodox patristic tradition.[52]

Coustant's train of thought connecting Erasmus' critique to Hilary's teaching of Christ's assumption of all humanity is applied backwards to Erasmus by scholars such as Mersch, McMahon, and Burns.[53] This is an awkward retrojection of Coustant's interpretation onto Erasmus, since what Coustant values, Erasmus supposedly criticizes. Burns cites the same quotation from Erasmus and offers this explanation: "Erasmus questioned the orthodoxy of Hilary for his alleged failure to distinguish Christ's union with his individual humanity from his union with all men."[54] This is an entirely misleading reading of Erasmus. Erasmus is worried that Hilary does not properly distinguish between the union of the Son with the Father and the union of both Son and Father with humanity, particularly as regards the Eucharist. However, Erasmus never mentions that Hilary does not specifically distinguish between the Son's union with his own proper humanity versus that with all humanity. While Coustant gives the impression that Erasmus has this concern, Erasmus' text manifests nothing of the sort. We must therefore conclude that the tradition of the critique ascribed to Erasmus by Mersch, McMahon, and Burns is false.

---

recipimus in sacramento Eucharistiae, ac demum eamdem, quam a Patre accepit, gloriam nobis retribuit in corporum reparatione. De triplici illa unitate singillatim agendum.

52 Coustant first quotes Gregory of Nyssa, Cyril of Alexandria, and Athanasius to conclude that there is a patristic tradition of teaching that Christ assumes all of humanity: Ob has locutiones videri possent sancti illi Patres existimasse, non singularem, sed universam generis humani naturam a Christo fuisse assumptam (*Praefatio generalis* 80, PL 9 45b–45C). He then quotes several passages from Hilary to argue that he also partakes in this tradition: Non obscura est ea de re Hilarii sententia (*Praefatio generalis* 81, PL 9 45C). Coustant begins with the supposition that Hilary's orthodoxy, as a doctor of the Church, is guaranteed: certe ab incerto in catholicum Ecclesiae doctorem ac defensorem praefractae haeresis suspicio nullo pacto injicienda erat (*Praefatio generalis* 6, PL 9 15B).

53 See Émile Mersch, *Corps mystique du Christ*, vol. 1, 347; John McMahon, *De Christo mediatore: Doctrina Sancti Hilarii Pictaviensis* (Mundelein: Pontificia Facultas Theologica seminarii sanctae Mariae ad Lacum, Dissertationes ad lauream 15, 1947), 9; Paul Burns, *Christology in Hilary*, 97.

54 Burns, *Christology in Hilary*, 97. Mersch similarly argues that Erasmus complained that Hilary went so far in teaching the union of the word with the whole human race that he lost sight of the incommunicable nature of the incarnation (Mersch, *Corps mystique du Christ*, vol. 1, 347). It is likely that Mersch is the source of Burns' mistake here.

Misinterpretations and Inaccuracies Regarding the Critique of Harnack and the German Liberal Protestants of the Nineteenth Century

Several Hilary scholars believe that Harnack and other German Protestants of the nineteenth century initiated a controversy that has shaped the study of Hilary's physicalism. However, one of the difficulties, both in ascertaining the influence of Harnack et al. on the study of physicalism in Hilary, and in moving beyond this influence, is that Hilary scholars consistently misreport the history and claims of this body of scholarship. I will begin with an accurate presentation of this history and then outline the misinterpretations and inaccuracies found in the histories given by Hilary scholars.

Beginning with Albrecht Ritschl in 1870,[55] then followed by Wilhelm Herrmann in 1875,[56] and Adolph von Harnack in 1889,[57] German Protestant scholars highlight a strand of soteriological thought among several Greek Fathers, most prominently Irenaeus, Athanasius, Gregory of Nyssa, and Cyril of Alexandria—as well as the Latin Hilary[58]—which they argue undermines a

55 Albrecht Ritschl, *A Critical History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation*, trans. H.R. Mackintosh and A.B. Macaulay (Edinburgh; T. and T. Clark, 1900), 8, 524. Ritschl, like Harnack, is concerned that the "mystical doctrine of reconciliation" views the redemption of the human race as a sort of chemical-physiological process and in so doing neglects the aspect of the will that is fundamental for an understanding of reconciliation. Thus, he says that the understanding of the title "redeemer" of Christ "in the period of patristic theology . . . received an erroneous, purely dramatic, thoroughly non-ethical application" (4).

56 See Wilhelm Herrmann, *Gregorii Nysseni sententiae de salute adipiscenda* (Halle, 1875), especially 27–37.

57 Adolph von Harnack, *History of Dogma*, vol. 3, 288–303. Harnack's explanation of the theology of Gregory of Nyssa is quite clear and often quoted: "Christ did not assume the human nature of an individual person, but human nature" (297). Harnack views Gregory's conception of this process of unity with the divine as problematic because it is strictly natural or physical rather than ethical.

58 For example, Ritschl, *Critical History*, 8: "Hilary of Poitiers enables us to see this kernel of the 'mystical-atonement doctrine,' as, generally speaking, the so-called mystical form of religious ideas is wont to rest upon the reduction of relations which pertain to the will, to the forms of a natural process." Though dealing ostensibly with Gregory of Nyssa, Herrmann also includes Hilary in his condemnation (Herrmann, *Gregorii Nysseni sententiae*, 30). This "Greek" understanding of the incarnation is, as Harnack argues, the source for the nearly identical teaching found in Hilary: Harnack, *History of Dogma*, vol. 3, 301: "The thought that Christ assumed the general concept of humanity occurs, though mingled with distinctive ideas, in Hilary, who was dependent on Gregory [of Nyssa]." The historical impossibility of Hilary being dependent upon Gregory, who was not raised to

correct understanding of salvation.[59] They attribute to these Fathers a theory of universal incarnation that views redemption as an automatic physical transformation, resulting from Christ's assumption and redemption of the general nature of the human race. These nineteenth century Germans view this understanding of redemption as wrong, for by eliminating any idea of moral transformation and, thus, reconciliation with God, it entails neither justification nor sanctification. Furthermore, Harnack adds an important point to this nineteenth century critique of Greek physicalist doctrine. He introduces the idea that this Christian "heterodoxy" is the result of Platonic influence.[60] Christ's assumption of all humanity, he says, is understood by the Greek Fathers as Christ's assumption of the Platonic idea or form of humanity, that is, a universal or generic humanity.

However, the report of these nineteenth century critiques offered by Hilary scholars is filled with misinterpretations and inaccuracies. The critiques advanced by these nineteenth century theologians are discussed by Karl Holl,[61]

---

his see until after Hilary's death, has done little to dissipate the force of Harnack's charge. See also, Joseph Tixeront, *History of Dogmas*, vol. 2, trans. Henry. L. Brianceau (St. Louis: Herder, 1914), 292.

59 Several scholars have come to the defense of each of the Fathers named in this nineteenth century critique, seeking to show that this attribution of heresy is unwarranted. This work of defense was begun by the German theologians Karl Holl, *Amphilochius von Ikoniumin* (1904), 222–225; and Johann Lenz, *Jesus-Christus nach der Lehre des hl. Gregor von Nyssa* (Trier: Verlag der Paulinus Druckerei, 1925), 84–87. For example, Gross' work on Athanasius and Gregory of Nyssa and Malevez's work on Nyssa and Cyril of Alexandria have shown that these Fathers did posit and lend importance to the individual humanity of Christ (see Jules Gross, *La Divinisation du chrétien d'après les Pères grecs* [Paris: J. Gabalda, 1938]; and Malevez, "L'Église dans le Christ," 257–297).

There has been a similar defense on Hilary's behalf. For example, Beumer says that the assumption of the whole of humanity in Hilary's work should not be understood as if Christ did not have an individual human nature. Beumer argues that it is a misapprehension of Hilary's teaching to say that Hilary asserts that Christ only has a general nature, which is identical to the totality of all men (J. Beumer, "De eenheid der menschen met Christus in de theologie van den H. Hilarius van Poitiers," *Bijdragen tijdschrift voor philosophie en theologie* 5 [1942]: 154).

60 For example, see Harnack, *History of Dogma*, vol. 3, 295–296: "... his [Athanasius'] doctrinal ideas could only be held on the basis of Platonism. This is at once clear in the case of Gregory of Nyssa, who in some points strengthened the expositions given by Athanasius."

61 Karl Holl, *Amphilochius von Ikonium in seinem Verhältnis zu den grossen Kappadoziern* (Tübingen and Leipzig: J.C.B. Mohr, 1904), 222–225.

John McMahon,[62] Jean-Pierre Jossua,[63] and Burns.[64] For example, Holl says that Ritschl follows Herrmann—despite Herrmann's quotations of Ritschl's earlier works. Nearly all McMahon's citations of the German theologians being discussed are incomplete or incorrect. Burns, clearly following the work of Jossua, though with a discussion which is far inferior to his source, cites, as does Jossua, Ritschl's entire volume, though Ritschl's discussion of this matter is limited to a very few pages. Burns also seems to misinterpret the thrust of the German critique, believing it to be centered around ecclesiological ramifications, rather than seeing that it is an automatic physical redemption separated from any notion of the individual will that is feared. In addition, both Mersch and McMahon include Dorner in the list of scholars accusing Hilary of teaching that Christ assumes a general human nature.[65] However, Dorner explicitly says the opposite: "the Maurinist [Coustant] is right when he denies that Hilarius held Christ to have assumed merely the general nature of the human race, and not an individual human nature."[66]

The Dominant Paradigm of Accepting Hilary's Physicalism Lacks an Argued Rationale for Its Rejection of Harnack

The recent stage of Hilary scholarship manifests that acceptance of Hilary's physicalism has become the dominant scholarly paradigm. Furthermore, this paradigm now assumes—with no mention of the large body of previous scholarship that speaks the contrary—that Hilary's physicalism is neither heterodox nor dependent on the theology of Greek physicalists or Platonism. In doing so, it demonstrates that Harnack and his three claims regarding physicalism no longer influence the course of Hilary scholarship. Nevertheless, despite this scholarly acceptance of Hilary's physicalism, there is, as yet, no book length study on the subject. This book is intended to fill this lacuna.

However, in the waning of Harnack's influence within Hilary scholarship and the elimination of the power of his three claims, an important step has been bypassed. While Hilary scholars no longer believe that his physicalism is dependent on Greek physicalism or Platonism, no scholar has offered an

62 McMahon, *De Christo Mediatore*, 80–85.

63 Jossua, *Salut: Incarnation ou mystère pascal*, 13–44.

64 Burns, *Christology in Hilary*, 97–101.

65 Mersch, *Corps Mystique du Christ*, 348; and McMahon, *De Christo Mediatore*, 9.

66 Isaak August Dorner, *History of the Development of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ*, vol. 2, trans. D.W. Simon (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1889), 543.

argument disproving this influence. The result of this omission is that modern scholarship outside of the field of Hilary studies continues to regard Platonism as essential for understanding physicalism. For example, two recent dictionary entries present physicalism as dependent on Platonism. Francis Schüssler Fiorenza in the 1987 *New Dictionary of Theology*, says of the Greek or physical theory that "in connection with the Platonic doctrine of universals, this tradition views human nature as a concrete universal in which humans participate."[67] In the 2005 *Encyclopedia of Christian Theology*, Raymond Schwager distinguishes between mystical and atonement redemption models and characterizes these as models from the first or the second millennium of Christianity respectively, rather than as Eastern and Western. Of the mystical (i.e. physicalist) model of the first millennium, he says: "Theologians of the first millennium emphasized the divine efficacy by understanding salvation first from the incarnation and including by way of analogy—against a Platonist background—the whole of humankind in the humanity of Christ."[68] The Harnack paradigm still has life outside the field of Hilary scholarship.

In Chapter 3 I will provide an evaluation of the influences—Greek, Latin, philosophical, and theological—on Hilary's development of the physicalist premise of Christ's assumption of all humanity. Within this evaluation I will provide the rationale for the dismissal of the Harnackian claims of Hilary's dependence on Greek physicalism and Platonism. If Hilary is to be classified among the Greek Fathers as a proponent of physicalist doctrine, this classification is only true insofar as his teaching resembles theirs. Besides Scripture itself and contact with Greco-Roman philosophy widely understood, Hilary does not share the particular theological and philosophical heritage of the Greek physicalists. A proper study of the sources of Hilary's physicalism can provide the needed corrective to a wider field of scholarship.

---

67 Francis Schüssler Fiorenza, "Redemption" in the *New Dictionary of Theology*, eds. Joseph A. Komonchak, Mary Collins, Dermot A. Lane (Wilmington, DE: Michael Glazier, 1987), 841.

68 Raymond Schwager, "Salvation" in the *Encyclopedia of Christian Theology*, vol. 3, ed. Jean-Yves Lacoste, (New York: Routledge, 2005), 1426.

CHAPTER 2

Hilary's Use of Language and Rhetoric

In the previous chapter, I showed that the history of Hilary scholarship manifests disagreement on whether or not Hilary participates in what was perceived to be the Greek trajectory of physicalism. While this disagreement is, in recent years, settling in favor of reading Hilary as a physicalist, there remains a significant body of recent scholarship on Hilary's soteriology that ignores, or even denies, the physicalist nature of Hilary's soteriology.[1] For those scholars who deny that Hilary is a physicalist, there is a historical tradition of reading Hilary's statements in a spiritual or metaphorical way. The question is: what does Hilary really intend to convey when he says that Christ assumes all humanity? In this chapter, I will analyze Hilary's use of language and rhetoric to argue that a metaphorical reading of Hilary's statements is not what Hilary intended. These statements should be read as asserting the real, physical presence of humans in Christ's body.

Unfortunately for us, Hilary never offers explicit instruction to his readers as to how to interpret his statements. As a result, the Hilary scholar needs to apply various criteria to ascertain the best interpretation. In this interpretive enterprise, there are appropriate and inappropriate criteria. There are two main categories of appropriate criteria for determining the correct interpretation of Hilary's statements: intertextual and extra-textual. Inappropriate criteria are also extra-textual but tend to be guided by inadequate historical information, confessional assumptions, or anachronistic readings.

The first appropriate interpretive criteria derives from intertextual comparison, which should be accomplished on two levels: that of language and that of theology. On the level of language there are two methodological criterion, both of which are the subject of this chapter. First, the interpretation of individual statements concerning Christ's assumption of all humanity is best accomplished through a comparison with other similar statements. This process of mutual interpretation provides a broader context for clarifying the intended meaning of phrases such as "nature of the assumed body," "nature of flesh," "nature of all human kind," or "nature of all flesh." Second, Hilary's education in rhetoric leads him to use classical rhetorical devices to signal when he desires his readers to apply a metaphorical interpretation. His use or non-use of these devices surrounding his statements concerning Christ's assumption of

1 For example Wild, Pelland, Anyanwu, Doignon, and Buffer. See Chapter 1 for a fuller treatment of the state of Hilary scholarship.

© KONINKLIJKE BRILL NV, LEIDEN, 2015 | DOI 10.1163/9789004290815_004

all humanity is a good indication of the intended interpretation. On the level of theology, a hermeneutic of coherence should be applied wherein the most valid interpretation of Hilary's statements concerning Christ's assumption of all humanity is the interpretation that is the most logically consistent and cohesive with Hilary's wider theology. An interpretation of Hilary's statements that comes into conflict with, or renders incoherent, other aspects of Hilary's theology should be discounted. The hermeneutic of coherence is the method undergirding the presentation of Hilary's theology in Chapters 5 through 9.

Second, there are extra-textual criteria that can clarify the meaning of Hilary's statements concerning Christ's assumption of all humanity. For example, as I will demonstrate in Chapter 3, Hilary's use of sources can shed light on his intended meaning. Chapter 4 analyzes Hilary's soteriology in light of a definition of the essential aspects of any physicalist soteriology as well as with regard to atonement soteriology to demonstrate that Hilary's participation in other soteriological models remains dependent on a foundation of physicalism.

Finally, the use of inappropriate interpretive criteria obscures rather than illumines the proper interpretation of Hilary's theology. In the previous chapter I highlighted the scholarly use of the criterion offered by Harnack that physicalism is a sign of heterodox dependence on Platonism. This Harnackian criterion is inappropriate for several reasons. First, it is based on inaccurate historical information that, for example, posits that Hilary had intimate knowledge both of Greek Platonism and of Cappadocian theology, when neither was available to him. Second, both Ritschl and Harnack criticized physicalism on explicitly confessional grounds: namely that physicalism presupposes a unity with the divine that is physical rather than ethical. The confessional conviction underlying the Harnackian criteria results in the importation of anachronistic theological conceptions—such as justification by faith alone—into the patristic witness.

What Does Hilary Mean by the Assumption of All Humanity?

One of the difficulties is assessing Hilary's soteriological teaching—whether he does indeed present a physicalist model of redemption, and how exactly he may do so—is that Hilary does not use any single set phrase to introduce this idea in his writings. Rather he speaks about the same idea of Christ's assumption of all humanity with a wide variety of terminology.[2]

2 Rondeau's study of the ambiguity of Hilary's use of *noster* (as in the assumption of "our" flesh or "our" body) is an excellent example of the application of the methodological criterion

I want to begin by gathering a few of Hilary's references to Christ's assumption of all humanity from all three of his major works. Notice how Hilary employs different vocabulary each time.

1) He calls the flesh that he had assumed a city because, as a city consists of a variety and multitude of inhabitants, so there is contained in him, through the nature of the assumed body, a certain assembly of the whole human race. And thus he becomes a city from our assembly in him and we become the dwelling of this city through consort with his flesh.[3]
2) He contains in himself the nature of us all through the assumption of the flesh.[4]
3) Having become man of a virgin, he took the nature of flesh to himself; and through the association of this commingling, the body of the whole human race was sanctified in him, so that . . . all are brought together in him by the fact that he wished to have a body . . .[5]

I use here, namely that the interpretation of individual statements concerning Christ's assumption of all humanity is best accomplished through a comparison with other similar statements in Hilary's works. Rondeau's linguistic study leads to the same conclusion as mine: "l'*adsumptio nostra* est assomption d'une humanité singulière et, dans celle-ci, de toute l'humanité" (Rondeau, *Les Commentaires patristiques*, vol. 2, 364).

3 *In Matt.* 4.12 (SC 254 130.3–9): Ciuitatem carnem quam adsumpserat nuncupat, quia, ut ciuitas ex uarietate ac multitudine consistit habitantium, ita in eo per naturam suscepti corporis quaedam uniuersi generis humani congregatio continetur. Atque ita et ille ex nostra in se congregatione fit ciuitas et nos per consortium carnis suae sumus ciuitatis habitatio. All Latin quotations of the *In Matthaeum* are taken from the 2 volume Sources Chretiennes edition edited by Jean Doignon published in 1978 and 1979 (SC 254, 258). The first volume contains chapters 1–13, the second volume 14–33.

Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own. My style of translation is literal in order to make, as much as possible, the English transparent to the Latin, so that the reader can see through my translation to Hilary's own words. Whenever possible, I have translated important Latin terms consistently with the same word into English.

4 *De Trin.* 11.16 (CCL 62A 544.1–2): Ipse autem uniuersitatis nostrae in se continens ex carnis adsumptione naturam . . . All Latin quotations of the *De Trinitate* are taken from the 2 volume critical edition edited by Pieter Smulders in the *Corpus Christianorum Series Latina* published in 1979 and 1980 (CCL 62, 62A). The first volume contains Books 1–7, the second Books 8–12.

5 *De Trin* 2.24 (CCL 62 60.6–10): ut homo factus ex virgine naturam in se carnis acciperet, perque hujus admixtionis societatem sancficatum in eo universi generis humani corpus existeret: ut . . . omnes in se per id quod corporeum se esse voluit conderentur . . .

4) . . . *the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us*, indeed assuming into himself the nature of all humanity.[6]
5) He assumed into himself the nature of all flesh, through which, having been made *the true vine*, he held in himself the origin of all *branches*.[7]

The first quotation declares that the "nature of the assumed body" contains, as a "city," an "assembly of the whole human race." In the second, Hilary says that Christ contains the "nature of us all." Third, when Christ takes the "nature of flesh," "all are brought together in him." Fourth, Christ assumes the "nature of all humanity." Lastly, he assumes the "nature of all flesh."

Certainly, nearly all of the phrases above—such as the "nature of the assumed body," "nature of flesh," "nature of all human kind," or "nature of all flesh"—could signal an understanding of the incarnation in which Christ takes a particular humanity that is singular. Hilary does not have any stock phrase that unquestionably demands a physicalist reading.

Nevertheless, the quotations above demonstrate that Hilary often, but not always, clarifies phrases like the "nature of flesh" in the surrounding context of the sentence. In the first quotation Hilary compares Christ's flesh to a city because the assumption of the "nature of the assumed body" allows Christ's body to contain within itself an "assembly of the whole human race." In comparing Christ's body with a city, Hilary is demanding that the reader understand the incarnation as something more than Christ's assumption of a particular humanity that is singular. Christ's individual humanity somehow contains all humanity in itself just as a city has a multitude of inhabitants. In the third quotation the "nature of flesh" that Christ assumes via his birth from Mary is presented as parallel and synonymous with the "body of the whole human race" in which "all are brought together in him." Again Hilary is careful to demonstrate that the incarnation brings about the presence of the multiplicity of humanity in Christ's body.

---

6 *Tr. ps.* 51.17 (CCL 61 104.5–6): . . . quia *Verbum caro factum est et inhabitauit in nobis*, naturam scilicet in se totius humani generis adsumens. . . . All Latin quotations of the *Tractatus super Psalmos* are taken from the 3 volume critical edition by Jean Doignon in the *Corpus Christianorum Series Latina* published in 1997, 2002, and 2009 (CCL 61, 61A, 61B). The first volume contains the *Instructio Psalmorum* and Psalms 1–41, the second volume Psalm 118, and the final volume covers Psalms 119–150.

7 *Tr. ps.* 51.16 (CCL 61 104.20–22): . . . naturam in se uniuersae carnis adsumpsit, per quam effectus *uera uitis* genus in se uniuersae *propaginis* tenet.

Scholarly consensus agrees that Hilary does say that in the incarnation, Christ assumes the multiplicity of all humans in his incarnate body. While a casual observer might think that Hilary is speaking only about the assumption of a *complete* humanity (body and soul) rather than *all* humanity (every human being), no scholar has made that mistake.

Where the scholarly consensus breaks down is not whether Hilary *says* that Christ assumes all humanity but whether he really *means* that Christ assumes all of humanity. One of the difficulties of Hilary's teaching that Christ assumes all humanity is that, frankly, it seems quite impossible to the modern reader. Hilary never addresses the question of how all individuals can exist in Christ's body, nor does he clarify how humans can be both in Christ's body and have their own bodies. It does not make sense to modern readers to say that all individuals who ever were, are, or will be, existed physically in Christ's incarnate body. Because such a thing seems impossible, and because Hilary provides no philosophical justification, many scholars come to the conclusion that Hilary must be speaking metaphorically when he says that Christ assumes all humanity. In the next section, I will address the question of whether Hilary intends his assertion that Christ assumes all humanity to be taken literally.

Hilary's Use of Non-Metaphorical Rhetoric to Speak of Christ's Assumption of All Humanity

When Hilary speaks of Christ's assumption of all humanity in the incarnation, he never explicitly directs the reader as to how to interpret these statements. As a result, there is scholarly disagreement on this issue: a large body of Hilary scholarship argues for a metaphorical interpretation of Hilary's statements concerning Christ's assumption of all humanity. This question of interpretation is a question of rhetoric. When Hilary speaks of Christ's assumption of all humanity, is he speaking metaphorically? Hilary was classically trained and has the rhetorical knowledge and skills to speak metaphorically following the guidelines laid out in the classical handbook on rhetoric, the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*. Hilary, as we shall see, knows and uses the technical terms used in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* to designate metaphor. However, when Hilary speaks about Christ's assumption of all humanity, either he uses the technical terms in a way that rejects their classical metaphorical usage—taking his cues instead from the doctrinal debates of his day and from Scripture—or he refrains from using such terms at all. Hilary's avoidance of the classical rhetoric to signal metaphor when he speaks of Christ's assumption of all humanity is deliberate.

The *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, along with Cicero's incomplete *De Inventione*, is one of the oldest surviving Latin books on rhetoric, dating from 86–82 BC. It was formerly ascribed to Cicero, but is now attributed to an unknown author. The *Rhetorica ad Herennium* designates several technical terms in the rhetorical artifice of metaphor. For example, *similitudo* is used as an equivalent term to *simile* (and the adjective *similis*), and both introduce a fictional comparison done for the sake of embellishment.[8] However, while Hilary demonstrates his ability to employ the technical terminology of rhetoric in line with the rhetorical guidelines, he moves away from these guidelines in the fields of soteriology and Trinitarian theology, and employs the terms *simile/similis* and *similitudo* to signify a real, divinely ordained, rather than metaphorical, connection. By the time of both the *De Trinitate* and the *Tractatus super Psalmos*, Hilary largely reserves *similitudo* to speak of only two things: the relationship between the Father and the Son and the relationship between God and humans.[9]

Hilary's use of *simile/similis* shows his appropriation of the classical guidelines of metaphorical rhetoric. According to the *Rhetorica ad Herennium, simile/similis* designates a fictional comparison done for the sake of embellishment. In his study on comparison in ancient rhetoric Marsh McCall argues that in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, the words *similitudo* and *simile/similis* are used for a type of comparison that effects an artificial resemblance between two things that do not share a natural resemblance.[10] In the *Instructio* of the *Tractatus super Psalmos*, Hilary introduces a metaphor in which he says that

8 For the equivalency of *similitudo* and *simile*, see McCall, *Ancient Rhetorical Theories*, 77. For the purpose of *similitudo* in rhetorical argumentation, see *Rhetorica ad Herennium* 4.45–59: Similitudo est oratio traducens ad rem quampiam aliquid ex re dispari simile. Ea sumitur aut ornandi causa aut probandi aut apertius dicendi aut ante oculos ponendi.

9 Out of the 13 times Hilary uses *similitudo* in the *In Matthaeum*, 11 of them are rhetorical uses to designate figurative language. Out of the 40 times Hilary uses *similitudo* in the *De Trinitate*, all 40 are in reference to the relationship between the Father and the Son or that between God and humans, and are influenced by the place of *similitudo* in Gen. 1:26. Out of the 33 times Hilary uses *similitudo* in the *Tractatus super Psalmos*, 7 of those are simply rhetorical designations of figurative illustration, while 26 are related to the relationships of Father and Son and God and humanity. We can notice three things from these numbers. First, early in his career, Hilary does not reserve *similitudo* for any special use as he does later in his career. Second, scriptural prompts occasionally encourage Hilary to use *similitudo* to designate figurative illustration. However, without the prompt of Scripture, Hilary reserves *similitudo* to speak of the relationships of Father and Son and God and humanity. Third, Hilary's contact with the homoiousians and engagement in Eastern Trinitarian polemic during his exile introduce him to the use of *similitudo* as a technical term with doctrinal, not merely rhetorical, weight.

10 McCall, *Ancient Rhetorical Theories*, 86.

the book of the Psalms "is entirely similar (*similis*) to a large and beautiful city with many different buildings."[11] Hilary extends this metaphor to show that there are different ways of interpreting each section of the Psalms, just as there are different keys for different buildings. The relationship between the book of the Psalms and a city is not a natural relationship, rather it is an artificial relationship constructed by Hilary to make a rhetorical point. Hilary also recognizes *similitudo* as a term of rhetorical embellishment used to effect an artificial resemblance when he labels Psalm 65's artificial comparison between the purification of silver by fire and the sufferings of believers as *similitudo*.[12] We see here that Hilary is quite familiar and adept with the classical use of *similis* and *similitudo* to designate a fictional comparison done for the sake of embellishment.

However, Hilary begins to break with the guidelines of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* as a result of his appropriation of the scriptural use of *similitudo* in Genesis 1:26, which he cites as "Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostrum."[13] Here *similitudo* cannot be an artificial comparison created by humans because it is the real relationship between the Father and the Son ("*our* likeness") and between God and humans effected by God himself.[14] As a result, in the context of both Trinitarian theology and soteriology, Hilary purposely does not use *similitudo* according to the classical rhetorical usage outlined in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*.

Like the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, Hilary considers *simile/similis* and *similitudo* to be synonymous. The result of Hilary's combination of the conventions of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* and Genesis' use of *similitudo* is that Hilary uses both *simile/similis* and *similitudo* in two distinct—and nearly opposite—ways: both terms may signal either an artificial metaphor or the most real, divinely ordained, connection possible.

---

11 *Tr. ps. Instr*. 24 (CCL 62 18.3–5): Nam liber omnis similis est urbi pulchrae atque magnae, cui plures aedes diuersaeque sint . . . For a study of Hilary's comparison between the psalms and a city, and its dependence upon Origen, see Paul Burns, *A Model for the Christian Life: Hilary of Poitiers' Commentary on the Psalms* (Washington D.C: Catholic University of America Press, 2012), 60–65, 69–71. Burns' conclusion is that *Tr. ps. Instr*. 24 offers "verifiable contact" (71) with Origen's commentaries on the Psalms. For the text of the passages of both Origen and Hilary, see Goffinet, *L'Utilisation d'Origène*, 33–36.

12 *Tr. ps*. 65.20 (CCL 61 246.9–11): Sed quae tandem comparationis similitudo est: *examinatos eos igni, sicut examinatur argentum*?

13 See *De Trin.* 3.23, 4.17, 4.18, and 5.7; *Tr. ps*. 118 iod 4 and 6, 118 resch 10, and 129.4.

14 The same argument can easily be made for *imago*. Humans are made in both the *similitudo* and the *imago* of God. Therefore, Hilary's usage of *imago* follows along the same lines as his usage of *similitudo*.

Furthermore, the polemical weight of the terminology of *similitudo* and *similis* in the Trinitarian sphere has two effects on Hilary's usage of these terms. First, it primes Hilary to use *similitudo* as a doctrinal rather than a rhetorical term (in line with the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*). Second, it reinforces Hilary's two-fold use of this terminology. The language of similarity is present in the argumentation of both the homoians and the homoiousians. During his exile, Hilary joined forces with Basil of Ancyra and the homoiousians against the homoians, and appropriated many aspects of homoiousian Trinitarian argumentation into his own framework.[15] The homoians use the language of likeness in a negative sense to insist on the distinction between Father and Son and argue against an understanding of unity, identity, or sameness of nature.[16] In other words, the homoians use the language of likeness to insist on unlikeness.

On the contrary, the homoiousians use the language of likeness in a positive sense to declare true similarity. Jeffrey Steenson has demonstrated that the homoiousians viewed the language of sameness, namely *homoousios*, as applying only to relationships based on sexual reproduction between material creatures.[17] Identity of substance is attained via the procreative process. Therefore while men can be *homoousios* with one another, Christ cannot be *homoousios* with humans (because of the virgin birth) nor can the Son be *homoousios* with the Father (because his "procreation" did not follow the natural generative process).[18] For the homoiousians, the language of similarity does admit of a distinction—it is of the nature of spiritual substances to remain always distinct[19]—but the thrust of the language of similarity applied to Father and Son is to show that these two spiritual substances are as closely joined as possible.

In the Trinitarian sphere, Hilary follows the homoiousian use of the language of similarity to express a close relationship of equality and identity between the Father and the Son:

---

15 Weedman has done the most to elucidate Hilary's debt to Basil of Ancyra and the homoiousians (Mark Weedman, *Trinitarian Theology of Hilary of Poitiers*, Supplements to Vigliliae Christianae 89 [Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2007]).

16 Hilary realizes at Seleucia that the homoian ("anomian") employment of *similis* to describe the relationship of the Father and the Son is not, as he had earlier thought, equivalent to *homoousios*, but rather to *disimilis*. See Williams, "Anti-Arian Campaigns," 8–9.

17 Jeffrey Steenson, "Basil of Ancryra on the Meaning of Homoousios," in *Arianism: Historical and Theological Reassessments*, ed. Robert Gregg (Philadelphia: Philadelphia Patristic Foundations, 1985), 272–273.

18 Steenson, "Basil of Ancryra on the Meaning of Homoousios," 269–270.

19 Steenson, "Basil of Ancryra on the Meaning of Homoousios," 273.

> But the equality of his [the Son's] particular character does not lead to any insult, because that which is similar (*simile*) to him [the Father] is his and that which is compared to him [the Father] on account of its likeness (*similitudinem*) is from him.[20]

Hilary's reading of Gen. 1:26 gives him the license to use *similitudo*—even apart from the context of Genesis—as a term to signify to unity, identity, and equality of the Father and Son.[21] Unlike the homoiousians, Hilary does not

---

20 *De Trin.* 7.26 (CCL 62 292.25–36): Aduero non habet contumeliam proprietatis aequalitas, quia suum est quod sui simile est, et ex se est quod sibi ad similitudinem conparatur, nec extra se est quod quae sua sunt potest, et profectus dignitatis est genuisse potestatem nec alienasse naturam.

21 For this use of *similis* and *similitudo* with reference to Gen. 1, see, for example, *De Trin.* 3.23 (CCL 62 96.21–27): Non enim aliunde est quod in omnibus simile est, neque diuersitatem duobus admisceri alterius ad alterum similitudo permittit. Ne similia permutes, neque sibi ex ueritate indiscreta disiungas: quia qui dixit: *Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram*, inuicem esse sui similes in eo quod *similitudinem nostram* dicat ostendit. *De Trin.* 4.18 (CCL 62 121.18–122.23): Adque ita Deus ad communem sibi cum Deo imaginem adque eandem similitudinem hominem repperitur operari, ut nec solitudinis intellegentiam significatio efficientis admittat, nec diuinitatis diuersitatem ad eandem imaginem ac similitudinem constituta patiatur operatio. *Tr. ps.* 144.3 (CCL 61B 269.3–4): . . . ex substantiae similitudine ac proprietate naturae alter in altero sit et ambo unum sint. . . .

For other examples of *substantia* and *natura* being used interchangeably, see *Tr. ps.* 122.7 (CCL 61B 39.19–20): . . . non dissimili scilicet aut differente a se substantia diuinitatis in utroque. *Tr. ps.* 131.22 (CCL 61B 127.5–15): At quomodo intelligitur, *Ponam super sedem meam*, et: *Sedebunt super sedem tuam*, nisi quod per concordem et non dissimilem a se innascibilis unigenitique naturam et Pater in Filio, et Filius in Patre est deitatis in utroque nec genere nec uoluntate dissidente substantia; cum paternae majestatis gloria Unigenito congenita sit? Atque ob id sedem Filii, *sedem suam* Pater nuncupat: quia et ex se et in gloria indemutabilis diuinitatis suae unigenitus et uerus Deus natus sit nec contumeliam communicatarum cum eo sedium sentiat, cui ex se genito in naturae similitudine nulla diuersitas est. *Tr. ps.* 138.17 (CCL 61B 201.15–202.22): Est enim maior Pater Filio, sed ut pater Filio, generatione, non genere: Filius enim est, et ex eo exiuit. Et licet paternae nuncupationis proprietas differat, tamen natura non differt. Natus enim a Deo Deus non dissimilis est a gignente substantia. Non potest ergo ad eum ex quo est. Nam quamuis alter in altero per uniformem ac similem eiusdem naturae gloriam maneat, tamen ei ex quo genitus est non exaequari in eo uidetur posse, quod genuit. *Tr. ps.* 138.35 (CCL 61B 212.17–21): Est namque genitus ex eo, non est in eo nouae creationis aliena natura. Virtute filius est, diuinitate filius est, substantia filius est, generatione filius est. Opera testantur, potestates loquuntur per naturae progeniem in Filio Patrem esse, et per legitimae originis substantiam Filium in Patre esse.

limit *homoousios* to material creatures with the result that Hilary interprets *homoiousios* as meaning the same thing as *homoousios*: Hilary argues that similarity implies the lack of any difference.[22]

Hilary, the homoians, and the homoiousians all use *similitudo* in a distinctively Christian, as opposed to classically rhetorical, fashion because they all consider *similitudo* a word that signals a real, natural, divinely-ordained, connection, as opposed to an artificial, human-constructed, connection. *Similitudo* has so much weight in fourth century Trinitarian polemics because it is considered a word that has real, as opposed to metaphorical, force.

In the Trinitarian sphere Hilary argues for a univocal meaning of *similitudo*—as signifiying a positive relationship of unity—against the other meaning of dissimilarity posited by the homoians. However, in the context of christology and soteriology, Hilary continues to use *similitudo* as a word that signals a natural, divinely-ordained (and non-metaphorical) connection, but he now gives *similitudo* a multivalent definition that emphasizes both likeness and difference.

In his use of *similitudo* in the soterioloigcal sphere, Hilary distances himself from the homoiousians. While the homoiousians would not apply *homoousios* to explain the relationship of the Father and Son because they believed *homoousios* can only apply to material creatures while *homoiousios* is the proper term for immaterial creatures, nevertheless they apply *homoiousios* not only to the immaterial relationship of Father and Son but also to the material relationship between Christ's human nature and the rest of humanity.[23] In this soteriological use of *homoiousios*, the homoiousians use the language of likeness with a univocal meaning, just as they did in the Trinitarian sphere, to signify positive identity.[24]

In the context of christology and soteriology, Hilary applies a multivalent use of *similitudo* that he again derives from the context of Scripture. *Similitudo* appears again in Scripture at Philippians 2:7, when Christ is said to come in the *similitudo* of human flesh. In a complicated passage from *De Trinitate* 10.25–26,

---

22 *De Synodis* 74 (PL 10 529A): Ita similitudo proprietas est, proprietas aequalitas est, et aequalitas nihil differt. See also *De Synodis* 76–77.

23 Weedman, "Martyrdom and Docetism," 25.

24 George of Laodicea says that Christ's flesh is identical to human flesh but is properly called similar (*homoiousios*) rather than identical (*homoousios*) because Christ's conception of Mary was not the result of sexual intercourse (Epiphanius, *Panarion* 73.17.4; Karl Holl and Jürgen Dummer, eds. *Epiphanius*, vol. 3, Die Griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten Jahrhunderte [Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1985], 291). See the discussion in Weedman, "Martyrdom and Docetism," 25.

Hilary makes a nuanced argument concerning the relationship between Christ and the rest of humanity based on his interpretation of the term *similitudo*.[25] On the one hand, Christ's birth demonstrates that he is a true man, with true flesh. On the other hand, his birth from a virgin guarantees that he is not touched by sin, meaning that he is a man different from other men, and he has flesh different from sinful flesh.[26] In this argument, *similitudo* has both a positive and a negative use. On the one hand, s*imilitudo* positively describes real likeness, and even identity: this is Hilary's meaning when he says Christ's birth is in the *similitudo* of human nature.[27] On the other hand Hilary uses *similitudo* negatively when he wants to emphasize that this "likeness" entails real difference. For example, Hilary says that Christ's flesh "is in the *similitudo* of sinful flesh, rather than itself sinful flesh."[28] In this case, *similitudo* does point out a real distinction: Christ's flesh is not *sinful* flesh.

Similitudo plays a nuanced role in Hilary's christology and soteriology. Hilary wants to identify the flesh of Christ with that of humans so that the flesh of Christ can contain all humanity; however, Christ's flesh, precisely in order to contain all of humanity, must be true human flesh unmarred by sins (and so unlike the flesh of sinful humanity).

Similitudo is a key term for Hilary's soteriological argument, for *similitudo* holds both likeness and difference together and allows Hilary to argue that in fact it is the difference between Christ and humanity (Christ does not have sinful flesh) that allows for the likeness and even identity between Christ and

---

25 In the course of this explanation, Hilary explains, again following the language of Paul (in Phil. 3:21), that Christ, in the incarnation, is receiving the form of a slave. *Forma* like *similis and similitudo* carries a double connotation in Hilary's usage. For the most part, Hilary uses *forma* to refer not to nature but to the fundamental condition of the respective natures, that is, glory, power and majesty for the *forma dei*, humility and infirmity for the *forma serui*. In this way, when Christ takes on the *forma serui*, the condition of humility which it entails is incompatible with the condition of glory which is the *forma dei*: he must empty himself of the *forma dei*, that is, estrange himself from the paternal glory. Hilary also, however, uses *forma dei* or *forma serui* to refer to the divine or human nature as such. When Hilary uses *forma* in this way, he maintains that even in his emptying, Christ never loses the *forma dei*, that is the nature of God. Though the Son can empty himself of divine glory, he can never empty himself of his divine nature.

26 For this reason, when he speaks of the "likeness of flesh," Hilary always clarifies that it is a "likeness to *sinful* flesh." See, for example, *De Trin*. 10.25, 10.26, and 10.47.

27 *De Trin*. 10.25 (CCL 62A 480.16–17): In similitudine enim naturae, non uitiorum proprietate generatio est.

28 *De Trin*. 10.25 (CCL 62A 481.6–8): . . . sed in similitudine carnis peccati sit potius, quam caro ipsa peccati sit . . . Hilary's two-sided presentation of the meaning of *similitudo* is his gloss on Rom. 8:3: "God sent his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh."

humanity (that Christ can contain all humanity in his sinless flesh). In fact, Christ's salvation of all humanity through humanity's assumption into, and glorification in, his body depends upon Christ's body being *different* from the bodies of the rest of humanity. The sinlessness of Christ's body, even while on earth, prefigures the glorified human body and so Christ's *similitudo* to human nature is a likeness not to what humans are but to what they will be.[29] Christ's body, in its sinlessness, and so its *similitudo* to every other human body—both negatively, in that it is different from human bodies in this life, and positively, in that it is like human bodies will be in the next life—is able to be the body that contains all humanity. Both the positive and negative usages of *similitudo* (to convey both similarity and difference) depend upon an understanding that the connection between Christ and humanity is far from an artificial construction.

We have seen that Hilary is familiar with the rhetorical conventions and terminology to signal metaphor: he recognizes and uses both *similis* and *similitudo* according to these guidelines. However, Hilary consciously distances himself from these conventions of metaphor when he is working within the Trinitarian, christological, and soteriological spheres. The connection between the Father and Son and between God and humanity is not an artificial construction. Hilary's rejection of the classical rhetorical use of *similis* and especially *similitudo* in the Trinitarian and soteriological contexts manifests his intention to distance himself from classical metaphor in these areas. Hilary knows how to signal metaphor according to rhetorical guidelines. When he does not use these guidelines, he is not speaking metaphorically.

We have already seen how in both the Trinitarian and the soteriological contexts, Hilary co-opts the technical term of classical rhetoric, *similitudo*, to signal not metaphor but something profoundly real. With reference to Christ's assumption of all humanity, Hilary uses *similitudo* to show how Christ's "likeness" to humanity (in both a positive and negative sense) is the basis for his ability to contain all humanity in his body. However, without a polemical or scriptural prompt, Hilary does not usually use this term in the context of the assumption of all humanity. Rather, Hilary avoids all the technical terms used to introduce metaphor in classical rhetoric. Hilary's avoidance of these terms

29 According to Weedman, "Hilary's description of Christ's human body anticipates his explanation of how Christ's humanity functions for human salvation. Christ's sinless body prefigures the nature of human bodies after they have been transformed and resurrected" ("Martyrdom and Docetism," 22). Compare with Hilary's gloss of Phil. 3:21 in *Tr. ps.* 128.9 (CCL 61B 94.9–13): . . . in cuius glorifico corpore, quod in caelestem gloriam transformatum est, spei nostrae honorem speculamur, humilitatis nostrae corpore in gloriam corporis sui conformando (Phil. 3:21).

coupled with his non-metaphorical use of *similitudo* demonstrate that Hilary does not intend Christ's assumption of all humanity metaphorically.

Case Study: Hilary vs. Tertullian

In the last section I showed that Hilary's use of classical rhetorical devices manifests his ability to signal metaphor in textbook fashion. Not once, in all his talk of Christ's assumption of all humanity or the presence of humanity in Christ's body, does Hilary use the guidelines of classical rhetoric to signal that he is speaking metaphorically. Having ascertained that Hilary does not intend Christ's assumption of all humanity metaphorically, the question remains of what Hilary *does* mean by statements such as "Christ assumes all of humanity," or "we are in the body of Christ," or the "Church is the body of Christ." Through a comparison with Tertullian, we will find that Hilary offers a way of understanding human presence in Christ that is both physical and spiritual at the same time.

Tertullian offers us a useful comparison when he speaks about the way in which the Church is the body of Christ:

> But wherever [the apostle] says that the Church is the body of Christ—as here he declares that he fills up in his flesh what is lacking of the afflictions of Christ for the sake of his body, which is the Church (Col. 1:24)—he is not, therefore, in every passage, transferring the naming of the body away from the substance of the flesh. For he says above that we are reconciled in his body through his death (Col. 1:22), namely, in that body in which he was able to die; that is, he was dead as regards the flesh and not as regards the Church: clearly [he died] for the sake of the Church by exchanging body for body, fleshly for spiritual.[30]

Tertullian here shows the difference between two uses of the word "body" in Scripture. The first use is tied to the physical substance of flesh and the second is not. Tertullian argues that Paul's declaration of the Church as the body

30 Tertullian, *Adv. Marc.* 5.19.6 (CCL 1 722.18–25): Sicubi autem et ecclesiam corpus christi dicit esse—ut hic ait adimplere se reliqua pressurarum christi in carne pro corpore eius, quod est ecclesia—, non propterea et in totum mentionem corporis transferens a substantia carnis. Nam et supra reconciliari nos ait in corpore eius per mortem, utique in eo corpore, in quo mori potuit, per carnem mortuus et non per ecclesiam, plane propter ecclesiam corpus commutando pro corpore, carnale pro spiritali.

of Christ is an example of the second use of the term "body" because it does not depend on the physical substance of the flesh. The "body" of the Church is not a fleshly body that consists of arms, legs, and innards. In other words, for Tertullian, *corpus* is used in Scripture sometimes synonomously with *caro*—Christ reconciles in his body, namely his flesh—and sometimes not: the Church is the body but not actually the flesh of Christ. Therefore, for Tertullian any talk of Christ's body is either on the fleshly plane (when it is synonomous with *caro*) or the spiritual plane (when it is not). Furthermore, he is clear that the fleshly plane is reserved to Christ's actual physical body while the spiritual plane applies to the human incorporation into Christ's physical body (which is accomplished in the Church).

However, though Tertullian's influence on Hilary is, in the words of Doignon, "omnipresent," the distinction between different uses of the word "body" in Scripture is not so clear for Hilary as it is for Tertullian.[31] While, when we look at the Church, we do not see arms, legs, and innards, Hilary insists that there still is a connection between Christ and the Church that is tied to the physical substance of the flesh of Christ. For example,

> . . . [God] is renewing us into new life and transforming us into a new man, constituting us in the body of his flesh. For he himself is the Church, containing all things in himself through the sacrament of his body.[32]

Like Tertullian, Hilary understands that Scripture speaks about the body in different ways. In Hilary's thought, "body" has the same type of double meaning as we saw in his usage of *similitudo*. Sometimes the body of Christ is the physical

---

31 Doignon, *Avant l'exil*, 520–522.

32 *Tr. ps.* 125.6 (CCL 61B 62.23–25): . . . nos in uitam nouam renouans et in nouum hominem transformans, constituens nos in corpore carnis suae. Ipse est enim ecclesia, per sacramentum corporis sui in se uniuersam eam continens. According to Kinnavey's study of Hilary's vocabulary, Hilary has two primary uses of the word *sacramentum*, the first refers to mystical truth, the second to concrete rituals (Raymond Kinnavey, *The Vocabularly of St. Hilary of Poitiers as Contained in the* Commentarius in Matthaeum, Liber I Ad Constantium, *and* De Trinitate: *A Morphological and Semasiological Study* [Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America, 1935], 255–259). Hilary's use of *sacramentum* in this passage is in the first category. Hilary speaks of the incarnation several times as the *sacramentum corporis* (for example, *De Trin*. 7.26, 8.45, 11.18; *Tr. ps*. 131.17) and even more frequently as the *sacramentum corporationis* (for example, *De Trin*. 4.27; *Tr. ps. Istruc.* 6; *Tr. ps*. 1.14, 63.2). The entire dispensation of human salvation is a *sacramentum* according to Hilary so he also speaks of the *sacramentum passionis* (for example, *In Matt.* 33.5; *De Trin*. 9.55; *Tr. ps.* 68.1). See also Weedman's discussion of the sacrament of the incarnation in "Martydom and Docetism," 36–37.

body in which Christ was born, suffered, died, and rose from the dead. When Scripture speaks about the body of Christ in other ways (as the Church, for example), however, it does not necessarily, as Tertullian said, offer a connection that is spiritual in the sense of excluding the true substance of Christ's flesh. These uses of the body are not, according to Hilary merely spiritual or metaphorical. The body of Christ, is not, in its most basic sense, the Church. Yet the Church is this body in a way that is both spiritual and yet also, in a mysterious fashion, physical.

For Tertullian, there are two planes of reference: physical and spiritual. Hilary breaks down this dichotomy by insisting that the connection of humans to Christ resides somewhere in the middle of these two. When Hilary explains John 1:14 as the Word "assuming into himself the nature of all humanity," he is arguing for a real, physical connection between Christ and humans.[33] When Hilary says that Christ "calls the flesh that he had assumed a city because . . . there is contained in him . . . a certain assembly of the whole human race," he is trying to show that between the most basic literal and physical understanding of Christ's body (namely, the body that walked and talked and was hung on the cross) and the spiritual understanding of his body (as was advocated by Tertullian above concerning the Church), there is a way to understand Christ's body as somehow physically containing humans in a mysterious and spiritual way.[34] Furthermore, when Hilary speaks of human entrance into heaven (using the past tense) as concomitant with Christ's entrance into heaven—such as when he says that Christ "who left the heavens when he took up the humility of our infirmity, has returned to the heavens carrying us back with him to offer as a gift to God . . ."[35]—he means neither that all humans now literally exist in heaven (and not on earth), nor that humans only entered heaven spiritually with Christ and will not enter physically until their own bodily resurrection. Rather Hilary's meaning lies in between these possibilities. Humans are present in Christ's body in a real, physical way, and so they enter heaven with Christ in a real, physical way. But this is a physicality that

33 *Tr. ps.* 51.17 (CCL 61 104.5–6): . . . quia *Verbum caro factum est et inhabitauit in nobis*, naturam scilicet in se totius humani generis adsumens . . .

34 *In Matt.* 4.12 (SC 254 130.3–9): Ciuitatem carnem quam adsumpserat nuncupat, quia, ut ciuitas ex uarietate ac multitudine consistit habitantium, ita in eo per naturam suscepti corporis quaedam uniuersi generis humani congregatio continetur. Atque ita et ille ex nostra in se congregatione fit ciuitas et nos per consortium carnis suae sumus ciuitatis habitatio.

35 For human entrance with Christ into heaven, see, for example, *Tr. ps.* 58.6 (CCL 61 175.1–3): Hic ergo solus currens direxit, qui, infirmitatis nostrae humilitate suscepta, egressus caelos, regressus ad caelos, qui reuehens nos secum oblaturusque Deo munus . . .

does not exclude the continued presence of humans in their own physical bodies on earth.

The difference in the understanding of the relationship of humans to Christ between Hilary and his Latin theological predecessors is his pronounced insistence on the physical reality of this connection. Hilary recognizes that human beings are not present in the body of Christ in the exact same way that a liver or a heart is present in the body of Christ. Nevertheless, Hilary insists that just because humans are not in Christ's body in the exact same way as a liver does not mean they are not there physically. Hilary's conception of the existence of humans in Christ's body is perhaps best described as spiritually physical or physically spiritual.

Does Hilary's Insistence on "Physicality" Make the Assumption of All Humanity Impossible?

I mentioned earlier that one of the difficulties in analyzing Hilary's physicalism is that it just seems impossible to us as modern thinkers. If only Hilary did not insist on the *physical* presence of humanity in Christ, we would be more open to his teaching. But he does insist on this physical presence which leaves us, as his readers, trying to imagine stuffing the bodies of every human being who ever has or will exist into the single body of Christ, a task that seems both ridiculous and impossible.

Hilary himself does not try to explain how this stuffing process could actually work, but I want to suggest three possible ways of thinking about what physicality means in the context of the physical assumption of all humanity.

First, physical does not necessarily mean material. Hilary is quite aware of non-material physical existence. For example, the non-material soul physically resides in the body. Christ's glorified body falls into this category of non-material physicality, as will all eschatological bodies. According to Scripture, Christ's glorified body can walk through walls, appear out of thin air, and change its appearance so that it is unrecognizable one minute but recognizable the next. Now Christ's incarnate body is not yet a glorified body. Nevertheless, Hilary is clear that Christ's incarnate body is not absolutely identical to all other human bodies, rather "That body is of a nature particular and proper to itself, which was conformed into heavenly glory on the mountain, which drives away fevers by its touch, which restores eyes by its spit."[36] While Christ's body, in both its

36 *De Trin*. 10.23 (CCL 62A 478.30–33): Naturae enim propriae ac suae corpus illud est, quod in caelestem gloriam conformatur in monte, quod adtactu suo fugat febres, quod de sputu suo format oculos.

incarnate and glorified state, is physical, its participation in what we might call the scientific rules of materiality is not absolute. Hilary could very well believe that all humanity exists in a physical yet non-material fashion in the body of Christ.

Second, the physicality of Christ's assumption of all humanity is no more or less impossible than the physicality of the Eucharist. The Fathers are content to believe that the small Eucharistic host contains the entire body of Christ . . . physically.[37] If the premise that Christ's body can fit in a Eucharistic host (and can duplicate itself to be fully present in all hosts) is acceptable in faith, then the premise that all humans can fit in Christ's body should be deemed likewise acceptable.

Third, while Hilary himself never insists that the physical presence of humans in Christ's body is a material presence, the Stoic philosophy of his day articulates the way in which distinct material substances can mix so that they inhabit the same physical space.[38] Furthermore, I propose that modern science and especially astronomy can offer ways to help the modern reader conceive of even a *material* presence as a possibility. The electromagnetic force is one of the four fundamental forces of nature and is the force that holds atoms together and determines their size. The compression of matter essentially overwhelms the repulsive force between the protons and electrons that make up atoms. This compression of matter is scientifically possible as demonstrated in magneto-optical traps and especially in the natural phenomena of neutron stars (where the compression results from an increased force of gravity).

The example of neutron stars offers a few guidelines to the possibility of the material existence of the mass of all humanity in the physical space of Christ's body. First, the problem is not one of size or space. Neutron stars are extremely dense: depending on their size, approximately 5mL worth of a neutron star contains a density equivalent to between one and fifteen times the total mass of the world human population. There is room enough in Christ's body for the mass of all humanity. Second, there are, however, problems that relate to density and force. This body would be exceedingly dense and therefore heavy.

---

37 For example, Justin Martyr (*First Apology* 66): "we have been taught that the food consecrated by the Word of prayer which comes from him, from which our flesh and blood are nourished by transformation, is the flesh and blood of that incarnate Jesus." Cyprian (*Ep.* 62.4): "For who is more a priest of the most high God than our Lord Jesus Christ, who offered a sacrifice to God the Father, and offered that very same thing which Melchizedek had offered, that is, bread and wine, to wit, His body and blood?" Tertullian (*De Res. Carnis* 8): "The flesh feeds on the body and blood of Christ."

38 For more details on Stoic mixture theory and Hilary's knowledge of this theory, see Chapter 3 "Stoic Contributions to Hilary's Soteriology."

Furthermore, the compression of matter requires a very strong force (like the gravity for neutron stars, which is 10^{11} times that of earth's gravity). Christ's body would have to be able to provide this force. I am not proposing that science explains exactly how Christ's body could physically contain the material mass of all humanity. However, I am arguing that it provides avenues for us to be able to think of this possibility in intelligible terms.

Conclusion

Hilary does not use technical terminology—either inherited from his predecessors or created by himself—to signal physicalist teaching. Rather, he uses a wide variety of non-technical language, usually with some variation of "all humanity," "all flesh," or "nature of us all," to speak of Christ's assumed human nature. Lacking a clear technical vocabulary, Hilary often clarifies statements such as Christ assumed "all humanity" with other, more detailed physicalist statements, for example, that Christ's body contains "the assembly of the whole human race."

Furthermore, though many scholars believe that Hilary intends his teaching of Christ's assumption of all humanity to be read in a metaphorical, rather than literal or physical fashion, Hilary's restricted use of rhetoric points to the opposite conclusion. While Hilary is fully trained in the techniques of classical rhetoric to signal metaphor, he does not apply these techniques when speaking about Christ's assumption of all humanity. We must conclude that Hilary intends his statements to be read literally as supporting a physicalist teaching.

As opposed to Tertullian, who teaches that when Scripture speaks about Christ's body, there are only two planes of reference—either physical (as in the case of his incarnate body) or spiritual (as in the case of the Church as the body of Christ)—Hilary offers a more flexible and nuanced interpretation. In the case of humanity's presence in Christ's body, he insists that though it is a spiritual presence, it is also quite definitely physical.

Hilary does not clarify the nature of this physical presence: we do not know whether it is material or non-material. Nevertheless, Hilary seems to be following well-trodden paths of Christian thinking when he accepts without question that the physicality of the body of Christ is well capable of breaking all human rules for how physical things should behave.

CHAPTER 3

The Context of, and Influences upon, Hilary's Soteriology

Having clarified in the last chapter that Hilary's use of language and rhetoric concerning Christ's assumption of all humanity is intentionally physical and non-metaphorical, I am now free to return to a question broached in Chapter 1: where does Hilary derive his physicalist teaching . . . does it originate in Platonism (qua Harnack) or elsewhere?

This chapter will focus on the philosophical and theological sources for Hilary's physicalist theology of Christ's assumption of all humanity. Hilary's theology in this respect bears such a resemblance to that of many of the Greek Fathers that Hilary is often classified with Athanasius, Gregory of Nyssa, and Cyril of Alexandria as an exemplar of the Greek physicalist doctrine of the incarnation (as opposed to the Western atonement theory). However, this resemblance, which has led many to classify Hilary with the Greeks, is not easily explained.

Scholars must heed the chronology of Hilary's works in order to account for the different influences that can be found in each work.[1] Though the post-exilic *Tractatus super Psalmos* contains the most pervasive and comprehensive account of Hilary's physicalism, even Hilary's earliest work clearly manifests physicalist teachings. However, it is quite impossible to cite Greek philosophical influence in the *In Matthaeum*.[2] Historical studies are starting to insist that

1 For example, Burns critiques both Coustant and Mersch, who recognize Hilary's physicalism but do so by reading Hilary's *In Matthaeum* through his *Tractatus super Psalmos*. Burns believes that the "themes in the Commentary [*In Matthaeum*] must be understood against their appropriate background and not according to later developments affected by factors unknown to Hilary at the time of the composition of the Commentary," *Christology in Hilary*, 100, no. 50. Albert Charlier likewise criticizes Mersch's lack of distinction between Hilary's pre- and post-exilic works ("L'Église corps du Christ," 452).

2 However, static accounts of Hilary's theology that have ignored the chronology are motivated by, and serve as witnesses to, the real unity and continuity of Hilary's thought, which differs more in emphases than in content between the *In Matthaeum* and the *Tractatus super Psalmos*. Ladaria (*Cristología de Hilario*, 296–97) follows Paul Galtier (*Saint Hilaire de Poiters; Le premier docteur*, 26–42) in asserting that Hilary remains substantially faithful to himself in his christological doctrine throughout his writing career. Doignon (*Sur Matthieu*, 22–23) asserts the continuity between Hilary's exegetical and doctrinal works. Doignon, as well as

© KONINKLIJKE BRILL NV, LEIDEN, 2015 | DOI 10.1163/9789004290815_005

Hilary in fact had little to no contact with, or knowledge of, Greek theology or philosophy prior to his exile in 356 AD.

The greatest influences on Hilary's physicalism seem to have been attained during his classical education and thus are those of secular Latin traditions, most notably Stoicism. Stoic thought already contains in its terminological use of *uniuersitas* a conceptualization of a unified humanity gathered in the universal city. Hilary brings this idea and its Stoic terminology into the Christian realm. Hilary's classical education did not preclude contact with Latin theology. While Hilary is deeply indebted to Latin theology, particularly Tertullian, there is little Latin theological precedent for Hilary's teaching concerning Christ's assumption of all humanity. This chapter will comprise four parts considering Hilary's relationship to 1) Greek Philosophy prior to and after his exile, 2) Greek theology, 3) Latin philosophy in the form of Stoicism, and 4) Latin theology.

Hilary's Appropriation of Greek Philosophy

Prior to His Exile

Historical research has, in recent years, led to greater care in distinguishing between the pre-exilic and the post-exilic works and influences of Hilary. The general consensus for the dating of Hilary's major works places the *In Matthaeum* before his exile, at 355 AD,[3] the *De Trinitate* during Hilary's exile, between 358 and 360[4] (though he uses reworkings of two of his earlier writings, the *De Fide* and *Aduersus Arianos*—both written between 356 and 357—in Books 2–6 of the *De Trinitate*),[5] and the *Tractatus super Psalmos* after

Charles Kannengiesser ("L'exégese d'Hilaire," in *Hilaire et son temps: Actes du Colloque de Poitiers*, [Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1968], 136), follows Gastaldi (*Hilario de Poitiers exégeta*, 77–93), who shows that Hilary's vocabulary, and thus thought, remains remarkably consistent throughout his exegetical works.

3 See Doignon, *Sur Mattieu*, 19–20.

4 Weedman dates the *De Trinitate* to 359 or 360 (*Trinitarian Theology of Hilary*, 21) but Beckwith dates the beginning of Hilary's work on the *De Trinitate* to 358 (Carl Beckwith, *Hilary of Poitiers on the Trinity: From* De Fide *to* De Trinitate [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008], 71).

5 Books 2–3 of the *De Trinitate* are reworkings of the *De Fide*; books 4–6 of the *De Trinitate* are reworkings of *Aduersus Arianos* (Beckwith, *Hilary of Poitiers on the Trinity*, 72–73). For Hilary's use of these earlier writings in his *De Trinitate* and the chronology of the writing of the *De Trinitate*, see Beckwith, *Hilary of Poitiers on the Trinity*, especially 71–73, 217.

Hilary's return from exile, between 364 and 367 AD.[6] Recently, in 2008, Patrick Descourtieux suggests very briefly and with little evidence that Hilary may have written part of the Psalm commentaries during his exile while he was in contact with Greek thought and especially Origen's commentaries.[7] Because Descourtieux's argument has little to recommend itself, the consensus dating ought to be preferred.[8]

Hilary's exile by Constantius in 356 led to his spending four years in Phrygia in Asia Minor.[9] While Mersch uses all of Hilary's works interchangeably, saying simply that it is impossible for him to distinguish between what Hilary learned during his exile in Asia Minor and what he had already known before,[10] the perpectives of contemporary historical scholarship now demand that Hilary's Greek influences and classification with the Greek physicalist Fathers be historically as well as theologically proven. Greater historical precision is calling into question many of the assumptions that underlay Hilary's classification with the Greek Fathers in the physicalist doctrine. Hilary, as I will show

6 A useful, though slightly outdated, table of the dating given for Hilary's works by various scholars can be found in Wild, *Divinization of Man*, 24 no. 95. Hilary's *De Synodis* is dated, by internal evidence, between August 28, 358 and early 359. See *De Synodis* 8 and Daniel Williams "A Reassessment of the Early Career and Exile of Hilary of Poitiers," *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 42 (1991): 209.

7 See pages 15–16 of Descourtieux's Introduction to *Hilaire de Poitiers: Commentaires sur les Psaumes*, Sources chrétiennes 515, (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 2008).

8 Descourtieux's argument is based on the hypothesis (arising from his reading of a section of *Tr. ps.* 129 as an autobiographical reference) that Hilary was aware of his impending death. From this hyposthesis, Descourtieux takes the additional step of saying that if Hilary sensed his impending death, perhaps he started the writing of the *Tractatus super Psalmos* earlier than the consensus dating supposes (SC 515, 15). While Descourtieux offers no proof for an earlier date, he does remind us that the "evidence" for a later date is relatively slim, and, in particular, he suggests that a study of the autobiographical references in the *Tractatus super Psalmos* is necessary before any date can be proposed with relative certainty. Certainly until such a study is accomplished, there is no reason to reject the consensus dating.

9 The standard reason given for Hilary's exile is his anti-Arian defense of the Nicene faith. Recent scholarship has questioned this hypothesis. See, for example, Daniel Williams, "Defining Orthodoxy in Hilary of Poitiers' *Commentarium in Matthaeum*," *Journal of Early Christian Studies* 9 (2001): 151–171, who argues, chiefly from a study of the *In Matthaeum*, that Hilary knew nothing of the Arian controversies at the time of his exile. On the other hand, Pieter Smulders, *Hilary of Poitiers' Preface to his* Opus historicum: *Translation and Commentary*, Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae, vol. 29 (New York: E.J. Brill, 1995), through a study of the *Opus historicum*, is much more willing to concede to Hilary considerable knowledge and savvy concerning the Arian intrigues even years before his exile.

10 Mersch, *Corps mystique du Christ*, 346.

briefly, had very little contact with Greek theology or philosophy prior to his exile. Even during his exile, though he certainly came into contact with Greek theological influence, both contemporary and of the Origenian school, what little direct contact Hilary had with Platonism led to his rejection rather than appropriation of its system.

In fourth century France there were only two centers for higher learning: Autun and Bordeaux. Following the reasoning of H.D. Saffrey, one of the premier scholars on fourth century Asia Minor Platonism, because of the eclipse of the schools of Autun at the beginning of the fourth century and the rise of those of Bordeaux, it seems likely that Hilary received his education in rhetoric at Bordeaux.[11] Bordeaux at that time provided instruction in Greek and Latin grammar and rhetoric; it did not teach philosophy.[12] An older professor of grammar from Bordeaux installed himself in Poitiers at the time of Hilary's youth.[13] This professor, according to Saffrey, must have had enough students to support him, making Poitiers itself a scholastic center of some importance. Saffrey finds it likely, then, that Hilary, having commenced his studies in Poitiers, moved to Bordeaux when he was ready to progress from grammar to rhetoric.[14] The course of studies in which Hilary would have participated at Bordeaux consisted of literary composition based upon the reading and the imitation of Latin rhetorical masters. The works of many of these masters, especially Virgil and Cicero, are philosophical as well as rhetorical, and thus the rhetoric student came into contact with a fair amount of philosophy. The philosophical thinking of Hilary's early works can and should be understood as the result of his classical rhetorical education.[15]

---

11 See p. 249 in H.D. Saffrey, "Saint Hilaire et la philosophie," in *Hilaire et son temps: Actes du Colloque de Poitiers* (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1968), 246–265.

12 See Saffrey, "Saint Hilaire et la philosophie," 249–250, where he discusses the curriculum at Bordeaux as demonstrated by the *Commemoratio Professorum Burdigalensium* of Ausonius (see *Ausonii Opuscula*, ed. C. Schenkl, MGH 5.2, Berlin: Weidmann, 1883, 55–71). Bordeaux was at this time something of a mini-Constantinople and the *Panegyrici latini*, given by Latin rhetors before the Byzantine emperors, show the fruit of the rhetorical culture of fourth century Gaul.

13 Saffrey here again follows Ausonius' lead in his *Commemoratio* ("Saint Hilaire et la philosophie," 250).

14 Saffrey, "Saint Hilaire et la philosophie," 250–251.

15 Saffrey, "Saint Hilaire et la philosophie," 251: "Voilà l'enseignement qu'Hilaire a reçu et, à mon avis, voilà aussi les éléments de philosophie que l'on peut trouver dans ses écrits." Beumer, "De Eenheid der menschen," 162–163, while more willing than Saffrey to allow some Greek influence, nevertheless also says that Hilary's theological ideas concerning the unity of man with Christ are of such a nature that they can be understood without

According to Jean Doignon, whose major contribution to Hilary scholarship—in addition to critical editions—has been the tracing of Hilary's sources and influences, Hilary is one of the most classically trained of all Christian writers.[16] He says: "L'unité de pensée qui se dégage de l'œuvre écrite d'Hilaire dans la première période de son épiscopat est en relation étroite, croyons-nous, avec l'usage constant que fait Hilaire d'une rhétorique traditionnelle, appliquée aux sujets nouveaux que l'enseignement de l'Écriture et la réflexion des premiers théologiens et moralistes avaient introduits dans la littérature latine."[17] Doignon attributes not only the greater part of Hilary's philosophical training, but the entire structure and unity of Hilary's early thought, to his classical rhetorical education.

Doignon also makes it clear that before his exile Hilary had no real knowledge of Greek.[18] Hilary had only enough Greek to be able to make use of Greek-Latin lexicons.[19] Even though Bordeaux had professors of Greek grammar, the state of Greek proficiency in Gaul had declined so much by the middle of the fourth century that what Greek Hilary might have learned from these professors was limited and, quite likely, incorrect.[20] Hilary's ignorance of the Greek language leads him to have no direct contact with Greek authors, or at least no traceable contact in his own pre-exilic works.[21]

---

the help of Platonic philosophy. He says that it is difficult to determine if there are traces of Platonic thinking in Hilary. At most, he says, one should admit an indirect influence by way of the Greek Fathers.

16 Jean Doignon, *Avant l'exil*, 520: "Depuis Cyprien et Lactance, il est l'intellectuel chrétien qui a le plus pratiqué la littérature morale classique."

17 Doignon, *Avant l'exil*, 518. See also ibid., 47: "Hilaire a été formé à Poitiers à ce que Jérôme appelle le 'cothurne gaulois', c'est-à-dire à une *eloquentia* héritière de la tradition scolaire."

18 See Doignon's discussion of Hilary's knowledge of Greek in *Avant l'exil*, 173–178.

19 Doignon, *Avant l'exil*, 175: "On peut donc conjecturer avec vraisemblance qu'à Poitiers, avant l'exil, Hilaire ne possède guère plus que des listes de mots grecs consignées dans un lexique, les exploite pour émailler son texte d'hellénismes, comme ses devanciers, et lui donner une allure plus technique."

20 Doignon, *Avant l'exil*, 173–174: "La présence de grammairiens grecs à Bordeaux, signalée par Ausone, n'empêche pas le grec d'y être parlé, de son propre aveu, incorrectement et sans raffinement, au moins au IVe siècle."

21 Doignon, *Avant l'exil*, 22: "Nous prendrons la peine de montrer, par des analyses précises de textes, d'Origène surtout,—analyses accompagnées de tableaux synoptiques—, qu'on ne trouve pas trace dans l'œuvre d'Hilaire, avant 356, de lectures directes d'auteurs grecs." Doignon dates the Latin translation of Irenaeus' *Aduersus haereses* after Hilary and so Hilary's inability to read Greek causes Doignon to also eliminate Irenaeus as a direct source for Hilary's pre-exilic theology (ibid., 194–200). Irenaeus was known, however, certainly by Tertullian, Novatian, and Lactantius, and perhaps by Cyprian, allowing Irenaeus

What knowledge, if any, could Hilary have received concerning Greek philosophy through the medium of the classical Latin masters that were part of his educational curriculum? He could have appropriated Greek philosophy first, through translations, and second, through Latin authors who themselves make use of Greek philosophy.

On the first topic of Greek philosophy available to Hilary in Latin translation: whole-scale translations of Greek philosophy are rare in his time and place. However, bits and pieces of Greek philosophy are certainly found in Latin writers.[22] For example, Cicero translates a number of passages from Plato, Epicurus and Xenophon. I will reproduce the list of these translations found in J.G.F. Powell's study of Cicero's translations from Greek.[23] In the left hand column are the passages in Cicero's corpus; on the right are the references to his Greek sources.

---

to indirectly influence Hilary through these Latin authors (ibid., 200). This is contrary to Lecuyer's belief that Hilary's understanding of priesthood and the unity of the human race derive directly from Irenaeus (Lecuyer, "Le sacerdoce royal," 302–325). Burns agrees with Doignon's assessment: "I agree with the main features of Doignon's case on Hilary's sources: Hilary does not depend directly on the work of Origen for the *Commentary on Matthew*; Hilary is influenced by his predecessors within the Latin traditions; the principal influence is Tertullian. My only criticism of Doignon's case is that he fails to acknowledge adequately the contributions of other Latin sources such as Novatian and the possible impact of oral traditions. He also fails to appreciate the originality of Hilary." Burns suggests Victorinus of Pettau as another possible source for Hilary not considered by Doignon (*Christology in Hilary*, 44).

22 See the list of early Latin translations of Plato given by Raymond Klibansky, *The Continuity of the Platonic Tradition during the Middle Ages* together with *Plato's Parmenides in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance* (Munich: Kraus International Publications, 1981), 22. He says Cicero had a version of the *Protagoras* that was, however, known only to a few learned men. Cicero also translated part of the *Timaeus*. Apuleius translated the *Phaedo*. There are many single passages of Plato in Cicero and others. Calcidius' fourth century version of the first part of the *Timaeus* was ignored by authors of the period. Other possible sources include Marius Victorinus' translation of neo-Platonic texts (of Porphyry and perhaps Plotinus), Seneca's letters, especially *Ep*. 58 and 65 on the ideas; Aulus Gellius' *Noctes Atticae*; Valerius Maximus' collection of memorable facts and sayings; Apuleius' *De Platone et eius dogmate* and *De Deo Socratis*; and remarks in Macrobius' Saturnalia and especially his Commentary on the *Somnium Scipionis*, which contains a comparison of Plato's and Cicero's philosophy.

23 J.G.F. Powell, "Cicero's Translations from Greek," in *Cicero the Philosopher*, ed. J.G.F. Powell (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 279–280. Powell also further distinguishes between acknowledged quotations and passages that are freely adapted or summarized.

Timaeus =	Plato, Timaeus 27d–47b
Tusc. 3.41–2 =	Epicurus, περὶ τέλους (in Diogenes Laertius 10.6)
Fin. 2.21 =	Epicurus, KD 10 (Diogenes Laertius 10.142)
Tusc. 1.97–9 =	Plato, Apol. 40c–42a
Tusc. 1.53–4 (= Rep. 6.27, see below) =	Plato, Phaedr. 245c–246a
Tusc. 5.34–5 =	Plato, Gorg. 470d
Tusc. 5.36 =	Plato, Menex. 247e–248a
Tusc. 5.100 =	Plato, Epist. 7.326b–c
Div. 1.60–1 =	Plato, Rep. 9.571c–572b
Orat. 41 =	Plato, Phadr. 279
Leg. 2.45 =	Leg. 12.955e–956b
Cato Maior 79 =	Xen., Cyrop. 8.7.17
Fin. 1.68 =	Epicurus, KD 28 (Diogenes Laertius 10.148)
Fin. 2.96 =	Epicurus, KD 28 (Diogenes Laertius 10.22)
Rep. 1.66–7 =	Plato, Rep. 8.562c
Off. 3.38 =	Plato, Rep. 2.359d–360b
Leg. 2.67–8 =	Plato, Leg. 12.958d–e
Cato Maior 59 =	Xen. Oecon. 4.20f
ND 1.45 =	Epircurus, KD 1 (Diogenes Laertius 10.139)
Fin 1.57 =	Epircurus, KD 5 (Diogenes Laertius 10.140)
Fin. 1.63 =	Epircurus, KD 15 (Diogenes Laertius 10.144)
Rep. 6.27 =	Plato, Phaedr. 245c–246a
Cato Maior 6–9 =	Plato, Rep. 1.328e–330a

Despite the length of this list, these passages treat few philosophical issues, namely only the soul and virtue. Concerning the soul, Cicero twice cites passages that argue that the essence of the soul is self-motion, which is both animate and eternal.[24] He also uses Plato's account of the three parts of the soul (reason, irrational appetite, and anger),[25] and Xenophon's description of the

24 See Cicero, *Tuscalan Disputations* 1.53–4 (trans. J.E. King, Loeb Classical Library [New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1927], 62–64 = Plato, *Phaedr*. 245c–246a; *De Re publica* 6.27 (in *De Re publica, De Legibus, Cato Maior de senectute, Laelius de amicitia*, ed. J.G.F. Powell [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006], 145–46) = Plato, *Phaedr*. 245c–246a.

25 See Cicero, *De Divinatione* 1.60–61 (in *De Senectute, De Amicitia, De Divinatione*, trans. William Falconer, Loeb Classical Library [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1953], 290) = Plato, *Rep*. 9.571c–572b.

immortal soul shackled by the flesh.[26] Concerning virtue, Cicero uses Plato to argue against Epicurus that virtue alone (without need of external goods) leads to happiness.[27] Other than these few statements—and the *Timaeus*, which we will discuss shortly—Cicero's translations of Greek texts import very little Greek philosophy into the Latin realm.

On the second topic of Greek philosophy available to Hilary via its appropriation and use by Roman authors: through Cicero and Seneca, Hilary could very well have come into contact with a mediated form of Platonism. However, both Cicero and Seneca demonstrate the syncretism of Latin philosophy begun with Antiochus: Platonism, Stoicism, and Aristotelianism are viewed by many as fundamentally compatible.[28] Thus, though Cicero considers himself primarily a Platonist, he often uses Stoicism to support and develop Platonic doctrines.[29] Likewise, though Seneca is primarily a Stoic, in his *Epistulae ad Lucilium* 58 and 65, he deals with philosophical questions from an essentially Platonic point of view.[30] Hilary's contact with Platonism, if he had any at all, was indirect and mediated through the Roman rhetors and philosophers who were syncretising the Platonic system with that of Stoicism and Aristotelianism. Later in this chapter we will look at the manner in which the Platonic theory of the Forms

---

26 See Cicero, *Cato Maior* 79 (in *De Re publica, De Legibus, Cato Maior de senectute, Laelius de amicitia*, ed. J.G.F. Powell [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006], 80.17–24) = Xen., *Cyrop*. 8.7.17.

27 See Cicero, *Tuscalan Disputations* 3.41–2 (Loeb 274–276) = Epicurus, περὶ τέλους (in Diogenes Laertius 10.6); *De Finibus bonorum et malorum* 2.21 (trans. H. Rackham, Loeb Classical Library, [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1931], 102–104) = Epicurus, *KD* 10 (in Diogenes Laertius 10.142); *Tuscalan Disputations* 1.97–9 (Loeb 114–118) = Plato, *Apol*. 40c–42a; *Tuscalan Disputations* 5.34–5 (Loeb 458–460) = Plato, *Gorg*. 470d; *Tuscalan Disputations* 5.36 (Loeb 460–462) = Plato, *Menex*. 247e–248a; *Tuscalan Disputations* 5.100 (Loeb 524–526) = Plato, *Epist*. 7.326b–c; *De Finibus* 1.68 (Loeb 70–72) = Epicurus, *KD* 28 (in Diogenes Laertius 10.148); *De Finibus* 2.96 (Loeb 186–188)= Epicurus, *KD* 28 (in Diogenes Laertius 10.22); *De Finibus* 1.57 (Loeb 60) = Epircurus, *KD* 5 (Diogenes Laertius 10.140); *De Finibus* 1.63 (Loeb 64–44) = Epircurus, *KD* 15 (Diogenes Laertius 10.144); *Cato Maior* 6–9 = Plato, *Rep*. 1.328e–330a.

28 See Stephen Gersh, *Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism: The Latin Tradition*, Publications in Medieval Studies 23/1–23/2 (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1986), 181.

29 For Cicero's self-definition as a Platonist, see Gersh, *Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism*, 67; Cicero, *Pro Murena* 63. For Cicero's combination of Stoicism and Platonism, see Gersh, ibid., 71–72.

30 See Gersh, *Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism*, 180.

is altered in the Latin milieu in such a way as to make it fundamentally incompatible with Hilary's physicalism.[31]

After His Exile

We have eliminated the possibility of Hilary having direct contact with Greek Platonism prior to his exile to Phrygia in Asia Minor in 356 by Constantius. Now we will address the question of whether Hilary had any direct contact with Greek Platonism during this Eastern exile. The Platonism of the fourth century is not a monolithic movement or philosophy but can be divided into different schools: Rome, Asia Minor, Athens and Alexandria. Each of these schools has its own distinctive character. For example, whereas the Neoplatonic school of Rome is led by Plotinus, who is a philosopher for whom reason controls all knowledge, Asia Minor is the home of the school of Iamblichus (d. 325). Iamblichus began in Syria, moved to Apamea, and finally to Antioch, where he wrote the *De mysteriis*, which is a refutation of the Plotinian rationalism set forth by Porphry. Iamblichus accomplishes this refutation through recourse to non-rational knowledge of God, that is to theurgy, oracles, magic and the like.[32]

Hilary never explicitly speaks about this Asian Platonism of the Neoplatonic school of fourth century Asia minor. It seems impossible that he would know nothing about it, because of the number of its disciples, but he seems to be uninterested in this kind of philosophy.[33] Moreover, we can assume that it was his personal contact with practitioners of this kind of magical philosophy that led to Hilary's subsequent critique against philosophers.[34] Most of Hilary's critiques of philosophers can be found in his *Tractatus super Psalmos*, which furthers the conclusion that Hilary's first contact with philosophy in its own right (that is, apart from his study of rhetoric) was during his exile. That he criticizes philosophy shows that Hilary was unimpressed with the Asian Platonism he met in Phrygia.[35]

---

31 For greater detail on Latin syncretized Platonism, see the section "The Transmission of Plato's Theory of the Forms via Latin Stoicism" later in this Chapter.

32 Saffrey, "Saint Hilaire et la philosophie," 252. For a short discussion of the relationship between theology, philosophy and theurgy in the thought of both Iamblichus and Porphry, see Daniela Taormina, *Jamblique critique de Plotin et de Porphyre: Quatre etudes* (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1999), 131–158.

33 Saffrey, "Saint Hilaire et la philosophie," 254.

34 See Saffrey, "Saint Hilaire et la philosophie," 255–57, for a number of citations from Hilary in which he is critiquing philosophy or philosophers.

35 Hilary's attitude against philosophy is not only a refusal of the pseudo-philosophy he observed in Asia Minor, but also an acknowledgement of the limits of pure reason, which he considers insufficient for the problem of God. Hilary believes the Arians have compromised

Hilary's exile in Phrygia serves as his first opportunity for direct appropriation of Greek Platonism. However, the Neoplatonic school of fourth century Asia Minor, the theurgic school of Iamblichus, apparently holds little appeal for Hilary: Hilary's new experience of Asian Neoplatonism leads to a greater hostility to "the philosophers" and does not seem to lead to an appropriation of its thought.

This brief study of influences allows us to draw a few conclusions. The earlier *In Matthaeum* shows no Greek philosophical influence except for what he receives indirectly through Tertullian and the Latin philosophers of his education, particularly Cicero and Seneca. While Hilary's exile led him to come into contact with Greek Platonism in Asia Minor, the post-exilic *De Trinitate* and the *Tractatus super Psalmos* continue to show no distinctive unmediated Greek philosophical influence. Furthermore, the Platonism available to him indirectly in the Latin milieu presents, as we will see later in this chapter, an altered version of the Forms that is incompatible with Hilary's physicalism. Therefore, Hilary's physicalism in both his pre-exilic and post-exilic works cannot be posited as dependent on Platonism. Hilary's ability to present a Latin physicalist teaching without the influence or support of a Platonic metaphysics demonstrates that Platonism's tie to this teaching must be seen as, at most, accidental.

Hilary's Relationship with Greek Theology

Irenaeus and Athanasius

Strangely enough, while nearly every scholar on Hilary deals with the question of Origen's influence, the influence of other Greek theologians, such as Irenaeus and Athanasius, especially on the post-exilic Hilary, remains relatively unstudied. This lacuna is especially baffling considering the dependency posited of Hilary on the Greek physicalists—including Irenaeus and Athanasius—argued by several scholars including Harnack, Mersch, and Lécuyer.[36] Certainly, future research in this area would be of great service.

---

the faith by giving philosophy priority to Scripture. See Saffrey, "Saint Hilaire et la philosophie," 263.

36 Harnack believes Hilary is dependent on Nyssa (*History of Dogma*, vol. 3, 301). Mersch frequently uses Athanasius or Cyril of Alexandria as means to understand Hilary (*Corps mystique du Christ*, vol. 1, 341, 343, 346, 349–350, 357–358). Lécuyer believes that Hilary's recognition of the unity and inclusion of the whole human race in Christ shows the influence of Athanasius and especially of Irenaeus ("Sacerdoce royal," 307).

Doignon offers two arguments against attributing any direct influence of Irenaeus on Hilary. First, Hilary's knowledge of Greek prior to his exile was nonexistent.[37] Second, Doignon argues for a late dating of the Latin translation of Irenaeus placing it between 381 and 430.[38] Therefore, as the Latin translation of Irenaeus did not exist during Hilary's lifetime and Hilary could not read the Greek original, Hilary did not directly appropriate Irenaeus' work. However, Irenaeus was known certainly by Tertullian, Novatian, and Lactantius, and perhaps by Cyprian, which would have allowed Irenaeus to influence Hilary indirectly through these Latin authors.[39] On the other hand, Lécuyer argues that Hilary's understanding of priesthood and the unity of the human race, in both the *In Matthaeum* and the *Tractatus super Psalmos*, derives from Irenaeus.[40] However, Lécuyer advances his argument solely on the basis of his perception of a similarity of ideas between Irenaeus and Hilary without any documentary proof that would demonstrate direct contact. Doignon's position of denying the direct influence of Irenaeus must be preferred.

Despite the standard conclusion that Hilary's condemnation and exile in 356 were the result of his defense of Athanasius, as yet there is no scholarship that conclusively demonstrates a direct influence of Athanasius on Hilary.[41] On the contrary, Williams rules out any direct influence at least on the pre-exilic Hilary of Athanasius' *Contra Arianos*, a work that Athanasius wrote while exiled in the West during the early 340s.[42] Ayres pronounces ignorance on this

37 Doignon, *Avant l'exil*, 194–200.

38 Doignon, *Avant l'exil*, 200.

39 Doignon, *Avant l'exil*, 200.

40 Lécuyer, "Sacerdoce royal," 302.

41 Jean Daniélou ("Saint Hilaire, évêque et docteur," in *Hilaire de Poitiers: Évêque et docteur* [Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1968], 17) argues that Hilary knew Athanasius (in addition to Origen, Marcellus, Basil of Ancyra and Photius). He footnotes Smulders who, unfortunately, does not back him up, but, citing similarities and differences between Hilary and Athanasius, Smulders suggests that it might be more accurate to propose their similarities are the result of common sources than direct dependence (Pieter Smulders, *La Doctrine trinitaire de s. Hilaire de Poitiers: Étude précédée d'une esquisse du mouvement dogmatique depuis le Concile de Nicée jusqu'au règne de Julien* (*325–362*), Analecta Gregoriana 32, Series Theologica, Sectio B 14 [Rome: Pontificia Università Gregoriana, 1944], 294).

42 Williams, "Defining Orthodoxy," 161–162: "Absent from Hilary's theology are the railings against Arius and his followers called the 'Arians,' arguments for the correlativity of the Father and Son, and the Son's eternal generation (*Contra Ar.* 1.9; 14;21; 25; 28; 2.34–35), and Athanasius' frequent use of the formula to establish divine relation: the Son is like the Father (1.6; 9; 17; 2.43; 3.14) (or 'like the Father in all things': 1.21; 38; 44; 52; 2.17; 3.10). The 'Arians' themselves are said to teach the Son is unlike the Father and foreign to his essence, or that the Son is changeable because he is a creature per the long discussion in

question while Hanson concludes that it is best to assume that Hilary never had direct knowledge of Athanasius' works but picked up some Athanasian ideas during his exile through discussion with Eastern pro-Nicenes such as Marcellus and Basil of Ancyra.[43] Knowledge of some of Athanasius' teachings could have come to Hilary through his association with Eusebius of Vercelli. Eusebius participated in the Synod of Alexandria of 362 that produced the *Tomus ad Antiochenos*, written by Athanasius.[44]

Origen and Eusebius of Caesarea

There continues to be significant debate concerning the depth of Hilary's debt to Origen.[45] Studies concerning Hilary's relationship to Origen have centered upon verbal parallels between the exegetical works of Hilary and Origen. These studies have offered two clear conclusions. First, Hilary had no direct knowledge of Origen's theology prior to his exile. Second, during or after his exile, Hilary did have some contact, either direct or indirect, with some of the works of Origen.

Doignon's work on the pre-exilic Hilary has shown the lack of direct dependency on Origen. Doignon has accomplished an extensive study of parallels and divergences between Hilary's *In Matthaeum* and Origen's *Commentariorum series in Matthaeum*, and concludes that in 78% of the cases the exegesis of

---

Oration 2 over Proverbs 8. Notably, the Athanasian insistence that all 'created' or 'made' language concerning the Son must be in reference to his incarnation is not found in the *Commentary*, whereas Hilary refers to the Son at least in one instance as 'the first work of God' ('primum Dei opus est'). As intelligent and resourceful as Hilary seems to have been, it is hard to imagine that he would not have made good use of such arguments had they been available to him."

43 Lewis Ayres, *Nicaea and its Legacy: An Approach to Fourth-Century Trinitarian Theology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 184: "We do not know if Hilary knew anything of Athanasius' theology. . . ." R.P.C. Hanson, *The Search for the Christian Doctrine of God: The Arian Controversy 318–381* (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1988), 473.

44 Burns suggests that Athanasius' argument in this document for the human soul of Christ may have come to Hilary's attention through Eusebius of Vercelli, and reinforced his affirmation of Christ's human soul in the *Tractatus super Psalmos*. See Burns, *A Model for the Christian Life*, 156–157.

45 For example, Orazzo (*Salvezza in Ilario*, 95) argues that Hilary's extended conception of the body derives from Origen. Origen's ontology says *true* being is being that has reached its end/goal, thus the Church, and not Christ's individual body, is the *true* body of Christ because the Church is a more perfect realization of the goal of salvation of humanity. However, since Hilary teaches physicalism prior to his exile, Orazzo's attribution of this idea to Origen is unlikely.

Hilary is done completely independently of that of Origen.[46] The 22% of cases that demonstrate a resemblance, Doignon believes ought to be understood without positing a dependence of Hilary on Origen.[47] Hilary does depend upon Tertullian, who shares exegetical similarities with Origen. However, Doignon shows that these similarities between Origen and Tertullian are more readily explained by their exploitation of the same exegetical sources (including Irenaeus, Philo and Hippolytus) in their common aversion to Marcionism than by a direct influence of Origen upon Tertullian. In other words, before his exile, Hilary may have received ideas that can also be found in Origen. However, Hilary derives these ideas from Tertullian who occasionally resembles Origen due, not to dependency, but to shared sources.[48]

However, several studies show varying levels of Origenian influence on the post-exilic Hilary. The work of Émile Goffinet showing the parallels between Hilary's *Tractatus super Psalmos* and Origen's various commentaries on the Psalms, despite serious methodological flaws, convincingly demonstrates Hilary's dependence on Origen in his *Instructio* and in his commentaries on Psalms 1, 2, 9, 13 and 14.[49] The work of Alice Whealey on a fragment on the Psalms called the *De Magistris* catena, first attributed to Hippolytus, then to Origen in 1884 by Jean-Baptiste Pitra, helps to clarify Origen's influence on Hilary's *Instructio*.[50] Following Pierre Nautin, she distinguishes between two

---

46 See excursus II, pp. 545–55 in Doignon, *Avant l'exil*.

47 Doignon, *Avant l'exil*, 178.

48 Doignon, *Avant l'exil*, 185: "Hilaire, qui dépend en droite ligne de Tertullien, n'est occasionnellement avant l'exil l'héritier d'Origène que par un jeu d'intermédiaires."

49 Émile Goffinet, *Utilisation d'Origene*. Goffinet's study attributes the Palestinian chains to Origen; however, the work done by von Balthasar, Rondeau, and Mühlenberg have shown that these commentaries derive from Evagrius of Pontus, not Origen. See Hans Urs von Balthasar, "Die Hiera des Evagrius." *Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie* 63 (1939): 86–106; 181–206; Marie-Josèphe Rondeau, "Le Commentaire sur les Psaumes d'Évagre le Pontique," *Orientalia Christiana Periodica* 26 (1960): 327–348; Ekkehard Mühlenberg, *Psalmenkommentare aus der Katenenüberlieferung*, vol. 1 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter), 1975. The index of Mühlenberg is especially helpful for separating the Evagrian material from that published under the name of Origen in Migne (PG 12, 17, 23). For analyses and critiques of Goffinet's study, see Rondeau, ibid.; Gastaldi, *Hilario de Poitiers exégeta*, 49–51; Charles Kannengiesser, "Exégese d'Hilaire," 133.

50 Alice Whealey, "Prologues on the Psalms: Origen, Hippolytus, Eusebius," *Revue Bénédictine* 106 (1996): 234–245. In 1884, Jean-Baptiste Pitra (*Analecta Sacra spicilegio Solesmensi*, vol. 2 [Frascati, 1884], 403–404, 428–435) argued that the bulk of this catena was taken from one of Origen's works on the psalms. He made this argument because it shows numerous parallels with the *Instructio* of Hilary's *Tractatus super Psalmos*. However, Pitra

different Psalm commentaries written by Origen.[51] Origen's first commentary, which was only on the first 15–25 Psalms and was the product of his youth in Alexandria, was written between 222 and 230 AD. The second, more extensive commentary was written in Caesarea between 246 and 247 AD.[52] She concludes that Hilary used only the prologue from Origen's earlier Alexandrian commentary for his own *Instructio*, but he followed this prologue very closely.[53]

György Heidl's study on Origen's influence on Augustine includes an appendix concerning Hilary's relationship to Origen's commentary on Genesis, specifically concerning the theme of the double creation of man.[54] Through a complicated process of cross comparisons with several texts, Heidl comes to the dubious conclusion that Hilary's Tractate on Psalm 129 derives from a no-longer-extant Latin compilation of Origen's *Commentary on Genesis*, done by Novatian as a help for his own *De Trinitate*.

Heidl compares Hilary's *Tractatus super Psalmos* 129.3–6 with the Latin *Tractatus Origenis de libris sacrarum scripturam*, discovered by Batiffol-Wilmart and published in 1900. These 20 homilies were attributed to Origen, and the translator has long been considered to be Gregory of Elvira. Heidl, against the standard scholarly position, argues against positing Gregory as the translator.[55] Heidl concludes, based on the obvious parallels between Hilary's *Tractatus super Psalmos* 129 and *Tractatus Origenis* 1, that both these sources

---

was not careful in noting which elements of the catena do not belong to Origen and so his point that there are so many parallels between the catena and Hilary was ignored by later scholars.

51 Whealey "Prologues on the Psalms," 237, follows Pierre Nautin, *Origène sa vie et son oeuvre*, Christianisme antique 1, (Paris: Beauchesne, 1977), 262–292.

52 In addition to these two commentaries, the Alexandrian and the Caesarean, Origen delivered a series of homilies on the Psalms, c. 239–242. He may also have written a series of notes, or scholia on the Psalms. See Craig Blaising and Carmen Hardin, *Psalms 1–50*, Ancient Christian Commentary on Scripture: Old Testament 7 (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2008), *xix*.

53 Whealey, "Prologues on the Psalms," 238–243.

54 See György Heidl, *Origen's Influence on the Young Augustine: A Chapter of the History of Origenism* (Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press, 2003), 273–298.

55 Heidl offers two arguments against the standard attribution. First, Heidl says that this translation seems to depend upon Rufinus' translation, which would put the date of this work after 404, when Gregory would have been in his nineties, if alive at all. Second, if Rufinus' translation incorporated an earlier Latin translation and this earlier translation was what was used by Gregory, there is still a problem of terminology, namely the *Tractatus Origenis* makes no use of the post-Nicene terminology characteristic of Gregory's *De Fide*. See Heidl's Appendix 3: Some Traces of a Latin Compilation of Origen's Commentary on Genesis (*Origen's Influence*, 237–272).

are indebted to Origen's interpretation of Gen. 1–3 as the double creation of man. Heidl argues that neither Hilary nor the author of the *Tractatus Origenis* knew enough Greek to read Origen in the Greek; rather, they both relied upon a previous Latin compilation of Origen's text.[56] Heidl proposes that Novatian is the author of this Latin compilation of Origen.[57] Heidl believes that Gregory of Elvira also relied on this proposed compilation accomplished by Novatian.[58]

Unfortunately, Heidl's work suffers from his method of comparison. Heidl uses the *Tractatus Origenis* as the standard to which he compares both Hilary's *Tractatus super Psalmos* 129 and Novatian's *De Trinitate* 6.5–7.3. From these comparisons, he argues that both Hilary and the author of the *Tractatus Origenis* depend upon Novatian's hypothetical translation and compilation of Origen, which he then used in the writing of his *De Trinitate*. However, Heidl does not compare Hilary with Novatian for the reason that there is no textual comparison to be made: Novatian's *De Trinitate* demonstrates anti-anthropormorphic argumentation; Hilary's *Tractatus super Psalmos* 129 is concerned with double creation. While Heidl argues that both Novatian's *De Trinitate* and Hilary's *Tractatus super Psalmos* derive from Novatian's hypothetical translation of Origen, the posited relationship of dependence of Hilary upon Novatian regarding Origenian interpretation finds its only support in the later *Tractatus Origenis*, which includes both Novatian's anti-anthropomorphism and Hilary's double creation. Heidl is not able to show in Hilary's own writings any direct Origen influence.

In the case of Hilary's *Tractatus super Psalmos*, there is another question related to the influence of Origen, namely the possible influence of the *Commentarii in Psalmos* by Eusebius of Caesarea.[59] While Hilary's years of exile in the East undoubtedly improved his ability with the Greek language, Jerome observes that Hilary's grasp of Greek was poor and therefore he had his secretary, Heliodore, assist him in translating Origen.[60] Doignon agrees that even after his exile, Hilary only had a rudimentary knowledge of Greek.[61] Furthermore, in his 61st epistle, in which he attributes to Hilary a translation

56 Heidl, *Origen's Influence*, 289.

57 Heidl, *Origen's Influenc*e, 270–271.

58 Heidl, *Origen's Influence*, 120

59 PG 23. Gastaldi provides the best study of the relationship between Eusebius of Caesarea and Hilary (see Gastaldi, *Hilario de Poitiers exégeta*, 58–76).

60 See Jerome, *Epistula* 34.5 (ed. Isidore Hilberg, CSEL 54 [Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1996], 264). Jerome here accuses Heliodore, not Hilary, of mistranslating Origen in Hilary's *Tractatus super Psalmos*.

61 Jean Doignon, *Avant l'exil*, 543. See Doignon's full appendix on Hilary and Greek: ibid., 531–543.

of Origen's Psalm commentaries, Jerome also attributes to Eusebius of Vercelli a now-lost Latin translation of Eusebius of Caesarea's Psalm commentary.[62] Eusebius of Vercelli, like Hilary, was exiled to the East, though Eusebius went to Syria, Cappadocia and finally Upper Egypt, while Hilary went to Phrygia. After their return from exile, Eusebius and Hilary traveled together (towards the end of 362) in Gaul, Italy, and east as far as Sirmium promoting the pro-Nicene cause.[63] If Eusebius of Vercelli indeed translated the *Commentarii in Psalmos* by Eusebius of Caesarea, he would have done so during his exile or after (before his death in 371) making it likely that Hilary would have had knowledge of, and perhaps access to, his friend's work.

Nevertheless, rarely is the possible Latin translation of Eusebius of Caesarea's Psalm commentary taken into account in the study of influences for Hilary's *Tractatus super Psalmos*. Newlands, one of the few to mention the possibility of Eusebius of Vercelli's translation, argues that Hilary's *Tractatus super Psalmos* "is often nearer to Eusebius of Caesarea than to Origen" and that "Hilary's use of Origen probably comes through Eusebius on the Psalms."[64] Gastaldi, on the other hand, argues that the points of contact between Eusebius and Hilary come from their shared source of Origen and not from direct contact.[65] However, Gastaldi himself notes that lack of textual material from Origen limits textual comparison between Hilary and Origen and, in particular, in very few places can texts from all three authors—Hilary, Eusebius of Caesarea, and Origen—be lined up. Gastaldi therefore is very hesitant about his judg-

---

62 Jerome, *Epistula* 61.2 (CSEL 54 577.12–17): si hoc crimen est, arguatur confessor hilarius, qui psalmorum interpretationem et homilias in iob ex libris eius, id est ex graeco, in latinum transtulit, sit in culpa eiusdem confessionis uercellensis eusebius, qui omnium psalmorum commentarios heretici hominis uertit in nostrum eloquium, licet heretica praetermittens optima quaeque transtulerit. Eusebius of Vercellis is accused of translating the Psalm commentary of "his namesake." In *De viris illustribus* 96, Jerome clarifies that this "namesake" is Eusebius of Caesarea.

63 See Ayres, *Nicaea and its Legacy*, 178.

64 G.M. Newlands, *Hilary of Poitiers: A Study in Theological Method* (Bern; Las Vegas: Peter Lang, 1978), 140, 142. Newlands offers a brief comparison of the respective commentaries of Hilary, Eusebius of Vercelli, and Origen on a few Psalms on p. 142.

65 Gastaldi, *Hilario de Poitiers exégeta*, 76. Gastaldi (ibid., 49–76) presents a more in-depth study of the commentaries of Eusebius of Caesarea and Hilary than Newlands (*Study in Theological Method*, 58–76), including several helpful tables comparing the text of Hilary's *Tractatus super Psalmos* with Eusebius of Caesarea's commentary. Gastaldi notes, for example, that in some Psalms Hilary and Eusebius have up to 25 of the same scriptural citations, however, they use these citations differently. Eusebius also customarily presents several different interpretations of each scriptural text, while Hilary prefers to work with just one.

ment that the commentaries of Hilary and Eusebius are related only indirectly. Gastaldi also does not take into account the possibility that Hilary might have had access to a Latin translation of Eusebius' commentary.

The issue of Hilary's dependence upon Origen is further complicated with regard to Hilary's methodology of scriptural exegesis. There are several different opinions regarding Origen's exegetical influence in this area. First, several scholars argue that Hilary's division in the *Tractatus super Psalmos* between exegesis according to the letter and according to the Spirit, as well as his acknowledgement that, at times, there is no literal meaning to the text, demonstrates that Hilary's method of exegesis is in the Alexandrian tradition of allegory and Hilary derives his method from Origen.[66] However, as Simonetti, Kannengeiser, and Burns all note, the exegetical method that Hilary "inherits" from Origen both predates Origen (in Philo, for instance) and can be found independent of Origen's influence (as in Hippolytus).[67] Second, Hilary's method of exegesis remains consistent between the *In Matthaeum* and the *Tractatus super Psalmos*. Goffinet believes that Hilary is able to appropriate from Origen's Psalm commentary so freely because Origen's exegesis was very similar to what Hilary was already doing before any possible Origen influence.[68] Third, in both the *In Matthaeum* and the *Tractatus super Psalmos*, Hilary's conception of *ordo*, as the structuring principle of Scripture that guides and unifies interpretation is uniquely his own and sets him apart from Origen's clear demarcations between the different levels of Scripture.[69] Doignon finds

66 See, for example, Orazzo, *Commento ai Salmi*, 25. However, in his extensive study of Hilary's exegesis Gastaldi (*Hilario de Poitiers exégeta*, 74), argues that Origen's influence is seen more clearly in Hilary's *literal* exegesis than in his allegorical. Casamassa slightly alters the argument by saying that Hilary is practicing in the *Tractatus super Psalmos* the same allegorical exegesis that he already demonstrated in the *In Matthaeum*, with, however, greater prominence of the literal sense resulting from contact with Antiochene, not Alexandrian, exegesis (Antonio Casamassa, "Appunti per lo studio del 'Tractatus super Psalmos' di S. Ilario," *Studia Anselmiana* 27–28 (1951): 237).

67 Manlio Simonetti, "Note sul Commento a Matteo di Ilario di Poitiers," *Vetera Christianorum* 1 (1964): 62–64; Charles Kannengeiser, "*Hilaire de Poitiers* (*saint*)," in *Dictionnaire de spiritualité: Aascétique et mystique, doctrine et histoire*, vol. 6, 466–499 (Paris: G. Beauchesne et ses fils, 1937–1967), 472; Burns, *Christology in Hilary*, 38.

68 See Goffinet, *Utilisation d'Origene*, 163–165.

69 See Burns, *Christology in Hilary*, 45–55. See also Jean-Louis Lemaire, ("Histoire et exégèse dans l'*In Mattheum* d'Hilaire de Poitiers," in *Penser la foi: Recherches en théologie aujourd'hui; Mélanges offerts à Joseph Moingt*, ed. Joseph Doré and Christoph Theobald [Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1993]), who argues that *ordo* is the concept that makes Hilary's exegesis "realist," that is, typological rather than allegorical (like Origen). Doignon argues that in the *In Matthaeum*, Hilary has a method of exegesis completely different from

that Tertullian already uses *ordo*—signaling the divine intention behind biblical facts—as a guiding principle to combat the dualism of Marcion.[70] Burns adds that Hilary's use of *ordo* has Stoic precedents.[71] Hilary's method of reading Scripture according to the divine order finds its precedents in Latin, rather than Alexandrian exegesis. The fact that Hilary's exegesis is accomplished on a spiritual level as well as on a literal level does not, in itself, point to the influence of Origenian exegesis.[72] Hilary's movement of exegesis between literal and spiritual senses, then, is possibly Latin rather than Alexandrian.[73]

A more fruitful avenue of exegetical similarity between Origen and Hilary is found in the prosopological exegesis Hilary employs in the *Tractatus super Psalmos*.[74] Prosopology approaches each text with three basic questions: who is speaking, to whom is he speaking, and what is he speaking about? Basic prosopology was standard Christian exegesis for scriptural passages where it was necessary to distinguish between a plurality of persons—the classic cases being the use of prosopology in Psalms 2, 109, and 144 to distinguish between the Father and the Son. But Origen is the first to systematically apply all the elements of pagan prosopological exegesis to the Psalter, namely, 1) the identification of the speaker, 2) use of the argument of "fittingness" to attach discourse to a character, 3) combination of prosopology and typology, and 4)

---

that of Origen (*Avant l'exil*, 178–179). Kannengiesser takes the opposite view, namely, that Hilary's realist exegesis based on *ratio* was well suited to Origen's spiritual interpretation, allowing Hilary to easily appropriate it (Kannengiesser, "Exégese d'Hilaire," 137). De Margerie considers Hilary's method of discerning the *ordo intelligentiae*, that is, his notion that the sequence of facts points to an inner intelligence or plan, one of Hilary's major exegetical priniciples, present in both the *In Matthaeum* and the *Tractatus super Psalmos* (*Latin Fathers*, 51–52).

70 Jean Doignon, *Avant l'exil*, 237–239.

71 See Burns, *Christology in Hilary*, 50; Doignon, *Avant l'exil*, 251–253; also Lemaire, "Histoire et exégèse," 445.

72 Though it must be noted that Hilary's and Origen's commentaries on Matthew are the only extant patristic commentaries on that gospel that exegete according to the spiritual sense.

73 The position of Thomas Torrance represents a fourth, rather far-fetched option, namely that Hilary was greatly influenced by Origen and Alexandrian exegesis early on but then distanced himself and rejected its basic presuppositions in his later works (Thomas Torrance, "Transition to the West: The Interpretation of Biblical and Theological Statements According to Hilary of Poitiers," in *Divine Meaning: Studies in Patristic Hermeneutics* [Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995], 392).

74 See the excellent treatment of prosoplogy in Origen and Hilary by Rondeau, *Commentaires patristiques*, vol. 2, *Exégèse prosopologique*, 35–97, 323–364.

use of technical vocabulary.[75] Rondeau has shown that while Hilary takes his foundation for prosopology from Tertullian,[76] he develops it in line with the systematic method of Origen.[77]

Nevertheless, an understanding of all exilic influences, both philosophical and theological, must keep in mind the work of Gastaldi showing the consistency of Hilary's vocabulary throughout his writing career.[78] Through his extensive study, Gastaldi shows that there are only three words in the *In Matthaeum* completely absent in the *Tractatus super Psalmos* and only four words in the *Tractatus super Psalmos* that are not present in the *In Matthaeum*.[79] Gastaldi notes that work has already shown that Hilary's technical expressions in the *In Matthaeum* are directly in line with the tradition of Latin rhetoric.[80] The continuity of these expressions throughout Hilary's writing career seems to

75 Rondeau, *Commentaires patristiques*, vol. 2, *Exégèse prosopologique*, 72, 96.

76 Rondeau shows (*Commentaires patristiques*, vol. 2, *Exégèse prosopologique*, 323) that Hilary's prosopological use of the word *persona*, reflects Tertullian's use of *persona* to show a real distinction of subjects in the Godhead (against the Sabellians). Hilary uses *persona* in a Trinitarian context to distinguish between the Father and Son as two different, speaking subjects. This use reflects Tertullian's formula: "the speaker and person spoken of and person spoken to cannot be regarded as one and the same" (see Tertullian, *Aduersus Praxean* 11.4 [ed. A. Kroymann and E. Evans, in *Tertulliani Opera, pars 2: Opera Montanistica*, CCL 2 (Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 1954), 1171.34–35]: non posse unum atque eundem uideri qui loquitur et de quo loquitur et ad quem loquitur). See Chapter 9 "Hilary's Trinitarian Vocabulary: *Persona, Nomen*, and *Natura*" for a fuller discussion of *persona*, the prosopological method, and Hilary's relationship to Tertullian on these issues.

77 Rondeau, *Commentaires patristiques*, vol. 2, *Exégèse prosopologique*, 38. Rondeau argues that even if Hilary comes to different theological conclusions than Origen, he is still using the same method. Hilary's manner of deciphering the speaker according to the category of "fittingness" (83) is reminiscent of Origen, who criticizes Celsus for attributing to Christians things that are not fitting (51).

78 See Gastaldi, *Hilario de Poitiers exégeta*, 77–93. See also Charles, Kannengiesser, "Exégese d'Hilaire," 136; de Margerie, *Latin Fathers*, 55.

79 See Gastaldi, *Hilario de Poitiers exégeta*, 88–89. The 3 words present in the *In Matthaeum* but absent from the *Tractatus super psalmos* are *novitas, reperire*, and *suscipere*. The 4 words present in the *Tractatus super psalmos* but not the *In Matthaeum* are *amphibolum, competere, scrutare*, and *symbolum*.

80 See Gastaldi, *Hilario de Poitiers exégeta*, 90.

indicate that Greek influence—including that of Origen—never significantly altered Hilary's predominantly Latin framework.[81]

Stoic Contributions to Hilary's Soteriology

Hilary's Latin rhetorical education brings him into direct contact with Latin secular traditions within which Stoicism plays a large, if somewhat nebulous, role. In her two-volume study on the Stoic tradition from Latin antiquity through the Latin Christian fathers to the middle ages, Marcia Colish says that while Stoicism "commanded an allegiance from the Latin world of antiquity and the Middle Ages far wider and deeper than that of any of its Hellenistic contemporaries and competitors," nevertheless,

> there is an irrefragible problem that attends the study of the Stoic tradition as it passes from Greece to Rome and from Rome to the Middle Ages. The ancient and middle Stoics who formulated the school's basic doctrines wrote in Greek and their teachings are preserved only in very fragmentary form. The works of the Roman Stoics are far better preserved but they are also far less important from a speculative standpoint. Even so, Seneca is the only one of the Roman Stoics who wrote in Latin. The Latin Stoic tradition is thus, perforce, an indirect tradition.[82]

Therefore the search for Stoic influences in Latin authors cannot proceed according to the common methodology of seeking and analyzing textual parallels. Furthermore, Colish emphasizes the ubiquity of Stoic ideas in Latin antiquity: Stoicism was transmitted primarily not by those who professed themselves Stoics but especially by those engaged in pedagogy.[83]

Therefore Hilary encountered Stoicism in the course of his education, not only through his reading of authors such as Cicero and Seneca, but likely in the figures of his pedagogues. Hilary's use of Tertullian gives him an additional level of indirect contact with Stoicism.

In this section, I will largely limit myself to the various topological areas—bearing a relation on physicalism—in which secondary scholarship sheds light

81 This framework includes spiritual exegesis for which Hilary had a complete vocabulary before his exile (see Gastaldi, *Hilario de Poitiers exégeta*, 90).

82 Marcia Colish, *The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages*, vol. 1 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1985), 1.

83 Colish, *Stoic Tradition*, vol. 1, 2.

on Hilary's appropriation of Stoicism. The methodological difficulties highlighted by Colish have, historically, hindered scholarship addressing the question of Stoic influence on Hilary. However, recent studies are highlighting the ubiquity of Stoic ideas, language, and metaphors in Hilary's thought.[84] These studies generally pursue a single theological topic and suggest Stoic roots. More work, especially synthetic work, needs to be done in this area.

The Stoic Conception of Human Unity

Both Burns and Pettorelli note the Stoic concept of *uniuersitas* as an important influence on Hilary's physicalist soteriology.[85] The Stoics use *uniuersitas* with *ciuitas* to signify the whole universe.[86] For the Stoics, the *uniuersitas* is the universal city, the city of God and men. For example, in *De Natura Deorum*, Cicero presents "the world as a common home or city of gods and people."[87] Burns

---

84 Doignon, *Avant l'exil*, 131; Newlands, *Study in Theological Method*, 84; Burns, *Model for the Christian Life*, 132–133, 158–161, 199, 203–204, 215–216; Weedman, "Martyrdom and Docetism," 26–33; Beckwith, "Suffering without Pain," 84–86; Raphaël Favre, "La Communication des idiomes dans les œuvres de saint Hilaire de Poitiers," *Gregorianum* 17 (1936): 481–514. However, Marcia Colish believes that Stoic influence on Hilary has been overestimated (*The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle* Ages, vol. 2: Stoicism in Christian Latin Thought through the Sixth Century [Leiden: Brill, 1990], 123).

85 Burns, *Christology in Hilary*, 106–108; Pettorelli, "Thème de Sion," 213–214.

86 Burns, *Christology in Hilary*, 107. See also Malcolm Schofield, *The Stoic Idea of the City* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999). Schofield uses Cicero's argumentation from *De natura deorum* 2.3 (Loeb 124) as an example of Stoic understanding of the "cosmic city": "The fundamental premise is the proposition (1) that it is true of men and gods alone that by use of reason they live in accordance with justice and law. This proposition is taken to license the inference that (2) men and gods form a community or a city. It is then assumed (3) that the location of this city is the universe itself" (64–65).

87 Cicero, *De Natura deorum* 2.154 (Loeb 270–272): Restat ut doceam atque aliquando perorem, omnia quae sint in hoc mundo, quibus utantur homines, hominum causa facta esse et parata. Principio ipse mundus deorum hominumque causa factus est, quaeque in eo sunt ea parata ad fructum hominum et inventa sunt. Est enim mundus quasi communis deorum atque hominum domus aut urbs utrorumque; soli enim ratione utentes iure ac lege vivunt. Schofield introduces his presentation of the Stoic conception of the universal or cosmic city by explaining that Diogenes the Cynic's self-description as κοσμοπολίτης was his way of saying that he was at home nowhere—except in the universe itself. The Stoic idea of the cosmic city is then at once utopian and a search for home (see Schofield, *Stoic Idea of the City*, 64–65).

In *De Finibus* 3.19.64 Cicero again says that the world "is like a common city or state of men and gods, and each one of us is part of this world. . . ." (Mundum autem censent regi numine deorum, eumque esse quasi communem urbem et civitatem hominum et deo-

and Pettorelli believe that Hilary appropriates this Stoic conception of the universal city within his physicalist framework. Christ's body is able to function as the city that contains all humanity.[88] Because Christ "is made the flesh of all of us" he is the meeting place of God and men; in Jesus is the assembly of all of humanity, the *uniuersitas*, for his body is the "city" of the Stoics.[89]

---

rum, et unum quemque nostrum eius mundi esse partem; ex quo illud natura consequi, ut communem utilitatem nostrae anteponamus).

From the theme of citizenship in this city, Cicero outlines the natural disposition of humanity that is oriented toward common interest: "we are naturally disposed towards the gathering of men and towards fellowship and community of humanity" (Cicero, *De Finibus* 4.2.4 [Loeb 304]: natosque esse ad congregationem hominum et ad societatem communitatemque generis humani.)

Seneca picks up this theme of global citizenship. Seneca, *De Otio* 4.1, in *De Otio; De Brevitate uitae*, ed. G.D. Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 39: Duas res publicas animo complectamur, alteram magnam et vere publicam qua di atque homines continentur, in qua non ad hunc angulum respicimus aut ad illum sed terminos civitatis nostrae cum sole metimur, alteram cui nos adscripsit condicio nascendi . . . Also *De Otio* 6.4 (41): nos certe sumus qui dicimus et Zenonem et Chrysippum maiora egisse quam si duxissent exercitus, gessissent honores, leges tulissent; quas non uni ciuitati, sed toti humano generi tulerunt. See also his *Epistulae Morales* 28.4 (Loeb vol. 1, 200): Cum hac persuasione vivendum est: "non sum uni angulo natus, patria mea totus hic mundus est."

88 We should note that Hilary's christological use of *uniuersitas* is limited to four passages in his corpus: see *In Matt*. 11.3, *De Trin*. 11.16, *Tr. ps.* 54.9 and 64.4. Burns argues that for Hilary, while *uniuersitas, corpus*, and *ciuitas* are all terms that signify a unity of the human race, only *uniuersitas* points to a unity that is *not* initiated by Christ and is prior to him and encompasses the whole human race. When Hilary uses the two words, *uniuersitas* and *nos*, together—as in "he contains in himself the nature of us all (*uniuersitatis nostrae*) through the assumption of the flesh" (*De Trin*. 11.16 [CCL 62A 544.1–2]: Ipse autem uniuersitatis nostrae in se continens ex carnis adsumptione naturam . . .), where through the genitives of *uniuersitatis nostrae* Hilary abstracts and expands *natura* to contain all humanity—he signals his technical use of these words to speak of Christ's assumption of all humanity. See Rondeau, *Commentaires patristiques*, vol. 2, *Exégèse prosopologique*, 357. Pettorelli also notes ("Thème de Sion," 230) that according to the *Thesaurus linguae latinae*, the expression *uniuersitas generis humani* prior to Hilary was only employed three times: Cicero, *De Natura deorum* 2.164 (Loeb 280), Pliny, *Naturalis historia* 7.1.6 (ed. H. Rackham, Loeb Classical Library [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1942], vol. 2 510), and Salvian *De Gubernatione dei* 3.57 (*Œuvres*, vol. 2: *Du Gouvernement de dieu*, ed. Georges Lagarrique, Sources chrétiennes 220 [Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1975], 228.7–8). Pettorelli argues, as I do, that Hilary uses the phrase *uniuersitas nostra* to mean *uniuersitas generis humani*. See Pettorelli's list of proof texts for this argument of equivalency: ibid., 230, no. 61 IV.

89 *In Matt*. 11.3, *De Trin*. 11.16, *Tr. ps.* 54.9 and 64.4. See Pettorelli, "Thème de Sion," 222.

In his book on Hilary's *Tractatus super Psalmos*, Burns, like Pettorelli, shows that Hilary's use of "city" as the universal home of humanity and God is an expansion of a popular theme in Latin rhetorical literature.[90] Burns considers the "city" to be Hilary's "master metaphor," and it is a metaphor he derives from popular Stoicism.[91]

The Stoic conception of universal fellowship in the cosmic city depends upon the rational nature that is shared by both gods and men. For example, Cicero says:

> Therefore, since there is nothing better than reason, and this exists in both man and god, the first association of man with god is in reason. But those who have reason in common also have right reason in common; and since that is law, we men must also be considered to be associated with the gods in law. But further, those who have law in common have justice in common. And those who have these things in common must be held to belong to the same city.[92]

---

90 See Burns, *Model for the Christian Life*, 95–100. Orazzo, "Ilario di Poitiers e la *universa caro*," 399–419, continues in the line Burns marks out. In his study of the central terms in Hilary's teaching of the incarnation, Orazzo turns not only to Hilary's theological predecessors, but to classical Latin usage. Thus for *ciuitas* he directs his reader, on p. 406, to E. Albertatio's *Studi di diritto romano*.

91 See Burns, *Model for the Christian Life*, 34, 71, 100, 102, 138. Burns discusses Hilary's use of the image of the "keys to the city" in *Tr. ps. Instr*. 24 and *Tr. ps*. 13.1, the image of the "city in plague" in *Tr. ps.* 13.3, and the "heavenly city" in *Tr. ps*. 121.1, 121.4, 121.15, and 136.5. In *Tr. ps*. 13.3 Hilary uses the "city" to signify universal involvement. Everyone in the city, namely all humanity, suffer from the plague of sin. In Latin rhetorical culture the city is a common metaphor to signify a shared situation and destiny. This use is based on practical reality: every inhabitant alike shares the woes of a city sacked. Hilary Christianizes this metaphor by showing that the danger is not from an outside enemy but from the interior force of sin.

92 Cicero, *De legibus* 1.23 (in *De Re publica, De Legibus, Cato Maior de senectute, Laelius de amicitia*, ed. J.G.F. Powell [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006], 168.15–23): Est igitur, quoniam nihil est ratione melius, eaque <est> et in homine et in deo, prima homini cum deo rationis societas; inter quos autem ratio, inter eosdem etiam recta ratio {et} communis est; quae cum sit lex, lege quoque consociati homines cum dis putandi sumus; inter quos porro est communio legis, inter eos communio iuris est. Quibus autem haec sunt {inter eos communi} <*> ei ciuitatis eiusdem habendi sunt.

Reason is proper to the nature of both gods and men and the possession of a rational nature is the requisite for citizenship in the cosmic city.[93] We also see in this passage how Cicero moves from reason to justice: in his descriptions of this common city, the citizens' participation in reason always leads to ethical injunctions—reason leads ultimately to social obligation.[94] In the end, it is the social virtue of justice that is found only in men and gods and so it is that virtue that binds men to gods.[95]

The Stoics understand the unity of the members of this city not as a gathering of many, but as a single totality, and they even use the language of a body (*corpus*) to speak of the unified entity of the city.[96] This connection between the city and a body already has wide-spread currency in classical literature.[97] Hilary makes the same connection between the universality of the Stoic city and the body. For example, when Hilary in Book 2 of the *De Trinitate* speaks

93 See Schofield's explanation of Cicero's understanding of reason in *De legibus* 1.23 (Powell 168–169): Schofield, *Stoic Idea of the City*, 69–74. Schofield explains that the Stoics reject the idea that the authority of law is external, that is, that it comes from the state. Rather, they insist that law derives its authority from right reason, namely individual good conscience. However, that Stoic argumentation makes it difficult for Cicero to show how reason can serve as the basis for unity: just because two people share right reason does not, in and of itself, mean they form a community. See also Cicero, *De Officiis* 1.153 (trans. Walter Miller, Loeb Classical Library [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1913], 156–158) where Cicero gives wisdom, namely the knowledge of those things concerned with the bonds between men and gods, pride of place: . . . illa autem sapientia, quam principem dixi, rerum est divinarum et humanarum scientia, in qua continetur deorum et hominum communitas et societas inter ipsos; ea si maxima est, ut est, certe necesse est, quod a communitate ducatur officium, id esse maximum.

94 Schofield, *Stoic Idea of the City*, 72: "So the reason which men and gods have in common is not simply prescriptive reason without further qualification. It is prescriptive reason instructing them how to treat each other as social animals. . . . It follows that the Stoic idea of a city is nothing but an idea of a community founded on common acceptance of social norms."

95 Cicero *De legibus* 1.25 (Powell 170.2–8): ex quo efficitur illud, ut is agnoscat deum, qui unde ortus sit, quasi recordetur. Iam vero virtus eadem in homine ac deo est, neque alio ullo in genere praeterea; est autem virtus nihil aliud nisi perfecta et ad summum perducta <natura>; naturalis est igitur homini cum deo similitudo. Quod cum ita sit, quae tandem esse potest propior certiorve cognatio?

96 According to Pettorelli, the best way of understanding this totality—which is not an abstract but a concrete reality—is as a body ("Thème de Sion," 231–32).

97 Lewis and Short list Cicero, Livy, Tacitus, and Ambrose as authors who make use of the metonymic connection between *corpus* and the state (Charlton Lewis and Charles Short, *A Latin Dictionary Founded on Andrews' edition of Freund's Latin dictionary* [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1879], 473.

of the "body of the *uniuersitas* of humanity" he is accomplishing two things:[98] 1) he is highlighting the Stoic conception of unity; 2) he is going even one step further than the Stoics. Whereas the Stoics understood the unity of the universal city from shared reason to be such that its members were joined into something that can metonymically be called a body, Hilary now takes all abstraction out of the scenario. The members of this city are not like a body; they are a body: they are the concrete body of the particular person Jesus Christ.

Hilary develops the Stoic description of the universal bond of humanity and gods as a "city" through his application of this idea of the city to his understanding of the relationship of humanity, each to another and to God in the body of Christ. However, Hilary argues an entirely different reason for this fellowship. Hilary, as we saw, uses the Stoic conception of *uniuersitas* to place the universal city in Christ's body. However, in his emphasis on the body of Christ as the basis for unity in the city, Hilary does not follow the Stoics in seeing reason as the ultimate basis for fellowship in this city. Also unlike the Stoics, Hilary does not use the metaphor of the common city always as the springboard for a discussion of ethical imperatives. Human participation in the city of Christ's body is as often a demonstration of Christ's power to draw all humanity into himself in the incarnation as it is a prescription for moral rectitude.

Burns is quick to point out that several other Christian Latin writers share this expanded notion of the city or use "body" as a term to designate the unity of believers.[99] For example, Tertullian uses *ciuitas* to speak of Christ's building of the Church, and *corpus* to speak of the unity of believers.[100] Cyprian uses *corpus* to speak of the body of Christ in an extended sense.[101] Lactantius is very

98 *De Trin*. 2.24 (CCL 62 60.7–9): perque huius admixtionis societatem sanctificatum in eo uniuersi generis humani corpus existeret.

99 Burns, *Christology in Hilary*, 104–106.

100 For *ciuitas* see, for example, *Aduersus Marcionem* 3.23 (ed. A. Kroymann, in *Tertulliani Opera, pars 1: Opera Catholica; Aduersus Marcionem*, CCL 1 [Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 1954], 540.3–7): Abstulit enim dominus sabaoth a iudaea et ab hierusalem inter cetera et prophetam et sapientem architectum, spiritum scilicet sanctum, qui aedificat ecclesiam, templum scilicet et domum et ciuitatem dei. For *corpus* and *congregatio*, see *Apologeticum* 39.1–2 (ed. E. Dekkers, in *Tertulliani Opera, pars 1: Opera Catholica; Aduersus Marcionem*, CCL 1 [Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 1954], 150.4–6): Corpus sumus de conscientia religionis et disciplinae unitate et spei, foedere. Coimus in coetum et congregationem facimus, ut ad deum quasi manu facta precationibus ambiamus.

101 Cyprian usually bases this extension of the body of Christ into the Church on a moral unity. See, for example, *De Ecclesiae catholicae unitate* 23 (ed. M. Bévenot, in *Sancti Episcopi Opera, pars 1*, CCL 3 [Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 1972], 266.562–567): Unus deus est et christus unus, et una ecclesia eius et fides una, et plebs in solidam corporis uni-

interested in the *ciuitas* as an eschatological reality.[102] Nevertheless, though these other writers appropriate the extended use of this terminology as found in the Stoicism of Latin secular culture, none of them develop this terminology in a physicalist sense as Hilary does.

One explanation for why Hilary's appropriation of the Stoic conception of the universal city leads to physicalism while the appropriation of this same concept by other Latin theologians—such as Tertullian, Cyprian, and Lactantius—does not, is that Hilary combines *uniuersitas* with the Stoic conception of the *humani generis*, which advocates a unity of the human race that is independent of Christ. Hilary infuses his use of the Stoic *humani generis* with his exegesis of the Pauline Adam-Christ parallel.[103] Hilary reads Paul as arguing that all humanity was present in Adam and so suffers Adam's fall, and

---

tatem concordiae glutino copulata. Scindi unitas non potest nec corpus unum discidio compaginis separari, diuulsis laceratione uisceribus in frusta discerpi; quicquid a matrice discesserit, seorsum uiuere et spirare non poterit: substantiam salutis amittit. However, occasionally Cyprian speaks of the unity of this body in a way that transcends moral unity and seems to imply a natural unity: see *Ad Demetrianum* 19 (ed. Manlio Simonetti, in *Praefatio ad libellos ad Donatum, De Mortalitate, Ad Demetrianum, De Opere et eleemosynis, De Zelo et liuore, De Dominica oratione, De Bono patientiae*, CCL 3A [Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 1976], 46.368–371): Quamdiu enim corpus hoc permanet commune cum ceteris, sit necesse est et corporalis condicio communis nec separari generi humano ab inuicem datur, nisi istinc de saeculo recedatur. See also Cyprian, *Epistula* 63.13, ed. G.F. Diercks, CCL 3C (Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 1996), 406–409.

102 See, for example, *Divinae institutiones* 7.26.1 (in *Opera omnia*, ed. Samuel Brandt, CSEL 19 [Prague: F. Tempsky, 1890], 665.8–13): sed idem, cum mille anni regni hoc est septem milia coeperint terminari, soluetur denuo et custodia emissus exibit atque omnes gentes quae tunc erunt sub dicione iustorum concitabit, ut inferant bellum sanctae ciuitati. et colligetur ex omni orbe terrae innumerabilis populus nationum et obsidebit et circumdabit ciuitatem.

103 For example, in *Tr. ps.* 59.4 Hilary's commentary on the verse "God, you have spurned and destroyed us; you have been angry and merciful to us," manifests his use of both Pauline and Stoic thought.

He says: "And indeed these things are not more fitting to Israel than to the entirety of the human race (*uniuersitas humani generis*) since from one man came unto all the sentence of death and the labor of life, when it says *the earth is cursed in your works* (Gen. 3:17), but now through one man unto all has abounded the gift of life and the grace of justification, so that those whose earth was cursed now may be conformed to God according to the body." (*Tr. ps.* 59.4 [CCL 61 185.1–6]: Et haec quidem non magis ad Israel quam ad uniuersitatem humani generis aptata sunt, quia ex uno in omnes sententia mortis et uitae labor exiit, cum dictum est: *Maledicta terra in operibus tuis* (Gen. 3:17), nunc autem per unum in omnes donum uitae et iustificationis gratia abundauit, ut quorum terra maledicta est, horum nunc conformia Deo corpora sint.)

likewise all humanity is present in Christ and so experiences the transformative effects of his life, death, and resurrection. Within this scriptural framework, Hilary also appropriates two important features of the Stoic notion of the *humani generis*. First, Stoicism assumes a unity of the human race that is, obviously, not dependent on Christ.[104] Second, the unified entirety of the human race is marred by its predilection to evil.

In his insistence on speaking of the entire human race (*humani generis*), and his view that humanity, before the grace of Christ, is cursed by death and labor, Hilary has Stoic precedent in both language and position. *Humani generis* has a history in Stoic writing wherein it signifies the unity of the human race and furthermore a unity that is manifested by every human's participation in evil action. Cicero, for example, says that "the human race is similar one to another not only in right actions but even in conspicuous perversities."[105] Seneca also demonstrates this dreary view of human nature, saying "You wish that the whole human race (*humanum generi*) were innocent, which may hardly be."[106] We find this conception of human unity expressed in the same language by both the Stoics and Hilary, that is, with the language of *humani generis*. We also find the pessimistic Stoic conception of this unity reflected in Hilary's understanding of the unity of humanity in sin (in Adam) prior to its unity in good (in Christ).

Rom. 5:18 is clearly in the background of Hilary's extension of the scriptural application from Israel to the entire human race. Hilary wants to clarify that the combination of destruction and mercy apply not only to Israel but to the entirety of the human race (*uniuersitas humani generis*) because the entire human race has experienced the curse from Adam and the mercy of salvation from Christ.

104 Burns, *Christology in Hilary*, 107.

105 Cicero, *De legibus* 1.31 (Powell 173.5–6): Nec solum in rectis, sed etiam in pravitatibus insignis est humani generis similitudo.

106 Seneca, *De Constantia sapientis* 4.3 (in *Four Dialogues*, ed. C.D.N. Costa [Warminster: Aris & Phillips Ltd., 1994], 104): Rem difficilem optas humano generi, innocentiam; et non fieri eorum interest qui facturi sunt, non eius qui pati ne si fiat quidem potest. The human race is, in summary, full of vice and error; see Seneca, *Ad Lucilium epistulae morales* 108.13 (Loeb vol. 2, 238): Ego certe cum attalum audirem in vitia, in errores, in mala vitae perorantem, saepe miseritus sum generis humani et illum sublimem altiorem que humano fastigio credidi. See also Seneca, *Ad Lucilium epistulae morales* 71.15 (Loeb vol. 2, 80–82) where he quotes Cato discussing the fate of humanity to be condemned to mortality: Itaque ut M. Cato, cum aevum animo percucurrerit, dicet: 'omne humanum genus, quod que est quod que erit, morte damnatum est: omnes, quae usquam rerum potiuntur urbes quae que alienorum imperiorum magna sunt decora, ubi fuerint, aliquando quaeretur et vario exitii genere tollentur: alias destruent bella, alias desidia pax que ad inertiam versa consumet et magnis opibus exitiosa res, luxus.'

Hilary could have derived his universal sense of the city directly from Stoic traditions or indirectly via their appropriation in his Latin theological predecessors. Stoicism provides a base for seeing humanity as a unified entity who, as a single totality, live together with the gods in a "city." Hilary combines the Stoic conception of the city with its presentation of a humanity united in its predilection for evil and then reads these Stoic ideas through the framework of the Pauline Adam-Christ parallel. The result is that Hilary appropriates this Stoic notion of the universal city in a way that is unique among Latin Christians: he both Christianizes and concretizes this conception by specifically calling this city of all humanity the body of Christ.[107]

Stoic Anthropology and Psychology

The Complementarity of Body and Soul

In Chapter 6, we will look at Hilary's anthropology and his discussion of the relationship between the body and the soul. Burns and Pettorelli argue that Hilary's anthropology manifests another area of Stoic influence, namely the Stoic belief in the compatibility and complementarity of the body and soul.[108] Echoes of the Stoic understanding of the relationship of spirit and matter can be found in Latin authors such as Cicero, Seneca, and Claudius Mamertinus.[109] Burns believes that this theme is mediated to Hilary through Tertullian. For

---

107 See *In Matt.* 4.12 (SC 254 130.3–9): Civitatem carnem quam adsumpserat nuncupat, quia, ut civitas ex varietate ac multitudine consistit habitantium, ita in eo per naturam suscepti corporis quaedam universi generis humani congregatio continetur. Atque ita et ille ex nostra in se congregatione fit civitas et nos per consortium carnis suae sumus civitatis habitatio.

108 Both Burns (*Model for the Christian Life*, 203) and Pettorelli ("Thème de Sion," 228–229) conclude that Hilary's conception of the relationship between the soul and body reflects Stoic, rather than Platonic influences. The first they associate with complementarity between body and soul, and the second with dichotomy between the two. Newlands also says that Hilary's theological anthropology is indebted to Stoic anthropology but he focuses on epistemology and a stress on moral values, rather than the body soul complemntarity (Newlands, *Study in Theological Method*, 89).

Durst, I believe incorrectly, concludes the opposite, namely that Hilary has a Platonic dualistic conception of the divide between soul and body, to the extent that the soul is trapped in the body, in both the *In Matthaeum* and the *Tractatus super Psalmos* (Durst, *Eschatologie des Hilarius*, 21). Fierro likewise concludes that Hilary's anthropology is Platonic (Fierro, *Sobre la gloria*, 334). However, Hilary's emphasis on the resurrection, and especially on the corporality of the resurrection, is thoroughly un-Platonic. See Chapter 6 "Christ the Mediator and the Double Creation of Man" for a lengthier discussion of Hilary's anthropology.

109 See Burns, *Model for the Christian Life*, 204.

example, in *De anima* 5, Tertullian cites the Stoics Cleanthes and Chryssipus to argue for the relationship of cooperation between the soul and the body.[110] In the *In Matthaeum*, Hilary follows these arguments for cooperation between body and soul even as far as attributing corporality to the soul as the Stoics and Tertullian do. However, by the time of the *Tractatus super Psalmos*, Hilary rejects the Stoic presentation of the soul as corporeal and regards souls as purely spiritual in accordance with the two-fold creation of man: soul from spirit, body from earth.[111] Hilary does continue, in the *Tractatus super Psalmos*, to follow the Stoic understanding of the complementarity of the body and soul, even when he rejects the soul's corporeality.

Pain vs. Suffering

In Chapter 4 we will see that one aspect of Hilary's christology—namely Christ's capacity for pain and suffering—has been the subject of much scholarly discussion. Hilary's assertion that Christ undergoes the objective experience of pain without the subjective experience of suffering has led scholars such as Harnack and Hanson to argue that Hilary's christology is docetic.[112] However, the argument—begun in 1906 by Anton Beck and made influential in 1936 by Raphaël Favre[113]—that Hilary makes a coherent and non-docetic use of Stoic psychology in his christology, is now widely accepted.[114] Appropriating a Stoic psychology, Hilary argues that while Christ experiences suffering, he does not

110 See Burns' discussion in *Model for the Christian Life*, 214–216.

111 See Durst, *Eschatologie des Hilarius*, 24. For the soul as corporeal, see *In Matt.* 5.8 (SC 254 158.14–15, 17–20): Nihil est quod non in substantia sua et creatione corporeum sit. . . . Nam et animarum species siue obtinentium corpora siue corporibus exsulantium corpoream tamen naturae suae substantiam sortiuntur, quia omne quod creatum est in aliquo sit necesse est. Compare to Tertullian *De carne Chr.* 11: Omne quod est, corpus et sui generis. Nihil est incorporale, nisi quod non est. For Hilary's later rejection of the corporality of the soul, see *Tr. ps.* 129.4 where Hilary argues that the soul is the part of man that is made in the image of God and since God is not corporal neither is the soul.

112 Harnack, *History of Dogma*, vol. 4, 140–148; see especially footnote 2 on page 140. Hanson, *Search for the Christian Doctrine of God*, 501.

113 Anton Beck, "Die Lehre des hl. Hilarius von Poitiers über die Leidensfähigheit Christi," *Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie* 30 (1906): 108–122, 295–310. Favre, "Communication des idiomes," 481–514.

114 As, for example, by Doignon, *Avant l'exil*, 376; Burns, *Christology in Hilary*, 89–91; Beckwith, "Suffering without Pain," 84–86; Weedman, "Martyrdom and Docetism," 26–33; and Jarred Mercer, "Suffering for Our Sake: Christ and Human Destiny in Hilary of Poitiers's *De Trinitate*," *Journal of Early Christian Studies* 22 (2014): 543–546.

give this suffering emotional weight and so transfer the objective experience of suffering into the subjective experience of pain.[115]

Doignon, Burns, Beckwith, Weedman, and Mercer—following Beck and Favre—argue that Hilary's account of Christ, who objectively experiences the blow of pain (*pati*) without undergoing the psychological experience of suffering (*dolere*), reflects the Stoic ideal of the wise man who is able to achieve a degree of impassibility.[116] The Stoic wise man might experience the infliction of pain on his body, through sickness or a beating for example, but his mastery over his own soul will allow him to avoid the unnatural and defective translation of that experience into the psychological passion of suffering. The Stoics place the experience of suffering in the soul, not the body, and the well-ordered soul should follow the directives of reason. For the Stoic wise man, bodily pain (like pleasure) should be a matter of psychological indifference.[117]

Christ's divinity purifies and strengthens his human soul with the result that he is able to practice the Stoic ideal of psychological indifference to pain.[118] In this way Christ experiences pain but does not suffer.

---

115 See Beckwith, "Suffering without Pain," 84–86. In addition, both Burns and Favre have highlighted Hilary's distinction between *pati* and *dolere*: the first is the experience of a physical blow, while the second is consciousness of the blow. Hilary lets Christ experience the first, but he denies that Christ experiences the internal anguish of the second. They both demonstrate that this distinction, and Hilary's method of locating Christ's sufferings within a human psychology, is influenced by Stoic psychology (Burns, *Christology in Hilary*, 89; Favre, "Communication des idiomes," 490–491).

116 However, Colish argues against this interpretation because while the Stoic sage attains to a rational mastery of the passions, Colish believes Hilary presents Christ as completely anesthetized to pain (*Stoic Tradition*, vol. 2, 124).

117 See Weedman's explanation in "Martyrdom and Docetism," 29–31.

118 See, for example, *De Trin*, 10.44: "Since the sensation of an animated body lives on account of its association with the soul that is infused into the body, and the soul that is mixed with (*permixta*) the body vivifies the body itself to feel the pain that afflicts it, so, where the soul in the blessed heat of its earthly hope and faith has despised the beginnings of an earthly origin in its body, a body is also formed which has sensation and spirit in its sufferings, so that it ceases to feel the pain which it endures. What need is there to say anything more about the nature of the Lord's body and about the Son of man who comes down from heaven?" ([CCL 62A 497.7–14]: Nam cum per transfusae in corpus animae consortium sensus animati corporis uiuat, et ipsum ad inlatorum dolorem corpus anima corpori permixta uiuificet,—quae ubi caelestis spei ac fidei suae beato calore terrenae in corpore suo originis despexit exordium, sui quoque sensus ac spiritus corpus efficitur in dolore, ut pati se desinat sentire quod patitur;—et quid nobis de natura dominici corporis et descendentis de caelo fili hominis adhuc sermo sit?)

Stoic Physics and Mixture Theory

While there is no scholarship connecting Stoic mixture theory to Hilary,[119] there are strong reasons—from both primary and secondary sources—to consider whether Hilary appropriates Stoic mixture theory as the underlying metaphysics to explain how Christ can assume all of humanity.

Stoics view the world as divided into two principles: the active principle (God/Pneuma/Logos) and the passive principle (matter).[120] Stoic physics provides the rationale to explain how these two principles interact. According to Stoicism, both active and passive principles must be corporeal because only bodies can act or be acted upon.[121] Within this framework, the Stoics offer three types of interaction between active and passive principles.[122] The three varieties of interaction are juxtaposition (παράθεσις), mixture/blending (μῖξις/κρᾶσις), and fusion (σύγχυσις).[123] In juxtaposition the two principles or ingredients interact only on the surface and so coexist one alongside the other as in a mixture of barley and lentils. Mixture applies to solids, while blending applies to liquids, but the two terms refer to the same type of interaction wherein the two ingredients mutually coextend (ἀντιπαρεκτείνω/ἀντιπαρήκω) to create a union of the two where the original qualities of the two elements persist as proven by the ability to later separate the mixture into its two constitutive ingredients.[124] This type of mixture is seen in the examples of water and wine,

---

119 In a footnote, Ladaria compares a passage in Hilary's *De Trinitate* with Tertullian's use of Stoic mixture theory. He does not, however, go so far as to suggest that Hilary himself is making use of the Stoic model (Ladaria, *Cristología de Hilario*, 66, no. 110).

120 For a clarification of the relationship between the Stoic physics of pneuma and Stoic mixture theory see Robert Todd, *Alexander of Aphrodisias on Stoic Physics A Study of the* De Mixtione *with Preliminary Essays, Text, Translation and Commentary* (Leiden: Brill, 1976), 30–49.

121 See, for example, Cicero, *Acad*. 1.39. See Richard Sorabji, *Matter, Space and Motion: Theories in Antiquity and their Sequal* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), 37: "The Stoics believed that matter was something real and something acted on, that acting or being acted on was the criterion for being fully real, and that only body could satisfy this criteria."

122 See the excellent treatment of the Stoic theory of blending with an extensive use of the primary sources in Todd, *Alexander on Stoic Physics*, 21–72. For a brief explanation of Stoic mixture theory along with a selection of primary source material, see Long and Sedley, *The Hellensistic Philosophers*, vol. 1, 290–294. The most important sources for Stoic mixture theory are Alexander of Aphrodisias (*On Mixture* 3 216.14–217.2; 4 217.26–26) and Arius Didymus (*Fragment* 28, in Stobaeus, *Ecologae* 1.17.4).

123 See Alexander of Aphrodisias, *On Mixture* 3 216.14–217.2.

124 The main difference between Stoic mixture theory and Aristotelian theory of predominance is that the Aristotelian theory says that the constituent ingredients persist only

iron in fire, and body and soul. In fusion the two ingredients perish in the process of producing a totally new resultant that contains neither the original substances nor their qualities. The second of these three options, namely mixture, has a history in early christology.

On the level of secondary scholarship, in 1985, Colish argued that both Tertullian and Augustine make a christological use of Stoic mixture theory.[125] In 1998, Ronald Heine demonstrated the importance of Stoic mixture theory in the christology of Callistus and early third century Roman monarchianism.[126] In 2013, Anthony Briggman showed Irenaeus' use of Stoic mixture theory in both christology and soteriology.[127] These studies have demonstrated that Stoic mixture theory had important theological currency in the patristic West.[128] Irenaeus, Callistus, Tertullian, and Augustine all use Stoic mixture theory to explain the interaction between the divinity and humanity in Christ. As with the soul and body, there is a mutual interpenetration that creates a true union wherein nevertheless the characteristics of both principles—in Christ's case, God and humanity—remain. Furthermore, Irenaeus uses Stoic mixture theory in a soteriological context to explain the union of human beings with God.[129]

On the level of primary evidence, I believe that Hilary does demonstrate a knowledge of the details of Stoic mixture theory. For example, in the *De Trinitate* Hilary uses both the definition and one of the classic examples of Stoic mixture—water and wine—to explain that the miracle of Christ's transformation of water into wine at Cana is not an example of Stoic mixture because the water ceases to exist and is transformed into something else: "this was not a mixture (*permixtio*) but a creation, and a creation that did not begin

---

potentially after the union while the Stoic theory says they exist actually. See Sorabji, *Matter, Space and Motion*, 67–69; Todd, *Alexander on Stoic Physics*, 57.

125 Colish, *Stoic Tradition*, vol. 1, 22–24, 202. For Tertullian's knowledge of the different types of Stoic combinations, including mixture, which he attributes to Christ, see Tertullian, *Aduersus Praxean* 27. For Augustine's application of mixture theory to immaterial elements, see Augustine, *Epistle* 137.12.

126 Ronald Heine, "The Christology of Callistus," *Journal of Theological Studies* 49 (1998): 56–91.

127 Anthony Briggman, "Irenaeus' Christology of Mixture," *Journal of Theological Studies* 64 (2013): 516–555.

128 Briggman hypothesizes that Stoic mixture theory had currency in the Roman church of the second century ("Irenaeus' Christology of Mixture," 555). However, if Tertullian and Augustine also use Stoic mixture theory, it is even more wide-spread, both chronologically and temporally, than Briggman suggests.

129 Briggman, "Irenaeus' Christology of Mixture," 541–544.

from itself but from one thing arises into another."[130] While Hilary believes that the miracle of Cana does not rightly demonstrate a true mixture, he says that the body and soul do. In *De Trinitate* 10.14, Hilary discusses the relationship of the soul and body. He argues that one proof of the reality of this as a true mixture is the Stoic criterion of mutual coextension: the mutual interpenetration of soul and body allows bodies to feel pain. "They (bodies) experience either pleasure or pain by the infiltration of the soul, which gets hold of them and penetrates them according to the circumstances in which they exist."[131] Without the soul, bodies would be a dull lifeless mass. When flesh is cut off from the body, "it does not feel anything since the mixture (*permixtio*) with the soul no longer remains with it."[132]

Though Hilary demonstrates knowledge of Stoic mixture theory, it is not clear that he views mixture theory as useful within a christological or soteriological schema as Irenaeus, Callistus, Tertullian, and Augustine do. There are, in fact, several reasons to conclude that Hilary does not make use of Stoic mixture theory as a metaphysical support for his physicalist soteriology. First, Stoic mixture theory depends upon a materialist view of the universe that Hilary does not share.[133] Second, Hilary seems to have a negative view of the end result of a Stoic mixture as disorganized or confused. Third, the Stoics themselves discount the possibility of a mixture of two individuals.

Though the technical language of Stoic mixture theory is in Greek, a study of Irenaeus reveals the Latin translations of this terminology. While Irenaeus wrote his *Against Heresies* in Greek, much of it survives only in Latin translation. In Irenaeus' use of mixture theory, we can highlight certain key Latin terms that render the Greek technical language.[134] The important terms are *mixtio* and its forms (*commixtio, miscere*) to render μῖξις/κρᾶσις;[135] *unire* to

130 *De Trin.* 3.5 (CCL 62 76.10–11): Non permixtio fuit sed creatio, et creatio non a se coepta sed ex alio in aliud existens.

131 *De Trin*. 10.14 (CCL 62A 469.5–7): Ex quodam enim obtinentis se penetrantis que animae transcursu, secundum ea in quibus erit, aut oblectatur aut laeditur.

132 *De Trin*. 10.14 (CCL 62A 469.11–470.15): Et si quando accedente uitio pars aliqua corrupta membrorum sensum uiuae carnis amiserit, ea cum uel desecabitur uel uretur dolorem quisquis esse potuisset, non manente in ea animae permixtione, non sentiet.

133 Though Colish argues that Augustine does not allow his belief in the immateriality of the principles to preclude his use of Stoic mixture theory (*Stoic Tradition*, 202).

134 See Briggman ("Irenaeus' Christology of Mixture") for an explanation of Irenaeus' use of these terms and a study of the probable Greek terminology underlying them. For *mixtio* see pp. 541–543; for *unire* see pp. 528–531; for *participare* see pp. 532–534

135 Tertullian also uses *mixtio* as when he says that Christ is a man mixed (*mixtus*) with God (see Tertullian, *Apologeticum* 21.14; *De Carne Christi* 15). However, Tertullian denies that

refer to the union of mixture in contradistinction to the results of either juxtaposition or fusion; and *participare* to signify the mutual interpenetration of ἀντιπαρεκτείνω/ἀντιπαρήκω.

Hilary makes limited use of the technical terminology found in Ireaneus to signify a Stoic-type mixture: he uses forms of *mixtio*, he does not use *unire*, and he uses participation language, but not that of Irenaeus. In the quotations from the *De Trinitate* I cited above, Hilary uses *permiscere* as the technical term to designate Stoic mixture. He uses another form of *mixtio* to speak of the relationship between Christ's incarnate body and all humanity: "he [the Son of God] received the nature of flesh in himself when he was made man of a virgin, and through the fellowship of this mixture (*admixtio*), the body of the entire human race might be sanctified in him."[136] His use of *admixtio* here, at first glance, seems to demonstrate that Hilary views the relationship between the Son of God and all humanity, which takes place in Christ's incarnate body, as a Stoic mixture.

Irenaeus also uses the language of participation to convey the mutual interpenetration of a Stoic mixture. While Hilary does not use *participare* as found in Irenaeus, he does use another term signifying participation, namely *consortio*.[137] In Hilary's explanation in *De Trinitate* 10.14 of the soul as a *permixtio*, he says that there is an association of participation, or *consortio*, between soul and body. He says: "It is the nature of bodies that by their association (*consortio*) with the soul they are animated with the perception of a

---

Christ is a *mixtura*, which he explains as an alloy in which the two ingredients combine to become a third thing (see Tertullian, *Aduersus Praxean* 27.8 [CCL 2 1199.43–48; Evans 124.20–25]: Si enim sermo ex transfiguratione et demutatione substantiae caro factus est, una iam erit substantia iesus ex duabus, ex carne et spiritu, mixtura quaedam ut electrum, ex auro et argento, et incipit nec aurum esse, id est spiritus, neque argentum, id est caro, cum alterum altero mutatur et tertium quid efficitur). For Tertullian, *mixtura* is an example not of Stoic mixture but of Stoic fusion.

136 *De Trin*. 2.24 (CCL 62 60.6–7): ut homo factus ex uirgine naturam in se carnis acciperet, per que huius admixtionis societatem sanctificatum in eo uniuersi generis humani corpus existeret.

137 Tertullian also uses a term of participation to convey the mutual interpenetration of Stoic mixture: *coniunctio*. For example, see Tertullian, *Aduersus Praxean* 27.11 (CCL 2 1199.62–63; Evans, 124.37–39): Videmus duplicem statum, non confusum sed coniunctum, in una persona deum et hominem Iesum.

Hilary mostly reservers *coniunctio* to refer to marriage (following Paul) but he extends the Pauline analogy so that *coniunctio* refers to the human marriage with immortality that takes place in the resurrection (*In Matt.* 22.3, 27.4). Hilary also uses *coniunctio* to signify the union between Father and Son (*De Trin*. 3.14), and that between Christ and all humanity (*Tr. ps.* 91.9) and humans with each other in Christ (*Tr. ps*. 143.21).

sentient soul."[138] Hilary uses *consortio* to signify several different kinds of participation: the soul with the body,[139] Father with Son,[140] believers in eternity,[141] believers with each other in the next life,[142] the soul with sin,[143] and humans with Christ's incarnate flesh.[144]

However, it is not clear in all these cases that Hilary's use of *consortio* signifies the type of participation distinctive to Stoic mixtures. One problem in reading all these uses of *consortio* as examples of Stoic mixture theory is that the Son acts as the active principle in some of these mixtures (as in the *consortio* of humans with Christ's flesh) but the passive principle in others (as in the *consortio* with the Father). In Stoic theory, the divine always functions as the active principle and certainly does not switch between active and passive. Another problem is that while Stoic mixture theory requires that both ingredients be corporeal, Hilary uses *consortio* even when one or both of the ingredients is not corporeal. For example, in the *consortio* of the soul with sin, sin is not corporeal, but neither is the soul according to Hilary in his later works.[145]

Furthermore, Hilary occasionally uses *mixtio* in a negative sense to refer to combinations where the end result is something disorganized (*confusus*). For example, he says that the existence of God in God is "not by a confused

---

138 *De Trin*. 10.14 (CCL 62 469.1–3): Ea enim natura corporum est, ut ex consortio animae in sensum quendam animae sentientis animate.

139 See, for example, *De Trin*. 10.14 (above) and 10.24; *Tr. ps*. 118 gimel 3.

140 *Tr. ps*. 129.9 (CCL 61B 105.9–11): ex similitudine gloriae alter in altero est gloriosus Filius, quia dignus consortio patris sit, gloriosus Pater, digni consortio suo Filii Pater.

141 *Tr. ps*. 125.6 (CCL 61B 61.3): aeternitatis consortio.

142 *Tr. ps*. 136.12 (CCL 61B 179.18–21): Quisque enim sanctus est, pro parte Hierusalem ipse est; quia ex conuentu beatorum uirorum et caelesti consortio dignorum Hierusalem uiuorum et pretiosorum lapidum ciuitas erit, quam haec terrena uitia *usque ad fundamentum exinanire* nituntur.

143 *Tr. ps*. 123.4 (CCL 61B 46.2–4): Sed neque nunc de eruto a morte corpore gaudium est, sed de anima a peccato conseruata atque a peccatorum consortio liberata.

144 *In Matt*. 4.12 (SC 254 130.7–9): Atque ita et ille ex nostra in se congregatione fit ciuitas et nos per consortium carnis suae sumus ciuitatis habitatio.

145 In the *In Mattheaum*, Hilary believes the soul is corporeal: see *In Matt*. 5.8 (SC 254 158.14–15, 17–20): Nihil est quod non in substantia sua et creatione corporeum sit. . . . Nam et animarum species siue obtinentium corpora siue corporibus exsulantium corpoream tamen naturae suae substantiam sortiuntur, quia omne quod creatum est in aliquo sit necesse est. However, by the *Tractatus super Psalmos* he believes that it is incorporeal: see *Tr. ps*. 129.6 (CCL 61B 102.5–7): Ergo ad imaginem Dei homo interior effectus est rationabilis, mobilis, mouens, citus, incorporeus subtilis, aeternus, quantum in se est, speciem naturae principalis imitator.

mixture."[146] He is also anxious to clarify that the unity of the body of Christ is again not a confused mixture.[147] The Stoics never describe mixture with terms of confusion or disorganization.[148] Hilary's coordination of the term *permixtio* with *confusus* demonstrates one of two things: either Hilary has a negative conception of the Stoic mixture and believes that it is indeed disorganized or he uses *permixtio* to refer not only to Stoic mixtures properly speaking but also to other types of combinations, some of which are disorganized. In either case, Hilary does not see Stoic mixture as a distinctly different or superior type of mixture compared to other combinations. For Hilary, Stoic mixture has the possibility of disorganization and so is not central in his christological or soteriological formulations.

In conclusion, despite Hilary's awareness of the details of Stoic mixture theory, there are several reasons to think that he does not use Stoic mixture theory as a metaphysical explanation for his physicalist soteriology. First, Stoic mixture theory relies on a completely materialist view of the cosmos: it is the interaction of bodies. However, Hilary's shift to viewing the soul as incorporeal in the *Tractatus super Psalmos* demonstrates that in his later works he no longer shares this materialist view. Second, Hilary's reference to a "confused mixture" and his haste to deny that this designation applies to the Church as the body of Christ, signifies at least that he does not use forms of *mixtio* as technical terminology to refer to Stoic mixture theory and at most that he views Stoic mixtures as incapable of conveying the relationship between humans and Christ's body. Lastly, the Stoics themselves deny the possibility of a mixture consisting of two individuals: while substances may interpenetrate, particular individuals may

146 *De Trin* 6.19 (CCL 62 218.14–15): Cognoui te in Deo Deum non ex permixtione confusum, sed ex uirtute naturae.

147 *Tr. ps.* 121.5 (CCL 61B 28.1–29.11): Sed quia unum ecclesiae corpus est, non quadam corporum confusione permixtum neque singulis in indiscretum aceruum et informem cumulum unitis, sed per fidei unitatem, per caritatis societatem, per operum uoluntatis que concordiam, per sacramenti unum in omnibus donum, unum omnes sumus, in quod nos Paulus hortatur dicens: *Obsecro uos, fratres, ut idipsum sapiatis omnes eandem caritatem exercentes*, et cum fuerit, ut scriptum est*: Erat autem omnium, qui credebant, cor et anima unum*, tunc erimus ciuitas dei, tunc sancta Hierusalem, quia *Hierusalem aedificatur ut ciuitas, cuius participatio est in idipsum*.

148 One of the ways Tertullian clarifies that he is speaking particularly about Stoic mixture, as opposed to Stoic fusion, is by saying that the result is *not* confused. See Tertullian, *Aduersus Praxean* 27.11 (CCL 2 1199.62–63; Evans, 124.37–39): Videmus duplicem statum, non confusum sed coniunctum, in una persona deum et hominem Iesum.

not.[149] Therefore, if Hilary is aware of the details of Stoic mixture theory—as it seems he is—he would realize that without an explicit argument for the ability of individual interpenetration—which he does not offer—Stoic mixture theory is incompatible with Christ's assumption of all humanity.

Therefore even when Hilary describes the relationship between Christ's body and humanity as a *mixtio* as in the quotation from the *Tractatus super Psalmos* we saw above—"he [the Son of God] received the nature of flesh in himself when he was made man of a virgin, and through the fellowship of this mixture (*admixtio*), the body of the entire human race might be sanctified in him"[150]—we should not assume the underlying framework of Stoic mixture theory.

The Transmission of Plato's Theory of the Forms via Latin Stoicism

I will finish this section on Stoic influence with a brief discussion of the alterations Latin Stoicism effects on Plato's theory of the Forms. Several scholars—including Harnack, Jossua, Kelly, and Anyanwu—have stated that Hilary's physicalism is dependent on Plato's theory of the Forms such that Christ assumes the universal Form of humanity.[151] However, I showed earlier in this chapter that prior to his exile Hilary had no direct contact with Platonism.

Prior to his exile, Hilary was already teaching a physicalist theory but his only possible contact with the Platonic theory of the Forms was mediated through Latin Stoicism. This mediation entailed significant alterations to the Platonic theory and these alterations are very important for our purposes because they compose the theory of the Forms with which Hilary came into contact. We shall see that the Stoic version of the Forms is incompatible with Hilary's physicalism.

Hilary does not make a positive use of the Stoic version of the Forms (in the same way that he uses the Stoic conception of *uniuersitas*, for example). Rather, Hilary makes no textual use of the Stoic version of the Forms. Hilary's silence here can be interpreted in two ways: either Hilary has no knowledge of

149 See Chrysippus' discussion found in Philo, *De aeternitate mundi* 48 (in *Stoicorum veterum fragmenta*, vol. 2, ed. Hans von Arnim [Leipzig, 1903], 397). See also David Sedley, "The Stoic Criterion of Identity," *Phronesis* 27 (1982): 255–275; Sorabji, *Matter, Space, and Motion*, 104–105. Todd clarifies that the complete blending of Stoic mixture theory is only possible between pneuma and matter, not between two different three-dimensional solids (*Alexander on Stoic Physics*, 48).

150 *De Trin*. 2.24 (CCL 62 60.6–7): ut homo factus ex uirgine naturam in se carnis acciperet, per que huius admixtionis societatem sanctificatum in eo uniuersi generis humani corpus existeret.

151 See Chapter 1 for an evaluation of this trajectory of scholarship.

the Stoic version of the Forms (and prior to his exile he could not have known the Greek version either), or Hilary knows the Stoic version of the Forms and recognizes it as incompatible with physicalism. For our purposes, it does not matter which of these interpretations are correct as they both conclude that Hilary's physicalism does not make use of the Platonic theory of the Forms as mediated to Hilary in the Latin tradition.

To understand the Latin teaching of the Platonic theory of the Forms, we will look briefly at Cicero's translation of *Timaeus* 28a.[152] Plato's Greek text is this: ὅτου μὲν οὖν ἂν ὁ δημιουργὸς πρὸς τὸ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχον βλέπων ἀεί, τοιούτῳ τινὶ προσχρώμενος παραδείγματι, τὴν ἰδέαν καὶ δύναμιν αὐτοῦ ἀπεργάζηται . . . . Cicero translates this section into Latin as: Quocirca si is qui aliquod munus efficere molitur eam speciem, quae semper eadem, intuebitur atque id sibi proponet exemplar . . . (*Timaeus* 2). There are two points of interpretation to be made here. The first regards the demiurge: where Plato has simply "δημιουργὸς" (the demiurge), Cicero paraphrases as "is qui aliquod munus efficere molitur" (he who sets himself to carry out a task). As Lévy says, "Cicero's translation expresses some subjectivism, because he does not say *efficit* but *molitur efficere*."[153] The will of the demiurge and the accomplishment of his will are separated temporally in Cicero's translation where they are not in Plato's original: this space between will and accomplishment allows the possibility of constraint. The second point concerns the "pattern": Plato says "τοιούτῳ τινὶ προσχρώμενος παραδείγματι . . . ἀπεργάζηται" (the demiurge produces according to some such pattern). The pattern or paradigm of Plato is a reality that has existence independent of the demiurge's production. Cicero's translation undermines the ontological reality of this pattern for he says that the demiurge "id sibi proponet exemplar" (places it before himself as an exemplar). The

152 Cicero's translation includes only sections 27d–47b of Plato's *Timaeus*.

153 Carlos Lévy, "Cicero and the *Timaeus*," in *Plato's* Timaeus *as Cultural Icon*, ed. Gretchen Reydams-Schils (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003), 104. Lévy notes that Cicero confuses Plato's hierarchical distinction between the noetic world and nature and, in general, has trouble conceptualizing the world of intelligibles as anything beyond nature (Lévy, 104). See also p. 100: "Whereas we still have difficulties with understanding the Platonic concept of the Demiurge, this problem was certainly even more complex at the time of Cicero, when Stoic immanentism, the Epicurean rejection of any theory of a created world, and the New Academy's refusal to perpetuate Platonic theories all were serious obstacles to the understanding of the demiurgic creation. Cicero's difficulties concerning this concept are evident. . . ." The result of Cicero's immanent Stoicism is that his demiurge is constrained by nature and that the "pattern" of creation, rather than being the realm of Forms as ontological existents, is a mental image in the mind of the demiurge.

pattern is something that the demiurge controls, something that he brings to mind at will. Cicero's translation of the *Timaeus*, then, is a Stoicized version of Plato's myth of creation. Of particular interest to us is that Plato's realm of intelligibles as the pattern for the created world subtly shifts through Cicero's translation to become a mental construct of the demiurge. In a study of four other Ciceronian texts,[154] Gersh notices the same alterations and concludes that these alterations manifest a distinct Stoic influence:

> the view that the Forms dwell in or are sustained by the mind is a deviation from Plato which is of great significance for the future development of the Platonic tradition. Plato's Forms had been separately subsistent principles which were the objects but not the subjects of intellection, whereas the theory in these Ciceronian texts stresses the essentially intellective character of the Forms. . . . The cause of this transformation of Plato's doctrine is once again clearly the intervention of the Stoics, for their common concepts are intellective in precisely this way and, when combined with the universals of Plato's thought, will produce a Form-concept of the kind described by Cicero.[155]

Cicero's translation of the *Timaeus* manifests the Stoicizing that Plato's theory of the Forms undergoes in the Latin milieu. Considering his inability to read Greek texts himself, any "theory of Forms" that Hilary would have known could only be a Latin Stoic-influenced version.

The attribution of a Platonic theory of Forms or universals to Hilary's teaching of Christ's assumption of all humanity is undermined by a study of the Stoic transmission and appropriation of the Platonic theory.

The Stoics relegate the Forms to the status of Ideas without real existence, and place these Ideas in the mind. Plato is charged by the Stoics with hypostasizing universals into "somethings" while the Stoics instead call them "quasi-somethings" to designate that universals do not have real existence but are only "concepts," that is, figments of the human mind.[156] For Plato the Forms are existents independent of mind, whereas the Stoics, as we have seen already from Cicero's translation of the *Timaeus*, convert "Forms" into "Ideas," and these ideas now depend upon the mind thinking them; they have no external,

154 Cicero, *Acad.* 33, *Orat.* 7, *Orat.* 101, and *Tuscalan Disputations* 1.57–58.

155 Gersh, *Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism*, 153.

156 See Long and Sedley's discussion of the Stoic understanding of universals in *The Hellensistic Philosophers* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), vol. 1, 179–183.

real existence of their own. This same teaching can be seen in Seneca's presentation of Platonic causes: when he deals with the formal cause, he specifically speaks of "Ideas" and refers to them as conceptions in the mind of God:

> To these four Plato adds a fifth [cause],—the pattern, which he himself calls the "idea"; for it is this that the artist gazed upon when he created the work that he had decided to carry out. Now it makes no difference whether he has this pattern outside himself, that he may direct his eyes to it, or within himself, conceived and placed there by himself. God has within himself these patterns of all things, and the numbers and the measures of all things that are to be done are comprehended by his mind; he is filled with these shapes that Plato calls the "ideas,"—immortal, immutable, not subject to decay.[157]

According to the Latin conception of the Forms or, more properly, Ideas, a physical instantiation cannot, by definition, be an instantiation of the universal Idea because the Ideas have no real external existence of their own.

Hilary's understanding of Platonic Forms, through the Stoic lens of his education, would in no way be open to the concretization of a universal Form in the person of Jesus Christ. Plato's really existent "Forms" have been converted into mind-dependent "Ideas" by the Stoics. The Ideas have no real existence outside of the mind of God. Hilary's understanding of Christ's assumption of a real, physical, person, is quite different from the assumption of a mental construct.

---

157 Seneca, *Ad Lucilium epistulae morales*, 65.7 (trans. Richard Gummere, Loeb Classical Library [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953], vol. 1, 448–49): His quintam Plato adicit exemplar, quam ipse 'idean' vocat; hoc est enim ad quod respiciens artifex id quod destinabat effecit. Nihil autem ad rem pertinet utrum foris habeat exemplar ad quod referat oculos an intus, quod ibi ipse concepit et posuit. Haec exemplaria rerum omnium deus intra se habet numerosque universorum quae agenda sunt et modos mente complexus est; plenus his figuris est quas Plato 'ideas' appellat, immortales, immutabiles, infatigabiles. See also Macrobius, *Commentarii in somnium Scipionis*, 1.2.14 (ed. Jacob Willis, Bibliotheca scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana [Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1963], 6.22–27): ceterum cum ad summum et principem omnium deum, qui apud Graecos ταγαθον, qui προτον αιτιον nuncupatur, tractatus se audet attollere, uel ad mentem, quem Graeci νουν appelant, originales rerum species, quae ιδεαι dictae sunt, continentem, ex summo natam et profectam deo . . . Also, Macrobius, *Commentarii in somnium Scipionis*, 1.8.10 (Willis 39.3–6): quartae sunt quae in ipsa diuina mente consistunt, quam diximus νουν uocari, a quarum exemplo reliquae omnes per ordinem defluunt. nam si rerum aliarum, multo magis uirtutum ideas esse in mente credendum est.

Latin Theological Context for Hilary's Physicalist Model of Redemption

Hilary combines the Stoic conception of the city of all humanity with a particular literal method of reading Paul to achieve his unique Christian understanding of the incarnation as Christ's assumption of all humanity into his body. Hilary is not the only Latin theologian to use terminology that seems to point to a physicalist doctrine of redemption. For example, Tertullian says "we are all made to live in Christ."[158] However, the significance that Pauline thought and language play in Hilary's own theology, combined with his unique development of Pauline theology, lead Hilary to be the only Latin author to consistently argue that Christ *physically* assumes all humanity in the incarnation and to present a theological system that thoroughly and coherently bears out the implications of this physical understanding.[159] For example, Hilary, throughout his career, becomes increasingly more insistent that the Church is the physical body of Christ. The community of believers who make up the Church, according to this logic, exists as part of the physical body of Christ.[160] On the contrary, Tertullian explicitly says that Paul's analogy of the Church as the body of Christ is figurative, and that Christians, as the Church, are only in Christ's body in a metaphorical sense.[161] While Tertullian is one of the greatest influences on Hilary's thought, he does not provide a theological precedent for this aspect of Hilary's understanding of Christ's assumption of all humanity.[162]

---

158 Tertullian, *Aduersus Marcionem* 5.9.5 (CCL 1 689.13): . . . in christo uiuificamur omnes . . .

159 For the significance of Paul in Hilary's thought, see Wilhelm Wille who, in his study of Hilary's *In Matthaeum* (*Studien zum Matthäuskommentar des Hilarius von Poitiers* [Hamburg, 1969], 103–108), shows that Hilary refers to Paul fifty times in the *In Matthaeum*—far more than to any other scriptural source (barring Matthew himself).

160 *Tr. ps.* 125.6 (CCL 61B 62.24–26): Ipse est enim ecclesia, per sacramentum corporis sui in se uniuersam eam continens.

161 Tertullian, *Aduersus Marcionem* 5.19.6 (CCL 1 722.18–7): Sicubi autem et ecclesiam corpus christi dicit esse—ut hic ait adimplere se reliqua pressurarum christi in carne pro corpore eius, quod est ecclesia—, non propterea et in totum mentionem corporis transferens a substantia carnis. Nam et supra reconciliari nos ait in corpore eius per mortem, utique in eo corpore, in quo mori potuit, per carnem mortuus et non per ecclesiam, plane propter ecclesiam corpus commutando pro corpore, carnale pro spiritali.

162 However, certain theological elements that Hilary brings to bear on this understanding of the incarnation and its effects—for example in anthropology and Trinitarian theology—do find their source in Tertullian. In anthropology Tertullian mediates the Stoic view of cooperation between body and soul (see Chapter 6 "Christ the Mediator and the Double Creation of Man" for a greater treatment). Tertullian's two-stage logos theory is influential on Hilary's early Trinitarian theology and consciously rejected later (see Chapter 9 "The

Cyprian is another possibility as a Latin source for Hilary's understanding of the incarnation as Christ's assumption all of humanity into his body, for Cyprian is the first Latin theologian to say that Christ "bore us in himself." However, Cyprian's emphasis with this phrase is quite different from what we find with Hilary. Hilary's understanding of the presence of humanity in Christ leads him to center his theology (in particular, soteriology, ecclesiology, and eschatology) in the physical body of Christ. Cyprian's interest in the presence of humanity in Christ is not centered on the physicality of this presence, as it is for Hilary, but rather on the unity this presence institutes, both within the Church and with Christ. Christ "bore all" as a means of teaching the importance of unanimity and mutual prayer within the Church: "God, the teacher of peace and concord, who taught unity, thus wished one to pray for all, just as He Himself bore all in one."[163] When Christ "bore all" he also paved the way for the unity of believers with Christ accomplished in the Eucharist:

> For because Christ, who bore our sins, also bore us all, we see that people are understood in the water, but in the wine the blood of Christ is shown. But when water is mixed with wine in the chalice, the people are united to Christ, and the people of the believers is bound and joined to Him in whom they believe. . . . Whence nothing can separate the Church . . . from Christ . . .[164]

Though both Hilary and Cyprian understand the presence of humanity in Christ as an important means toward unity of believers with one another and

---

Eternal Relationship of the Father and the Son in the *De Trinitate* and the *Tractatus super psalmos*").

163 Cyprian, *De Dominica oratione* 8 (ed. C. Moreschini, in *Praefatio ad libellos ad Donatum, De Mortalitate, Ad Demetrianum, De Opere et eleemosynis, De Zelo et liuore, De Dominica oratione, De Bono patientiae*, CCL 3A [Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 1976], 93.109–111): Deus pacis et concordiae magister qui docuit unitatem, sic orare unum pro omnibus uoluit, quomodo in uno omnes ipse portauit.

164 Cyprian, *Epistula* 63.13 (CCL 3C 406.227–407.231, 233–235): Nam quia nos omnes portabat Christus qui et peccata nostra portabat, uidemus in aqua populum intellegi, in uino uero ostendi sanguine Christi. Quando autem in calice uino aqua miscetur, Christo populus adunatur et credentium plebs ei in quem credidit copulatur et iungitur. . . . Vnde ecclesiam . . . nulla res separare poterit a Christo . . . The copenetration of Christ in humans and humans in Christ appears most strikingly in Cyprian's discussion of the Eucharist. See also *Epistula* 69.5 (CCL 3C 476.107–477.109): Nam quando dominus corpus suum panem uocat de multorum granorum adunatione congestum, populum nostrum quem portabat indicat adunatum . . .

with Christ, Hilary emphasizes that this unity is a byproduct of the inclusion of humanity in Christ's body that is salvific only because it is physical. For Cyprian, on the contrary, this unity is of primary importance with little to no indication of whether the presence of humanity in Christ is physical or spiritual.

Cyprian, like Hilary, also speaks of humanity's resurrection and eschatological reign *in* Christ: "For since he himself is the resurrection, because we rise in him, so too he can be understood as the kingdom of God, because we are to reign in him."[165] However, whereas for Hilary, both the place and the cause of humanity's unity, each with another and as a whole with God, is always the *body* of Christ, Cyprian envisions the place of human unity more specifically and practically as the Church and offers several different causes for this unity. Cyprian does speak of the "people being glued together into a unified body" but this glue is "concord."[166] "Concord" and "unanimity" are two terms that, for Cyprian, describe the unity of the Church and, furthermore, he argues that it is the job of the bishop to preserve this unanimity of concord. The bishops, as ministers of the sacraments, "hold the unity of the Church."[167] For this reason, the unity of the Church finds its focal point in the bishop: "There is one God and one Christ, and one Church, and one Chair founded on Peter by the word of the Lord."[168] Again, where Hilary's emphasis is on human presence in the body of Christ, Cyprian emphasizes the practical reality of the Church as a place of human concord that unites all to God.

Cyprian's eschatological vision of unity is based on his practical understanding of the Church where unity is found in the physical person of the bishop. Both Hilary's eschatology and ecclesiology, however, remain consistently focused on the body of Christ. While Hilary's understanding of the presence of humanity in Christ leads him to center his theology (in particular, soteriology, ecclesiology, and eschatology) in the physical body of Christ, Cyprian understands

---

165 Cyprian, *De Dominica oratione* (CCL 3A 97.227–229): Nam cum resurrectio ipse sit, quia in ipso resurgimus, sic et regnum Dei potest ipse intellegi, quia in illo renaturi sumus.

166 Cyprian, *De ecclesiae catholicae unitate* 23 (ed. M. Bévenot, in *Sancti Episcopi Opera, pars 1*, CCL 3 [Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 1972], 266.562–64): Vnus deus est et christus unus, et una ecclesia eius et fides una, et plebs in solidam corporis unitatem concordiae glutino copulata.

167 Cyprian, *Epistula* 69.5 (CCL 3C 477.115–116): . . . ecclesiae unitatem tenere. For the bishop's sacramental power of unity, see, for example, *Epistula* 69.5 (CCL 3C 476.105–107): Denique unanimitatem christianam firma sibi atque inseparabili caritate conexam etiam ipsa dominica sacrificia declarant. See also *Epistula* 72.1 (CCL 3C 523–24) concerning baptism.

168 Cyprian, *Epistula* 43.5 (CCL 3C 511.76–79): Deus unus est et Christus unus et una ecclesia et cathedra una super Petrum domini uoce fundata.

this presence of humanity in Christ as a demonstration for the need for unanimity within the Church.

Though there seems to be no direct Latin precedent for Hilary's physicalist model, we have still to ascertain whether Hilary is a fourth century anomaly or whether this physicalist model of redemption based on Christ's assumption of all humanity is characteristic of the Latin theology of the late fourth century. Chromatius of Aquilaea, raised to his bishopric some twenty years after Hilary's death, and so another representative of Latin fourth century theology, seems to reflect Hilary's thought when he says that "Christ took from us what is ours so that he might give to us what is his."[169] However, the immediate context of Chromatius' statement is that of revelation (not salvation or divinization): Christ becomes man as a means to "give to us what is his," namely to reveal his invisible divinity. Furthermore, Chromatius has a specific anti-Apollinarian agenda to show that Christ assumed the whole human person. For example, he says that in Joseph's dream, "[the angel] clearly declares that the Son of God, perfect God, has taken up perfect man, that is not only a body, but also a soul . . . for it was necessary that the Lord take up both so that he might save both."[170] Chromatius' emphasis is not that Christ takes up every man but that he take up a whole man, body and soul.[171] Chromatius further distances himself from Hilary's theology by giving primary importance to Christ's death, rather than the incarnation, as the moment of salvation. The death of Christ, according to Chromatius, saves humans both by its sacrificial nature and its triumph over the devil.[172] Chromatius, then, serves not as another Latin representative of the "Greek" physicalist model but rather as a representative of the

169 Chromatius of Aquileia, *Tractatus in Matthaeum* 2.1, in *Chromatii Aquieleiensis Opera*, ed. R. Étaix and J. Lemarié, CCL 9A (Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 1974), 202.34–35: Suscepit a nobis quod nostrum est, ut nobis quod suum est largiretur.

170 Chromatius, *Tractatus in Matthaeum* 7.1 (CCL 9A 224.3–6, 18–19): In eo quod dixit angelus ad ioseph: mortui sunt qui quaerebant animam pueri, manifeste declarat filium dei, perfectum deum, perfectum hominem suscepisse, id est non solum corpus sed et animam. . . . necessario Dominus utrumque suscepit, ut utrumque saluaret.

171 See Jossua, *Salut: Incarnation ou mystère pascal*, 156.

172 For the sacrificial nature of the death of Christ, see, Chromatius, *Tractatus in Matthaeum* 7.2 (CCL 9A 225.38–39): . . . sacrificium sui corporis obtulit pro nostra salute. For triumph over the devil, see Chromatius, *Tractatus in Matthaeum* 7.2 (CCL 9A 225.53–55): . . . et Dominus ac Saluator noster per suscepti corporis sacramentum leonem diabolum, extensis in cruce manibus, interemit. Jossua argues that Chromatius has no trace of the "Greek" perspective, namely the salvific effect of the union of natures in the incarnation (*Salut: Incarnation ou mystère pascal*, 152).

traditional soteriology of fourth century Latin theology, what is termed the "moral" or "atonement" model.

Gregory of Elvira is a Latin fourth century theologian (made bishop c. 357–359) who has a connection to Hilary and, at first glance, seems to share Hilary's physicalism. First, word for word parallels between Gregory's *Tractatus Origenis* 1 and Hilary's *Tractatus super Psalmos* 129.4–6 demonstrate that there is some sort of direct contact between Gregory of Elvira and Hilary.[173] While the most likely scenario is that Gregory read Hilary's *Tractatus super Psalmos*, since the dating of nearly all of Gregory of Elvira's works remains uncertain, it is possible that the influence went in the other direction and that he influenced Hilary.[174] Further study on the parallels between Gregory and Hilary could help date Gregory's works and shed light on the relationship between the two theologians. Second, Gregory of Elvira's works offer interesting phrases and themes that bear some resemblance to Hilary's physicalist model of redemption.

Gregory's "physicalism" comes to light almost exclusively in the realm of ecclesiology.[175] For example, he says "it must be understood that it is Christ who is called 'grapes' because he contains in himself the many seeds of believers."[176] Gregory, like Hilary, returns time and again to Paul's words that the Church is the body of Christ. Gregory further demonstrates his physical understanding of this analogy by often substituting *caro* for *corpus* when "quoting" Paul's words.[177] But Gregory also puts strong weight on the Pauline analogy of Christ's relationship

---

173 Gregory of Elvira's *Tractatus Origenis* 1.10 (ed. Vincent Bulhart, in *Greogrius Iliberritanus, Faustinus, Luciferianus*, CCL 69 [Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 1967], 7.127–129) = Hilary's *Tractaus super Psalmos* 129.4 (CCL 61B 102.11–13) Quidquid autem . . .; *Tractatus Origenis* 1.10 (CCL 69 7.129–131) = Hilary 129.5 (CCL 61B 102.1–2) Deus autem semper . . .; *Tractatus Origenis* 1.19 (CCL 69 7.224–226) = Hilary 129.6 (CCL 61B 103.13–15) dum naturam . . .

174 Gregory wrote the first edition of *De fide* in 360, and the second in 363. Francis Buckley (*Christ and the Church according to Gregory of Elvira* [Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1964], 163–165) argues that Gregory's exegetical works were written after the *De fide*. Buckley bases his argument upon what he perceives as a more advanced ecclesiology present in these works as compared to the *De fide*. However, the lack of a developed ecclesiology in the *De fide* may be more the result of ecclesiology being, at best, a secondary interest in this work than of its earlier composition in relation to the exegetical works.

175 The best book on Gregory's physical understanding of the relationship between Christ and the Church is Francis Buckley's *Christ and the Church According to Gregory of Elvira*.

176 Gregory of Elvira, *In Canticum Canticorum libri quinque* 3.5 (CCL 69 193.27–29): Hoc enim intellegendum est quod christus qui botrus appellatus est, eo quod multa in se credentium grana contineat . . .

177 See, for example, Gregory of Elvira, *In Canticum Canticorum libri quinque* 1.20 (CCL 69 176.169–170): carnem autem christi ecclesiam esse apostolo auctore didicimus qui dixit: caro christi quod est ecclesia.

with the Church being a marital relationship. Again Gregory insists on the physicality of the two becoming one flesh.[178]

Unlike Hilary, Gregory's "physicalism" is not a consistent or influential part of his larger theological system. Gregory does not mention eschatological life in the body of Christ nor does he seem terribly interested in a vision of the incarnation that institutes his ecclesial physicalism. Occasionally Gregory says things that may perhaps be interpretated as physicalist soteriology. For example, Gregory says that "the Lord assumed into himself everything that is common (*summam generalem*) to the human body."[179] And again he says that "the Lord put on (*induere*) the body of the human race (*humani generis*)."[180] However, it is not clear that Gregory intends a physical assumption of all humanity. Furthermore, Ladaria has done an excellent study comparing Hilary and Gregory of Elvira on the topic of the Adam-Christ parallel. He concludes that while Hilary uses the Adam-Christ parallel to develop his physicalist soteriological theme of the unity of all humanity in Adam unto death and in Christ unto life, Gregory does not develop this parallel as groundwork for presenting a unified humanity that can be assumed by Christ in the incarnation.[181]

Gregory is further distinguished from Hilary by his incarnational vocabulary. When Gregory of Elvira speaks of the incarnation, one of his favorite terms is *induere*.[182] The same use is found in Eusebius of Vercelli, another of

---

178 See, for example, Gregory of Elvira, *In Canticum Canticorum libri quinque* 4.26 (CCL 69 205.191–193): Vnum sunt enim christus et ecclesia, quia *erunt* inquit *duo in carne una*, id est deus et homo.

179 Gregory of Elvira, *In Canticum Canticorum libri quinque* 1.29 (ed. J. Fraipont, in *Greogrius Iliberritanus, Faustinus, Luciferianus*, CCL 69 [Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 1967], 178.230–179.234): . . . et quia generalem summam humani corporis dominus in semet ipso suscepit, unde et apostolus: peccatum inquit pro nobis factus est, id est carnem hominis peccatoris induendo, quam carnem ecclesiam esse apostolus definiuit cuius nos membra sumus . . . Joaquín Pascual Torró eliminates any possible connotations of an assumption by Christ of all humanity by translating *generalem summam humani corporis* into Spanish as "la plena realidad de un cuerpo humano" (Joaquín Pascual Torró, trans. *Comentario al Cantar de los Cantares y otros tratados exegéticos de Gregorio de Elvira*, Fuentes Patristicas 13 [Madrid: Editorial Ciudad Nueva, 2000], 65).

180 Gregory of Elvira, *Tractatus Origenis* 19.13 (CCL 69 139.104–109): Ceterum tityo extractus hab igne semustulatus, non percombustus ostenditur; corpus enim illut humani generis, quod ex protoplaustrorum transgressione et criminum flamma fuerat adustum, hoc induit dominus et quasi tityonem semiustulatum a gehennae incendio liberauit. . . .

181 Ladaria, "Gregorio de Elvira y el paralelismo Adán-Cristo," Gregorianum 80 (1999): 677–695. See also Ladaria, "Adan y Cristo. Un motivo soteriologico del *In Matthaeum*"; "Adan y Cristo en los *Tractatus super Psalmos*."

182 For a list of Gregory's use of *induere*, see Ladaria, "Gregorio de Elvira," 692.

Hilary's contemporaries and one with whom Hilary corresponded and even travelled.[183] But while *induere* has currency within the fourth century as a term for the incarnation, Hilary breaks with this tradition. Hilary does use *induere*, and frequently, to speak about baptism or human eschatological transformation but in his entire corpus, he uses it only once to refer to the incarnational assumption of humanity.[184] Rather than *induere*, Hilary begins the Latin tradition of using *adsumere* to speak about the incarnation.[185] Hilary believes that Christ not only *clothes* himself with humanity, but the incarnation's assumption of humanity culminates in the eschaton where Christ *assumes* humanity even *into* his own divinity.

Hilary's break with the language of his fourth century contemporaries manifests, I would argue, the novelty of his thought—though Hilary never offers any indication that he recognizes either his theology or language as novel. Hilary consciously rejects the standard use of *induere* to speak of the incarnation and instead appropriates *adsumere*, a verb that previously had only been used to speak of the ascension. In this nuance of language, we will see that Hilary's idea of the incarnation differs from that of his contemporaries. Gregory of Elvira's use of *induere* does not support a physicalist soteriology because *induere* conveys an accidental and temporary relationship between Christ and his humanity. While Gregory seems to have some physicalist tendencies, he does not consistently apply a physicalist logic to his entire theological system.

---

183 See Eusebius' profession of faith: Eusebius of Vercelli, *Epistula 2 ad presbyteros et plebem Italiae* 5 (in *Eusebius Vercellensis, Filastrius Brixiensis, Appendix ad Hegemonium, Isaac Iudaeus, Archidiaconus Romanus, Fortunatianus Aquileiensis, Chromatius Aquileiensis*, CCL 9 [Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 1957], 106.106–107.113): Nouit hoc omnipotens deus, nouit et eius unigenitus inenarrabiliter de ipso natus filius, qui salutis nostrae causa deus sempiternae uirtutis hominem perfectum induit, pati uoluit, morte triumphata tertio die resurrexit, ad dexteram patris sedet uenturus iudicare uiuos et mortuos, nouit et spiritus sanctus, testis est ecclesia catholica, quae sic confitetur, quia non ego in me reus ero, sed uos, qui conseruos meos necessaria ministraturos prohibere uoluistis.

184 Hilary's one use of *induere* to refer to the incarnation is in *Tr. ps*. 9.3 (CCL 61 74.9–16): Est enim occultum, Deum salutis humanae causa non in caelisti gloria et claritate nominis sui adfuisse, sed formam humani corporis ex communi originis genere induisse, sed extitisse ex uirgine et editam fuisse et absque nascendi initio procreatam. For Hilary's use of *induere* to refer to baptism, see *De Trin.* 8.8. For *induere* referring to spiritual conversion (casting off the old man and putting on Christ) see *De Trin*. 12.48, and *Tr. ps*. 129.6. For *induere* as speaking about human eschatological transformation, see *Tr. ps*. 135.5.

185 We will talk more about Hilary's use of *adsumere* in Chapter 7 "Hilary's Use of *Adsumere* Manifests the Connection between Soteriology and Eschatology." See Doignon, " 'Adsumo' et 'adsumptio'."

The last Latin fourth century theologian we will look at is Marius Victorinus who presents a clear physicalist teaching that is nevertheless quite different from what we see in Hilary. Victorinus reveals what Greek and Platonic influenced physicalism looks like. In his *Adversus Arium*, dated 361–363, Victorinus demonstrates a clear physicalist redemption model that, unlike Hilary's, does depend upon a Neoplatonic conception of universal forms. He says that Christ assumed the "universal *logos* of flesh" and the "universal *logos* of soul."[186] The transformation of the universal *logoi* of flesh and soul affects every individual human since all humans are patterned from these *logoi*. The universal *logoi* of flesh and soul function as Platonic Forms in that they provide the Form for all particularizations of flesh. Therefore, when the universal *logoi* of flesh and soul are transformed, all individual particularizations of human flesh and soul, patterned on the universal *logos* are also transformed.

We might be inclined to believe that Victorinus brought physicalism into the Latin West through his contact with Greek thought and Hilary was introduced to physicalism through Victorinus. However, Victorinus' Christian works, written just a few years before Hilary's *Tractatus super Psalmos*, post-date Hilary's teaching of Christ's assumption of all humanity in the *In Matthaeum* and *De Trinitate*. Furthermore, while more study should be done on the possible interrelationship between Victorinus and Hilary, no textual evidence has been found connecting the two. While Victorinus shows that Hilary is not the only Latin fourth century proponent of physicalism, he is not the source of Hilary's thought.

Conclusion

As has been argued by Doignon and Burns, Hilary's pre-exilic influences are limited to Latin theology, principally Tertullian, and Latin philosophy, primarily Stoicism. Greek influence, either philosophical or theological, remains quite limited before his exile and is always mediated: in the case of philosophy, through Stoicism; in theology, largely through Tertullian.[187] During or after his exile, there is evidence verifying the influence of the Psalm commentaries of

186 Marius Victorinus, *Adversus Arium* 3.3 (CSEL 83.1 196.30, 34): Sed, cum carnem sumpsit, universalem λόγον carnis sumpsit. . . . Item et universalem λόγον animae.

187 Though Tertullian's mediation of philosophy should also not be underestimated. In one chapter alone of *De Anima*, Tertullian refers to Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Eubulus, Zenocrates, Hipparchus, Heraclitus, Hippon, Thales, Empedocles, Critias, Epicurus, Critolaus and his Peripatetics, Zeno, Cleanthes, Chrysippus and Lucretius (Tertullian,

both Origen and Eusebius of Caesarea—the first in Greek, the second possibly in the Latin translation of his colleague Eusebius of Vercelli. Direct influence of any of Origen's other works or the writings of Irenaeus or Athanasius remains unsubstantiated. Likewise, as I established in Chapter 1, the Neoplatonism of fourth century Asia Minor was of little interest to Hilary.

Hilary's teaching on Christ's assumption of all humanity finds some impetus in Stoicism's use of *uniuersitas* to signal a universal city combined with its use of *humani generis* signifying a unity of the human race that is independent of Christ. Likewise, some of Cyprian's language points in the direction of the unity of all humanity in Christ. Nevertheless, we must conclude that Hilary's theology of Christ's assumption of all humanity is neither imported from the East nor inherited from the West, but is a development within Latin theology. Further study of both Marius Victorinus and Gregory of Elvira will shed light on the wider trend of the Latin fourth century toward a physicalist redemption model.

De Anima 5, ed. J.H. Waszink, in *Tertulliani Opera, pars 2: Opera Montanistica*, CCL 2 [Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 1954], 786–787).

CHAPTER 4

Proof of Hilary's Physicalism

While there is a trend in Hilary scholarship toward greater acceptance of Hilary's soteriology as physicalist, there is not yet a general consensus on the importance of this claim. In his 2002 monograph on Hilary's soteriology, Buffer accepts Hilary's physicalist teaching of Christ's assumption of all humanity but mentions it only in passing.[1] Doignon, in his voluminous writings on Hilary, never once mentions the question of physicalism but translates a passage from the *In Matthaeum* in a way that would seem to exclude the possibility.[2] Likewise the phenomenon of connecting physicalism with Platonism, begun with Harnack (et al.) has not completely disappeared.[3]

In this chapter, I will show that Hilary's soteriology, throughout his entire career, manifests the characteristics of a physicalist model of redemption. From his earliest work, the *In Matthaeum*—before he had any contact with non-Latinized Platonism (which I discussed in the previous chapter)—to the late *Tractatus super Psalmos*, Hilary teaches that Christ assumes all of humanity in the incarnation.

Hilary is a Latin, non-Platonic physicalist, an anomaly not allowed in the standard classifications of patristic soteriology that trace back to the nineteenth century German Protestant division of patristic redemptive models into the Greek physicalist model and the Latin moral or atonement model. The critique of physicalism outlined by the nineteenth century German Protestants was only one part of their larger project that served to codify "Latin" and "Greek" soteriological systems.[4] In short, according to this codification,

1 For Buffer's acceptance of Hilary as a physicalist, see *Salus in St. Hilary*, 124: "In taking flesh, Christ assumed 'all flesh,' all humanity, so that all men are 'in Christ' by that very fact." However, Buffer offers no treatment or explanation of Hilary's teaching of Christ's assumption of all humanity, considering it to be of minor importance.

2 Doignon translates an ambiguous passage from the *In Matthaeum* in a way that may indicate, not only indifference, but even denial of the presence of this teaching in Hilary's thought. He translates "Erat in Iesu Christo homo totus . . ." as "Il y avait en Jésus-Christ totalement un homme" (SC 254, p. 109). The question here is whether "homo totus" in this context means "an entire man" or something like "the entirety of humanity humanity."

3 Anyanwu, *Christological Anthropology in St. Hilary*, 97; Schwager, "Salvation," 1426.

4 For a study of Hilary's place within the scholarly classification of "Latin" and "Greek" models of salvation, see Ellen Scully, "The Soteriology of Hilary of Poitiers: A Latin Mystical Model of Redemption," *Augustinianum* 52 (2012): 159–195.

© KONINKLIJKE BRILL NV, LEIDEN, 2015 | DOI 10.1163/9789004290815_006

the Greek theory, termed "physicalist" or "mystical," lends so much weight to the hypostatic union and its transformative power that it places humanity's key salvific moment in the incarnation. This centrality of the incarnation is complemented by the Greek soteriological emphasis on deification or divinization.[5] In contrast to Greek emphases, the Latin theory, termed the "moral" or "atomenment" theory of redemption, understands the key soteriological moment as Christ's atoning death. This theory has a juridical, rather than a mystical, nature.[6]

Harnack includes Hilary as the single Latin to participate in what he and his predecessors term the Greek trajectory. Harnack's placement of Hilary on the "Greek" side, along with Irenaeus, Athanasius, Gregory of Nyssa, and Cyril of Alexandria has encouraged the connection of Hilary with Platonism and/or the Greek physicalists that has marred much of 20th century scholarship on Hilary's soteriology.[7]

Curiously, Harnack's placement of Hilary, a Latin, on the Greek side of the soteriological codification has not led to a re-evaluation of this Greek/Latin division. Not only is Hilary himself not a Greek but, while Hilary's exile does lead to a productive interaction with the Greek homoiousians, Hilary's physicalism pre-dates his exile and is not influenced by Greek Platonism or other Greek physicalists; certainly not by Cappadocian theology as Harnack argues. In this skewed scholarship, if Hilary is a physicalist, he must somehow be "Greek." As with all generalizations, the systemization of Latin and Greek soteriologies is useful only to a point. The case of Hilary, a Latin with what has been termed a "Greek" theology, is an important example of the limits of this codification. Hilary's soteriology, which shows that physicalism is neither the exclusive property of the Greeks nor dependent on Platonic influence, calls for a reevaluation of the classification of patristic soteriology.

---

5 A classic example of this tendency is Athanasius' famous saying that the "Word of God became man so that man might become God." *De Incarnatione* 54.3 (Charles Kannengiesser, *Sur l'incarnation du verbe* [*Sources chrétiennes* 199. Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1973]: 458.13–14): Αὐτὸς γὰρ ἐνηνθρώπησεν, ἵνα ἡμεῖς θεοποιηθῶμεν.

6 For a discussion of these two different theories by advocates of this system of classification, see Wild, *Divinization of Man*, 57–65; and McMahon, *De Christo Mediatore*, 63–64.

7 See Chapter 1 for a detailed treatment on problems in twentieth century Hilary scholarship. Harnack is not the only scholar to include Hilary with the Greek physicalists. See J.N.D. Kelly, *Early Christian Doctrines*, 375, 377–86, 397. See also, Jossua, *Salut: Incarnation ou mystère pascal*, 13: "il se propose surtout de résumer les positions classiques en histoire des doctrines sur la sotériologie des Pères grecs à laquelle on associe en général saint Hilaire de Poitiers . . ."

Problems of Terminology

Unfortunately, there is no consensus on the proper terminology to describe the soteriological trajectory—which Hilary shares with Irenaeus, Athanasius, Gregory of Nyssa and Cyril of Alexandria—that insists on contact of the divine with all humanity in Christ such that there are immediate, automatic, consequences resulting from this union for the entire human race apart from, and prior to, any individual faith, baptism, or action. Harnack introduced the terms "physical," "physicalism," or "physicalist." A recent dictionary entry by Raymond Schwager in the *Encyclopedia of Christian Theology* uses the term "mystical," originally given by Albert Ritschl who was the first modern scholar to delineate and name this trajectory.[8] Jean-Pierre Jossua, the one scholar who actually attempts to outline all the defining features of this soteriology calls it simply the "Greek theory."[9] Of the scholars explaining this theory in Hilary we find a variety of terminology: Émile Mersch calls it "collective incarnation,"[10] Paul Burns uses "extended incarnation,"[11] and Luis Ladaria retains Hilary's terminology of the "assumption of all humanity."[12]

While each of these terms highlights an important aspect of this teaching, I have chosen to use "physicalist" in this work for two reasons. First, I believe that the term "physicalist" is the most apt for conveying the physicality of Hilary's vision of human presence in the body of Christ. Second, this term, one of the first given to this soteriological trajectory, is also the one most in need of rehabilitation: it was the favorite of the nineteenth century Protestants used in a pejorative sense to show the physical and, according to their minds, automatic nature of salvation in this theory of redemption. I propose to rehabilitate the terms "physical theory of redemption" and "physicalist," seeking

8 Raymond Schwager in "Salvation" in the *Encyclopedia of Christian Theology*, vol. 3, ed. Jean-Yves Lacoste, (New York: Routledge, 2005), 1421–1434, distinguishes between mystical and atonement redemption models, he characterizes these as models from the first or the second millennium of Christianity respectively, rather than as Eastern and Western. Of the model of the first millennium, we find the typical charge of Platonism: "Theologians of the first millennium emphasized the divine efficacy by understanding salvation first from the incarnation and including by way of analogy—against a Platonist background—the whole of humankind in the humanity of Christ" (1426).

9 Jossua, *Salut: Incarnation ou mystère pascal*, 22–33.

10 Mersch says that Hilary teaches an "incarnation collective et mystique," (*Corps mystique du Christ*, vol. 1, 364).

11 Burns, *Christology in Hilary*, 99.

12 Ladaria, *Cristología de Hilario*, 87.

by them to convey the physicality of human incorporation into Christ's body without including the nineteenth century baggage of automatic salvation.

The Definition of Physicalism

In this section, I intend to lay out the definition of the physicalist theory given by Jean-Pierre Jossua. While Jossua wrote more than fifty years ago and believed that his definition applied only to Greek soteriology, nevertheless, as he is the only scholar who has attempted a definition of physicalism, I will use his definition here, both to clarify the theory and analyze Hilary's presence in this trajectory. I shall demonstrate the presence within Hilary's teaching of each characteristic of this theory, barring the first of Platonic dependence, outlined by Jossua.

Jossua lists six elements that generally make up what he terms the "Greek theory."[13]

1 A Platonic conception of a general or common nature that is present in Christ by concomitance with his humanity.
2 An insistence on the contact of the divine with the human in Christ.
3 The idea of immediate consequences resulting from this union for the entire "nature," that is, for all of humanity.
4 A "dynamic" soteriological value attributed to the incarnation that affects individuals in non-automatic manner.
5 The dependence of divinization and the sacraments upon the birth of Christ.
6 The conception of the baptism of Christ as a regeneration of our common nature.

The first point, being the most complicated, we shall leave to the last. All the other elements can be found in Hilary's thought.

2. Hilary insists on the contact of the divine with the human in Christ through his teaching of humanity's presence in Christ's body. For example, he says: "the *Word became flesh*, because while once we were alienated and enemies of his perception on account of our bad deeds, now we are reconciled in the body of his flesh. Therefore we are in Christ through the union of the

13 See Jossua, *Salut: Incarnation ou mystère pascal*, 22–33.

assumed flesh. . . ."[14] The union (*coniunctio*) of flesh enables contact between the Word of God and humanity. It is on account of the Son's incarnation unto death that humans are "already assumed into the household of the Father."[15] Furthermore, humans are "in Christ" on account of, and through, the flesh that the Son of God assumes in the incarnation. It is the Word of God, as Hilary says elsewhere, who ". . . constitutes us in the body of his flesh."[16]

3. Hilary shows that the body of Christ is the point of human contact with the divine by making it the place of all human transformation. The incarnation, seen as the assumption of all humanity, has immediate consequences upon not just Christ's individual humanity, but the entire human race. In the *De Trinitate*, Hilary says that "he [the Son of God] received the nature of flesh in himself when he was made man of a virgin, and through the fellowship of this conmingling, the body of the entire human race might be sanctified in him."[17] The Son became incarnate so that the entire human race could be sanctified through the incarnate body of Christ at the very moment of the incarnation. Through the analogy of the vine, Hilary shows that all of humanity, through the incarnation, comes to have Christ as its origin and root: "He assumed into himself the nature of all flesh, through which, having been made *the true vine*, he held in himself the origin of all *branches*."[18] In using the analogy of a plant, Hilary speaks of human unity with Christ as something that is, in a certain way, organic or natural. In effect, human presence in Christ's body, and therefore salvation, is not something to be gained but rather something that might be lost. These immediate consequences of the incarnation upon humanity have, historically, been the source of accusations against Hilary's orthodoxy. As we saw in Chapter 1, Ritschl, Herrmann, and von Harnack were concerned that

---

14 *Tr. ps.* 91.9 (CCL 61 329.13–16): quia *Verbum caro factum est*, quia, cum aliquando essemus alienati et inimici sensus eius in factis malis, nunc autem reconciliati sumus corpora carnis eius. Ergo per coniunctionem carnis adsumptae sumus in Christo. . . .

15 *Tr. ps.* 9.4 (CCL 61 75.20–26): sed ut nos clarificatos et immortalitate coopertos et in corporis sui gloriam conformatos in regnum Patris inducat, iam cohereditate sua dignos, iam in familiam Patris adsumptos, iam bonorum eius gloriaeque participes, ut Patri conregnet in nobis sit que Deus omnia in omnibus, cum subiectione oboedientiae in diuinam naturam humanae adsumptionis absorbeatur infirmitas.

16 *Tr. ps.* 125.6 (CCL 61B 62.24): . . . . constituens nos in corpore carnis suae.

17 *De Trin.* 2.24 (CCL 62 60.6–9): homo factus ex uirgine naturam in se carnis acciperet, perque hujus admixtionis societatem sanctificatum in eo uniuersi generis humani corpus existeret.

18 *Tr. ps.* 51.16 (CCL 61 104.20–22): . . . naturam in se uniuersae carnis adsumpsit, per quam effectus *uera uitis* genus in se uniuersae *propaginis* tenet.

Hilary had turned redemption into an automatic physical process that ignored the working of the will.

4. The consequences of the incarnation are, for Hilary, immediate; they are not for this reason automatic. Though the act of the will is secondary to the ontological reality of unity with Christ, it still plays into Hilary's understanding of salvation. Again using the analogy of the vine, Hilary explains that lack of faith can sever individuals from the unity that all have with Christ as a result of the incarnation. Belief is necessary to continue the relationship of participation in Christ's body that already exists as the result of the incarnation:

> Therefore, if some will merit through faith in the embodied God to remain in the nature of the body assumed by God, *they will be washed* so as to *bear eternal fruits* from themselves: this is because it is necessary that *the branch that remains* in the vine should have the nature of the *true vine*. But he who is incredulous of God born in a body, even if he also *remains* believing, nevertheless he will lack the *fruits* of his faith and *he will be cut off* either on account of his infidelity or on account of the uselessness of *the fruits* of unbelievers.[19]

The assumption of humanity into God is the divine act that has the immediate consequence of rendering all of humanity branches of the true vine. However, those branches that do not bear fruit will be cut off from the true vine, that is to say, those who do not believe in God's assumption of humanity are cut off from their natural unity with God, which was the gift given to all in the incarnation.

5. The efficacy of the sacraments and the possibility of divinization depend upon Christ's incarnation. The waters of baptism are able to begin the heavenly reign in individual humans because these waters have been consecrated through contact with the incarnate Christ: "But both the body and name of our creation were assumed by him, and though he did not need the washing, nevertheless, the purifying water of our cleansing had to be sanctified through

19 *Tr. ps.* 51.16 (CCL 61 104.12–18, commenting on John 15:1–8): Si qui igitur per fidem corporati Dei manere in natura adsumpti a Deo corporis merebuntur, hi *emundantur in fructus* aeternos ex se *adferendos*, quia necesse est ut naturam *uerae uitis propago* intra uitem *manens* teneat. At uero qui incredulus nati in corpore Dei fuerit, uel si et credens *maneat, fructibus* tamen fidei suae careat, *eradicabitur* aut ob infidelitatem aut ob inutilitatem *fructuum* negatorum. See also *Tr. ps.* 65.11 (CCL 61 241.10–13): . . . per eum uia nobis caelestis regni et in nouae generationis lauacro possessio aeternorum corporum inchoatur, aquis ipsis baptismo Domini consecratis.

him."[20] For Hilary, the Eucharist is a mirror image of the incarnation. The incarnation is Christ taking humans into himself and the Eucharist is humans taking Christ into themselves.[21] Membership in the Church is connected to salvation because the Church, as Christ's body, is the extension of the incarnation. Hilary goes so far as to say that those who separate themselves from the incarnation in the form of the body of the Church are handed over to the devil: "For those who are cast out from the body of the Church, which is the body of Christ, are as foreigners and strangers from the body of God and are handed over to the domination of the devil."[22]

6. As we have seen already in the previous point, Hilary understands the baptism of Christ as a regeneration of all humanity because of its tie to the incarnation. Through the language of Son of God and son of man, Hilary shows that Christ's baptism is the moment that human beings, the son of man, become adopted sons of God.

> For he who is born man of the virgin, was also then the Son of God, but he who is the son of man, the same one was the Son of God, but he [the son of man] was born again from baptism and then was the Son of God, so that he was born both into the same thing and into something different; but it is written, when he ascended from the water: *you are my Son; today I have begotten you*. However, since, according to the generation of the man then being renewed, he also was born into a perfect Son of God, [this verse] is fitting to both the son of man and the Son of God in baptism.[23]

---

20 *In Matt*. 2.5 (SC 254 109.9–110.1): Sed adsumptum ab eo creationis nostrae fuerat et corpus et nomen, atque ita non ille necessitate habuit abluendi, sed per illum in aquis ablutionis nostrae erat sanctificanda purgation.

21 See *De Trin*. 8.13 (CCL 62A 325.7–13): Si enim uere *uerbum caro factum est*, et uere nos uerbum carnem cibo dominico sumimus, quomodo non naturaliter manere in nobis existimandus est, qui et naturam carnis nostrae iam inseparabilem sibi homo natus adsumpsit, et naturam carnis suae ad naturam aeternitatis sub sacramento nobis communicandae carnis admiscuit?

22 *Tr. ps.* 118 Ain 5 (CCL 61A 151.16–18): Qui enim ab ecclesiae corpore respuuntur, quae Christi est corpus tamquam peregrini et alieni a Dei corpore dominatui diaboli traduntur.

23 *Tr. ps*. 2.29 (CCL 61 57.3–58.11): Nam qui natus ex uirgine homo est, erat et tum Dei Filius, sed qui filius hominis est, idem erat et Dei Filius, natus autem rursum ex baptismo et tum Dei Filius, ut et in idipsum et in aliud nasceretur; scriptum est autem, cum ascendisset ex aqua: *Filius meus es tu, ego hodie genui te*. Sed secundum generationem hominis renascentis tum quoque ipse Deo renascebatur in Filium perfectum, ut hominis filio ita et Dei Filio in baptismate comparato.

The son of man is not one man but all men. As Hilary says in his commentary on Psalm 65, Christ's baptism is a moment of joy for all, because Christ's baptism in the Jordan affects not just Christ's human nature, but all human nature: all are healed by Christ's baptism. "Therefore this is what is signified [in the verse]: *we will rejoice there in him*. In the coming of the Lord and his baptism in the Jordan, these things were fulfilled by means of the healing of all. For this reason, *they will rejoice there*, pertains to the Jordan."[24]

Even Wild, the scholar who most vociferously denies that Hilary teaches Christ's assumption of all humanity, is quite ready to accept the presence of elements two through five in Hilary's thought, though he does so in a manner that disconnects them from the premise of Christ's assumption of all humanity.[25] Hilary, he says, teaches the effect of the incarnation on all, regardless of whether the incarnation assumes all or just one. He comments on *In Matthaeum* 2.5: "Hilary may mean that God sanctified all men by the assumption of one man, the Christ. Or he may mean (less probably, it seems) that God sanctified all men by assuming them all somehow in Christ. In either case, however, the Word does sanctify all men by the mere fact of His becoming man."[26] Wild acknowledges the immediate consequences of the incarnation on all humanity. Prior to any faith commitment, association with the Church or reception of the sacraments, all humans are sanctified by virtue of the incarnation. Having eliminated the possibility of the presence of humanity in the body of Christ, Wild is unable to provide a rationale that would explain how the consequences of the incarnation are applied, with no other mediation than the incarnation itself, unto the sanctification of all men.

Wild's understanding deprives the incarnation of much of its saving force. As a result, Wild relies heavily on the role of faith and the sacraments in salvation. Wild notices the presence of Jossua's elements three and four in Hilary's thought, giving them perhaps too much prominence. Wild notices the clear

---

24 *Tr. ps.* 65.11 (CCL 61 241.29–31): Hoc ergo illud est quod significatur: *Ibi laetabimur in ipso*. Quae in aduentu Domini et Iordanis baptismo et infirmitatum omnium curatione expleta sunt. Quod autem *ibi laetabimur*, ad Iordanen pertinet.

25 Wild's dissertation is premised upon the similarity between Hilary's teaching and the "Greek" model: "Saint Hilary teaches a doctrine similar to the 'physical' theory" (Wild, *Divinization of Man*, 58). Wild devotes only one paragraph to the idea that the physical theory of the Greek Fathers outlines an assumption of all humanity in the incarnation (16). Wild rightly argues that the Fathers have been vindicated from teaching a "pantheistic Incarnation of the whole human race" (16). He does not consider the possibility of a non-pantheistic assumption of all humanity and so excludes it from his conception of the physical theory.

26 Wild, *Divinization of Man*, 60.

connection between the incarnation and baptism in Hilary's thought: "In fact so closely united in Hilary's mind are the saving properties of the incarnation and Baptism that he puts them down as a double cause of man's sanctification: '. . . hominem et assumptione sanctificans et lavacro' (In Matt. 2.5)."[27] Wild also portrays faith and the sacraments as the individual appropriation of the general effect of the incarnation: "These four: faith, Baptism, honor and the Eucharist, seem to bestow directly on the individual Christian what is given in general to all by the Incarnation."[28] Yet again, however, in denying a teaching of Christ's assumption of all humanity, Wild misunderstands the framework of the physicalist theory of redemption and eliminates Hilary's understanding of the manner in which the incarnation bestows salvation generally.

The Physicalist Model in the *In Matthaeum*: Refutation of Platonic Influence

We have shown the presence of each of the elements outlined by Jossua as characteristic of the "Greek theory" in Hilary's thought—excepting the first. We have also shown that even Wild, who denies Christ's assumption of all humanity, accepts the presence of these other elements in Hilary's thought. However, though he recognizes the similarity between Hilary's thought and the "Greek" physicalist model of redemption in many aspects, Wild refuses to admit the presence of the necessary incarnational premise of this model in Hilary's thought. Jossua points to the premise of the physicalist Greek model in his first element—namely, a Platonic conception of a general or common nature. There are more subtleties here than either Jossua or Wild realize. Despite Wild's effort of denial, the physicalist model of redemption depends upon the idea that Christ assumes all of humanity. When this teaching is viewed through the lens of Platonism, Christ's assumption of all humanity is perceived as the assumption of a Platonic-type common or general nature (the Form of man). Hilary, however, teaches Christ's assumption of humanity in a way that is not Platonic and neither does he conceive of this assumption in

27 Wild, *Divinization of Man*, 93. Wild offers two different interpretations of this quotation from *In Matt*. 2.5. In one place, he says that this *lavacro* is Christ's baptism and cites this passage as the one place in the *In Matthaeum* where Hilary clearly presents a physical theory of redemption (Wild, *Divinization of Man*, 60–61). In another place he interprets this *lavacro* as the individual Christian's baptism and he uses the passage to support the necessity of individual baptism for the forgiveness of sins (Wild, *Divinization of Man*, 93).

28 Wild, *Divinization of Man*, 82.

terms of a common or general nature. Hilary, in clearly demonstrating all other of the main points of the Greek or physicalist model of redemption as well as a teaching of Christ's assumption of all humanity, calls into question the standard scholarly assumption that there is a necessary relationship between Platonism and this redemption model.

There are two separate issues related to Jossua's first point (a Platonic conception of a general or common nature): the first surrounding "common nature," the second concerning Platonic influence.

Does Hilary teach that Christ assumes a common or general nature? Certainly, as we saw in Chapter 1, this is the belief of Harnack and Ritschl. On the opposite side, in an effort to affirm the individual personality of Christ's human nature, Wild explicitly denies that Christ's assumption of the nature of humanity means anything other than Christ's assumption of a complete individual nature.[29] Hilary uses phrases that can be seen as pointing to a conception of a common or general nature. For instance, he says the Word assumes the "nature of all humanity"[30] or "the nature of all flesh."[31] However, these statements must, as we saw in Chapter 2, be read in context of other statements in which he demonstrates that this "nature of all humanity" that Christ assumes is not a single general nature, but a nature that includes the multiplicity of humanity. "The nature of all humanity" taken up by Christ is a nature that includes, individually, each human person as becomes clear when Hilary speaks about Christ's body as containing the universal Church: "For he himself is the Church, containing in himself the universal Church through the sacrament of his body."[32] Christ's body, being the Church, is also the temple—the bustling place of all the commerce of sacrifice—of the city of Jerusalem, an image that pictures the presence of many in Christ's body, not just one."[33]

---

29 Wild, *Divinization of Man*, 60.

30 *Tr. ps.* 51.17 (CCL 61 104.5–6): . . . quia *Verbum caro factum est et inhabitauit in nobis*, naturam scilicet in se totius humani generis adsumens . . .

31 *Tr. ps.* 51.16 (CCL 61 104.20–22): . . . naturam in se uniuersae carnis adsumpsit, per quam effectus *uera uitis* genus in se uniuersae *propaginis* tenet. See also *De Trin.* 2.24 (CCL 62 60.6–12): ut homo factus ex uirgine naturam in se carnis acciperet, perque hujus admixtionis societatem sanctificatum in eo uniuersi generis humani corpus existeret: ut quemadmodum omnes in se per id quod corporeum se esse uoluit conderentur, ita rursum in omnes ipse per id quod ejus est inuisiblile referretur.

32 *Tr. ps.* 125.6 (CCL 61B 62.24–26): Ipse est enim Ecclesia, per sacramentum corporis sui in se uniuersam eam continens.

33 *Tr. ps.* 64.2 (CCL 61 221.12–14): Sion mons quidem Hierusalem adiacens est; sed montem hunc eiusque nomen atque etiam urbis ipsius ecclesiam, quae corpus est Christi, nuncupatam semper accepimus . . .

Is Hilary's idea of Christ's assumption of all humanity Platonic? The short answer to this question is "no." We already saw in Chapter 3 that Hilary's Latin rhetorical education and ignorance of the Greek language precludes a pre-exilic knowledge of Greek Platonism. Hilary's teaching of Christ's assumption of all humanity derives from his use of specific Pauline and Johanine themes, Latin theology, and Stoic philosophy. This "Greek" or physicalist redemption model within Hilary's thought has been assumed to be Platonic because Hilary's theology has been read through the lens of Greek theology, where this model does seem to largely owe to Platonism. I will argue that in the *Tractatus super Psalmos* this physicalist theory of redemption is not the result of Platonic influence. Though at the time of the writing the *Tractatus super Psalmos*, Hilary has already had, during his exile, the opportunity to appropriate Eastern theology and philosophy, I have argued in Chapter 3 that Hilary's contact with Platonism during his exile was with that Asia-Minor branch of Platonism that was highly theurgical and apparently unsavory to Hilary. Hilary did not appropriate this Platonism in his thought, nor did he need to in order to present a teaching on Christ's assumption of all humanity and a physicalist doctrine of redemption. Prior to our exploration of physicalism in the *Tractatus super Psalmos* I will show that Platonism was not necessary to Hilary's teaching by demonstrating that this physicalist model of redemption was already present in Hilary's theology, prior to his exile and contact with Greek theology, in the *In Matthaeum*. Hilary's teaching of Christ's assumption of all humanity in his post-exilic *Tractatus super Psalmos* is an expansion of the same theme already present in his pre-exilic *In Matthaeum*.

There is one incontrovertible statement of the physical doctrine of redemption and two passages that can be interpreted along those lines, but not indubitably so, in the *In Matthaeum*. Hilary offers a clear and explicit teaching of Christ's assumption of all humanity in *In Matthaeum* 4.12, where he says:

> He [Christ] calls the flesh that he had assumed a city because, as a city consists of a variety and multitude of inhabitants, so there is contained in him, through the nature of the assumed body, a certain assembly of the whole human race. And thus he becomes a city from our assembly in him and we become the dwelling of this city through consort with his flesh.[34]

34 *In Matt.* 4.12 (SC 254 130.3–9): Ciuitatem carnem quam adsumpserat nuncupat, quia, ut ciuitas ex uarietate ac multitudine consistit habitantium, ita in eo per naturam suscepti corporis quaedam uniuersi generis humani congregatio continetur. Atque ita et ille ex nostra in se congregatione fit ciuitas et nos per consortium carnis suae sumus ciuitatis habitatio.

Christ's body is a city that contains the assembly of the human race. Hilary says this in a quite straightforward fashion. Humans dwell in this city of Christ's body. Christ does not assume a single Form or Idea of humanity, but the multitude of all individual persons. The unity of each person with Christ is accomplished through consort with his flesh; that is, each person participates in the flesh of Christ by dwelling within it.

The single quotation offered above is enough to prove that Hilary—even in his earliest work the *In Matthaeum*—did indeed teach that Christ assumed all humanity into his body in the incarnation. At this point in his writing career, the role of this physicalist teaching may be very limited. The question of exactly how limited the role of physicalism is in the *In Matthaeum* is partially dependent upon the interpretation of two contested passages. Before we look at these two passages, I would like to clarify my own interpretative position. Since the passage from *In Matthaeum* 4.12, which we looked at above, demonstrates the presence of physicalism in the *In Matthaeum*, I approach the contested passages with the preconception that there is a possibility, though not a necessity, that they likewise support a physicalist teaching. However, to be clear, these two passages are not needed to prove Hilary's early physicalism, for such was already demonstrated in *In Matthaeum* 4.12. These passages offer indications of the scope, not the presence, of physicalism in Hilary's early writings.

The first contested passage is found in *In Matthaeum* 2.5. The interpretive difficulty centers upon the phrase *homo totus*.[35]

> There was in Jesus Christ the *homo totus*, and so the assumed body, as a servant of the Spirit, completed in itself the entire sacrament of our salvation.[36]

There is scholarly disagreement on how to translate *homo totus*. Mersch translates *homo totus* as if it were rendering *omnis homo*, that is, "every man": "tout homme."[37] On the other side, Doignon, in the *Sources Chretiennes* edition of the *In Matthaeum*, translates *homo totus* as "an entire man": "totalement un homme."[38] Not surprisingly, Mersch is an ardent advocate of the presence of

35 See Burns' comment on the translation of *homo totus* (*Christology in Hilary*, 100).

36 *In Matt.* 2.5 (SC 254 108.2–5): Erat in Iesu Christo homo totus atque ideo in famulatum Spiritus corpus adsumptum omne in se sacramentum nostrae salutis expleuit.

37 See Mersch, *Corps mystique du Christ*, vol. 1, 346.

38 SC 254, p. 109. While he does not comment on this particular passage, Wild prefers to interpret *homo* strictly as Christ's individual humanity (rather than humanity as a whole)

physicalism in Hilary's writings while Doignon, in his voluminous writings on Hilary, never once mentions the idea. Charlier takes something of a compromise position when he asserts that Hilary intentionally makes use of the ambivalent *homo totus* to express *both* that there was in Christ a whole man (namely body and soul) and the entirety of humanity.[39] I find the position of Charlier to be most likely for two reasons. First, it is typical of Hilary's writing style that he invests multiple meanings into his chosen technical terminology and that he plays off the interaction between these meanings to highlight the complexity of any knowledge about God. Second, at other times in his writings, Hilary makes both the points Charlier mentions: namely that Christ has both body and soul, and that he contains the entirety of humanity.[40] Since we know Hilary advocates both these positions, and that he revels in terminological ambiguity, I suspect that Charlier is right that both are to be found in this passage.

The second contested passage is found in *In Matthaeum* 19.5. This passage has been used as textual evidence for the argument against Christ's assumption of all humanity, but I would like to suggest that, in the context, this passage *can* be read in a manner that supports a physicalist teaching. The passage is as follows:

> He [the young man who prefigures the Jewish people][41] is commanded to love his neighbor (*proximum*) just as himself, yet he persecuted Christ—who assumed the body of us all and by reason of the assumed body became a neighbor (*proximus*) to each of us—all the way to the death of the Cross.[42]

---

in order to avoid any extension of the incarnation into humanity (Wild, *Divinization of Man*, 60).

39 Charlier, *L'Église*, 456.

40 For Christ having both body and soul, see, for example, *De Trin*. 10.15 (CCL 62A 470.6–9): Quodsi adsumpta sibi per se ex uirgine carne, ipse sibi ex se animam concepti per se corporis coaptauit, secundum animae corporis que naturam necesse est et passionum fuisse naturam. For Christ containing the entirety of humanity, see *In Matt.* 4.12 (SC 254 130.3–9): Ciuitatem carnem quam adsumpserat nuncupat, quia, ut ciuitas ex uarietate ac multitudine consistit habitantium, ita in eo per naturam suscepti corporis quaedam uniuersi generis humani congregatio continetur. Atque ita et ille ex nostra in se congregatione fit ciuitas et nos per consortium carnis suae sumus ciuitatis habitatio.

41 *In Matt.* 19.4 (SC 258 92.14–15): Iuvenis hic namque formam Iudaici populi habet.

42 *In Matt.* 19.5 (SC 258 94.15–17): Proximum tamquam se amare praeceptus est: hic Christum, qui omnium nostrum corpus assumpsit, et unicuique nostrum assumpti corporis conditione factus est proximus, usque in poenam crucis persecutus est.

In this passage, the meaning of the "body of us all" is glossed by Christ's relationship as *proximus* to each person. The term *proximus*, translated as "neighbor," suggests according to scholars such as Wild and Blasich, that Christ is assuming a body like all human bodies and this assumption and the similarity between his body and the bodies of other individuals leads him to become as a neighbor—someone extremely close, yet remaining a separate person—to all humans.[43] However, we may go one step further. *Proximus*, translated here as neighbor, also means "the closest/nearest." Using this translation of *proximus*, the argument would be that Christ is the closest thing there is to each human person individually and that the Jews did not recognize him as such. If Christ assumed a body like other human bodies, he would be no closer to an individual than any other human being with a body. Having simply *a* human body or *a* human nature would make Christ close, but not the closest, to each human individual. Each person is commanded to love Christ as himself because, in taking the body of all humanity, humans exist within Christ's body as a part of him. *Proximus*, then, would connote not distance but identification of self.

Both Wild and Blasich use this text from the *In Matthaeum* as a major textual support for their denial of Christ's assumption of all humanity. They do so by arguing that Hilary uses the term neighbor to imply a real distinction and difference between Christ and believers. However, I believe it is more likely that Hilary, playing on the scriptural prompt, intends *proximus* to signify the superlative that it is grammatically: *proximus* is not simply "close" (as Wild and Blasich argue) but "the closest there is." I believe that Christ's assumption of all humanity is the most adequate interpretation of Hilary's use of *proximus*.

The Physicalist Model in the *Tractatus super Psalmos*

These passages in the *In Matthaeum* demonstrate that Hilary teaches, at least on one occasion, and possibly in three, Christ's assumption of all humanity

43 Wild is quite clear in his commentary on this passage: "The fact that although Christ took our body, He is no more than a neighbor to us indicates that Hilary means merely that Christ assumed a body exactly like ours and of the same race of Adam when he says that Christ assumed our body" (*Divinization of Man*, 60). Blasich uses the imagery of neighbor to explain all instances of Hilary's teaching that Christ assumes the nature of humanity ("Risurrezione dei corpi," 76). This understanding, unfortunately hamstrings Blasich's argument concerning the resurrection of the body in Hilary's thought. For example the last line of his article—"È Gesù Cristo, il Verbo che assume un corpo simila al nostro, che porta il nostro corpo nella sua risurrezione; consegna al Padre il suo regno, il Popolo di Dio, la Chiesa." (90)—raises the question: how does Christ carry our body in the resurrection if it is only a body "similar to ours," not our body itself?

before he had any possibility of a direct knowledge of Greek Platonism that has not undergone the Latin syncretization with Stoicism. The limited presence of this teaching in the *In Matthaeum* grows into a substantial presence in the *Tractatus super Psalmos*. This substantial presence of Christ's assumption of all humanity in the *Tractatus super Psalmos* is connected, as I will show in Chapter 7, to Hilary's growing interest in eschatology. This interest requires Hilary to be much more intentional and systematic about his teaching of Christ's assumption of all humanity than he was previously in the *In Matthaeum* and even the *De Trinitate*.

The statements concerning Christ's assumption of all humanity become both more frequent and less ambiguous in the *Tractatus super Psalmos*. For example, Hilary compares Christ to the true vine: an analogy whose success depends upon the presence of all humanity in this vine:

> He assumed into himself the nature of all flesh, through which, having been made *the true vine*, he held in himself the origin of all *branches*.[44]

Christ, as the vine, is able to be the origin of all branches, because he has assumed the nature of all into himself. Hilary explains John's prologue and the meaning of the "Word was made flesh" with a clear statement of Christ's assumption of all humanity:

> . . . *the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us*, indeed assuming into himself the nature of all humanity . . .[45]

We see in both these quotations from the *Tractatus super Psalmos* that Hilary speaks of the incarnation as Christ's assumption of the nature of "all flesh" or "all humanity," phrases that seem to point back to the Platonic generic view of humanity.[46] However we shall see that Hilary's emphasis on Christ's assumption of a single nature does not do away with the collectivity we found in the *In Matthaeum*. The *In Matthaeum's* vision of the city finds a place in the *Tractatus super Psalmos*, though it gives way to Hilary's preferred image of the Church:

---

44 *Tr. ps.* 51.16 (CCL 61 104.20–22): . . . naturam in se uniuersae carnis adsumpsit, per quam effectus *uera uitis* genus in se uniuersae *propaginis* tenet.

45 *Tr. ps.* 51.17 (CCL 61 104.5–6): . . . quia *Verbum caro factum est et inhabitauit in nobis*, naturam scilicet in se totius humani generis adsumens . . .

46 Hilary uses the word "flesh" synonomously with "humanity." Hilary clarifies in *Tr. ps*. 64.4 that he uses the term flesh, according to scriptural custom, to mean humanity: Humani generis uniuersitatem scriptura sub carnis nomine designat . . . (CCL 61 223.3–4).

> For he himself is the Church, containing in himself the universal Church through the sacrament of his body.[47]
>
> Therefore, we are in Christ through union with the assumed flesh. . . .[48]

As in the *In Matthaeum*, the unity of each person with Christ is accomplished through the association of the flesh; however the *consortio* (consort) of the *In Matthaeum* has been strengthened to *coniunctio* (union). Hilary's increased emphasis on Christ's assumption of a unified human nature in the *Tractatus super Psalmos*—which never does away with his understanding of multiplicity and individuality in the body of Christ—is the result of a more cohesive and extensive understanding of the unity of humanity, a unity that preexists and forms a necessary condition for Christ's assumption of all humanity.

Latin Atonement Theory? The Importance of the Suffering and Death of Christ in Hilary's Redemption Model

The typical schema for Greek and Latin redemption models proposes, as we have seen, that the Greek model focuses on the transformative power of the incarnation and resurrection, while the Latin model, by contrast, emphasizes the atoning power of Christ's death. I have argued that Hilary's soteriology is based upon a non-Platonic "Greek" physicalist model of redemption. However, Hilary, in keeping with the larger Christian tradition, also speaks about the salvific power of Christ's sufferings and death. We shall see that though Hilary acknowledges the importance of the passion and death of Christ for the salvation of humanity, he integrates these moments into his overarching physicalist model of redemption. Hilary's soteriology, and even his entire theological system, is coherent only in light of his physicalist model of redemption.

Hilary integrates the sufferings and death of Christ into his physicalist model of redemption by viewing these moments of Christ's life in light of the incarnation and resurrection, respectively. The passion of Christ is an extension of the emptying of the incarnation; it is the result of Christ's true assumption of the *forma serui*. Christ's death is both the continuation of this descent of the incarnation and suffering and, on the other hand, is the necessary prelude to the resurrection.

---

47 *Tr. ps.* 125.6 (CCL 61B 62.24–26): Ipse est enim Ecclesia, per sacramentum corporis sui in se uniuersam eam continens.

48 *Tr. ps.* 91.9 (CCL 61 329.15–16): ergo per coniunctionem carnis adsumptae sumus in Christo. . . .

Hilary's presentation of the relationship between the sufferings of Christ and his impassibility has received much scholarly attention and some critique. The criticism of Harnack, who accused Hilary of docetism,[49] has led to a number of studies vindicating and nuancing Hilary's teaching concerning the relationship of the two natures in Christ and the manner of the participation of each in suffering.[50] Appropriating a Stoic psychology, Hilary argues that while Christ experiences suffering, he does not give this suffering emotional weight and so transfer the objective experience of suffering into the subjective experience of pain.[51] For our purposes, the manner of Christ's suffering is rather unimportant; we need only know that Hilary both attributes suffering in some way to the person Jesus Christ and acknowledges this suffering as salvific.[52] Hilary does indeed do both these things. He says: "It must be understood that Christ was subjected to sufferings not on account of a necessity of nature but rather on account of the sacrament of human salvation. . . ."[53] Christ both undergoes sufferings (*subdere passioni*) and does so for human salvation.

---

49 Harnack, *History of Dogma*, vol. 4, 140–148; see especially footnote 2 on page 140. See also R.P.C. Hanson, *Search for the Christian Doctrine of God*, 501. A good refutation of the Docetism charge can be found in Mark Weedman, "Martyrdom and Docetism: 21–41. Weedman says that "within the context of Hilary's theological and philosophical tradition, it was not necessary for Christ to be human as other humans" (40). Indeed, the key to understanding Hilary's statements concerning Christ's suffering (or lack thereof) is to realize that "Hilary's description of Christ's human body anticipates his explanation of how Christ's humanity functions for human salvation. Christ's sinless body prefigures the nature of human bodies after they have been transformed and resurrected" (22). Beckwith offers a similar evaluation: "Christ's humanity, then, is not less human because he suffers without pain; rather, according to Hilary's anthropology and moral psychology, he is more truly human because his soul is properly and perfectly ordered toward that which is true and good" ("Suffering without Pain," 86). See also Burns, *Model for the Christian Life*, 158–162.

50 See, for example, Raphaël Favre, "Communication des idiomes," 481–514; Burns, *Christology in Hilary*, 83–87; Smulders, *Doctrine trinitaire*, 202–206.

51 Both Burns and Favre demonstrate that this distinction between the objective experience of suffering (*pati*) and the subjective experience of pain (*dolere*) is influenced by Stoic psychology (Burns, 89; Favre, 490–491). For a longer treatment, see Chapter 3 "Pain vs. Suffering."

52 See Favre's summary of Hilary's teaching on the suffering of Christ specifically in the *Tractatus super Psalmos*, in "Communication des idiomes," 500, 514. See also Orazzo, *Salvezza in Ilario*, 62–64.

53 *Tr. ps.* 53.12 (CCL 61 137.4–5): non ex naturae necessitate potius quam ex sacramento humanae salutis passioni fuisse subditus intellegendus est. . . .

Christ's sufferings after the last supper can contribute to the redemption of humanity because these sufferings are an extension of the suffering entailed in the incarnational assumption of the *forma serui*.[54] Hilary, as we will show in the next chapter, sees the incarnation and the resurrection as parallel movements: the descent of Son of God into the form of a slave is the movement opposite to the ascent of this form of a slave into the form of God. Suffering is an attribute of the *forma serui*, for this reason, whenever the words of the Psalm are the words of Christ concerning his own suffering, Hilary says Christ is speaking as a man.[55] As a result, Hilary understands the exaltation to be dependent upon the descent: the lower Christ descends into the infirmity and humility of human nature, the higher he can raise this human nature into the glory of the divine nature. Hilary emphasizes that "the reason for *exalting above the heavens* was that humility, descending all the way to the depths of the earth, was assumed."[56] The passion of Christ and his death represent the lowest depths of Christ's descent into human nature. The exaltation of Christ, and humanity in him, is the direct result of this descent.

Hilary generally integrates the salvific power of the suffering of Christ into the schema of the physicalist model of redemption in which Christ's assumption of all humanity into his body in the incarnation culminates in his glorification of this humanity in his resurrection. Christ's sufferings, then, are undergone not for his own sake, but for the sake of humanity and, particularly, for the sake of the "sacrament of divine communion."[57] The rationale for the necessity and the efficacy of the passion is the same as that of the incarnation:

---

54 Buffer makes the same point by saying that the incarnation and the passion are two aspects of a single act of obedience (*Salus in St. Hilary*, 172).

55 For example, *Tr. ps.* 55.2 (CCL 61 155.8–13): Erit ergo sermo inter Dauid ipsum et hominem Iesum Christum temperatus, ut, quia infirmitates omnium portauerit et peccatorum nostrorum frequenter et uoce sit usus et lacrimis, extra contumeliam Dei sit et adfectus et sermo qui hominis est. See Rondeau, *Commentaires patristiques*, vol. 2, *Exégèse prosopologique*, 333–353.

56 *Tr. ps.* 66.6 (CCL 61 163.13–164.15): . . . hinc *exaltandi super caelos* causam significans extitisse, quod descendendi usque in inferiora terrae humilitas esset adsumpta. Hilary is patterning this passage on the descent and ascent of the Philipians hymn as supported by the common preposition "usque."

57 See *Tr. ps.* 68.17 (CCL 61 305.8–15): Et quia *propter inimicos suos* haec perpetienda sibi fuerant, per quae humanae saluti atque aeternitati consulebat, huius *beneplaciti temporis* testatur adfectum dicens: *Improperium expectauit cor meum et miseriam*, desideratas sibi esse huius temporis significans passiones secundum illud diuinae communionis sacramentum: *Desiderio concupiui hoc manducare*, quia in his passionis suae desideriis *beneplaciti temporis* consistebat effectus.

Christ lowers himself into the suffering of human nature to raise human nature to the glory of divine nature. Christ's descent into the infirmity of human nature, that is, into suffering and death, has salvific power for humanity because all humanity is in his body by virtue of the incarnation and through faith may choose to be integrated even more deeply in his body. According to Hilary, the psalmist has been made a concorporeal participator in Christ and so can say that it is the infirmity of *his* (the psalmist's) flesh that Christ both bears in his passion and exalts into heaven.[58]

Christ's death, then, is sometimes viewed by Hilary as the final moment in the downward trajectory of emptying and humility entailed by the assumption of the *forma serui*. At other times Hilary regards the death of Christ as the necessary prelude to the resurrection. Within his physicalist model of redemption, Hilary includes a teaching of satisfaction that he ties to the death of Christ. On the one hand, Hilary expands Tertullian's satisfaction theory of repentance and good deeds by using satisfaction to apply to Christ's death.[59] However, unlike Tertullian, he consistently denies the possibility of satisfaction being

58 *Tr. ps*. 66.7 (CCL 61 164.1–6): Omnis autem hic profectus non naturae diuinae, sed infirmitati hominis optatur, quia se per adsumptionem carnis in caelestibus conlocandum propheta non nescit, quippe cum concorporales et participes effecti simus in Christo Iesu. Et idcirco haec ad carnis suae infirmitatem, quae et in passionibus domini uexanda et *super caelos* esset *exaltanda*, conexuit. . . .

59 Tertullian never uses satisfaction to describe Christ's death, however he does say that the death of Christ is "the whole weight and fruit of the name 'Christian'," (*Aduersus Marcionem* 3.8.5 [CCL 1 519.23–24]: Totum Christiani nominis et pondus et fructus, mors Christi) because Christ was "sent in order to die" (*De Carne Christi* 6.6 [ed. A. Kroymann, in *Tertulliani Opera, pars 2: Opera Montanistica*, CCL 2 (Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 1954), 884.37–38]: At vero Christus mori missus). Furthermore, though in itself, sacrifice has nothing to do with *satisfacio*, Tertullian does say that "it was fitting for him to become a sacrifice for all the nations" (*Adv. Iud*. 13.21): Hunc enim oportebat pro omnibus gentibus fieri sacrificium). See Kelly, *Early Christian Doctrines*, 177, for a brief summary of Tertullian's teaching regarding the concept of satisfaction.

Harnack states that while Tertullian was the first to say that humans must "satisfy God," Cyprian is the first to apply satisfaction to Christ himself (*History of Dogma*, vol. 3, 311–312). Though there is no proof supporting Harnack's claim concerning Cyprian—neither did Harnack provide citations nor have later scholars been able to find the concept of Christ rendering satisfaction to God in any of Cyprian's writings—it continues to exert considerable influence. For example, while Turner notes in a footnote that he has not found satisfaction applying to Christ in Cyprian, in the body of his text he reproduces the assertion of Harnack (H.E.W. Turner, *The Patristic Doctrine of Redemption: A Study of the Development of Doctrine during the First Five Centuries* [London: A.R. Mowbray, 1952], 98). Dunn, in his recent article on Tertullian's soteriology makes the same argument with

accomplished by individual Christians. Tertullian often speaks of the satisfaction individual Christians, as sinners, need to render to God.[60] However, Hilary only uses satisfaction to speak about works done under the Law.[61] Satisfaction for Hilary is a reality of the old dispensation that is overcome by Christ. At times, Hilary speaks of the concept of satisfaction negatively: it is the arrogation of God's grace.[62] Since satisfaction is necessarily tied to the Law, Hilary rarely speaks of it in relationship to the life of the Christian. Only once in the *Tractatus super Psalmos* does Hilary explain the life of Christ, and especially the events of his passion, in terms of satisfaction. Christ, as the fulfillment of the Law, is the last person to render satisfaction to the Lord: "Clearly he did and said all things so that he would be seen to satisfy the religion of the sacrament."[63]

Likewise, only once does Hilary outline the manner of Christ's satisfaction: in his commentary on Psalm 53, Hilary speaks of Christ's passion and death as a sacrifice. The sacrifices offered according to the Law by the Jews were imperfect for two reasons: 1) since they were required, even when the sacrifices were performed properly they were offered under duress and not freely; 2) these sacrifices were offered again and again because by their very nature they could be neither permanent nor continuous. Christ offers his own body as a sacrifice

---

a footnote to Turner—Dunn seems to have read the text but not the footnotes of his source (Geoffrey Dunn, "A Survey of Tertullian's soteriology," *Sacris Erudiri* 42 (2003): 68).

60 See, for example, Tertullian, *De Paenitentia* 5.9 (ed. J. Borleffs, in *Tertulliani Opera, pars 1: Opera Catholica; Aduersus Marcionem*, CCL 1 [Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 1954], 328.32–329.35: Ita qui per delictorum paenitentiam instituerat domino satisfacere, diabolo per aliam paenitentiae paenitentiam satisfaciet erit que tanto magis perosus domino quanto aemulo eius acceptus. See also *De Paenitentia* 6.4 (CCL 1 330.20–22): Hoc enim pretio dominus veniam addicere instituit, hac paenitentiae conpensatione redimendam proponit inpunitatem.

61 For example, *Tr. ps.* 126.1 (CCL 61B 66.12–16): Dignum est enim ut miserabilem populi casum et impietati eius debitam poenam et post longae seruitutis sufficientem peccatis grauibus satisfactionem et misericordem in eos dei indulto reditu uoluntatem secundum prouidentiae scientiam prophetae spiritus praeloquatur

62 See *Tr. ps.* 142.12 (CCL 61B 251.10–252.15): Et conpetens illa humanae uerecundiae professio est, ut, quod *per Spiritum Dei in terram rectam deducendus sit*, id non meriti esse sui arroget neque per satisfactionem proprii obsequii id sibi postulet, sed totum hoc ad clarificandum in se Dei nomen expectet, ut propter honorem Dei nominis *in terra recta* esse statuatur.

63 *Tr. ps.* 131.4 (CCL 61B 113.4–5): Certe ita gessit et locutus est omnia, ut sacramenti religioni satisfacere uideretur. Hilary says this in the context of Christ's vow to the Father to save humanity: see *Tr. ps*. 131.4 (CCL 61B 114.19–20): Impium et profanum docens esse, si non omnia, quae erga humanam salutem Patri uouisset, expleret.

and his sacrifice is perfect because 1) he does so freely, for, since he offers the sacrifice for the sins of others and not his own, he offers voluntarily; 2) it is the sacrifice that needs no repeating:

> Therefore, he offered himself to the death brought about by curses so that he might dissolve the curses of the Law by voluntarily offering himself as a sacrifice to God the Father so that through the voluntary sacrifice he might destroy the curse which was added on account of the guilt of sacrifices that were both necessary and intermittent.[64]

Christ's sacrifice is the one sacrifice that actually has the power of satisfaction. After Christ, "satisfaction" no longer exists, because satisfaction is a category of the Law. Satisfaction, then, plays no part in Christian living. Sacrifice continues to exist but only in a new form: the sacrifice of praise.

> But the gospel confession is that in him [Christ] is both the end of the Law and the sacrifice of praise in such a way that the sacrifice of thanks and praise was anticipated (*praefero*) by the blood of sacrifices and the oblation that came to an end.[65]

Hilary takes little from the "legal model" of Tertullian. He does not see Christian life in terms of satisfaction; rather he explicitly excludes the principle of satisfaction from Christian life by tying satisfaction definitively to the Law. Christ's satisfaction of the Law is the satisfaction to end all satisfactions. However, though satisfaction ends with the Law, sacrifice pertains to life under the Law and life in Christ. Christ's sacrifice does not end all sacrifice, but instead alters its nature: his sacrifice is the last sacrifice of blood. The perfection of Christ's sacrifice transcends the Law by being voluntary (because it is not personally necessary) and ceaseless (for it is the permanent nature of the Son's obedience that culminates in the cross). The sacrifice of praise that is the proper

---

64 *Tr. ps.* 53.13 (CCL 61 138.10–14): Maledictorum se ergo obtulit morti, ut maledictum legis dissolueret, hostiam se ipse Deo patri uoluntarie offerendo, ut per hostiam uoluntariam maledictum, quod ob hostiae neccesariae et intermissae reatum erat additum, solueretur. See also Orazzo on Hilary's conception of the sacrifice of Christ and the priestly function of this sacrifice (*Salvezza in Ilario*, 66–68). The priestly role of Christ will be discussed at greater length in Chapter 7 "The Eternal Priesthood of Christ."

65 *Tr. ps.* 68.26 (CCL 61 312.1–3): Esse autem in eo finem legis et sacrificium laudis euangelica confessio est, ita ut, hostiarum sanguine et oblatione cessante, sacrificium gratiae laudisque praelatum sit.

Christian sacrifice is also unfettered by the demands of the Law because it too is voluntary—for it is Christ's sacrifice not that of the Christian that renders satisfaction—and without ceasing—for it is a permanent attitude of the heart.

Christ's death as the perfect sacrifice that ends the satisfaction demanded by the Law is a victory. However, Hilary locates Christ's definitive triumph over the powers of sin and death in his resurrection, rather than his death.[66] Hilary never denies the salvific power of Christ's death—and will go so far as to say "Christ has conquered by dying."[67] Nevertheless, Hilary understands Christ's death as a condition for his salvific rising from the dead. For example, he says:

> Therefore, the Lord, in taking up our sins and suffering for us, was *struck*, so that in him who was *struck* all the way to the infirmity of the cross and death, health might be restored to us through [his] resurrection from the dead.[68]

Hilary here is commenting on Deut. 32:39: ". . . there is no God before me. I will kill and I will give life; I will strike and I will heal."[69] Clearly in Deuteronomy both striking and healing are the prerogatives of God alone. Hilary applies these prerogatives to Christ and while he retains the active voice for "heal" he changes to the passive for "strike." Christ does not strike in order to heal; he *is stricken* in order to heal. There is a temporal sequence to these events: first striking, then healing. Christ is stricken before he heals, that is, he dies before he rises and saves. Christ's death, then, is the preface to the healing of humanity accomplished in the resurrection.

Hilary integrates Christ's death into the overarching physicalist schema of incarnation and resurrection by locating the salvific power of the death of Christ not in the death per se but in Christ's role as "firstborn of the dead." Christ's defeat of death is not in his death but in his resurrection where he

---

66 See Blasich, "Risurrezione dei corpi," 80: "L'insistenza sull'elemento positivo della morte di Cristo, documenta l'organicità della visione di Ilario. E in questo senso deve essere preso lo stretto rapporto che egli intesse tra morte e risurrezione di Cristo, e il rapido immediato passaggio tra i due eventi, considerati nella loro unità significante."

67 *Tr. ps.* 55.1 (CCL 61 154.15): qui moriendo uicerit.

68 *Tr. ps.* 68.23 (CCL 61 309.1–3): *Percussus* ergo est Dominus peccata nostra suscipiens et pro nobis dolens, ut in eo usque ad infirmitatem crucis mortisque *percusso* sanitas nobis per resurrectionem ex mortuis redderetur.

69 Hilary quotes this verse in 68.22 (CCL 61 309.15–17): *Videte, uidete quia ego sum, et non est Deus praeter me. Ego interimam et ego uiuificabo; percutiam et ego sanabo*.

"leads captivity captive" and receives the people as his inheritance.[70] By understanding the power of Christ's death according to his role as firstborn of the dead, Hilary places Christ's death into his three-stage christology within the framework of Philippians 2:6–11.[71]

> And generated today in the glory of God the Father, he is born, that is, the assumption of the form of a slave is honored into the form of God that was before through the reward for his death: and thus a new but not nevertheless strange birth takes place in time, since he, who from the form of God was found in the form of a slave, is born as the firstborn of the dead in order to resume the glory of God the Father.[72]

The reward for Christ's death is the movement of the form of a slave (i.e., humanity) into the glory of the form of god. Christ is the firstborn of the dead because in association with the form of God, the form of a slave is lifted up to partake in the glory of divine life.

The integration of the saving power of Christ's suffering and death into Hilary's physicalist model of redemption is the necessary prerequisite for Hilary's statements concerning humanity's participation in the suffering, death, and resurrection of Christ. Humans are able to co-suffer, co-die, and co-rise with Christ only because Christ assumed all humanity into his body in the incarnation.[73] It is because humans are "taken up in the birth of the Lord through the fellowship of the body" that they "are saved in the cross if [they] believe."[74] The consummation of the assumption of all by Christ, begun in the

---

70 See *Tr. ps*. 67.19 (CCL 61 275.15–276.20): Dehinc *dona in hominibus* accepit, cum primogenitus ex mortuis de se ipse testatur dicens: *Dominus dixit ad me: Filius meus es tu, ego hodie genui te. Posce a me, et dabo tibi gentes haereditatem tuam, et possessionem tuam terminos terrae* (Ps. 2.7,8). Accepit ergo *dona in hominibus*, gentes scilicet in hereditatem; in quibus *in sancto in altum* primogenitus ex mortuis *capta captiuitate, conscendit*.

71 This three-stage christology is outlined in the next chapter.

72 *Tr. ps.* 2.33 (CCL 61 61.20–25): Et in gloria Dei Patris hodie genitus nascitur, id est, in manentem antea Dei formam per praemium mortis formae seruilis adsumptio honestatur; fitque sub tempore noua, nec tamen inusitata natiuitas: cum ad resumendam gloriam Dei patris, qui ex forma Dei forma serui erat repertus, primogenitus ex mortuis nasceretur.

73 For human participation in Christ's suffering and death, see *Tr. ps*. 56.8 and 118 Samech 13. The place of the Holy Spirit in Hilary's understanding of human salvation will be addressed in Chapter 8 "The Expansion of Hilary's Christocentric Soteriology to Include the Holy Spirit."

74 *Tr. ps*. 121. 8 (CCL 61B 30.3–6): Ille Israel a Domino in Pharao uindicatus, in mari ablutus . . . in natiuitate a Domino per consortium corporis susceptus, in cruce si crederet saluatus.

incarnation and tested in his suffering and death, is his resurrection and glorification, in which humanity, present in his body, finds its own resurrection and glorification.[75]

Conclusion

Hilary's physicalist model of redemption is that which is more commonly found among the Greek Fathers and is thus often termed the "Greek" model of redemption. Hilary includes aspects of the "Latin" or "atonement" model, such as emphasis on the salvific power of Christ's suffering and death, but he integrates them into the larger framework of the physicalist model. Hilary demonstrates in his teaching all the major elements that Jossua asserts belong to the physicalist model, except one. The one element that is missing in Hilary's teaching is the Platonic conception of a general nature. The lack of Platonic influence in an otherwise typical physicalist model of redemption makes Hilary's teaching an enigma that calls for a reevaluation of the traditional schema of viewing physicalism as Greek and dependant on Platonism.

In Hilary we have the representative of a Latin physicalist model of redemption, one that differs from the Greek paradigm largely in terms of its source: Hilary's soteriology has no connection to Platonism but rather results, as we shall see in Chapter 6, from the development of Latin tradition and a specific exegetical understanding of the Pauline Adam-Christ parallel. Hilary's teaching supports a view that the connection between Platonism and the physicalist model is accidental rather than necessary.

---

75 For human resurrection and glorification in the resurrection and glorification of Christ, see *Tr. ps*. 56.9 and 67.6.

PART 2

The Ramifications of Physicalism on Hilary's Theological System

CHAPTER 5

Christological Ramifications: Sublimation of Christology into Soteriology

Despite the recent wide-scale scholarly recognition of Hilary's physicalist teaching of Christ's assumption of all humanity, there is not yet any work dedicated to outlining the theological ramifications of this teaching.[1] This present work is intended to fill this lacuna in Hilary scholarship. Christ's assumption of all humanity is an integral part of Hilary's soteriology and is an idea that threads through all the various aspects of Hilarian thought, defining and connecting them. The theological ramifications of Hilary's physicalism are the subject of the Second Part of this book.

With the previous chapter's elucidation of physicalist soteriology, we are led to ask: is Hilary's teaching concerning Christ's assumption of all humanity properly christology or soteriology? Christ's assumption of all humanity is an account of the incarnation (christology) that pivots into a specific understanding of redemption (soteriology).

Physicalist soteriology has on obvious effect on christology in that it demands that Christ's human nature be understood as a nature that contains all human beings. Therefore, Christ's human nature bears an interesting relationship to the nature of individual humans. Christ's nature is like that of other individuals in that he is fully human: he has body and soul and experiences the weakness of the human condition. However, his nature is unlike that of other individuals in that it contains all humanity in itself, which is not true for any other individual human.

In this chapter, I will begin with a meta-reflection on the delineation of christology as a discrete theological area. Because christology is actually the meeting point of Trinitarian theology and soteriology, scholarly presentations of christology inevitably pursue the topic from interest in one of these two areas.

1 For the scholarly history of rejection or recognition of Hilary's physicalism, see Chapter 1 "The Scholarly Controversy surrounding Physicalism in Hilary." The recent recognition of Hilary's physicalism is begun by Mersch, Lécuyer, Charlier and Pettorelli and then revitalized in the 1980s by Burns and continued by Rondeau, Ladaria, de Margerie, Collautti, and Orazzo.

© KONINKLIJKE BRILL NV, LEIDEN, 2015 | DOI 10.1163/9789004290815_007

This meta-reflection on christology will contain two parts: one from the side of Trinitarian theology, the other from the side of soteriology. First, in the field of Hilary scholarship, Trinitarian interests and concerns have long dominated christological studies. While this prioritization of Trinitarian theology partially reflects Hilary's own agenda against homoianism and Western forms of monarchianism, nevertheless, this method of studying Hilary's christology has long blinded scholars to the christological principle that Christ's human nature contains all humanity. A recent shift in Hilary scholarship away from Trinitarian theology and toward more soteriological interest has led to the "rediscovery" of the assumption of all humanity. Second, since this book is dedicated to Hilary's soteriology, it is reasonable that I pursue Hilary's christology from the soteriological angle. As scholars, we assume that there is a correspondence between christology and soteriology because Christian concern in the "make-up" of the "person" of Christ has always been tied to the conviction that this person Jesus Christ saves human beings. However, it does not take long to realize that there is no one-to-one correspondence between christological and soteriological categories in patristic theology: a particular christology does not automatically yield a particular soteriology. This lack of correspondence is not the result of inconsistent theology on the part of the Fathers but rather of the modern categorization.

Following this meta-reflection, I will offer a brief outline of Hilary's christology, which, rather than focusing on Christ's two natures and the characteristics of each, emphasizes the temporal movement from eternal Son of God to incarnate Christ to glorified Christ. The loci of this movement are the two key events of the incarnation and the glorification. In the previous chapter, I noted that physicalist soteriology is likewise centered on the same two moments. This correspondence is not coincidental. Hilary is clear that the incarnation takes place for humanity. What happens to Christ happens for humanity and, as a result of the assumption of all humanity, what happens to Christ is happening to all humanity within him. Therefore the primary christological moments are primary precisely because they are the primary soteriological moments.

Hilary's physical understanding of Christ's assumption of all humanity actually undermines the existence of christology as a discrete category within Hilary's theology. Since all humanity is present in Christ's human nature, anything that might be said about the interaction between Christ's divine nature and his human nature can now just as accurately be said about the interaction between the Son of God and all humanity. In Hilary's theology, physicalism causes the category of "christology" to become subsumed into the categories of soteriology and eschatology.

"Christology" as a Double Category

The physicalist redemption model in Hilary is premised upon an understanding of Christ's incarnation in which Christ's human nature physically includes every single human person. The assumption of all humanity defines both what happened in the incarnation and the human nature that was assumed. This understanding of the incarnation is as much christological as soteriological.

However, a strange thing happens when we begin to look at the connection between christology and soteriology, namely we begin to see that they are not as inextricably connected as one might think. Each "classical" type of christology does not have its own model of redemption to which it is tied inextricably and to the exclusion of all other models. Rather, there is a certain fluidity, which is perhaps underappreciated in scholarship, that allows christological and soteriological models to overlap. For example, a *logos-sarx* christology can accompany any of the classic redemption models: physicalism, atonement, or ransom from the devil. These redemption models rarely appear singly; the Fathers are distinguished one from the other by their emphasis on one model over another, not by the exclusive presence of a single model in any of them. For example, Athanasius' *logos-sarx* christology leads to the predominance of the physical theory, though he does not lack the other two.[2] However, Gregory of Nyssa's *logos-anthropos* christology also leads to the predominance of physicalism.[3] And Ambrose uses a *logos-anthropos* christology to support a soteriology that emphasizes both the sacrificial interpretation of Christ's death and its power as ransom from the devil, but not physicalism.[4] Furthermore, Hilary's physicalist soteriology is complemented by a christology that has been defined variously by different scholars as *logos-sarx*,[5]

2 See Kelly, *Early Christian Doctrines*, 375–377.

3 Kelly, *Early Christian Doctrines*, 380–382; and Grillmeier, *Christ in Christian Tradition*, 282–290.

4 See Grillmeier, *Christ in Christian Tradition*, 318–319; and Kelly, *Early Christian Doctrines*, 387–389.

5 See Williams, "Defining Orthodoxy." Williams argues that at least in the *In Matthaeum* Hilary is working with a *logos-sarx* christology. "But Hilary himself is working from an inconsistent (and perhaps unconscious) "logos-sarx" perspective, and it is clear that he does not have a developed theology to deal with the present challenges by making a functional distinction between the human and divine in Christ" (170). This analysis is seconded by Weedman who argues that the *logos-sarx* christology of the *In Matthaeum* is superseded by a christology based on the *forma dei – forma serui* dialectic of Philippians 2. See Weedman, *Trinitarian Theology of Hilary*, 158.

logos-anthropos,[6] or spirit-christology.[7] Therefore, as far as our standard classifications of christological and soteriological models are concerned, there is no absolute connection to be made between any single christological model and with any single redemption model.

One of the reasons behind this lack of direct correlation between christological and soteriological models is that the modern notion of "christology" actually encompasses two distinct categories of thought. We use christology to mean discourse or theory that depicts, or gives an account of, the incarnate Son of God. Inasmuch as it deals with the Son of God, christology both presupposes and determines Trinitarian thought. Inasmuch as it deals with the incarnation of this Son of God, christology both presupposes and determines soteriology. Of course, these are interrelated categories—that is just the point: christology is a merging point of Trinitarian thought and soteriology.[8] Clarifications concerning the Word made flesh are necessary either to explain the manner of human salvation or to delineate the relationship between the Father and the Son. This duality of purpose leads to the apparently strange phenomenon that much of what we term a theologian's christology is accidental to his model of redemption; other aspects are accidental to his Trinitarian thought. As obvious as this point is, it has not been given sufficient attention. The result of the confluence of Trinitarian and soteriological interests in the realm of christology is that christology is always approached from one direction or another: either from the Trinitarian angle or the soteriological.

In the realm of Hilary scholarship, the prioritization of Hilary's "orthodox" Trinitarian theology to his "heterodox" soteriology has led the standard doctrinal evaluations of Hilary's thought to evaluate his christology solely in Trinitarian terms. From the Trinitarian angle, the important christological question is: Did the Son suffer and how does this suffering reflect on the Father? For example, Smulders in 1944 treats the doctrine of the incarnation within the chapter dealing with the properties that distinguish the Father from

6 See Grillmeier, *Christ in Christian Tradition*, vol. 1: "So Hilary has a christology of divinization and union within the context of the 'Word-man' framework and in this respect comes close to Gregory of Nyssa" (312).

7 See Burns, *Christology in Hilary*, 69, where he outlines Hilary's use of the word *spiritus* to delineate the divine power in Christ. Burns makes clear this is only one aspect of Hilary's christology.

8 In asserting that christology is motivated by either soteriology of Trinitarian theology, I do not mean to deny that christological formulations can also be motivated by other areas of theology. They may, for example, reflect on the nature of human freedom or make a point about the sacraments. My point is that the person of Christ, as both God and man, helps clarify both God and man as well as their relationship to each other.

the Son.[9] In this context, the primary christological issues are the relationship between the two natures of Christ and the nature of Christ's sufferings because these issues have Trinitarian implications. This manner of treating Hilary's christology has long dominated scholarship, from Giamberardini in 1947,[10] to R.P.C. Hanson in 1988.[11]

The theological explanations that this type of scholarship offers concerning Hilary's christology should not be considered necessarily, by reason of its method, wrong.[12] However, it must be appreciated that a christological discussion done in light of Trinitarian concerns sheds light only on the Trinitarian aspects of christology. It goes without saying that none of these scholars has mentioned Hilary's teaching concerning Christ's assumption of all humanity and his physicalist model of redemption, because these are ideas that are principally related to Hilary's teaching regarding the salvation of men, not the Trinity. The distinction, though at times useful, is artificial: Hilary himself would hardly say any teaching about Christ applies to the Trinity but not the salvation of men or vice versa. However, modern classification has made these distinctions, though it has not systematically followed through on them.

Since my interest in this book is Hilary's soteriology, it makes sense to approach Hilary's christology with soteriological, rather than Trinitarian questions. However, our modern soteriological approach to christology has been profoundly shaped by the paradigm of Grillmeier. The categories set by Grillmeier—such as *logos-sarx* or *logos-anthropos*—are categories that provide answers to the question: *what* parts of human nature were present in Christ and thereby saved? However, the typical scholarly soteriological

---

9 Smulders, *Doctrine trinitaire*, 195–206.

10 Gabriel Giamberardini, "De Incarnatione Verbi secundum S. Hilarium Pictaviensem," *Divus Thomas* 50 (1947): 35–56. Giamberardini seeks to show Hilary's essential similarity to later dogmatic teachings of the Church and to defend his orthodoxy in cases where such similarity seems to be lacking. He deals with questions such as the following: whether it was the Holy Spirit proper (or the Word) who was the working agent in the incarnation, whether Mary is properly mother of God, whether Christ possesses perfect humanity and perfect divinity, whether he is one person in two natures, whether he suffered, whether God abandoned him on the cross, etc.

11 In his section entitled "Hilary's Doctrine of the Incarnation," (*Search for the Christian Doctrine of God*, 492–502) Hanson deals with Hilary's teaching on the emptying of Christ (and how to defend against opponents who use his emptying as reason to ascribe a subordinate position to the Son of God), and Christ's sufferings—concerning which Hanson argues that Hilary, in his concern to refute accusations of weakness in the Son of God, falls into Docetism.

12 Smulders (*Doctrine trinitaire*), in particular, offers much of value.

categories—such as physicalism, atonement, or ransom from the devil—seek to answer a different question: *how* does Christ save? Both of the questions asked are fundamentally soteriological questions, however, the question behind the christological categories—namely, what parts of human nature were present in Christ and thereby saved?—already depends on one particular view of how Christ saves, namely that view elucidated so well by Gregory of Nazianzus that "what is not assumed is not healed." Therefore, the soteriological categories, in positing other answers to the question of *how* Christ saves, enter into different territory than that inhabited by the christological categories.

Grillmeierian christology will never reveal whether or not a theologian has a physicalist doctrine of redemption. Grillmeierian christology has set parameters that are concerned with whether Christ assumes a human body, soul, and mind, but not whether he assumed the body, soul, and mind of one person or many people. Grillmeieran christology assumes that Christ saves all souls through assuming one soul, all minds through assuming one mind. However, this assumption is contrary to the very premise of physicalism.

Both Trinitarian-oriented studies of Hilary's christology and soteriological-oriented studies shaped by the paradigm of Grillmeier obscure our ability to recognize Hilary's physicalist doctrine of redemption. Recent studies of Hilary's christology show a change in the course of the scholarly discussion in that they are soteriologically oriented and yet have gone beyond the parameters set by Grillmeier.[13] The previous generation's concerns over Christ's suffering, or whether or not Hilary says Christ has a soul, have lost their dominance. The change of methodology has allowed this new generation of scholars to recognize Hilary's physicalist teaching based on Christ's assumption of all humanity.

Hilary's Three-Stage Christology in the Framework of Philippians 2:6–11

Hilary has a dynamic understanding of christology structured by the framework of Philippians 2:6–11 and especially the notions of *forma dei* and *forma serui*.[14] Hilary shapes his christology not primarily on static descriptions of

13 In particular, see Burns, *Christology in Hilary*, and Ladaria, *Cristología de Hilario*.

14 Hilary's three-stage christology in the context of the *forma dei - forma serui* of Philippians 2 can be found in *Tr. ps.* 2.27, 68.25, 126.17, 131.7, 138.5, 138.19,21–24, 143.7. See the useful section "Philippians 2 as a Hermeneutical Guide," in Weedman, *Trinitarian Theology of Hilary*, 130–135. Weedman says later that "the key to understanding Hilary's christology is to recognize the weight he gives to Philippians 2.6–7 as the Christological proof-text"

Christ's two natures, but on the dynamic movement of the eternal Son of God to incarnate Christ to glorified Christ. Therefore Hilary's christology focuses on the three stages of the Son's existence and on the two pivotal moments when the Son transfers from one stage to another, namely the incarnation and the glorification.[15] As the *Tractatus super Psalmos* manifests both Hilary's mature theology and his greatest emphasis on physicalist soteriology, I will use this work to outline Hilary's christology. In his commentary on the second Psalm Hilary speaks about each stage of the Son's existence when he says:

> For when he said *soon you will see the son of man sitting at the right hand of power* (Matt. 26:64), he showed that time in which the son of man, who is both Christ and the Son of God, would be worthy of sitting with God: so that that which is then son of man—namely he who before was Son of God, and then also was son of man—should be born for the perfection of the Son of God: that is, for resuming and granting the glory which, while being in the body, he asked of the Father, to his eternal body through the power of the resurrection. For he who was in the form of God received the form of a slave. And he asks that the glory of God, in which he remained, be received by this form of a slave, saying: *Father, glorify me with you with that glory which I had with you before the world came to be* (Jn. 17:5).[16]

---

(137). Weedman argues that Hilary's use of Philippians 2 in the *De Trinitate* has precedents neither in Hilary's earlier work nor in the Latin tradition (161–163). Hilary only quotes this section of Philippians once in the *In Matthaeum* (*In Matt.* 16.11). Burns concurs and adds that neither can a precedent be found in the extant work of Origen (Burns, *Model for the Christian Life*, 149). Both Weedman and Burns suggest that Hilary's treatment of Philippians 2 depends upon its use by homoiousians, particularly Basil of Ancyra (Weedman, 161–168; Burns, 149–153). However, the Ancyran texts use the language of "image" from *Colossians* 1:15, "form" from *Philippians* 2:6–7 and "likeness" from *Romans* 8:3 to emphasize the distinctiveness of the Son against potential modalist interpretations associated historically with Sabellius and later with Marcellus of Ancyra and his student Photinus. Hilary, on the contrary, uses *forma dei* to highlight the unity and equality between Father and Son rather than distinction (see Weedman, 158–166).

15 Ladaria outlines these three stages in *Cristología de Hilario*, 3; in the context of Philippians 2: ibid., 70–80.

16 *Tr. ps.* 2.27 (CCL 61 56.6–16): . . . cum enim ait: *A modo uidebitis filium hominis sedentem a dextris uirtutis*, tempus quo filius hominis, qui et Christus et Dei Filius est, consessu Dei dignus esset ostendit, ut, qui antea Dei Filius, tum quoque et hominis filius esset, id quod tum hominis filius est ad perfectum Dei Filium, id est ad resumendam indulgendamque corpori aeternitatis suae gloriam per resurrectionis potentiam gigneretur, quam gloriam a patre corporeus reposcebat. Qui enim in forma Dei erat, formam serui acceperat; et acceptae huic formae serui gloriam Dei, in qua mansit, expostulat dicens*: Pater, clarifica*

Hilary here conveys two main points. First, among all three stages there is a unity of subject: it is the second member of the Trinity who is the actor in this movement between Son of God and son of man, between the form of God and the form of a slave.[17] Because it is the Son of God who becomes son of man, the reception of the glory of God and the sitting at God's right hand are not something new to him nor something received for the first time: after his glorification, the Son of God simply receives what he had already possessed. Second, despite the unity of subject, the glorification *is* something new—not to the Son of God per se, but to the Son of God now existing as the son of man. It is not new to the *forma dei*, but it is new to the *forma serui*. The glory he receives is the glory he had before, but he never had it before in the form of a slave.

Fierro's study on Hilary's teaching concerning glory highlights the connection between glory and *forma* in Hilary's thought. Fierro shows that Hilary uses glory with two different and complementary meanings. Glory is both nature and appearance: it is both divine incorruptibility (nature) and divine light (appearance).[18] *Forma* reflects the duality of meaning found in glory. Like glory, *forma* (as we will see in the next section) can signify an external appearance or the true nature.[19] When he assumes the *forma serui*, Christ maintains the nature of God but not the appearance of God. In the same way, in the form of a slave he retains the nature of divine glory (incorruptibility) while at the same time needing to be glorified so that he can once again manifest the appearance of glory.

Hilary uses the language of generation and birth to speak of the resurrection and the beginning of this third stage in the existence of the second member of the Trinity precisely because there is something new here.[20] Hilary explains

---

me apud te ipsum ea claritate quam habui, priusquam mundus esset apud te (Jn. 17:5). See Ladaria's discussion of this passage in *Cristología de Hilario*, 243–246.

17 The *forma dei* and *forma serui* represent what Tertullian terms the first and second advents. See, for example, Tertullian, *Aduersus Marcionem* 3.7.3 (CCL 61 516.21–22): Quae ignobilitatis argumenta primo aduentui competent, sicut sublimitatis secundo. . . .

18 Fierro, *Sobre la gloria*, 139–141.

19 Fierro, *Sobre la gloria*, 162–169.

20 Hilary speaks of Christ's resurrection as a birth, a *natiuitas*. Hilary uses *natiuitas* in the *Tractatus super psalmos* to refer to the Son's incarnation, his resurrection/glorification, and even his baptism, but he does not uses this term to speak of his eternal generation (for which he most often uses *genitus*). In this avoidance of the term *natiuitas* to speak of the eternal generation of the Son in the *Tractatus super psalmos*, Hilary shows a change from the *De Trinitate* where *natiuitas* is the normal designator for the Son's eternal generation. However, in both the *De Trinitate* and the *Tractatus super psalmos*, Hilary, unlike

that the resurrection, which is the Son's return to what he was before time, is something new for the existence he has in time, that is, for the person Jesus Christ: "but being born to that which he was before time, nevertheless, he is born in time to be that which he was not."[21] Just as the incarnation is the birth of the Son of God into the son of man—in that he moves from the form of God to the form of man—so the resurrection and glorification is the birth of the son of man into the Son of God. With this birth of the resurrection, a birth, as Hilary says, "has happened in time which is new but not strange."[22] However, the circle of the dispensation is not perfectly symmetrical: when the *forma dei* finally returns to *forma dei* at the resurrection it brings with it something new: the *forma serui* which is glorified before God so that God might see it too as his Son.[23] For the end to be exactly like the beginning, the body and the nature of humanity would have to be left behind. This is not, however, what happens in Hilary's model: the transformation of the body and nature of humanity is the reason behind the entire dispensation. For this reason, the assumed humanity, that is, the *forma serui*, is not to be discarded but to be transformed: it is, as Hilary says, "received into the nature of divinity."[24] "Even if the only-begotten Son of God has always reigned, he has not always reigned in the body."[25] It is the Son's reigning in his body—that is, in all humanity—that is the final end of the incarnation. Hilary prioritizes Philippians 3:21 (Christ will transform our

---

Lactantius, for example, never speaks of two births (*natiuitas*), or a two-fold birth, to refer to Christ's eternal generation and his incarnation. See Lactantius (*Divinae Institutiones* 4.8.2 [CSEL 19 295.9–13]): qui cum esset a principio filius dei, regeneratus est denuo secundum carnem. quae duplex natiuitas eius magnum intulit humanis pectoribus errorem circumfudit que tenebras etiam iis qui uerae religionis sacramenta retinebant.

21 *Tr. ps.* 2.27 (CCL 61 56.24–57.1): Sed nascens ad id quod ante tempora fuit, id tamen in tempore nascitur esse, quod non erat.

22 *Tr. ps.* 2.33 (CCL 61 63.7–8): "... fitque sub tempore noua nec tamen inuisita natiuitas ..."

23 For the glorification of the *forma serui* see *Tr. ps.* 138.5 (CCL 61B 194.17–195.22): Honor autem, qui donatur, non alius potest esse quam nominis; nomen uero indulti honoris non aliud est quam quod gloria est paterna, ut, qui in forma Dei manens formam serui accepit, propter oboedientiam formae seruilis cum crucis morte susceptae in gloria Dei Patris esset, cuius antea manebat in forma. See also *Tr. ps.* 118 Nun 10 and *De Trin.* 9.39.

24 *Tr. ps.* 68.25 (CCL 61 312.22–24): *Omnis enim lingua confitebitur, quia Dominus Iesus in gloria Dei patris est*, id est susceptus homo in naturam diuinitatis adceptus.

25 *Tr. ps.* 65.13 (CCL 61 242.1–2): Vnigenitus enim Dei Filius etsi regnauit semper, non tamen semper regnauit in corpore.

lowly bodies so that they will be like his glorious body) in order to center the salvific conformity to Christ in the body.[26]

Hilary's Use of Forma *to Mean Both Nature and Condition*

Hilary uses the term *forma* in two different ways, and understanding the distinction between the two is necessary for understanding Hilary's conception of the incarnation.[27] Hilary uses both meanings of *forma* in his attempt to understand the nature of the incarnate God in his commentary on Psalm 68:

> For coming into the form of a slave he emptied himself of the form of God. For the one who can exist in the form of man while remaining in the form of God could not, however, be destroyed as form of God so that only the form of a slave remain. He is both emptying himself of the form of God and assuming the form of man, because that emptying of the form of God is not the death of the heavenly nature. . . .[28]

For the most part, *forma* refers not to nature but to the fundamental condition of the respective natures, that is, glory, power and majesty for the *forma dei*, humility and infirmity for the *forma serui*. Hilary says later in this passage that "form and aspect and face and image do not differ in their meaning."[29] In this way, when Christ takes on the *forma serui*, the condition of humility that this form entails is incompatible with the condition of glory that is proper to the *forma dei*. In order to exist in the *forma serui*, Christ must empty himself of the *forma dei*, namely, estrange himself from the paternal glory.[30] However, though the Son can empty himself of divine glory, he can never empty himself of his divine nature. We can see in this passage that Hilary also uses *forma dei* or *forma serui* to refer to the divine or human nature as such. In this way, Hilary consistently maintains that even in his emptying, Christ never loses the *forma*

---

26 Fierro (*Sobre la gloria*, 253–254) argues that Hilary gives Phil. 3:21 a technical sense in his theology that leads him to prioritize corporeal conformity to Christ. In this, Fierro says Hilary is unlike both Origen and Eusebius of Caesarea.

27 See Paul Galtier's excellent article: "*Forma Dei*."

28 *Tr. ps.* 68.25 (CCL 61 311.3–8): In forma enim serui ueniens euacuauit se ex Dei forma. Nam in forma hominis existere manens in Dei forma qui potuit, aboleri autem Dei forma, ut tantum serui esset forma, non potuit. Ipse enim est et se ex forma Dei inaniens et formam hominis adsumens, quia neque euacuatio illa ex Dei forma naturae caelestis interitus est. . . .

29 *Tr. ps.* 68.25 (CCL 61 311.16–312.17): Forma et uultus et facies et imago non differunt.

30 *De Trin.* 9.39 (CCL 62A 413.27–414.29): glorificaturus eum apud se Pater erat, quia gloriae suae unitas per oboedientiam dispensationis excersserat.

dei, that is the nature of God. Christ never loses the divine nature because what the Son assumes in the incarnation is not an "interior property, but an exterior addition."[31]

Hilary's different uses of *forma* explain his apparently contradictory assertions both that Christ empties himself of, and yet remains in, the form of God. In terms of the condition of his existence, the incarnation entails the replacement of the *forma dei* by the *forma serui*, but in terms of nature, the *forma serui* is an addition to, not a replacement of, the *forma dei*.

According to Hilary's first use of *forma*, namely as the condition of the nature, the exaltation of the *forma serui* into the divine nature to sit at the right hand of the Father is not a change from human to divine nature. Both the incarnation and the glorification are not a change in nature but rather a change in the *habitus*, the condition, of the existence of this nature.[32] As Iacoangeli, in his studies on Hilary's vocabulary, explains: humility is the *habitus* or condition of the earthly human life.[33] In the resurrection and glorification, man ceases to be characterized by humility and infirmity and instead is a participant in the glory and majesty of the *forma dei*. The glorification of humanity is the intention of the incarnation and the *profectus*, or progress and perfection, of man is the inversion of the abasements of the Son. Hilary speaks of humanity's *profectus* as the reward (the *praemium* or *merces*) of the Son's humility.

Hilary uses *forma serui* as a shorthand for a nuanced type of physicalism: the Son of God assumes all of humanity in all its weakness, though not its sin. In the *De Trinitate*, Hilary says that Christ "truly bears us in the form of a slave, though he is free from the sins and vices of a human body: so that we are indeed in him through his generation from a virgin, but our vices are not

31 *Tr. ps.* 68.25 (CCL 61 311.6–11): Ipse enim est et se ex forma Dei inaniens et formam hominis adsumens, quia neque euacuatio illa ex Dei forma naturae caelestis interitus est neque formae seruilis adsumptio tamquam genuinae originis condicionis que natura est, cum id quod adsumptum est non proprietas interior sit, sed exterior adcessio.

32 *Tr. ps.* 2.41 (CCL 61 66.15–17,21–22): . . . ut corruptibilium corporum in incorruptionis gloriam resurrectio non interitu naturam perimat, sed qualitatis condicione demutet. . . . Fit ergo demutatio, sed non adfertur abolitio.

33 Roberto Iacoangeli, " 'Sacramentum Carnis, Sanguininis, Gloriae'," 513–515. He says that Hilary, in accordance with Latin tradition, usually uses *habitus* in the sense of condition or state: "Ilario nella maggior parte dei casi fa uso di questo termine nel senso pieno di condizione, stato, pur impregnando anche nell'ampiezza dei significati, con cui ricorre nella tradizione latina" (513). See also Iacoangeli, "Linguaggio soteriologico in Ilario," 127–130.

in him."[34] The *forma serui* is not a generic human nature, rather it is the manner in which Christ "bears us," so that humanity is "in him," namely in his body generated from a virgin.

Stage One: The Son of the Father

Each stage of the Son's existence receives ample treatment in the *Tractatus super Psalmos*. The first stage provides the scene for Hilary's Trinitarian explanations. The Son is generated of the Father,[35] which makes the Father greater than the Son,[36] though the Son is one nature (*una natura*) with the Father,[37] and has the same substance of divinity (*non dissimilis aut differens a se substantia diuinitatis*),[38] and the same power (*inseparabilis uirtus*)[39] as the Father. There is no interval of time between the Father and the Son.[40] Hilary speaks of the Son as the revealer of the Father,[41] and though he often speaks of the Son as the right arm, Word, wisdom and power of the Father,[42] he shows hints of having a doctrine of common operation.[43] The Father and Son are one God, one God from one God,[44] and both in one.[45]

Stage Two: The Incarnate Christ's Reception of All Humanity

The second stage of the Son's existence is the incarnate life of Jesus Christ. Discussions of this stage provide the basis for Hilary's understanding of the saving dispensation. Here we find treatments of Christ's weakness and suffering,[46]

---

34 *De Trin.* 10.25, (CCL 62A 479.4–480.1): gerens quidem nos per formam serui, sed a peccatis et a uitiis humani corporis liber: ut nos quidem in eo per generationem uirginis inessemus, sed nostra in eo . . . uitia non inessent.

35 *Tr. ps.* 2.23.

36 See *De Trin.* 9.54–56.

37 *Tr. ps.* 2.10 (CCL 61 43.5–7): Qui enim per genuinam Patris et Filii secundum se legitimam que naturam in gloria diuinitatis unum sunt. . . .

38 *Tr. ps.* 122.7 (CCL 61B 39.19–20): . . . non dissimili scilicet aut differente a se substantia diuinitatis in utroque.

39 *Tr. ps.* 122.2 (CCL 61B 36.12–13): Sed non nunc de inseparabili uirtute Patris et Filii sermo est.

40 *Tr. ps.* 63.10 (CCL 61 231.14): . . . nullo a Patre interuallo temporis separatum . . .

41 *Tr. ps.* 134.7.

42 *Tr. ps.* 63.10, 118 Teth 9, 118 Iod 10, 137.15.

43 *Tr. ps.* 135.13, 91.4,5–8.

44 *Tr. ps.* 134.8.

45 *Tr. ps.* 61.9 (CCL 61 203.18): . . . in uno utrumque . . .

46 *Tr. ps.* 53.10, 55.2, 68.17, 138.3.

and it is in this context that Hilary lays out his physicalist teaching of Christ's assumption of all humanity into his body. The incarnation is the beginning of something new both for humanity and for the Son.[47] For humanity it is the beginning of hope for it is the beginning of participation in the divine life. For the Son, the incarnation is the assumption of a non-divine created nature, which is infirm and weak.

Despite accusations of being a Docetist,[48] Hilary makes three points about the reality of the Son's humanity. First, Hilary is clear that the Son participates in all that is human in a manner that is not natural but willed on account of the dispensation:

> He both prayed and suffered everything which pertains to humanity. . . . He hungered, thirsted, slept, was exhausted, fled from the gathering of the impious, was sorrowful, wept, suffered and died. And to prevent him being understood as subjected to all these things by nature rather than from the assumption, having fulfilled all these things, he rose.[49]
>
> But he took up our infirmities for the sake of the salvation of the human race on account of the will of the Father, because he came not to do his will, but the will of him who sent him, that is, the Father.[50]

Christ's incarnation and his assumption of all humanity, with all the weakness that pertains to humanity, are accomplished for the purpose of bringing about humanity's participation in the divine life.

---

47 See *Tr. ps.* 2.33 (CCL 61 61.20–25): Et in gloria Dei Patris hodie genitus nascitur, id est, in manentem antea Dei formam per praemium mortis formae seruilis adsumptio honestatur; fitque sub tempore noua, nec tamen inusitata natiuitas: cum ad resumendam gloriam Dei patris, qui ex forma Dei forma serui erat repertus, primogenitus ex mortuis nasceretur.

48 For example, R.P.C. Hanson in *Search for the Christian Doctrine of God* is amazed at the reluctance of other scholars to admit that Hilary "was nakedly Docetic," (501). Further discussion on Hilary's "Docetism" can be found in the section "Pain vs. Suffering" in Chapter 3.

49 *Tr. ps.* 53.7 (CCL 61 134.9–10, 9–16): Omnia, quae hominum sunt, et orauit et passus est. . . . esuriuit, sitiuit, dormiuit, lassatus fuit, impiorum coetus fugit, maestus fuit et fleuit et passus et mortuus est. Et ut his omnibus non natura, sed ex adsumptione subiectus esse posset intellegi, perfunctus his omnibus resurrexit.

50 *Tr. ps.* 68.9 (CCL 61 298.1–3): autem infirmitates nostras ad salutem generis humani ex paterna uoluntate susceperit, quia non uoluntatem suam facturus uenerit, sed uoluntatem eius, qui se miserit, Patris.

Second, Hilary says quite explicitly in *De Trinitate* 9.38 that the incarnation brings about an obstacle to the unity of the Father and the Son.[51] The assumption of humanity separates the Son in some way from the Father because what the Son has assumed shares neither the same nature nor the same glory with the Father as the Son's own divine nature does.[52]

Third, and most important for our purposes, Christ's human nature is a nature that contains all humanity. As we have seen before, Hilary says that "there is contained in him [Christ], through the nature of the assumed body, the assembly of the entire human race (*uniuersi generis humani*)."[53] Becoming incarnate is more than the assumption of a humanity; it is the assumption of all humanity. This subject is treated at length in Chapters 4 and 6 discussing Hilary's physicalism.

Stage Three: The Glorification of Christ and All Humanity in Him

Hilary's increasing eschatological interest in the *Tractatus super Psalmos* leads to a corresponding interest in explaining and outlining the third stage of the Son's existence, which is his resurrection and glorification. The resurrection and glorification of Christ are the fulfillment of the work begun in the incarnation. This third stage contains the definitive participation of humanity in the immortal glory of divine reign and sonship. As we shall see in the Chapter 7, in the *Tractatus super Psalmos*, Hilary outlines the end of the dispensation in the framework of 1 Corinthians 15 to show that Christ's handing over of the reign and subjection to the Father are expansions and indeed the accomplishment of the incarnation.

The third stage is also the resolution of the Trinitarian obstacle presented in the second stage, namely the incarnation. The glorification changes man's *habitus*: he ceases to be characterized by humility and infirmity and instead is a participant in the glory and majesty of the *forma dei*. In this way, the glorifica-

---

51 *De Trin*. 9.38 (CCL 62A 412.24–26): quia dispensationis nouitas offensionem unitatis intulerat, et unitas, ut perfecta antea fuerat, nulla esse nunc poterat, nisi glorificata apud se fuisset carnis adsumptio. See Ladaria, *Cristología de Hilario*, 73–74.

52 For the unity of nature between the Father and the Son, see *De Trin*. 7.8 (CCL 62 267.6–268.8): unius nominis adque naturae in indissimilis genere diuinitatis Patrem et Filium esse. See also *De Trin*. 5.20 (CCL 62 171.17–19): Aut quae in utroque naturae diuersitas est, ubi eiusdem naturae unum adque idem nomen est?

53 *In Matt.* 4.12 (SC 254 130.3–9): Ciuitatem carnem quam adsumpserat nuncupat, quia, ut ciuitas ex uarietate ac multitudine consistit habitantium, ita in eo per naturam suscepti corporis quaedam uniuersi generis humani congregatio continetur. Atque ita et ille ex nostra in se congregatione fit ciuitas et nos per consortium carnis suae sumus ciuitatis habitatio.

tion of the assumed humanity, the *forma serui*, resolves this divide of the Son from the Father because it allows all of humanity, including Christ's own, to enter into a new relationship with the Father: that of son.[54]

However, this obstacle to the relationship between the Father and the Son presented in the incarnation and resolved in the glorification is a subject that, while discussed quite explicitly in the *De Trinitate*, is implicit at best in the later *Tractatus super Psalmos*. Hilary's eschatological interest at the time of the *Tractatus super Psalmos* is motivated more strongly by soteriological concerns and less by the Trinitarian concerns that dominate the *De Trinitate*. While the *De Trinitate* analyzes the incarnation as the introduction of a Trinitarian problem solved only by the glorification, the *Tractatus super Psalmos* shows the incarnation, as the moment in which all humanity is assumed by Christ and so brought into contact with divinity, as the primary moment of salvation that is later ratified and fulfilled by the glorification of Christ, which serves as the glorification of all humanity in Christ.

According to Hilary's understanding of the incarnation in which Christ assumes all of humanity into his body, all humans exist in the body of Christ. In this schema humans exist in the body of Christ, first in the incarnate body and then in the eschatologically glorified body. Even in his post-resurrection state, the Son of God continues to contain the multiplicity of individual members of humanity in his body. The movement of Christ into the third stage of his existence through his glorification is also the beginning of humanity's move to an eschatologically glorified state, not because Christ accomplishes something in himself that can then be transferred to human beings but because in accomplishing glorification in himself, he accomplishes it for the humans dwelling in his body. A detailed explanation of humanity's participation in the third stage of the Son of God's existence can be found in Chapter 7 on Hilary's eschatology.

Thus, for Hilary there are three stages in the Son's filiation, and he clarifies these stages nearly always through Philippians 2:6–11 and the *forma dei – forma serui* imagery (or, as often happens, he continues to speak about *forma dei* and *forma serui* with no explicit reference to its source in Philippians). In assuming the *forma serui* at the incarnation, Christ takes all humanity into his body, and his glorification is the glorification of all humanity that remains in his body. In his resurrection, Christ returns to the *forma dei* in all its fullness but he brings with him something new: the *forma serui*, which, containing all humanity, is now glorified before God and participates in the divine nature.

54 See *De Trin*. 9.38–41. See also Ladaria's discussion in *Cristología de Hilario*, 236–37.

Conclusion

Christology is not identical with soteriology and though physicalism is based on a christological presupposition—namely that the nature Christ assumes in the incarnation is much more than an individual human nature—until recently, studies of Hilary's christology have failed to make note of its relationship to his physicalist soteriology. There is a twofold reason for this oversight. First, christological studies oriented toward Trinitarian concerns quite simply have no interest in the question of whether Christ assumes a single humanity, or a humanity that contains all, because it seems this question has few Trinitarian implications.[55] Second, until recently, christological studies oriented toward soteriological concerns have been dominated by the paradigm and categories set by Grillmeier. This paradigm has at its foundation a premise that is contrary to physicalist soteriology, namely that the assumption of a single human nature (body, soul, mind) is sufficient to save any human.

In keeping with a redemption model that focuses on humanity's assumption into divine life, Hilary uses Philippians 2:6–11 as the scriptural frame for a christological teaching that highlights the dynamic movement of the dispensation in which the Son of God, through his emptying and glorification, moves through three temporal stages—preexistence (God), mortal life (God and man), resurrected life (God and man). Within this movement, Hilary clearly teaches that Christ assumes and glorifies all of humanity in his body.

The incarnation and the glorification are the two primary moments in both Hilary's christology and his soteriology. In his christology, they are the moments of transition in which the Son of God enters into a new state of his existence. In his physicalist soteriology the primary moments of salvation in Hilary's thought are the incarnation and the resurrection/glorification (not passion and death, as we saw in Chapter 4's discussion of Hilary's relationship to Latin atonement theory). In other words, the dynamic of Hilary's christology is the very path, or movement, of human salvation. As we have seen in the course of this chapter, when Hilary's christology is read in the light of the assumption of all humanity, much of the discussion is better left to the areas of soteriology and eschatology because what happens to Christ happens to all humanity in Christ. The result is that the category of christology is largely subsumed, in Hilary's thought, into these other areas.

55 Despite first appearances, this question *does* have Trinitarian implications, which I outline in Chapter 9.

CHAPTER 6

The Assumption of All Humanity as Definitive of Hilary's Physicalist Soteriology

Salvation requires a human nature that has been transformed and conformed to Christ. Christ's human nature is transformed when it is assumed in the incarnation and especially when Christ is glorified. But how is this glorification transferred such that it affects the nature of individual humans? According to physicalism, individual humans benefit from the transformation of Christ's human nature even apart from secondary means of transference such as the work of the Holy Spirit, faith or baptism. In other words, in this trajectory, the incarnation has a direct, immediate effect—unmediated by the post-incarnation working of the Holy Spirit or the sacraments—on the human nature of every single person.

Hilary's physicalist soteriology is based on his conviction that Christ assumes all humanity physically into his body at the incarnation. According to physicalism, there is no need for a transference mechanism from Christ's humanity to other individual human natures because Christ's human nature somehow touches all human nature. For Hilary, this "touching" is accomplished by the actual physical existence of all individuals in Christ's body. Christ's human nature contains all humans. When his human nature is transformed, all human nature is immediately and automatically transformed.

Hilary's conception of the assumption of all humanity is tied to his reading of the Pauline Adam-Christ parallel in which just as all died in Adam, all now live in Christ. Hilary's reading of this parallel leads him to envision humanity as a unified entity such that it can be affected, as a whole, by the singular protagonists Adam and Christ. The Adam-Christ parallel shows Hilary that humanity was unified even before the incarnation. This unity is what makes the assumption of all humanity possible.

In Chapter 1, I showed that the automatic effect of physicalism has been the cause of concern and critique, especially by Harnack and other German Protestants of the nineteenth century. In this chapter I will show that for Hilary the universal assumption of all humanity in the incarnation does not result in the final salvation of all. According to Hilary's physicalist soteriology, the assumption of all humanity does transform the nature of every single individual human being. However, this transformation is undermined if it is not ratified by individual acts such as faith, participation in the sacraments, and

© KONINKLIJKE BRILL NV, LEIDEN, 2015 | DOI 10.1163/9789004290815_008

Christian living. When individuals do not accomplish these additional acts, Hilary says that they cut themselves out of the body of Christ and, as salvation is only accomplished in the body of Christ, these individuals are not saved. While the "standard" Christian understanding is that humans are born in an unsaved state and achieve salvation through some combination of grace, faith, and works, Hilary offers the reverse view: humans are born in a saved state (existing in the body of Christ) but they can lose this salvation through their neglect of faith or works.

The Prerequisite: The Anterior Unity of Humanity

Christ's assumption of all humanity posits a unity of humanity.[1] This is a unity that preexists the incarnation and is the necessary condition for the possibility and efficacy of the incarnation. If there were no preexisting unity of humanity, the incarnation and the resurrection would have affected only the person Jesus but would not have been able to extend their salvific effect into the entire human race. For Hilary, the universal possibility of salvation is a result of Christ's assumption of humanity as a whole, an assumption that depends upon there being a unified humanity able to be assumed.

Hilary's entire vision of salvation history presupposes this unity of humanity. In his commentary on Psalm 134, Hilary explains salvation history and its culmination in the incarnation.

> Nothing is more lovable to God than man. . . . God founded the world with a word, but man is made with deliberation: not by a word, but by a planned action . . . man is turned over to his free will and established as lord of the world, free from all things . . . after sin, man was preserved for mercy . . . and man himself, through the sacrament of birth according to Jesus Christ, was assumed into him.[2]

We see in this passage that "man" (*homo*) is the consistent grammatical subject of God's workings. When Hilary says: "after sin, man (*homo*) was preserved for

1 As I said in Chapter 3 "Stoic Contributions to Hilary's Soteriology," this unity of humanity in Hilary's thought has precedents in Stoic sources.

2 *Tr. ps*. 134.14 (CCL 61B 151.3, 4–5, 7–8, 9, 13–14): nihil amabilius Deo homine est. . . . Mundus uerbo constitit, homo autem cum consilio efficitur, non uerbo, sed opere cogitato . . . uoluntati suae permittitur, liber ab omnibus mundi Dominus constituitur . . . post peccatum misericordiae reseruatur . . . Hic ipse per sacramentum natiuitatis secundum hominem Iesum Christum adsumptus in eum est.

mercy" (that is, the mercy that is to come later at the incarnation), he means all humanity, not just one man, is preserved. At the very least, the sin of the Fall included two humans, Adam and Eve. Hilary is certainly not saying here that Adam was preserved but Eve was not. *Homo* here must include more than a single individual; rather it includes all human beings in existence. A grammatically consistent read of this passage allows that in the next part, where it says that "man (*homo*) himself, through the sacrament of birth according to Jesus Christ, was assumed into him," *homo* is not limited to a single individual but yet again extends to include all existent humanity. In other words *homo* in this entire passage is best understood as referring to "humankind." The unity of humanity, which allows humanity to be referred to grammatically as a single subject is not brought about by the incarnation but actually precedes it.

The premise of a unity of humanity anterior to the incarnation is necessary for any physicalist theory of redemption and thus is an element not only of Hilary's thought but also of Greek purveyors of this doctrine. Malevez, in his study on Gregory of Nyssa, shows that Gregory conceives of the human species, even prior to the incarnation, as the body of a living being. For Gregory, it is because humans exist as a single body that divine contact at one point has an effect on all points.[3] Malevez explains Gregory's conception of human unity prior to the incarnation as dependent upon the belief in universal Forms, that is, upon a Platonic understanding of Christian truth.[4] In particular, Malavez argues that Gregory's adhesion to Pauline teachings orders and structures his use of Platonism.[5] It is not my task here to argue Gregory's case, but I bring up Gregory, and Malevez's understanding of him, to demonstrate an aspect of the physicalist theory that, long considered the result of Platonic influence, can be, and is, in the case of Hilary, a Christian reading of Scripture with Stoic rather than Platonic influences.

Though human unity is a necessary premise for a physicalist understanding of the incarnation, the incarnation itself brings about a new level of human unity. Through the incarnation, Christ becomes the author of a new

3 Malevez, "Église dans le Christ," 275.

4 Malevez "Église dans le Christ," 279: Malevez seeks a new understanding of Gregory's Platonism. He shows that Gregory does not hold the doctrine for which he has been accused of Platonism, namely, that of collective incarnation defined by Christ's assumption of a universal nature (as opposed to a particular nature). Malevez relocates Gregory's Platonism to the belief in universal Forms that underlies the conception of a unity of humanity prior to the incarnation.

5 Malevez "Église dans le Christ," 279: "la lecture d'un traité quelconque de Grégoire révèle un homme attaché à la doctrine de saint Paul, qu'il tient pour divine, par une adhésion absolue et irrévocable. On reconnaîtra que, réduit à cela, la platonisme de Grégoire n'a plus rien d'invraisemblable ni de suspect."

and superior union, a union that leads to human resurrection and glorification with each other and in him. Hilary envisions these two stages of human unity through the two figures of Adam and Christ. The unity of humanity is first clearly manifested in Adam, but due to Adam's actions, it becomes a unity unto sin. The unity instituted by Christ corrects and improves human unity so that it is now a unity unto the good. In this way, unity is both the premise and the result of the incarnation.

The Pauline Adam-Christ Parallel

Hilary follows the Pauline parallel between Adam and Christ found in 1 Corinthians 15:20–28,45–49 and Romans 5:12–21.[6] Hilary argues that Adam and Eve's choice to eat of the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil was able to affect all humanity—rather than simply Adam and Eve—because all humanity existed somehow in Adam such that all humanity sinned and so all humanity suffers the effects of sin in and with Adam. Furthermore, this parallel between Adam and Christ is such that, for Hilary, if all of humanity is in Adam, then all humanity is in Christ: "Therefore . . . we who have been mud in Adam are now heavenly in Christ . . ."[7]

Human unity in Adam is manifested in the Fall but pre-exists it. All humanity was created and existed in Adam as he was fashioned by God from the dust of the earth. Humans were physically formed in Adam and can be reformed in Christ.[8] Therefore, human origin in Adam has two different faces. As descen-

---

6 However Ladaria has demonstrated that Hilary himself only rarely cites the Pauline texts in his treatment of the Adam-Christ parallel, in fact he only once makes direct mention of the Pauline text that motivates him. Rather, he more often cites gospel pericopes, Genesis, or the Psalms ("Adán y Cristo en los *Tractatus super Psalmos*," 97). One hypothesis that Ladaria offers for this neglect is that Hilary presupposes the Adam-Christ parallel as a theological given that can be put to theological use without the necessity of the Pauline proof-texts (ibid., 121).

7 *Tr. ps*. 122.3 (CCL 61B 36.13–17): Ergo si, qui in Adam limus fuimus, nunc caelestes sumus in Christo et Christus habitator est nostri, per habitantem Christum in nobis etiam ille quoque habitator est nostri, cui est *habitans* in nobis Christus habitatio. Hilary is expanding on 1 Cor. 15:22. See, for example *Tr. ps*. 9.4 (CCL 61 75.6–9): beatus apostolus ad Corinthios ita loquitur: *Quomodo enim in Adam omnes moriuntur, sic et in Christo omnes uiuificantur, unusquisque autem suo ordine: primitiae Christus, deinde qui sunt Christi*.

8 *In Matt*. 10.4 (SC 254 218.1–6): Tota deinde in apostolos potestas uirtutis dominicae transfertur, et qui in Adam in imaginem et similitudinem Dei erant figurati, nunc perfectam Christi imaginem et similitudinem sortiuntur, nihil a Domini sui uirtutibus differentes, et qui terrestres antea erant, caelestes modo fiunt.

dants of Adam, humans are inheritors both of the promise of Eden and the malediction of the Fall. For example, commenting on Psalm 145, Hilary says:

> *I will praise the Lord in my life*: for this life, which now exists through the infirmities of the body, is not [the prophet's] life. Indeed such life, which is not life but death, began from Adam but it was not begun with Adam. . . . Therefore, in that life, such as was first founded in man, [the prophet] will praise God.[9]

Here Hilary speaks of two kinds of life: the one "first founded in man," and the life that is death, which "began from Adam" when he ate of the tree. From Adam humanity inherits both life and death: the benevolence of God's creation and the results of sin.

In the course of the *Tractatus super Psalmos*, Hilary uses Adam more to represent humanity's common origin in sin than to recall its common origin in the original benevolence of God's creation. The result of this common origin of sin in Adam is that "death has equal dominion over all: its law is common to the nature of every body."[10]

While Hilary does occasionally use Adam to represent humanity's prelapsarian common origin in foundational goodness, he prefers to use Christ as the representative for this state, for Christ, the heavenly Adam, is the promise of return, and more, to this goodness. For example, Hilary says that "our totality (*uniuersitas*) in the first parent of parents, Adam, is shown by the word 'land,' "[11] and:

> Truly it is this land, the land of Adam, which, criminal through the attraction of food, is cursed. . . . Therefore, all those similar to the earthly Adam render cursed fruits to their land. But the one who is configured to the heavenly Adam has innocent fruit for his land.[12]

---

9 *Tr. ps.* 145.2 (CCL 61B 279.8–11, 280.12–14): *Laudabo Dominum in uita mea.* Non enim ea uita, quae nunc est per infirmitates corporis, sua est. Ab Adam namque ista coepit, non cum Adam inchoata est, quam non uitam, sed mortem esse . . . In hac ergo uita sua Deum, qualis primum in homine est instituta, laudabit.

10 *Tr. ps.* 118 Samech 7 (CCL 61A 144.8–145.9–10): Mors aequaliter dominatur uniuersorum; in omnium corporum naturas commune ius illi est.

11 *Tr. ps*. 65.4 (CCL 61 237.5–6): uniuersitas nostra ex terra in primo Adam parente genitorum . . . monstratur.

12 *Tr. ps.* 66.7 (CCL 61 257.13, 258.18–21): Verum hic Adae terra, quae per inlecebram cibi erat criminosa, maledicitur. . . . Omnis ergo terreno Adae similis hos maledictos fructus terrae suae reddit, ceterum qui iam caelesti Adae configuratur, habet innocentem terrae suae fructum. . . .

Hilary uses land (*terra*) as a metaphor for the body. Human bodies, first configured to Adam and so suffering his curse, now may be configured to Christ.

Hilary uses this Adam-Christ parallel to develop some of his soteriological themes, in particular the unity of all humanity in Adam unto death and in Christ unto life. In the pericope of the paralytic (Matt. 9:2–8, *In Matthaeum* 8.5), Hilary explains that the paralytic symbolizes Adam, and in him all humanity, who is brought to Jesus to be cured.[13]

> Indeed in the paralytic, the totality (*uniuersitas*) of the peoples is offered to be healed, and the very words of curing must be considered. It is not said to the paralytic: "be healed;" nor: "get up and walk;" but: "*Be constant, my son, your sins have been remitted of you*." In the one, Adam, the sins of all the peoples are remitted . . . he is called son because he is the first work of God, and to him, out of kindness, the sins of the soul are remitted and indulgence granted for the first transgression. For we do not accept that the paralytic had committed any [personal] sin. . . .[14]

The unity of humanity that Hilary bases in Adam is manifested here as a unity in sin. Hilary's commentary on this periscope depends upon the presupposition of humanity's unity in sin: without this unity, Jesus' healing of the paralytic could in no way symbolize his healing of the sins of all. Hilary uses the parallel between Adam and Christ to show the transformation of the unity of

---

13 See Ladaria's treatment of this passage in "Adán y Cristo: Un motivo soteriológico del *In Matthaeum*," 451–454. Orazzo, in dealing with this pericope, nuances the paralytic's position as representative of the *uniuersitas hominum*. He asserts that the paralytic does not represent all of humanity but only that section of humanity that realizes its sinfulness and comes to Christ in order to be cured and saved (Orazzo, "Ilario di Poitiers e la *universa caro*, 408). Chromatius is even more explicit than Hilary in equating the paralytic with Adam. See Chromatius, *Tractatus in Matthaeum* 44.4 (CCL 9A 414.78–80): Pro huius ergo paralytici salute id est populi gentilis, uel certe Adae qui auctor humani generis esse cognoscitur . . . For Hilary's use of *uniuersitas*, see the discussion in Chapter 3 "The Stoic Conception of Human Unity" and Pettorelli, "Thème de Sion," 230, no. 61.

14 *In Matt.* 8.5 (SC 254 198.1–6,7–10): Iamque in paralytico gentium uniuersitas offertur medenda et curationis ipsius uerba sunt contuenda. Non dicitur paralytico: Sanus esto; non dicitur: Surge et ambula; sed dicitur: *Constans esto, fili, remissa sunt tibi peccata tua* (Matt. 9.2). In Adam uno peccata uniuersis gentibus remittuntur . . . hic filius nuncupatur, quia primus Dei opus est, huic remittuntur animae peccata et indulgentia primae transgressionis ex uenia est. Non enim paralyticum pecasse aliquid accepimus . . .

humanity from the unity in sin in Adam into a definitive unity in the good in Christ.[15]

Hilary's soteriology, then, has its foundation in protology. Hilary does not explain this foundation; rather he presupposes it as revealed truth.[16] Salvation history shows that humanity is unified to such an extent that both its fall and its salvation each depend upon a single protagonist: Adam and Christ respectively.[17] Following Paul in Romans 5, Hilary says: "From one man came unto all the sentence of death and the labor of life . . . but now through one man unto all has abounded the gift of life and the grace of justification."[18] Christ is the new Adam, the founder of a unity that leads to life rather than death.

The result of human unity in Adam's sin is the instability of human nature about which Hilary often speaks in the *Tractatus super Psalmos*. The weakness of human nature is demonstrated in its actual choices to sin. However, the cause of this weakness is the sinful condition of human life itself, a condition that precedes actual individual sin.[19] Drawn by the body towards the earth, human nature has, since Adam's fall, become profoundly unstable; it is characterized by an instability of the will that now suffers different attractions and pulls—a constant oscillation between what one should do and what one wishes to do—which then darken the intellect, rendering it blind to knowledge of God.[20] The great evil of the human condition is that it is characterized by a shifting and changing nature.[21] Every sin, inasmuch as it causes man to depart from the one reality beyond change, namely God, increases this inquietude.

---

15 Ladaria shows the importance that the physical body of Christ has in this picture ("Adán y Cristo: Un motivo soteriológico del *In Matthaeum*," 455): "En su cuerpo la humanidad errante vuelve al paraíso del que Adán la había apartado."

16 See Ladaria, *Cristología de Hilario*, 90.

17 See Orazzo, "Ilario di Poitiers e la *universa caro*," 408–409.

18 *Tr. ps.* 59.4 (CCL 61 185.2–3, 4–5): ex uno in omnes sententia mortis et uitae labor exiit . . . nunc autem per unum in omnes donum uitae et iustificationis gratia abundauit.

19 While instability is part of the reality of fallen human nature, personal sin worsens the condition. Hilary distinguishes between the common human condition of sin and individual actual sins. For example, Hilary explains that Esau was hated by God "for this, namely knowingly sinning, rather than for that, namely being generated according to the necessity and nature of sin" (*Tr. ps.* 57.3 [CCL 61 168.6–8]: . . . ipso potius hoc sciente quam aliquo ad necessitatem genito naturamque peccati).

20 See Orazzo, *Salvezza in Ilario*, 153.

21 Hilary shows a fascination with this theme such that the antithesis between human instability and divine stability can be seen in nearly every Psalm commentary and is often the subject of rhetorical embellishment. Hilary, recently returned from exile and perhaps reflecting on the instability of his own life, demonstrates a real longing for the steadfastness that God promises to his saints. See, for example, *Tr. ps*. 1.19–20, 2.13, 52.11–12.

While eternal fluctuations are the fitting punishment for the impious,[22] Hilary says that the just find in God "the safe and secure port"[23] who keeps them from the fate of the impious, that is, being tossed about, in this life and the next, as dust.[24]

Hilary is quite clear that the lowliness of being generated according to the necessity and nature of sin is not man's created state, but his fallen state: it is the result of Adam's sin that has been passed on to all humans. The passing of this sin occurs through the transmission of flesh and is a part of human generation. Hilary explains this passage of sin in his commentary on Psalm 135, verse 8, where he explains why the daughter of Babylon is called miserable:

> The whole verse revolves around this unhappy flesh of our confusion and perturbation, which, according to historical faith, is generated from the fathers of confusion [namely, Babylon] since all flesh is the daughter of previous flesh. . . . Therefore, this, namely the flesh of all, *is the miserable daughter of Babylon*.[25]

Sin, having gained entrance into humanity through Adam, has brought humanity to a lamentable condition. This condition is passed on to each generation through the flesh.[26] As sin exiled Adam from his original condition, Hilary refers to the prophet David as "an exile because of the crime of the first parent Adam."[27] David, often a representative for humanity, "knows that he is born under the origin and law of sin,"[28] and thus he is an exile from Eden, an exile from original innocence, an exile from the promise of immortality. In

---

22 See *Tr. ps.* 54.19.

23 *Tr. ps.* 54.18. (CCL 61 152.1–2): Sed inter ista inimici *iacula* inperterritus manet nobisque portum securitatis tutum fidumque demonstrans.

24 See *Tr. ps.* 1.19.

25 *Tr. ps.* 136.13 (CCL 61B 180.13–16, 18–19): Ad infelicem enim illam confusionis et perturbationis nostrae carnem sermo omnis reuertitur, quae secundum historiae fidem ex confusionis patribus genita est, quia omnis caro superioris carnis est filia. . . . Haec ergo *misera Babylonis est filia*, id est caro omnium.

26 Tertullian also argues that every soul, by reason of its birth, has its nature in Adam and is therefore both unclean and actively sinful: Ita omnis anima eo usque in adam censetur, donec in christo recenseatur, tamdiu immunda, quamdiu recenseatur, peccatrix autem, quia immunda, recipiens ignominiam et carnis ex societate (Tertullian, *De anima* 40 [CCL 2 843.1–4]).

27 *Tr. ps.* 136.5 (CCL 61B 174.9): in crimine primi parentis Adae exulem.

28 *Tr. ps.* 118 Tau 6 (CCL 61A 201.4–5): Scit sub peccati origine et sub peccati lege esse se natum.

the situation of David, Hilary shows that all of humanity together has fallen. Indeed, Hilary notes that David believes that "no one of the living can be without sin."[29] Because of Adam humans have lost what was originally given in Adam.

Ladaria has illuminated a subtle shift of emphasis in Hilary's use of the Adam-Christ parallel between the *In Matthaeum* and the *Tractatus super Psalmos*.[30] In the *In Matthaeum*, as we saw in the pericope of the paralytic, this parallel is centered on sin: Jesus Christ heals and saves humans from the consequences of Adam's sin.[31] However, in the *Tractatus super Psalmos*, Ladaria shows that Hilary develops the parallel based upon God's original design for man. Here Adam is not just the first sinner (in contrast to Christ), but a type of Christ, and as such, the first Father. Commenting on Psalm 118, Hilary says: "In the beginning, the truth of the words of God is this: that the new man, regenerated in Christ, may finally live as eternal according to the image of the eternal God, that is, of the heavenly Adam."[32] Christ is the realization of the original design of the Father, for in him humanity can give the fruits that God desired from Adam in the beginning. Christ is the heavenly image of God of which Adam is the type. In the *Tractatus super Psalmos*, Hilary begins to look back to Adam and the beginning not just to see what needs to be overcome and undone through the working of Christ, but also now with an eye that at once looks further back and further forward to the original paradisiacal design of the Father to be realized in the eschaton. In the *Tractatus super Psalmos*, the emphasis shifts from humanity's initial unity in Adam to its eschatological unity in Christ.[33] This is a unity that focuses on returning to, and furthering, the initial unity that God ordained unto the good in Adam—that is, the unity of being created according to the image of God—rather than on correcting the unity in sin attained through Adam's fall.[34]

---

29 *Tr. ps.* 118 He 16 (CCL 61A 57.12–13): Propheta in corpore positus loquitur et neminem uiuentium scit sine peccato esse posse.

30 Ladaria, "Adán y Cristo en los *Tractatus super Psalmos*," 120–122.

31 As Ladaria says: "Jesús une a todos los hombres en el bien, en su cuerpo la humanidad errante vuelve al paraíso del que Adán la había apartado" ("Adán y Cristo: Un motivo soteriológico del *In Matthaeum*," 455).

32 *Tr. ps.* 118 Resch 10 (CCL 61A 192.13–16): Sic in principio uerborum Dei ueritas est, ut nouus homo, regeneratus in Christo, uiuat deinceps secundum aeterni Dei, id est caelestis Adae imaginem iam aeternus.

33 See Ladaria, "Adán y Cristo en los *Tractatus super Psalmos*," 121.

34 See *Tr. ps.* 118 Resch 10 (CCL 61A 192.3–5): Hoc super hominem principium uocis est Dei, cum ad imaginem interminatae aeternitatis originis nostrae exordium conderetur.

For Hilary, Christ's assumption of all humanity is the logical development of the unity of humanity in Adam that he, in accordance with tradition, understands as outlined in Scripture. Though differing in their conception of the results of Adam's sin, and thus the nature of redemption, the majority of Fathers, East and West, held a conception of human unity in Adam such that Adam's Fall, in some way, affects all.[35] The Adam-Christ parallel is pervasive in patristic thought and is often accompanied by language that seems to support a physicalist theory of redemption: Tertullian, for example, says "We all live in Christ just as we are all killed in Adam."[36] But Hilary follows the logic of this

---

This point is also made by Colautti in the context of ecclesiology. Colautti argues that Hilary identifies the body of Christ with the Church and further with humanity as a whole. This identification of all humanity with the Church is not actually founded in the incarnation, rather it is founded even before creation (*Figuras eclesiológicas*, 267). Thus, according to Collauti, Hilary's doctrine of the assumption of all humanity follows upon, and is not the basis for, his understanding of the unity of all humanity, which is the Church. However, as we will see later in this chapter, while at times, Hilary presents the Church as the unity of all humanity, at other times he is clear that the Church contains not all humans but only some.

35 For example, Justin Martyr, *Dialogue with Trypho*, 88.4 (*Iustini Martyris Dialogus cum Tryphone*, ed. Miroslav Marcovich, Patristiche Texte und Studien 47 [New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1997], 223.20–21): ὃ ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἀδὰμ ὑπὸ θάνατον καὶ πλάνην τὴν τοῦ ὄφεως ἐπεπτώκει; Irenaeus *Aduersus haereses* 3.18.1 (*Contre les heresies: Livre 3*, Sources chrétiennes 211 [Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1974], 342.11–344.13): ut quod perdideramus in Adam, id est secundum imaginem et similitudinem esse Dei, hoc in Christo Iesu reciperemus; Tertullian *Aduersus Marcionem* 5.9.5 (CCL 1 689.13–14): sic in christo uiuificamur omnes, sicut mortificamur in Adam; Ambrosiaster *In Epistulam ad Romanos* 5.12 (CSEL 81 165.9–12): in quo—id est in Adam—omnes peccaverunt. ideo dixit in quo, cum de muliere loquatur, quia non ad speciem retulit, sed ad genus. manifestum est itaque omnes in Adam peccasse quasi in massa; Gregory of Elvira *Tractatus Origenis* 20.10 (CCL 69 143.72–75): ut id quod primus Adam perdiderat restauretur in Xpisto, et quemadmodum per primum Adam mors uenerat, ita et per hunc secundum Adam uita omnibus redderetur; Ambrose *Expositio euangelii secundum Lucam* 7 (in *Ambrosii mediolanensis opera pars 4*, ed. M. Adriaen, CCL 14 [Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 1957], 295.2566–2570: Potest tamen et hic in uno species accipi generis humani. Fuit Adam et in illo fuimus omnes: periit Adam et in illo omnes perierunt. Homo igitur et in illo homine qui perierat reformatur et ille ad similitudinem dei factus et imaginem diuina patientia et magnanimitate reparatur. See also Faustinus, *De Trinitate* 33 (ed. M. Simonetti, in *Greogrius Iliberritanus, Faustinus, Luciferianus*, CCL 69 [Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 1967], 333–334), and Gregory Nazianzus, *Oratio* 33.9 (in *Opera quae exstant omnia*, ed. J.-P. Migne, PG 36 [Turnhout: Brepols, 1857], 225).

36 Tertullian, *Aduersus Marcionem* 5.9.5 (CCL 1 689.13–14): . . . sic in christo uiuificamur omnes, sicut mortificamur in adam . . . See also Ambrosiaster, *In Epistulam ad Romanos* 5.21 (*Commentarius in epistulas Paulinas, pars 1*, ed. Heinrich Vogels, CSEL 81 [Vienna: Hoelder-

tradition in a specific and unique way: if all of humanity is somehow present in Adam so as to be affected by his sin, Hilary concludes that all of humanity must somehow be present in Christ so as to be affected by his resurrection to eternal life; and for Hilary, this presence of humanity in Christ is a physical presence. Tertullian, though he says "we all live in Christ," does not intend to mean that all humans are physically present in Christ's body: this is, however, exactly what Hilary does mean. The language of Tertullian, unlike that of Hilary, is metaphorical or spiritual. The scholarship of those such as Harnack, Gross, Wild, and Mersch, which connects Hilary's teaching on Christ's assumption of all humanity with Greek influence would lead one to believe that the Latin development of a physicalist soteriology is surprising. However, Hilary's teaching is surprising not, as the scholarship would suggest, for its development without Greek influence. Rather the surprise is that while the unity of humanity in Adam was common parlance in patristic thought, the development of this concept to the physical unity of humanity in Christ was, at least among the Latins, quite rare.

Birth from a Virgin

Salvation, in Hilary's theology, is dependent upon Christ assuming all of humanity into his body in the incarnation. This assumption depends upon the anterior unity of humanity. However, the salvific effects of the incarnation depend on more than the mere fact of the presence of all humanity in Christ's body. All humanity existed, as we have seen, in Adam. Indeed, Hilary says that all humanity also existed in Abraham. And yet neither Adam nor Abraham saved humanity. One element that distinguishes Christ from both Adam and Abraham and renders his incarnation salvific is his birth from a virgin. As Hilary says, "we are in him by the birth from the virgin."[37] Being born from a virgin allows Christ to be both like and unlike humanity. This combination of likeness and unlikeness is necessary for the accomplishment of salvation.

Picheler-Tempsky, 1966], 189.12–13): . . . aeternae vitae heredes futuri per Christum, sicut fuerant perditioni obnoxii per Adam. Chromatius says that the second Adam wished to conquer in those ways in which the first Adam was overcome: His enim modis secundus Adam uincere uoluit, quibus primus Adam fuerat superatus (Chromatius, *Tractatus in Matthaeum* 14.2 [CCL 9A 252.53–54]). See also Tertullian, *De Resurrectione mortuorum* 53 (ed. J. Borleffs, in *Tertulliani Opera, pars 2: Opera Montanistica*, CCL 2 [Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 1954], 998–1000).

37 *De Trin*. 10.25 (CCL 62A 479.5–6): nos quidem in eo per generationem uirginis inessemus.

Adam and Christ are not the only individuals to have contained all humanity in themselves such that they are able to act as the protagonists for the entire human race. Within his commentary on the pericope of the lost sheep in the *In Matthaeum*, Hilary explicitly names three individuals as containing in themelves the entirety of the human race: Adam, Abraham, and Christ:

> The one sheep should be understood as a man, and by a single man the entirety of humanity (*uniuersitas*) should be perceived. In the one error of Adam the entire race of humanity strayed. The ninety-nine who did not stray should be reckoned as the multitude of the heavenly angels, to whom there is joy in heaven and the care of human salvation. Christ is the one who seeks the man; the ninety-nine that are left are the multitude of heavenly glory who have great joy when the man who strayed is led back into the body of the Lord. Therefore, for good reason this number [one] is in the form of a letter which was added to [the name of] Abraham and fulfilled in [the name of] Sarah. Abraham is derived from Abram, and Sarah from Sara. We are all in the one Abraham, and through us, who are all one, the number of the heavenly Church will be accomplished.[38]

Hilary defines the one lost sheep from the gospel pericope as the entirety of humanity and he connects this one sheep to Adam, Christ, and Abraham. In Adam all humanity strayed; in Christ all humanity is led back into the body of the Lord; through Abraham's containment of all humanity, the number of the heavenly Church will be accomplished.

The examples of Adam and Abraham show that all humanity existing in a single person is not, in and of itself, salvific. Christ's birth from a virgin allows him to have true yet non-sinful humanity. Hilary explains this true yet non-

38 *In Matt.* 18.6 (SC 258 80.6–82.19): Ouis una homo intelligendus est et sub homine uno uniuersitas sentienda est. Sed in unius Adae errore omne hominum genus aberrauit. Sed in unius Adae errore omne hominum genus aberrauit; ergo nonaginta nouem non errantes multitudo angelorum caelestium opinanda est, quibus in caelo est laetitia et cura salutis humanae. Igitur et quaerens hominem Christus est et nonaginta nouem relicti caelestis gloriae multitudo est, cui cum maximo gaudio errans homo in Domini corpore est relatus. Merito igitur hic numerus per litteram et Abrahae additur et consummatur in Sarra; ex Abram enim Abraham nuncupatur et ex Sara Sarra accepit nomen. In uno enim Abraham omnes sumus et per nos qui unum omnes sumus caelestis ecclesiae numerus explendus est.

sinful humanity through his two-fold use of *similitudo*.[39] Christ's human nature is similar to that of the rest of humanity: it is identical as regards nature but different as regards sin. Contact with Christ's humanity, as opposed to the sinful humanity of both Adam and Abraham, has a transformative effect. Provided they do not remove themselves from Christ's body, all humans experience this transformation, which is completed at eschatological glorification.

The Conditional Universality of Salvation: Given to All but Rejected by Many

The original unity of humanity, though first recognized in Adam and the universal results of the Fall, is centered and dependent upon not Adam, but Christ. Hilary understands that humanity is created *ad imaginem*, that is "according to the Image," namely Christ himself.[40] Every human being is created according to Christ, and thus original unity, though first seen in Adam, is actually centered in Christ. Unity, both that found in the incarnation and that of creation, has to do with relationship to Christ. The incarnation embodies this original unity of humanity into unity in Christ's body: "because *we are* all *one body in Christ*"[41] and "we are in Christ through union with the assumed flesh."[42] In the incarnation, the manner of human unity becomes a physical unity in the body and nature of Christ.

When Christ assumes human nature and its infirmities in the incarnation, he binds himself to humans in a very intimate way. Since Hilary insists that Christ's assumption of flesh is the assumption of the flesh of all humanity, the divine Word enters into a union not simply with his own human nature, but with the human nature of each individual human. The incarnation introduces all of humanity into a physical unity with Christ.

---

39 For a more detailed discussion of Hilary's use of *similitudo* to describe the humanity that Christ assumes via his birth from a virgin, see Chapter 2's section: "Hilary's Use of Non-Metaphorical Rhetoric to Speak of Christ's Assumption of All Humanity."

40 See *Tr. ps.* 118 Iod 7 (CCL 61A 92.3–5): Non Dei imago, quia *imago Dei* est *primogenitus omnis creaturae*; sed ad imaginem, id est secundum imaginis et similitudinis speciem. Man is not the "image of God": this title is reserved for Christ. Rather man is made "according to the splendor of the image and likeness of God."

41 *Tr. ps.* 118 Phe 11 (CCL 61A 167.6–7): quia omnes *unum corpus sumus in Christo* . . .

42 *Tr. ps.* 91.9 (CCL 61 329.15–16): ergo per coniunctionem carnis adsumptae sumus in Christo. . . .

> Therefore, God is *marvelous in his saints* whom, when he has conformed them to the glory of his body, he will assume even into the unity of paternal majesty through him who is the mediator, since the Father is in him though nature, and he is in us through the fellowship of the flesh. . . .[43]

This physical unity of humanity with Christ accomplished in the "fellowship of the flesh," unifies individuals with the Father through the mediation of Christ's natural unity with him.

In the *De Trinitate*, in the context of the Eucharist, Hilary says that humanity's unity with Christ is a unity based on the flesh, as opposed to the will. Therefore, through the Eucharist, humanity attains a "natural unity" (*naturalis unitas*) with God.[44] However, in the *Tractatus super Psalmos*, while Hilary continues to emphasize the physical and fleshly nature of humanity's unity with Christ, he no longer speaks of this unity as "natural," perhaps in an effort to distinguish more clearly between the unity of Father and Son and the unity of Son and humanity.[45] The closest Hilary comes to using the terminology of natural unity in the *Tractatus super Psalmos* is in his use of the Johannine metaphor of the vine, where he says: "it is necessary that *the branch that remains* in the vine should have the nature of *the true vine*."[46]

---

43 *Tr. ps.* 67.37 (CCL 61 291.8–11): *Mirabilis* ergo *in sanctis* Deus est, quos, cum conformes gloriae corporis sui fecerit, per se, qui mediator est, etiam in unitate paternae maiestatis adsumet, dum et in eo per naturam Pater est et ille rursum per societatem carnis in nobis est. . . .

44 See *De Trin.* 8.13–16.

45 In the Trinitarian sphere, a standard way of defining the relationship of the Father and the Son is to say they share a natural, as opposed to a volitional, unity. In the *De Trinitate*, Hilary uses similar terminology for the relationship between the Son and humanity. Wild, in his discussion of Hilary's use of the language of natural unity to describe the relationship of humans with the Son in *De Trin.* 8 (*Divinization of Man*, 108–111), notes that the only orthodox way of understanding Hilary here is to say that he is speaking analogously of the unity of the Father and the Son and of human unity with Christ. But Hilary himself gives no indication that he is using an analogy here. Wild, however, maintains that "He insists that our unity with God is a true and natural one. Nevertheless he never says that the natural unity that binds us to God is the same as that which binds the Father and the Son together" (*Divinization of Man*, 108). The lack of language of "natural unity" in the *Tractatus super Psalmos* could demonstrate Hilary's acknowledgement of the ambiguity of its use in the *De Trinitate*.

46 *Tr. ps.* 51.16 (CCL 61 104.14–15, commenting on John 15:1–8): . . . necesse est ut naturam *uerae uitis propago* intra uitem *manens* teneat. Cyprian also uses the metaphor of the vine; however, he uses it to show the relationship of the faithful to the Church. See, for

Nevertheless, with or without the language of natural unity, Hilary teaches that human nature, which before was alienated from God, has been taken up by Christ and even made a part of him through the incarnation. Christ, in assuming all humanity to himself, brings all humanity without exception into communion with him. Indeed, Hilary says Christ wishes and wills the salvation of all: the eternal life of all flesh is the inheritance Christ asks of the Father.[47] Every human being now born, because of his very human nature—the nature that Christ assumed—is conformed to the body of Christ and participates in Christ. Participation in Christ is now an ontological fact that precedes any individual's act of the will.

Though all humanity is, at the moment of the incarnation, brought into participation with Christ, individuals must cling to Christ in faith or else they will be cut off.[48]

> For it is open to all that they may be consorts of the body and kingdom of God *because the Word was made flesh and has dwelt in us*, indeed assuming into himself the nature of all humanity. But anyone who shows, on account of his merit, that *he must be torn out of the temple and eradicated from the land of the living* has never been prevented from entering, since

---

example, Cyprian *De ecclesia catholicae unitate* 5.9: Ecclesia quoque una est quae in multitudinem latius incremento fecunditatis extenditur. Quomodo . . . rami arboris multi sed robur unum tenaci radice fundatum. . . . While Hilary understands the vine metaphor in a physical fashion, Cyprian understands it more metaphorically: the unity of the faithful to one another and to the Church is, as we saw in Chapter 3 "Latin Theological context for Hilary's Physicalist Model of Redemption," the unity of wills, namely concord or harmony (see Cyprian, *De Ecclesiae catholicae unitate* 23 [CCL 3 266.562–64]: Vnus deus est et christus unus, et una ecclesia eius et fides una, et plebs in solidam corporis unitatem concordiae glutino copulata). For Cyprian, while the Church does possess a unity that comes "from above, that is, from heaven and the Father," (*De Ecclesiae catholicae unitate* 7) nevertheless, he urges Christians to participate in this unity by (in Paul's words) "being of the same mind and same judgement" (*De Ecclesiae catholicae unitate* 8).

47 See *Tr. ps.* 2.31 (CCL 61 58.2–3, 58.8–59.10): Accepit ergo hereditatem gentium, quam poposcit. . . . Haec ergo hereditas eius, ut omni carni det uitam aeternam, ut omnes gentes baptizatae atque doctae regenerentur in uitam. . . .

48 Collauti, *Figuras Ecclesiológicas*, 77–78: "Por una parte, la participación al cuerpo de Cristo que podríamos llamar *per naturam*. Nos referimos a la doctrina de la asunción total de la humanidad en la encarnación, explícitamente desarrollada en estas líneas [*Tr. ps*. 51.16]. Por otra, la permanencia en el mismo cuerpo de Cristo *pro merito*. Esto significa que la subsistencia en la naturaleza del cuerpo asumido no es una realidad de suyo dada, sino que es posible ser arrancados del tabernáculo que es el cuerpo de Cristo."

> he may be received as an inhabiatant on account of the assumption of the flesh, but *he he is eradicated* because of the crime of infidelity and is unworthy of the consort of nature.[49]

The ontological fact of the physical union of all humanity with the Son of God in the incarnation is only part of what is needed for salvation. The new ontological existence of each person, accomplished universally by Christ's assumption of all humanity, needs to be ratified by personal adherence to Christ through faith and a participation in the life and death of Jesus through the sacraments.[50] Humans do not need faith in order to begin their participation in Christ: every human person receives this participation as his birthright, thanks to the incarnation. However, humans do need faith in order to maintain what they already have.

The new unity with Christ depends upon his assumption of all into his body, but also upon faith, for "we who have believed in Christ are one."[51] Participation with Christ needs to extend beyond the flesh to include a participation in the characteristics or qualities of Christ: "whoever persists in justice, will participate in him [Christ], because he himself is justice; whoever persists in truth, will participate in him, for he himself is truth."[52] Hilary speaks both of the universality of the salvation obtained through Christ's assumption of human flesh and of the necessity of a personal reception of, and participation in, this new life offered in Christ.

---

49 *Tr. ps*. 51.17 (CCL 61 104.4–10): uniuersis enim patet, ut consortes sint corporis Dei atque regni, quia *Verbum caro factum est et inhabitauit in nobis*, naturam scilicet in se totius humani generis adsumens—, sed unusquisque pro merito se et *euellendum de tabernaculo et eradicandum de terra uiuentium* praebet non prohibitus umquam inesse, quia per naturae adsumptionem incola sit receptus, sed *eradicatur* ob infidelitatis crimen naturae consortio indignus existens.

50 See Orazzo, "Ilario di Poitiers e la *universa caro*," 415–416. Orazzo speaks about the two different planes of Hilary's thought regarding the assumption of all humanity in Christ: the ontological and the soteriological. Christ, he says, assumes all of humanity, which allows every human being without exception, prior to any individual choice, to have a "natural" union with him. This is the ontological plane of Hilary's use of *adsumere*. But there is also a soteriological plane that intersects with and completes the ontological level. In order for this natural union to be salvific there are two requirements for each individual: he must believe in God made man and he must be fruitful, that is, act according to this belief.

51 *Tr. ps.* 127.4 (CCL 61B 82.2–3): qui in Christo crediderimus, unum esse.

52 *Tr. ps*. 118 Heth 16 (CCL 61A 81.7–9): Et particeps eius, quisque in iustitia manet, quia ipse iustitia est; particeps eius erit, quisque in ueritate persistit; ipse est enim ueritas.

> Therefore, we are in Christ through the union of the assumed flesh: and this is the sacrament of God hidden from the ages and generations in God, which is now revealed to his saints, that we are coheirs, concorporeal beings, and co-participators of his promise in Christ. Therefore, through the union of flesh, an entrance is opened to all in Christ, if they put off the old man and nail themselves to his cross, and if, having put off from themselves those things that they did before, they are buried with him in baptism unto life, and nail their flesh with its vices and concupiscences to his cross so that they might enter into the consort of the flesh of Christ.[53]

In his flesh, Christ has opened an entrance to the divine life for all, and he has further paved the way to God through nailing himself, and the sins of all, to the cross and through passing from death to life. All may pass through the doorway that his body offers, but to be truly a coheir, concorporeal being, and co-participator with Christ, each person must willingly participate in this way, this path, that Jesus paved to God. As a result, in many passages of the *Tractatus super Psalmos*, Hilary speaks about those who will receive eternal punishment.[54] These people have rejected the participation in Christ that was theirs by nature.

Hilary explains the relationship between the universal ontological change effected by the assumption of all humanity and the subsequent individual choice to participate in, or enact, this divine reality in his commentary on Psalm 51, where he introduces the text from the Gospel of John: "I am the true vine and you are the branches" (Jn. 15:1–8) to comment on the nature of human unity with Christ:

> Therefore, if some will merit through faith in the embodied God to remain in the nature of the body assumed by God, *they will be washed* so as to *bear eternal fruits* from themselves: this is because it is necessary

53 *Tr. ps.* 91.9 (CCL 61 329.15–24): Ergo per coniunctionem carnis adsumptae sumus in Christo; et hoc est sacramentum Dei absconditum a saeculis et generationibus in Deo, quod nunc reuelatum est sanctis eius, esse nos coheredes et concorporales et compartícipes pollicitationis eius in Christo. Patet ergo uniuersis per coniunctionem carnis aditus in Christo, si exuant ueterem hominem et cruci eius adfigant, et ab his quae ante gesserunt in baptismo eius consepeliantur ad uitam, et, ut in consortium Christi carnis introeant, carnem cum uitiis et concupiscentiis adfigant.

54 See *Tr. ps.* 118 Gimel 18 (CCL 61A 35.1–2): Peccata obprobrio sunt digna; et idcirco peccatores exsurgent in obprobrium aeternum.

> that *the branch that remains* in the vine should have the nature of the *true vine*. But he who is incredulous of God born in a body, even if he also *remains* believing, nevertheless he will lack the *fruits* of his faith and *he will be cut off* either on account of his infidelity or on account of the uselessness of *the fruits* of unbelievers.[55]

Hilary presupposes in this passage that the assumption of humanity into God is the divine act that renders all humans branches of the true vine. However, some branches bear fruit and some do not in accordance with each one's faith or unbelief. Those branches that do not bear fruit will be cut off from the true vine, that is to say, those who do not believe in the incarnation are cut off from their participation in the divine nature that was the gift given to all in the incarnation. In this way, Hilary preserves both the universality of Christ's assumption, with its promise of salvation and divine participation, and the necessity of faith, works, and adherence to the embodied God for the fulfillment of this promise.

In the *Tractatus super Psalmos* Hilary wants to emphasize the universality of the salvation that is the result of Christ's assumption of all humanity. Universality does not mean every person is saved; Hilary explicitly denies such a position. But the salvation of Christ is universal in that it is offered not just to the Jewish people but to all peoples. Hilary says that "*the name of God is sweet* not to one people alone (and to an irreverent people at that), but now to all peoples and tongues."[56] The special access to God, which in earlier days was the sole possession of the Jews, is now offered to everyone regardless of race, tribe, nation, or time. Christ makes it possible for all people to praise God. Christ's assumption of all humanity is the key to the fulfillment of the texts in the Old Testament that call for universal praise for God.

However, Hilary's desire to demonstrate the universal power of Christ's assumption of humanity leads to a confusing use of images. Hilary often identifies the body of Christ with all humanity. At other times he identifies the body

---

55 *Tr. ps.* 51.16 (CCL 61 104.12–18, commenting on John 15:1–8): Si qui igitur per fidem corporati Dei manere in natura adsumpti a Deo corporis merebuntur, hi *emundantur in fructus* aeternos ex se *adferendos*, quia necesse est ut naturam *uerae uitis propago* intra uitem *manens* teneat. At uero qui incredulus nati in corpore Dei fuerit, uel si et credens *maneat, fructibus* tamen fidei suae careat, *eradicabitur* aut ob infidelitatem aut ob inutilitatem *fructuum* negatorum.

56 *Tr. ps.* 134.6 (CCL 61B 146.6–8): *Dei nomen suaue est*, non uni tantum genti atque ipsi inreligiosae, sed omnibus iam gentibus atque linguis. See also *Tr. ps.* 66.5 (CCL 61 256.5–7): per eum in uiam uitae omnes gentes terram inhabitantes dirigantur, relicto idolorum errore, ad cognitionem Dei eruditae. Also *Tr. ps*. 67.33.

of Christ with the Church.[57] The Church, though, is not equivalent to humanity but rather a selection of it.[58] The Church is that part of humanity that has, through faith and baptism, died and risen with Christ and so will possess eternal life. On the one hand, there are several affirmations in the *Tractatus super Psalmos* that in Jesus is the assembly of all of humanity, the *uniuersitas*.[59] All humanity finds immortality in union with the body of Christ. This immortality leads to the resurrection of all without exception. On the other hand, Hilary repeatedly says that while every man is resurrected, some are resurrected to life and some to judgment. Not every individual accepts the immortal communion with divine life offered in the body of Christ.

Christ's body is really the body of all humanity because, according to Hilary, the incarnation grafts all humans into the vine of Christ. However, Christ's body is also, rightly speaking, the body of the elect, namely the Church, because individuals who do not cleave to Christ through belief, sacramental participation, and moral living, cut themselves out of the body of Christ, leaving only the elect in this body.

The incarnation is the beginning of a new unity of humanity, a unity that exists in the very body of Christ and that is a unity unto life rather than the unity unto death which had been the lot of humanity since the fall of Adam. In making the body of Christ the hinge of the whole movement of salvation, Hilary gives salvific weight to the words *corpus* and *caro*.[60] The body of Christ is the location of salvation, for this is the place where divinity meets humanity; in particular, this is the place where the Son of God meets all of humanity and takes it to himself so that he may take it to the Father. Some people choose to remove themselves from the body of Christ, and thus salvation. These people, according to Hilary, have separated themselves from the body of Christ on earth, that is, the Church.[61] These are the impious, the heretics,

57 *Tr. ps.* 124.3 (CCL 61B 52.14): beata illa dominici corporis ecclesia.

58 Here I disagree with Collauti who explicitly equates all humanity with the Church (Collauti, *Figuras eclesiológicas*, 267). While Hilary asserts both that all humanity is assumed into the body of Christ and that the body of Christ is the Church, he does not equate the Church with all humanity. Hilary makes this clear by dealing explicitly with the situation of members of humanity excluding themselves from the Church as, for example, in *Tr. ps*. 121.5.

59 For example, *Tr. ps.* 54.9 (CCL 61 146.8): uniuersitatis nostrae caro est factus. See also, *Tr. ps.* 2.31, 59.4, 64.4, and 143.6. See Pettorelli, "Thème de Sion," 222.

60 See Orazzo, "Ilario di Poitiers e la *universa caro*," 399–419.

61 See *Tr. ps.* 121.5 (CCL 61B 29.11–14): Dissidentes autem a coetu sanctorum et se ab ecclesiae corpore peccatis, fastu, litibus separantes *participationem* sanctae istius domus non habent, quia *participatio* ciuitatis huius *in idipsum est*. Hilary goes so far as to say that

the philosophers.[62] The point for Hilary is that there is no salvation outside of the body of Christ. Human hope is not simply because of Christ but *in* Christ.

In the first section of this chapter, we explored the parallel between Adam and Christ in Hilary's thought. One of Hilary's conclusions from this parallel is that just as all of humanity is in Adam and affected by Adam's sin unto death, so all of humanity is in Christ and is affected by his death and resurrection unto life. In this section we have described Hilary's vision of the new unity that humanity has found in Christ's body. This unity is a unity of nature that precedes, though it also demands, individual acts of the will. In the next section, we shall discuss some of the effects of this new unity in Christ's body.

Christ the Mediator and the Double Creation of Man

The perfection of the Son's mediation is in the incarnation where he mediates between humanity and divinity in his very own body, but Hilary emphasizes that the Son has always been the mediator between the Father and humanity.[63] Creation was in and through the Son.[64] Hilary also sees him as the primary mediator in salvation history, which, until the incarnation, was the history of God's interaction with the Jews. It is the Son who mediates between God and the Jews because he is the giver of the Law: "the Lord is the mediator of God and men, in whose hand through the angels, as is said [in the Scriptures], the

---

those who separate themselves from the body of the Church are handed over to the devil; see *Tr. ps.* 118 Ain 5 (CCL 61A 151.16–18).

62 See, for example, the list of texts cited by Saffrey concerning Hilary's condemnation of philosophers including *Tr. ps*. 1.7, 61.2, 63.5, 63.9, 65.7, 144.4, and 148.3 ("Saint Hilaire et la philosophie," 255–257).

63 For the Son's eternal role as mediator of the Father, see Chapter 9.

64 See *De Trin.* 4.6 (CCL 62 105.4–11): Nouit enim unum Deum *ex quo omnia*, nouit et unum Dominum nostrum Iesum Christum *per quem omnia*, unum ex quo et unum per quem, ab uno uniuersorum originem, per unum cunctorum creationem. In uno ex quo auctoritatem innascibilitatis intellegit, in uno per quem potestatem nihil differentem ab auctore ueneratur: cum ex quo et per quem . . . communis auctoritas sit. See also *Tr. ps*. 63.10 (CCL 61 218.1–219.2): Iam si fidem haereticus destruet, Dei Filium semper fuisse cognoscet, nullo a Patre interuallo temporis separatum ipsum esse uerbum, uirtutem, sapientiam Dei, hunc mundi opificem fuisse, hunc et hominis conditorem, hunc prima mundi crimina diluuio abluisse, hunc Moysi legem dedisse, hunc in prophetis fuisse et per eos ingentia illa corporationis et passionis suae sacramenta cecinisse, hunc in corpore resurgentem caducae carni claritatem spiritalis gloriae intulisse et in naturam diuinitatis suae terrenae corruptionis absorbuisse primordia.

Law was offered."[65] And now, finally, in the incarnation, Christ perfects his mediation and becomes the high priest by mediating between divinity and humanity in his very own body.[66] His assumption of all humanity is the condition for the perfection of this mediation for it assures that the human person Jesus Christ does not have to act merely as a stand-in or representative for all of humanity. In his body, Christ contains all of humanity whom he can present, individually and as a whole, to the Father.[67] We will return to a quotation we looked at before:

> Therefore, God is *marvelous in his saints* whom, when he has conformed them to the glory of his body, he will assume even into the unity of the paternal majesty through him who is the mediator, since the Father is in him through nature, and he is in us through the fellowship of the flesh.[68]

---

65 *Tr. ps.* 67.18 (CCL 61 275.14–16): mediator Dei hominumque sit dominus, in cuius manu per angelos, ut dictum est, lata lex fuerit. We see Hilary's vision of Christ's permanent role as mediator in *Tr. ps*. 118, where Christ is portrayed as the bringer of the new Law: *Tr. ps.* 118 Mem 10 (CCL 61A 124.14–16): . . . et gloriam noui huius latoris legis expectant in exordio sui iam ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei constituti. Origen's commentary on this verse also designates Christ as the bringer of a new Law (Marguérite Harl, *La Chaîne palestinienne sur le psaume 118* (*Origène, Eusèbe, Didyme, Apollinaire, Athanase, Théodoret*), Sources chrétiennes 189, 190, [Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1972], 354–355).

66 See Lécuyer's discussion of the priestly mediation of Christ in "Sacerdoce royal." For the perfection of Christ's mediation in the incarnation see "Sacerdoce royal," 308. See also *Tr. ps*. 149.3. Cyprian also envisions the incarnation as Christ's mediation between divinity and humanity: Cyprian, *Quod idola dii non sint* 15 (CSEL 3.1 31.14–17): hunc igitur comitamur, hunc sequimur, hunc habemus itineris ducem, lucis principem, salutis auctorem, caelum pariter et patrem quaerentibus et credentibus pollicentem. Tertullian uses the language of exchange to speak of the mediation of Christ: Christ is the "sequester," the guardian of a deposit. See Tertullian, *De Resurrectione mortuorum* 51.2 (CCL 2 994.11–16): Hic, sequester dei atque hominum appellatus ex utriusque partis deposito commisso sibi, carnis quoque depositum servat in semetipso, arrabonem summae totius. Quemadmodum enim nobis arrabonem spiritus reliquit, ita et a nobis arrabonem carnis accepit et vexit in caelum, pignus totius summae illuc quandoque redigendae. Note that Tertullian's understanding of Christ's mediation makes it clear that the Son does not assume each human being, rather the Son "preserves in himself the deposit of the flesh as an earnest of the whole sum."

67 Lécuyer, "Sacerdoce royal," 306.

68 *Tr. ps.* 67.37 (CCL 61 291.8–11): *Mirabilis* ergo *in sanctis* Deus est, quos, cum conformes gloriae corporis sui fecerit, per se, qui mediator est, etiam in unitate paternae maiestatis adsumet, dum et in eo per naturam Pater est et ille rursum per societatem carnis in nobis est.

Christ mediates through the unity of nature he shares both with the Father and with humanity. We see in this passage the centrality of Christ's body as itself the physical place of mediation. Access to the Father is "in him," and thus humans attain to divine participation in the fellowship of Christ's flesh and the conformation to his body.

The joining of heavenly and earthly natures in Christ's assumption of all humanity serves not only to unify humanity with God, but also to unify the heavenly and earthly natures within the human person.[69] The human person is a microcosm and contains within himself heavenly and earthly natures (soul and body, respectively).[70] The assumption of the flesh of humanity is the means by which Christ brings both body and soul to eternal life.[71] As Christ unifies humanity with the Father in his body, so he reharmonizes in his body the heavenly soul and earthly body put out of order within each person by sin. There is a mirroring of Christ's cosmic mediation in each human person.

Hilary firmly believes that the human person is a composite being who is made up of two natures that differ in character because they are the result of a double creation of humanity.[72] Hilary supports this double creation of humanity with his reading of Genesis 1–3. Hilary explicitly details humanity's double creation in two places in the *Tractatus super Psalmos*: 118 Iod 6–8 and 129.4–6. Both Heidl[73] and Goffinet[74] assert that Hilary's teaching of the two-fold creation of man derives from Origen. Likewise, they both base their claims (Heidl with respect to *Tractatus super Psalmos* 129.3–6 and Goffinet with respect to *Tractatus super Psalmos* 118 Iod 3–5) on a comparison between Hilary and Origen's Homilies on Genesis. However, it is far from certain that Hilary read Origen's Homilies on Genesis. The only text of Origen's that we are certain Hilary read is Origen's Psalm commentaries.[75]

---

69 Orazzo (*Salvezza in Ilario*, 183–184): "L'antropologia dei *Tractatus* obbedisce ad un movimento evolutivo che « raccoglie in unità » quell'uomo che portava in sé un dualismo originario, in cui poi trovava le radici il dramma profondo tra l'uomo interiore e l'uomo esteriore di cui parla S. Paolo a più riprese."

70 See *Tr. ps*. 129.5.

71 See *Tr. ps*. 61.2 (CCL 61A 199.43–47): Quid enim ultra ignorationi anxietatique hominum est relictum, cum aeternitas animae et corporis, id est totius hominis praedicetur, cum adsumptio atque susceptio terrenae nostrae carnis a Deo sub sacramento magnae huius pietatis ostensa sit . . .

72 See the excellent article by Marie-Josèphe Rondeau: "Remarques sur l'anthropologie de saint Hilaire," *Studia Patristica* 6 (1962): 197–210.

73 Heidl, *Origen's Influence*, 273–289.

74 Goffinet, *Utilisation d'Origene*, 123–125.

75 See the discussion of Hilary's debt to Origen in Chapter 3 "Origen and Eusebius of Caesarea."

When we compare Hilary's argument in *Tractatus super Psalmos* 118 Iod 3–6 with what is revealed about Origen's argument in his commentary on Psalm 118 by the catenist of the Palestinian chain, we find that while both do teach a double creation of man, they do so with different arguments making the direct textual dependence of Hilary on Origen for the double creation of man unlikely.[76] Hilary begins with the Psalm verse "Your hands have made me and prepared me."[77] The "hands" of this verse lead Hilary to a reflection on the privileged position of humanity since only man was made by the hands of God. Hilary then continues to show the two stages of creation in Genesis: the first, in Genesis 1, when God says, "Let us make man according to our image and likeness," is the creation of the soul; the second, in Genesis 2, is the creation of the body by the hands of God. The catenist of the Palestinian chain says that, in his commentary on this verse, Origen teaches a two-fold creation of man, by applying the two verbs of the Psalm verse to the two steps of creation: God created (ποίεω) the soul and then fashioned (πλάσσω) the body.[78] Hilary and Origen both teach a double creation based on the language of this passage, but they focus on different aspects of the Psalm in question: Hilary reflects on "hands," while Origen distinguishes between the two verbs "create" and "fashion."

Other possible precedents for Hilary's teaching of a two-fold creation of man include Calcidius, Cicero, and Tertullian. Two-stage creation can be found in Calcidius' commentary to his translation of the first part of Plato's *Timaeus*. Calcidius refers to the argument of Philo who speaks of the creation of an incorporeal human being first, who only later becomes corporeal:

> What then was that heaven and earth that God established before the rest? Philo considers them to be incorporeal and intelligible essences, ideas and exemplars as much of this dry earth as of the firmament. After all, he says, also in the case of man, first an intelligible and archetypal exemplar of the human race was made by God and then afterwards corporeal man.[79]

---

76 See Harl, *Chaîne palestinienne*, 305.

77 *Tr. ps.* 118 Iod 3 (CCL 61A 90.6): Manus tuae fecerunt me et praeparaverunt me.

78 See Harl, *Chaîne palestinienne*, 118 YODH v. 73 (SC 189 a 305.10–12).

79 Calcidius, *Commentarius in Platonis Timaeum* 278 (*Timaeus a Calcidio translatus commentarioque instructus*, ed. J.H. Waszink, Corpus philosophorum medii aevi corpus Platonicum, Plato Latinus, vol. 4 [London: E.J. Brill, 1975], 282.7–11): Quod ergo illud caelum prius quam cetera deus condidit quam ue terram? Philo carentes corpore atque intellegibiles essentias fore censet, ideas et exemplaria tam siccae istius terrae quam soliditatis; denique etiam hominem prius intellegibilem et exemplum archetypum generis humani, tunc demum corporeum factum a deo esse dicit. The dating of Calcidius' translation and

Cicero, on the other hand, speaks of the two-step creation of humanity according to the opposite order of body, then soul: first the seed of the human race was scattered over the earth, then this seed is enriched by the divine gift of souls.[80] Despite the different ordering, Cicero's explanation that this gift of souls gives humans a familiar (*genus vel stirps*) relationship with the gods could be behind Hilary's description of the soul as exhibiting several divine qualities, since it is made according to the image of God.[81] Tertullian, like Cicero, has the reverse order of Hilary: first the flesh is made, then it becomes animated by a soul. This order of creation leads Tertullian, in his use of the Adam-Christ parallel in *De Resurectione carnis* 53, to focus on flesh, since it is created prior to soul, as the category that unites Adam and Christ and makes them both man. Though Tertullian's account of creation differs from Hilary's, Tertullian uses his account to come to an understanding of the Adam-Christ parallel that is similar to Hilary's in its concentration on the flesh. Tertullian argues that Christ is the last Adam because he is a man, but Adam was a man even before he was ensouled: for this reason, Christ is the last Adam in his flesh alone.[82]

---

commentary on the *Timaeus* remains unsettled. Against the prevailing opinion that dates the translation and commentary in the middle of the fourth century, in the first edition (1962) of his critical edition, Waszink argues, for a later dating and places the translation around 400AD (xv). In the addenda of the 1975 second edition, based on textual similarities between Calcidius and Ambrose, Waszink concedes the possibility that Calcidius is the source of these similarities, which would return the dating for Calcidius' translation to the mid or even early fourth century (clxxxvi). Klibansky believes 350AD to be the earliest possible date. No evidence has been found that would suggest that Hilary had contact with Calcidius' text.

80 Cicero, *De legibus* 1.24 (Powell 169.8–18): Nam cum <ea quae> de natura hominis quaeritur, disputari solent, nimirum ita sunt ut disputantur: perpetuis cursibus conversionibus <que> caelestibus extitisse quandam maturitatem serendi generis humani, quod sparsum in terras atque satum divino auctum sit animorum munere, quom que alia, quibus cohaererent homines, e mortali genere sumpserint, quae fragilia essent et caduca, animum esse ingeneratum a deo: ex quo vere vel agnatio nobis cum caelestibus vel genus vel stirps agnosci potest.

81 See *Tr. ps*. 129.6 (CCL 61B 102.5–7): Ergo ad imaginem Dei homo interior effectus est rationabilis, mobilis, mouens, citus, incorporeus subtilis, aeternus, quantum in se est, speciem naturae principalis imitator.

82 Tertullian, *De Resurrectione mortuorum* 53.12 (CCL 2 999.40–45): Sed cum et christum nouissimum adam appellat, hinc eum recognosce ad carnis, non ad animae resurrectionem omnibus doctrinae uiribus operatum. Si enim et primus homo, Adam, caro, non anima, qui denique in animam [uiuam] factus est, et nouissimus Adam, Christus, ideo adam quia homo, ideo homo quia caro, non quia anima.

There are Latin precedents for Hilary's teaching of a two-step creation and Hilary's theology reaches some of the same conclusions regarding this two-step creation as his Latin predecessors: Hilary's understanding of the relationship between the soul and God bears some similarity to Cicero while his emphasis on the flesh in his use of the Adam-Christ parallel reflects Tertullian. Calcidius offers a Latin precedent for a two-step creation of soul first, and then body, but no evidence has yet been found suggesting that Hilary had knowledge of Calcidius' text. We must await greater evidence concerning Hilary's appropriation of Origen's Homilies on Genesis before we can conclude that Origen is the source of the ordering of Hilary's two-step creation.[83]

Hilary teaches that man's soul was created first, and the body was added later: these two were then joined together through God's breath.[84] In his commentary on Psalm 129, Hilary explains:

> For he [God] did not make the body when he made man according to the image of God. Genesis teaches that the dust was taken up and the body formed long after man had been made according to the image of God, and then it was made into a living soul through the inbreathing of God, that is to say, the earthly and heavenly natures were joined together by a certain bond of inbreathing.[85]

As we already saw, in *Tractatus super Psalmos* 118 Iod, Hilary pairs man's twofold creation with the two different divine creative acts in Genesis: the first

---

83 In his study on Origen's influence on Augustine, Heidl includes an appendix concerning Hilary's relationship to Origen's commentary on Genesis, specifically concerning this theme of the double creation of man. Through a complicated process of cross comparisons with several texts, Heidl comes to the dubious conclusion that Hilary's Tractate on Psalm 129 derives from a no-longer extant Latin compilation of Origen's *Commentary on Genesis*, done by Novatian as a help for his own *De Trinitate* (Heidl, *Origen's Influence*, 237–298). See Chapter 3 "Origen and Eusebius of Caesarea" for a more extensive critique of Heidl's work.

84 Rondeau ("Remarques sur l'anthropologie," 200–201) clarifies that while Hilary here speaks of three steps in creation, corresponding to soul, body and spirit, in fact he retains a bipartite conception of man, namely soul and body, with the spirit serving only as the bond between the two.

85 *Tr. ps.* 129.5 (CCL 61B 102.6–12): Non enim, cum ad imaginem Dei hominem fecit, tunc et corpus effecit; Genesis docet longe postea, quam ad imaginem Dei homo erat factus, puluerem sumptum formatumque corpus, dehinc rursum in animam uiuentem per inspirationem dei factum, naturam hanc scilicet terrenam atque caelestem quodam inspirationis foedere copulatam.

when God says "let us make man in our own image,"—of which he says, "This is the voice of God upon man in the beginning when the beginning of our origin was founded according to the image of his unending eternity"[86]—the second when God takes dust from the earth and forms man.[87] In the first act, God makes the soul from nothing, in the second, he takes already existent earth and then forms or prepares it into the body.[88] It is the two stages of man's creation that, according to Hilary, even prior to sin, explain the difference between the inner and the outer man of which Paul speaks. The outer man is formed of earth and shares the characteristics of earth. The inner man, by contrast, made according to the image of God, is "rational, mobile, moving, quick, subtly incorporeal, and eternal," in this way imitating the form of its maker.[89]

The result of humanity's double creation is that man is a composite being of two natures: "for there is one nature of the human soul just as there is one nature of earthly flesh."[90] These two natures have different origins and different tendencies, yet they share a common destiny.[91] Man, from his institution, is a composite creature with a lower and higher nature, unlike God who is eternal and therefore not composite.[92] However this composite foundation, while it serves to distinguish man from God, was not in its institution something negative. These two natures were designed by God to be ordered such that the body serves the soul: "the institution of man is contained in two natures, namely of soul and body, the first of which is spiritual, the other earthly, and this inferior material is suited to the work and operation of that stronger nature."[93]

---

86 *Tr. ps.* 118 Resch 10 (CCL 61A 192.3–5): Hoc super hominem principium uocis est Dei, cum ad imaginem interminatae aeternitatis originis nostrae exordium conderetur.

87 See *Tr. ps.* 118 Iod 6.

88 *Tr. ps*. 118 Iod 7 (CCL 61A 93.13–15): Primum ergo non accepit, sed fecit; secundo non primum fecit, sed accepit et tum formauit uel praeparauit.

89 *Tr. ps*. 129.6 (CCL 61B 102.5–7): Ergo ad imaginem Dei homo interior effectus est rationabilis, mobilis, mouens, citus, incorporeus subtilis, aeternus, quantum in se est, speciem naturae principalis imitator.

90 *Tr. ps.* 122.8 (CCL 61B 39.9–10): natura una est animae humanae, sicuti et terrenae carnis una natura est.

91 See Rondeau, "Remarques sur l'anthropologie," 205. Before Christ, it was the "law of human necessity that the soul, buried together with the body, descend to the depths" (*Tr. ps*. 138.22 [CCL 61B 204.6–8]). Now, the resurrection changes the nature of earthly bodies, metaphorically giving them wings, which allows the body to ascend upwards together with the soul (see *Tr. ps*. 138.24).

92 Hilary says that whatever is composite is not eternal because it has a beginning. See also *Tr. ps*. 129.4.

93 *Tr. ps*. 129.4 (CCL 61B 101.4–8): . . . primum meminisse debet hominum institutionem naturis duabus contineri, animae scilicet et corporis, quarum alia spiritalis, alia terrena est, et

The human being was created as a harmonious joining of complements.[94] This harmony was upset with the introduction of sin.[95] Now the body oversteps its given role and leads the soul downwards towards its own earthly concerns. The new situation is that "the nature of our body brings us into every course of crime and the assault of human cupidities compels us into this way."[96] Humanity's two natures are no longer harmoniously ordered to the good; rather they are antagonistic, with the soul still seeking spiritual things but more often than not dragged down to the things of this age rendering it a slave to the desires of the body.[97] According to Hilary, a sinner is a person

---

inferiorem hanc materiam ad efficientiam atque operationem naturae illius fuisse potioris aptatam.

94 See Antonio Peñamaria de Lllano, *La Salvación por la fe: La noción "fides" en Hilario de Poitiers. Estudio filológico—teológico* (Burgos: Ediciones Aldecoa, 1981), 167: ". . . el desgarrón que actualmente experimenta el hombre en su intimidad, es algo que no le acompaña desde su origen y que le abandonará algún día, es decir una realidad humana que tiene historia."

Hilary's understanding of the relationship of body and soul reflects the Stoic belief that the two are compatible and complementary (see Chapter 3 "The Complementarity of Body and Soul" for greater detail). For a list of the echoes of the Stoic understanding of the relationship of spirit and matter in Latin authors such as Cicero, Seneca, and Claudius Mamertinus see Burns, *Model for the Christian Life*, 204. Hilary's treatment of the salvation of body and soul follows Tertullian's mediation of Stoic themes. For example, in *De Resurrectione mortuorum* 63 (CCL 2 1011–12), Tertullian uses spousal imagery to speak of the relationship of body and soul. Like Hilary, Tertullian focuses on the resurrection of the flesh, rather than the soul, because it is the resurrection of the flesh that is the more unbelievable of the two. In *De Anima* 5 (CCL 2 786–787), Tertullian cites the Stoics Cleanthes and Chryssipus to argue the relationship of cooperation between the soul and the body. However, Hilary does not follow these arguments for cooperation as far as attributing corporality to the soul as the Stoics and Tertullian do. See Burns, *Model for the Christian Life*, 214–224.

95 See Iacoangeli, "Linguaggio soteriologico," 127: Just as the soul provides the mediation between man and God, so the body provides the mediation between man and the world. But this is a dangerous mediation, for the terrestrial world easily leads to sin. Hilary says it is not the body, but the will, that is responsible for sin. Nevertheless, it is the body that provides the powerful incentive towards evil because to the body are attributed the negative aspects of man's earthly life: *humilitas, infirmitas, corruptio, mors*.

96 *Tr. ps.* 118 Mem 8 (CCL 61A 123.2–4): Natura corporis nostri fert nos in omnem criminum cursum, et humanarum cupiditatum impetus in hanc nos *uiam* cogit.

97 See *Tr. ps*. 122.8 (CCL 61B 39.8–14): Nunc autem una *ancilla* et una *domina*, quia natura una est animae humanae, sicuti et terrenae carnis una natura est. Et quia nunc de peccatoribus, qui peccati serui sunt, sermo est, haec *ancilla* anima carni *dominae suae* dedita est et per corporalium uitiorum blandimenta subiecta est habetque inferioris sui per

whose soul serves the desires of the body. The antagonism between body and soul does not lead to a division between the two, but to a shared destiny, no longer to the good, but to the bad.

The task of the Christian is to try to recreate the original harmony of body and soul within himself so that once again the lower body is guided by, and serves, the higher soul in such a way that the whole person is directed towards the good.[98] This is a process that only has success in and because of Christ. Christ reinstitutes in man the original composite harmony of body and soul and even goes further to make a single, unified, new man. In this way, Christ institutes peace for humanity:

> For our Lord Jesus Christ, in taking away all our stains and sins, *made* as the apostle says *the two one* (Eph. 2.14), and according to the same apostle, he [Christ] made the inner man and the outer man into one man in order that he—making peace so that he might found in himself one new man out of two—might reconcile both to God in one body. Therefore we are not combined, but united. . . .[99]

Christ's harmonizing of the heavenly and the earthly in his sinless body, is, because of the presence of all humanity, a reharmonizing also of the heavenly and the earthly in each human person. This unification of the human person begins in this life—in the ability to will what one ought and to pursue the good—and is completed in the resurrection. For "after the transformation of the resurrection, the nature of our earthly body will be made more glorious."[100] This new, more glorious nature remains human but now partakes

---

inlecebrarum fomenta dominatum, fructus operum eius inspiciens. See also *Tr. ps*. 118 Zain 6 (CCL 61A 70.13–15): Non est periculoso nocturnarum uigiliarum otio animus relaxandus, sed in orationibus, in deprecationibus, in confessionibus peccatorum occupandus est, ut, cum maxime corporis uitiis oportunitas datur.

98 See *Tr. ps.* 118 Mem 13 (CCL 61A 126.4–7): Nostrum ergo est modo utilis organi corpora nostra in coaptatos et concinentes modos temperare, ut non uitia diligamus, ut non uirtutes bonas oderimus, ut unicuique nos generi decenter atque utiliter coaptemus.

99 *Tr. ps*. 140.7 (CCL 61B 235.7–12): Dominus enim noster Iesus Christus omnes inmunditias nostras et peccata auferens *fecit*, secundum apostolum, *utrumque unum* (Eph. 2:14), et secundum eundem, ut duos conderet in se in unum nouum hominem, faciens pacem, ut reconciliaret ambos Deo in uno corpore, internum scilicet hominem et externum fecit unum. Non ergo combinamur, sed unimur. . . .

100 *Tr. ps.* 118 Gimel 4 (CCL 61A 28.12–13): post demutationem resurrectionis terreni corporis nostri effecta gloriosior natura.

in the simplicity of the divine nature. Through Christ, humanity comes to have a greater proximity to God than Adam had: man is no longer made *according* to the image of God, he comes to *be* the image of God.[101]

Conclusion

Hilary's understanding of salvation, based upon his incarnational theology of Christ's assumption of all humanity, is direct. Christ does not win salvation in his own body and *then* pass it on to others. Because every human person is present in Christ's body, the resurrection and glorification of Christ are the entrance into salvation for every human person.

However, this is an entrance into salvation, not the *fait accompli*: salvation is not won by faith but it can be lost by unbelief, which causes a self-removal from Christ's body, the body of salvation. Hilary is universalist in the sense that he believes all humans are assumed in the incarnation and so, prior to any individual faith or act, are integrated into and transformed by the body of Christ. However, Hilary is not a universalist in the sense of believing that all humans will be definitively saved. The incarnation, in effect, gives salvation to all human beings, but this salvation must be maintained and preserved by the individual through faith, sacraments, and Christian living. Hilary believes that, in actuality, many people do not maintain their salvation but rather cut themselves off from the participation in Christ that was freely given to them.

The presence of every person in Christ depends upon an understanding of the unity of the human race. Hilary bases this unity in Adam and has a very developed theology of the Pauline Adam-Christ parallel: all humans are in Adam unto death and in Christ unto life. Hilary follows Latin tradition in developing this parallel but his understanding is far more physical than his theological predecessors or counterparts. Hilary takes a new theological step in understanding human presence in Christ as a physical presence.

Christ's assumption of all humanity creates a physical unity of every person with Christ. This is the entrance to salvation. However, an individual can exercise his will to separate himself from this unity and bar the door to his salvation. For those who do not separate themselves from Christ, the unity created in the assumption of all humanity has effects that are begun in this life. Christ serves as the perfect mediator: in bringing each human person together

101 See *De Trin.* 11.49. See Rondeau, "Remarques sur l'anthropologie," 209–210.

with the divine in his own body, Christ also unifies the fleshly and the spiritual natures within each person.

Nevertheless, the consummation of all the effects of Christ's assumption of all humanity awaits the eschaton. The assumption of all humanity is an assumption unto salvation and awaits the day of salvation to be fully perfected. Christ assumed all of humanity in order to change the destiny of all humanity. It is to this destiny that we now turn.

CHAPTER 7

Eschatological Ramifications: Eternal Life in Christ

The increased attention to Christ's assumption of all humanity that Hilary manifests in his later works, especially the *Tractatus super Psalmos*, comes hand in hand with an increased eschatological emphasis.[1] This is not coincidental. Christ's assumption of all humanity has clear eschatological ramifications. An emphasized teaching of this incarnational principle requires eschatological exploration; conversely, Hilary could not study eschatology without clarifying and solidifying his redemption model.

Hilary's Use of *Adsumere* Manifests the Connection between Soteriology and Eschatology

We can see this intrinsic connection between Christ's assumption of all humanity and eschatology through Hilary's use of the term *adsumere*.[2] In Scripture and in the early Latin patristic tradition *adsumere* was rarely used with reference to the incarnation, but was reserved for the ascension.[3] The use of *adsumere* to refer to the incarnation is first found in Novatian who uses it three times in his *De Trinitate*.[4] *Adsumere* is taken up by Hilary as his preferred

1 Fierro notices a connection in Hilary's thought between an increasingly soteriologically motivated christology and an eschatological teaching of transformation. He says that the idea that Christ will transform the human body of humility, conforming it to his body of glory, does not appear in the *In Matthaeum*; it appears in the *De Trinitate* in Book 9, when the christology leans towards soteriology, and virtually dominates the *Tractatus super Psalmos*. See Fierro, *Sobre la gloria*, 218.

2 For an excellent study of *adsumere* in the thought of Hilary, see Doignon, " 'Adsumo' et 'adsumptio'." Orazzo also analyzes this term in "Ilario di Poitiers e la *universa caro*," 409–414.

3 The patristic Greeks have a whole set of terms specifically to designate the incarnation (usually formed around σάρξ, σῶμα, or ἄνθρωπος, e.g. σάρκωσις). However, the Latins customarily use approximate periphrases (*induere corpus*, etc.). The Latin *incarnari/incarnatio* is a late word, beginning with Marius Victorinus (and found twice in Hilary). See Doignon, " 'Adsumo' et 'adsumptio'," 126–129.

4 Novatian, *De Trinitate* 13 (in *Novatiani Opera*, ed. G.F. Diercks, CCL 4 [Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 1972], 33.30), 21 (CCL 4 53.38), and 24 (CCL 4 59.44). Tertullian knows "*sumere carnem*" but not *adsumere* as a distinctively Christian word. See Doignon, " 'Adsumo' et 'adsumptio'," 127.

© KONINKLIJKE BRILL NV, LEIDEN, 2015 | DOI 10.1163/9789004290815_009

term for designating the incarnation. After Hilary, *adsumere* becomes a common term for Latin theologians to speak about the incarnation: it is found frequently, for example, in Jerome and Augustine.[5] Hilary easily makes the move from using *adsumere* exclusively for the ascension to using it as a designation for the incarnation because in his theology the ascension is so tied in with the whole mystery of the dispensation (incarnation, passion, resurrection) that he can use the same term for both incarnation and ascension. The incarnation is man "assumed" by Christ. The ascension is Christ "assumed" by the Father. The Father, in "assuming" Christ, "assumes" also the man Christ has assumed. The ascension is, in Hilary's thought, a prolongation of the incarnation. The unity of these two mysteries of the dispensation allows Hilary to use *adsumere* for the incarnation.[6]

Hilary's use of *adsumere* is occasional in the *In Matthaeum* but becomes standard by the *Tractatus super Psalmos*.[7] This development parallels Hilary's increased attention to both eschatology and the assumption of all humanity. In Hilary's use, the word *adsumere* itself ties together the two primary moments of the dispensation—the incarnation and the ascension/glorification—and thereby shows that Hilary sees soteriology and eschatology as intrinsically connected.

The Contours of Hilary's Eschatology

In his monograph on Hilary's eschatology, Durst concludes that, as regards his eschatology, Hilary is a traditional Latin thinker.[8] Durst argues that contact with the East during Hilary's exile, especially Origen, did not strongly affect

5 See Doignon, " 'Adsumo' et 'adsumptio'," 123–124.

6 See Orazzo, "Ilario di Poitiers e la *universa caro*," 409–414.

7 See Doignon's table in " 'Adsumo' et 'adsumptio'," 131. According to Doignon, Hilary uses *adsumo* or *adsumptio* to speak of the incarnation 17 times in the *In Matthaeum* and 115 times in the *Tractatus super psalmos*.

8 See Michael Durst, *Die Eschatologie des Hilarius von Poitiers: Ein Beitrag zur Dogmengeschichte der IV Jahrhunderts*, Hereditas 1 (Bonn: Borengässer, 1987), 338. See also Brian Daley, *The Hope of the Early Church: A Handbook of Patristic Eschatology* (Peabody, Massachussets: Hendrickson Publishers, 2003), 94. Daley says that Hilary's reliance on Tertullian and Cyprian gives his works a "curiously archaic flavor." These typical or "archaic" elements include presenting the history of the world as a "week" of 6000 years, conceiving of the end of history in the classical terms of Christian apocalyptic, and the resurrection of both just and unjust for judgement.

Hilary's eschatology.[9] There are a few problems with Durst's conclusion. First, Durst posits substantial Greek influence on Hilary prior to his exile: he presents Hilary as having, already in the pre-exilic *In Matthaeum*, an anthropology that is affected by Platonic dualism in which the soul is trapped in the body.[10] Furthermore, Durst purports to show that Hilary's understanding of death and resurrection are expansions of this anthropological dualism.[11] If Hilary's anthropology is based on Greek philosophy, it is hard to understand how Durst can say his eschatology is traditionally Latin. Second, while Durst acknowledges Hilary's teaching of Christ's assumption of all humanity, he does not see this as a defining element of Hilary's eschatology that distinguishes him from his Latin forebears.[12] On the contrary, we will find that Hilary's eschatology is profoundly shaped by his understanding of Christ's assumption of all humanity in the incarnation. As a result, Hilary's eschatology, like his theology of the incarnation, while not Greek, is distinctive in Latin patristic theology.[13]

Hilary's eschatology is based upon his understanding of the incarnation. Christ has assumed all of humanity in his body, making his body the locus of human salvation. In this way, the resurrection and the glorification of Christ are not only a type or a model of the general resurrection to come, but are, in some mysterious fashion, the actual accomplishment of human resurrection and glorification as well, for human resurrection and glorification are accomplished *in Christo*.

Since human resurrection and glorification are accomplished *in* Christ rather than merely *because* of Christ, Hilary describes human eschatological life as taking place in the body of Christ. Resurrected life is to be accomplished in Christ and so with Christ. This participation in Christ is necessary for humans to come to the Father, for, as Hilary says, "*They shall appear before God* in no other way than in the *Holy One* of whom it is said *he who sees me sees also the Father* (Jn. 14:9)."[14] For Hilary, access to the Father is attained only through

9 Durst, *Eschatologie des Hilarius*, 338.

10 See Durst, *Eschatologie des Hilarius*, 21, referring to *In Matt.* 11.5.

11 See Durst, *Eschatologie des Hilarius*, 139, where he argues that Hilary uses three disparate elements to develop his anthropology, namely Platonic dualism, the Stoicism he receives through Tertullian, and Origen.

12 See Durst, *Eschatologie des Hilarius*, 78.

13 Daley's presentation of Hilary's eschatology is somewhat confusing on this point: he says both that Hilary's eschatology is the first Latin appearance of Greek soteriology and divinization eschatology (*Hope of the Early Church*, 96) and that Hilary relies mainly on Tertullian and Cyprian (ibid., 94).

14 *Tr. ps.* 62.4 (CCL 61 207.12–14): Sed *in sancto Dei* non aliter *adparebunt* deo quam secundum illud: *Qui me vidit, vidit et patrem*. . . . Hilary, in commenting here on of Ps. 62.3 which

the Son's body. Furthermore, this arrangement is not temporary: the Son does not bring humans to the Father in whom they can then participate directly. The Son, as we saw in the last chapter, is the mediator between God and man.

> Therefore, God is *marvelous in his saints* whom, when he has conformed them to the glory of his body, he will assume even into the unity of the paternal majesty through him who is the mediator, since the Father is in him through nature, and he is in us through the fellowship of the flesh.[15]

A connection between the Father and human beings happens in Christ's body, for this is the place where both the Father and humans have a natural unity. Therefore, we will see later in this chapter that Hilary is adamant that the Son's handing over of his kingdom to the Father is not the end of human participation in his body. For Hilary, the eschatological outcome of this eternal mediation is that the eternal participation of humanity in the paternal glory is in and through the body of the Son.

The fact that the resurrection of individual bodies is still to come does not separate humans from the body of Christ. Human nature, as we discussed in the previous chapter, is a nature characterized in this life by its *habitus* of humility and infirmity. Furthermore, "The stain of human flesh, through the custom of sin mixed in the flesh, cannot be wholly abolished except through a transformation of nature."[16] Resurrection is a transformation of human nature—not from human into something else, but from an infirm condition to a glorious condition. Hilary never tires of speaking of the time when human corruption will be absorbed into incorruption and human infirmity will be transformed into the glorious nature of Christ's body.[17] Hilary understands the effecting of

---

says "sic in sancto apparui tibi," is offering an interpretation which is based on the grammatical ambiguity of *sancto*. The *sancto* that is usually taken as neuter referring to holy place (i.e. the temple), Hilary reads instead as masculine, referring to the Holy One (i.e. Christ). In other words, the temple in which humans have access to God is now Christ's body. I offer a lengthier discussion of this text from *Tr. ps*. 62.4 later in this section.

15 *Tr. ps.* 67.37 (CCL 61 291.8–11): *Mirabilis* ergo *in sanctis* Deus est, quos, cum conformes gloriae corporis sui fecerit, per se, qui mediator est, etiam in unitate paternae maiestatis adsumet, dum et in eo per naturam Pater est et ille rursum per societatem carnis in nobis est.

16 *Tr. ps.* 142.13 (CCL 61B 252.2–4): labes carnis humanae per admixtam in se uitiorum consuetudinem aboleri penitus nisi cum naturae demutatione non possit.

17 This is a very common theme. For the movement from corruption to incorruption, see *In Matt*. 5.12; *De Trin*. 3.16, 9.31; *Tr. ps*. 1.18, 2.41, 52.3, 55.12, 67.35, 138.19, 139.17, 146.4, and 150.2. For the movement from humility to glory (cp. Phil. 3:21), see *In Matt*. 26.1, 27.4; *De Trin*.

this transformation in a very physical way: humans can only be transformed by contact with that which is itself transformed. There is no transformation without contact with Christ's body. This contact is, however, eternally assured by Christ's assumption of all humanity in his incarnation. The body that the Son takes to himself is a body that contains, in some fashion, each human person. Since he never discards this body,[18] he never severs direct physical contact with each person in and through the medium of his body.

While Hilary believes that the transformation of human nature is not fully accomplished until eschatological glorification, nevertheless, human presence in Christ's incarnate body leads to a proleptic experience of this eschatological glorification. In several places in the *Tractatus super Psalmos*, Hilary alters the wording of Scripture to signify the proleptic nature of human transformation. Hilary often makes use of Philipians 3:21 ("he will transform our lowly bodies so they will be like his glorious body") to manifest the corporeal conformation to Christ that humans await in the eschaton. However, in *Tractatus super Psalmos* 1.15, 14.5, and 124.4, Hilary alters the tense of the verb from future to perfect in order to signify that this corporeal conformity to Christ is already begun.[19] While Hilary is aware that the verb tense found in the Greek and most Latin versions of Philippians is the future *transformabit* and even uses this version (as in *De Trinitate* 9.8), he uses the perfect tense to make a theological point: the future condition of transformation and conformation to Christ's body is proleptically begun in the incarnation by means of Christ's assumption of all humanity.

Hilary's explanation of Colossians 2:10 in *De Trinitate* 9.8 has led to a scholarly understanding of Hilary in which human participation in Christ is a temporary participation.

> For, as the fullness of the Godhead is in Him, so we have received of that fullness in Him, nor does he indeed say: "You have received of that fullness," but: *In him you have received of that fullness* (Col. 2.10), because all those who have been or are to be reborn through the hope of faith into eternal life now have received of that fullness in the body of Christ, while later on they themselves will no longer receive of that fullness *in him* but

---

9.8, 11.35; *Tr. ps*. 1.15, 14.5, 91.9, 124.4, 128.9, 131.26, 135.15, and 141.8. For the movement from infirmity to glory, see *De Trin*. 6.37, 9.8; *Tr. ps*. 2.41, 9.4, 55.11, 91.10, and 138.5.

18 See, *Tr. ps.* 118 Nun 10 (CCL 61A 133.11–12): . . . ut corpus adsumptum *in gloria Dei patris* maneret. . . .

19 See Burns, *Model for the Christian Life*, 174; Doignon, "Comment Hilaire de Poitiers a-t-il lu et interprété le verset *Philippiens* 3,21;" and Fierro, *Sobre la gloria*, 219–223.

> in themselves, at that time of which the Apostle says: *Who will transfigure the body of our lowliness in conformity with the body of his glory* (Cf. Phil. 3:21).[20]

The classic reading, begun by Coustant, sees the time "in him" (*in eo*) as an interim state in which the separated soul dwells in Christ's body, a time that is then surpassed by the resurrection of individual bodies in which humans then dwell "in themselves" (*in ipsis*), that is, outside of the body Christ, eternally.[21] Coustant has connected these two stages with the two reigns: the first is the kingdom of the Son, the second is the kingdom of the Father. Wild, while he reads the time *in eo* as this life, and *in ipsis* as after death, follows Coustant in connecting these two successive periods with the kingdom of the Son and the kingdom of the Father.[22]

Coustant's reading has been rejected by authors such as Fierro and Pelland.[23] Despite their rejection of Coustant's understanding of Hilary's eschatology, neither Fierro nor Pelland offer an opposing reading of this passage. They do, however, offer citations from the *Tractatus super Psalmos* in which Hilary offers no hint of a time in which humans will be "in themselves" rather than "in him." For example:

---

20 *De Trin*. 9.8 (CCL 62 378.11–17): Ut enim in eo diuinitatis est plentitudo, ita nos in eo sumus repleti. Neque sane ait: 'estis repleti,' sed: *in eo estis repleti*. Quia per fidei spem in uitam aeternam regenerati ac regenerandi omnes nunc in Christi corpore manent repleti, replendis postea ipsis non iam in eo, sed in ipsis, secundum tempus illud de quo apostolus ait: *Qui transfigurabit corpus humilitatis nostrae conforme corporis gloriae suae*.

21 See Coustant, *Praefatio generalis*, PL 9.95–106. Mersch follows Coustant's reading (*Corps mystique du Christ*, vol. 1, 352).

22 See Wild, *Divinization of Man*, 98–100.

23 Fierro rejects Coustant's reading because he believes Coustant bases his entire understanding of Hilary's eschatology upon the distinction between the kingdom of the Son and the kingdom of the Father, a distinction that Fierro sees as marginal in Hilary's writings. Fierro says that the glory proper to the flesh of the saints is no different from that which they have in the body of Christ: thus the two stages are not markedly different (see Fierro, *Sobre la gloria*, 200). Pelland rejects Coustant's reading because he believes there is no basis in Hilary's works to support a reading of a separated soul. Furthermore, Pelland also notes that Hilary presents different stages of the history of salvation that are not reducible to the kingdom of the Son/kingdom of the Father distinction that Coustant presents (See Pelland, "Thème biblique du Règne," 670–72).

> Therefore, if the entire hope of our rest is in the body of Christ, and since *we must rest in the mountain*, we can not understand "mountain" as anything other than the body that he took up from us, before which body he was God and in which he is God and through which he has transfigured the body of our humiliation making it conformed to the body of his glory (Cf. Phil. 3:21), if, that is, we have nailed the vices of our body to his cross so that we may rise in his body.[24]

Rest in the body of Christ is rising in his glorified body. Hilary here points to no other hope that could supersede, either in terms of time or beatitude, this hope of resurrection and rest in Christ's body.

Both of the quotations we have just looked at—*De Trinitate* 9.8 and *Tractatus super Psalmos* 14.5—use Philippians 3:21 as the scriptural proof text to explain the eschatological conformity humans will experience with Christ's body.[25] However, though the presence of Philippians 3:21 in both these passages manifest Hilary's consistent and unchanging emphasis on the corporeality of eschatological transformation, these two passages use Philippians 3:21 slightly differently. In *De Trinitate* 9.8, Hilary understands Philippians 3:21 as pointing to the time after the resurrection of bodies in which humans will dwell "in themselves." At this point in his career, Hilary parses Philippians 3:21—"who will transfigure the body of our lowliness in conformity with the body of his glory"—as speaking of individual resurrected bodies. The "conformity" of these bodies with Christ's glorious body requires a separateness or distinction between individual bodies and Christ's body. However, in the *Tractatus super Psalmos*, Hilary parses Philippians 3:21 differently: the "body" that Christ transfigures and conforms does not refer to individual resurrected bodies but to Christ's very own assumed body. In *Tractatus super Psalmos* 14.5 Hilary explains that through his own assumed body, Christ "transfigured the body of our humiliation making it conformed to the body of his glory." In other

---

24 *Tr. ps.* 14.5 (CCL 61 84.25–31): Si ergo requiei nostrae spes omnis in Christi est corpore et, cum *in monte sit quiescendum*, montem non aliud possumus intellegere quam corpus quod suscepit e nobis, ante quod Deus erat et in quo Deus est et per quod transfigurauit corpus humilitatis nostrae conformatum corpori gloriae suae, si tamen et nos uitia corporis nostri cruci eius confixerimus, ut in eius corpore resurgamus.

25 For the importance of Phil. 3:21 in Hilary's thought as well as a comparison between Hilary's use of this verse and the use of other patristic authors including Origen and Ambrose, see Fierro *Sobre la gloria*, 218–223, 251–256; Doignon, "Comment Hilaire de Poitiers a-t-il lu et interprété le verset *Philippiens* 3,21."

words, the process of the dispensation—from incarnation to glorification—transfigures Christ's individual body, the mountain, as Hilary says, in which all individual humans rest eschatologically. In the *De Trinitate*, conformation of individual human bodies necessitates a distance between Christ and individuals, because conformation is the patterning of one thing off of something else. However, in the *Tractatus super Psalmos*, confirmation requires the presence of individuals in Christ, to enable the transfiguration that Christ effects on all humans.

I would argue that *De Trinitate* 9.8 does offer evidence that at the time of writing the *De Trinitate*, Hilary did not consistently teach that human life exists only and eternally in the body of Christ. However, in the *Tractatus super Psalmos*, Hilary offers no statement similar to that of *De Trinitate* 9.8, where he implies that humans, at some point of the eschaton, will exist outside of the body of Christ. On the contrary, there are several places in his Psalm commentaries where Hilary indicates that human eschatological existence is entirely in Christ.[26] In *Tractatus super Psalmos* 62.4, commenting on the Psalm verse 62.3, which says "*sic in sancto apparui tibi*," Hilary makes use of the grammatical ambiguity of the word *sancto* to advocate eternal dwelling in Christ's body. The *sancto*, which, in its literal sense, refers to the neuter holy place (i.e. the temple),[27] Hilary reads instead as masculine, referring to the Holy One (i.e., Christ): he explains the verse thus: "*They shall appear before God* in no other way than in the *Holy One of God* of whom it is said *he who sees me sees also the Father* (Jn. 14:9)."[28] Hilary's understanding of Christ as the temple, the very place of humanity's contact with God, allows him to read *sancto* in this Psalm verse as the masculine Christ, who is himself the temple. Hilary also inserts two very important words in his explanation of the verse, namely *non aliter* (no other way). Whereas the verse simply says, "I will appear in the Holy place/One," Hilary glosses it as "They will appear in no other way (*non aliter*) than in the Holy One." Hilary inserts *non aliter* to make human presence before the Father exclusively dependent upon existence in the temple of Christ's body. There is "no other way" to come to the Father except in and through Christ. In this passage in the *Tractatus super Psalmos*, Hilary explicitly denies the

26 See, for instance, the example offered by both Fierro and Pelland: namely, *Tr. ps.* 14.5. See also *Tr. ps.* 13.4, 62.3, and 91.9.

27 See, for example, Jerome's *Commentariorum in Hiezechielem* 13.44 (ed. Francisci Glorie, CCL 75 [Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 1964], 651.1336–37) where he explains *sancto* as *templum dei*.

28 *Tr. ps.* 62.4 (CCL 61 207.12–14): Sed *in sancto Dei* non aliter *adparebunt* deo quam secundum illud: *Qui me vidit, vidit et patrem*. . . .

human eschatological existence apart from Christ's body that he implied in *De Trinitate* 9.8

In the *Tractatus super Psalmos*, not only does Hilary explicitly deny the possibility of human eschatological existence apart from the body of Christ as we saw in the quotation above, but his favorite vocabulary for describing human eschatological life depends upon existence in Christ's body. Hilary's favorite way to speak about human eschatological life in the *Tractatus super Psalmos* is to make use of the constellation of terms from Ephesians 3:6: humans are to be coheirs, concorporeal beings, and co-participators with Christ.[29] In his commentary on Psalm 9, Hilary says: "... we are coheirs, concorporeal beings and co-participators of his promise in Christ. Therefore, through the union of flesh, an entrance [to this promise] to all is opened in Christ."[30] Hilary structures this passage to show that human existence as coheirs and co-participators with Christ depends upon the middle term (concorporeal), that is, upon human existence in Christ's body.[31] The second sentence of this quotation parallels and explains the first: the "association of the flesh"—namely, being "concorporeal" with Christ—is "our entrance ... to God's promise in Christ"—namely that humans shall be coheirs and coparticipators with Christ. The gift of eschatological existence and adoptive sonship depends upon the continued presence of humanity in the body of Christ. Hilary then, by the time of the *Tractatus super Psalmos*, views human eschatological life as a life of concorporeality with Christ: it is an eternal existence in Christ's body.

Christ's Inheritance

Christ, as eternal Son of the Father, receives as his inheritance from the Father those who as coheirs and coparticipators are made sons in his body. In the course of the *Tractatus super Psalmos*, Hilary speaks a number of times of Christ's inheritance: "the holy ones, now asleep and awaiting resurrection

29 For example, see *Tr. ps.* 138.30 (CCL 61B 209.5–6): *esse gentes coheredes et concorporales et conparticipes polliciationis eius in Christo*. Hilary uses this constellation of terms from Ephesians 3:6 (or two out of the three together) six times in the *Tractatus super psalmos*. See *Tr. ps.* 60.6, 68.14, 68.24, 91.9, and 138.30 (twice). Becoming coheirs, concorporeal, and coparticipators is the mystery which has not been made known in other generations but has now been made known in Christ (see especially *Tr. ps.* 138.30 and 91.9).

30 *Tr. ps.* 91.9 (CCL 61 329.18–20): ... esse nos coheredes et concorporales et comparticipes pollicitationis eius in Christo. Patet ergo uniuersis per coniunctionem carnis aditus in Christo.

31 See Orazzo, "Ilario de Poitiers e la *universa caro*," 414–415.

are the inheritance of the Lord."[32] Christ's inheritance is his reception of the faithful. Hilary speaks of Christ's inheritance as the reward and the result of the incarnation: "And the *reward* of him who desired to be *fruit of the womb* through his birth from the virgin is that his *inheritance* be the nations whom he has generated into *sons* through faith."[33] This "reward" is the result of the incarnation in that Christ receives as his eternal inheritance the body that he assumed never to put down again. In this body is all of humanity—or, in light of what was said in the previous chapter, all of humanity that has ratified its inclusion in Christ's body through faith and the sacraments—and by being in Christ's body, humanity becomes what Christ is: sons of God. The one who is generated as Son generates as sons those whom he joins to himself in and through his body.

1 Corinthians 15:21–28 as the Scriptural Frame for Hilary's Eschatology

Participation in Christ's body generates humans into sons of God. The incarnation, understood as the assumption of all humanity, provides the means for this necessary participation that Hilary terms Christ's inheritance. Christ's body is the locus for human transformation, both in the case, as we have seen, of Christ's inheritance, and in the case, to which we shall now turn, of Christ's kingdom. As Hilary's christology is framed by Philippians 2, so the eschatology in the *Tractatus super Psalmos* revolves around 1 Corinthians 15:21–28, which serves to provide the outline and the consistent reference point for Hilary's understanding of the end of the dispensation.

> *For since all die in Adam, so also all are vivified in Christ, but each in his order: Christ, the first-fruits, then those who are of Christ, who have believed in his coming. Then will come the end, when he will hand over the kingdom to God the Father after he has destroyed every principality and power. For it*

32 *Tr. ps.* 126.16 (CCL 61B 75.3–4): sancti scilicet dormientes et resurrecturi sedentes hereditas domini est.

33 *Tr. ps.* 126.16 (CCL 61B 76.19–21): Et haec eius *merces* est, qui ex uirgine nascendo *fructum uentris* esse se uoluit, ut ei gentes, quas in *filios* per fidem generaret, *hereditas* sit. See also *Tr. ps*. 67.8 (CCL 61 266.19–20,23–24) where Christ's generation of men into sons of God is portrayed as the movement from the living death of angering God, to life: Sunt enim multi in uiuentibus mortui. . . . Sed hos omnes de *sepulcris* Dominus, qui in filios Dei regenerantur, *eduxit*.

> *is fitting for him to reign until he puts all enemies under his feet, for God has subjected everything under his feet. Death is the last enemy destroyed in him. But when it says that everything has been subjected to him, "everything" does not include him who subjected everything to him. Then he will be subject to him who has subjected all things to him so that God may be all in all.*[34]

The framework of 1 Cor. 15:21–28 proposes two movements: 1) the handing over (*traditio*) of the kingdom from the Son to the Father, and 2) the subjection (*subiectio*) first of all things to the Son, then of all things, including the Son, to the Father.

1 Cor. 15:21–28 is an important scriptural verse in fourth century Trinitarian polemics. Hilary, like all fourth century Nicenes, saw the theology of Marcellus of Ancyra to be the real threat in the time after the council of Nicea.[35] In the monarchianism of Marcellus, both the Son and the Spirit exist as independent entities only for the time of the economy of human salvation. According to Marcellus' theology, at least as understood by his opponents, the reign of the Son would come to an end because the Son himself would come to an end.[36]

---

34 This is the citation of 1 Cor. 15.21–28 found in *Tr. ps.* 9.4 (CCL 61 75.6–16): *Quomodo enim in Adam omnes moriuntur, sic et in Christo omnes uiuificantur, unusquisque autem suo ordine: primitiae Christus, deinde qui sunt Christi, qui in aduentu eius crediderunt; deinde finis, cum tradiderit regnum Deo Patri, cum euacuauerit omnem principatum et potestatem. Oportet enim illum regnare, donec ponat omnes inimicos sub pedibus suis; Deus enim omnia subiecit sub pedibus eius. Nouissima inimica deuicta est in eo mors. Cum uero dixerit: omnia subiecta sunt absque eo qui subiecit illi omnia, tunc ipse subiectus erit illi qui sibi subiecit omnia, ut sit Deus omnia in omnibus*. Hilary does not cite the text of 1 Corinthians in an absolutely consistent manner. Citations and/or references to these verses can be found in *Tr. ps*. 9.4, 52.1, 60.5, 65.13, 118 Lamed 8, and 148.8 and *De Trin*. 11.8.

35 See the excellent article by Michel Barnes, "The Fourth Century as Trinitarian Canon," in *Christian Origins: Theology Rhetoric and Community*, eds. Lewis Ayres and Gareth Jones (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), 47–67.

36 Barnes says of Marcellus' Trinitarian theology that it "begins with a divine Monad and ends with that Monad restored: in the time between the initial and final divine Monad—that time known as the *oeconomia*—is the temporary activity of the divine as Son and Spirit. Marcellus' theology was captioned—at least by his opponents—by the slogan that the reign of the Son would come to an end, just as his separate existence would come to an end. The desire to condemn Marcellus' infamy left its trace in the Creed of 381, where the belief is affirmed (pace Marcellus) that the Son's 'kingdom will have no end'. The unstated corollary is that neither will the Son's separate existence 'have an end' " ("Fourth Century as Trinitarian Canon," 52).

Hilary carefully parses 1 Cor. 15:21–28 to demonstrate that the Son ceases neither his existence nor his reign.[37]

However, Hilary's exegesis of these verses of 1 Corinthians in the *Tractatus super Psalmos* not only accomplishes a Trinitarian polemic, but also outlines a constructive and necessary piece of Hilary's understanding of eschatology as the fulfillment of the dispensation begun in the incarnation. The subjection of Christ and the handing over of his kingdom to the Father are the necessary fulfillments of the process begun in the incarnation of assuming humanity into the divine life. For Hilary, these movements demonstrate not so much a truth about the relationship between the Father and the Son as the purpose and manner of fulfillment of the entire dispensation.[38] They are the means of human glorification and incorporation into the divine majesty: they are not a forced external subjection of the inferior Son to the superior Father. Since the eschatological future of humanity is accomplished entirely in the body of Christ, the Son's subjection will not reduce him to dependence; his handing over the kingdom is not his own ceasing to reign, and neither can the Son simply disappear into the Father at the end.

> *The Lord is close to all who call upon him* (Ps. 144:18). Therefore, this hymn is proper to those *who will approach God*, who, through this blessed reign of the holy Jerusalem, are nearest to the eternal kingdom, who, after the kingdom of our Lord Jesus Christ, will cross over into the kingdom of God the Father where the Lord co-reigns, as the apostle teaches: . . . (1 Cor. 15:24–28). Therefore this is *the people approaching* to the kingdom of God the Father through the kingdom of the Son of God. Thus, the Lord, about to hand the kingdom over to God the Father, reigns, and he is not about to lose the power of reigning, but he is about to hand us, who are his reign, over to God the Father unto a kingdom. The handing over of the kingdom is our advancement, so that we who will be in the kingdom of the Son may also be in the kingdom of the Father, worthy of the kingdom

37 For a study of Hilary's use of 1 Cor. 15:24–28 to refute Marcellan theology, see John McHugh, *Exaltation of Christ in the Arian Controversy* (Shrewsbury: Pontificia Università Gregoriana, 1959), 16–26. See also Giles Pelland's two articles on the subject of Hilary's understanding of the reign or kingdom and the "subjection" of Christ of which these verses of Corinthians speak: Pelland, " 'Subiectio' du Christ;" "Thème biblique du Règne." Pelland emphasizes the polemical nature of Hilary's exegesis of these verses. He says that Hilary is arguing, at the same time, against the opposing positions of Arius and Marcellus of Ancyra (" 'Subiectio' du Christ," 423, no. 1).

38 See also Ladaria's article: " 'Dispensatio' en S. Hilario de Poitiers," *Gregorianum* 66 (1985) 429–455.

> of the Father because we will be worthy also of the kingdom of the Son; when we are in the kingdom of the Son, then we will be nearest to the kingdom of the Father.[39]

When Christ hands over the kingdom, he does not "lose the power of reigning." Rather, since humans are members of the kingdom of Christ by being in Christ's body, when Christ hands the kingdom over to the Father he brings humans into a new relationship with the Father. This new relationship does not change humanity's relationship with Christ, which is based on participation in his body; rather this new relationship with the Father depends upon a continuation of humanity's participation in the Son's body.

Christ reigns in those who participate in his body. Therefore Hilary's argument that Christ does not cease to reign depends upon the continued participation of the saints in Christ's body. As Hilary says above, handing over the reign to the Father does not mean that the Son ceases to reign. Rather, Christ co-reigns with his inheritance, those whom he has made coheirs of the kingdom through their assumption in his incarnation: "But when he hands the kingdom to God the Father, he himself will co-reign in those, who are kings."[40] This co-reign of Christ with the saints is a reign that will never cease: Hilary says that David praises God "on account of the glory of the eternal reign, by which he himself [Christ] will reign with the saints co-reigning."[41] The eternal reign of Christ gives humans their eternal hope; for an eternal reign needs those in whom to reign eternally.[42]

The subjection of Christ is Christ's gift of himself (and of humanity with him) to the Father and into the Father's glory. It is a necessary part of the

---

39 *Tr. ps.* 148.8 (CCL 61B 302.10–15, 21–28): *Prope est Dominus omnibus inuocantibus eum* (Ps. 144.18). Illis ergo proprius hymnus est, qui *Deo propinquabunt*, qui per hoc sanctae Hierusalem regnum beatum aeterno regno proximi post regnum Domini Iesu Christi in regnum Dei Patris Domino conregnante, transibunt, apostolo docente. . . . Hic ergo *populus* est *propinquans* regno Dei Patris per regnum Filii Dei proximus. Regnat itaque Dominus traditurus Deo Patri regnum, non regni potestate cariturus, sed nos, qui regnum eius sumus, Deo Patri traditurus in regnum. Regni traditio nostra prouectio est, ut, qui in regno Filii erimus, in regno quoque simus et Patris, digni per id regno Patris, quia digni regno erimus et Filii, proximi tum Patris regno, cum filii erimus in regno.

40 *Tr. ps.* 60.5 (CCL 61 194.14–15): Sed cum tradiderit regnum Deo Patri, conregnabit is ipsis, qui reges sunt.

41 *Tr. ps.* 144.2 (CCL 61B 269.1–3): . . . hic ob aeterni regni gloriam, qua sanctis conregnantibus ipse regnabit, laus deo prophetae confessione cantetur. . . .

42 See *Tr. ps.* 144.16 (CCL 61B 275.17–19): . . . regni gloria in aeternitate dominatus est, dominatus aeternitas eos necesse est habeat, in quos agatur aeternus.

handing over of the kingdom. Like the *traditio*, the *subiectio* belongs to the dispensation. The subjection of the end is the final movement of Christ's assumption of all humanity begun in his emptying of the incarnation.[43] Hilary says that Christ "who left the heavens when he took up the humility of our infirmity, has returned to the heavens carrying us back with him to offer as a gift to God . . ."[44] Christ's return to heaven and his subjection, like his emptying, is not a change or diminishment in Christ's divine nature, but a change in the *habitus* of his nature.[45] The emptying of Christ is a passage from *forma Dei* to *forma serui* and the final subjection is the reverse movement from *forma serui* to *forma Dei*, in which the corruptibility of the assumed man is made incorruptible. The subjection of Christ fulfills the plan of God's will because it achieves the subjection of all that he is—and all that is within him (namely all humanity), and perhaps more importantly, all of the present conditions of humanity (namely infirmity and death)—to the incorruptibility of God. "God will be all in all when the infirmity of the assumed man is absorbed into the divine nature by the subjection of obedience."[46] The subjection is essentially the assumption of Christ and of all of humanity with him into the glory of God. The two movements of emptying and subjection center upon the body that is assumed. Christ's emptying is a taking on of the corruptible in the form of the assumed body; the subjection is the transformation of this body from corruptible to incorruptible.

There is no other human fulfillment than Jesus Christ himself and participation in his life: this, as we have seen, explains Hilary's favorite three terms for describing humanity's future. Humans will be heirs *with* Christ, sharing a body *with* Christ and participating *with* Christ: each has the Latin prefix *co-*.[47] Christ

---

43 Hilary uses two verbs to speak of Christ's emptying: *exinanio* and *euacuo*. For examples of Hilary's use of *exinanio* see *Tr. ps*. 2.33, 67.6, 67.21, 118.10, 124.3, and 126.17. For *euacuo*, see *Tr. ps*. 142.2 and 143.7. Hilary's use of these words is largely limited to verbal and participial forms: he never uses the noun *exanimatio* and only uses *euacuatio* twice in the course of the *Tractatus super Psalmos.*

44 *Tr. ps*. 58.6 (CCL 61 175.1–3): Hic ergo solus currens direxit, qui, infirmitatis nostrae humilitate suscepta, egressus caelos, regressus ad caelos, qui reuehens nos secum oblaturusque Deo munus . . .

45 Pelland argues that Hilary situates the mystery of both the *euacuatio* and the *subiectio* on the level of the body that Christ assumed. He asserts that Hilary here demonstrates a Stoic model for how the transfiguration of the body happens. A change in the quality of the nature leads to a change in the mode of being without a change in the being itself (" 'Subiectio' du Christ," 425–29).

46 *Tr. ps.* 9.4 (CCL 61 75.24–26): . . . sitque Deus omnia in omnibus, cum subiectione oboedientiae in diuinam naturam humanae adsumptionis absorbeatur infirmitas . . .

47 Eph. 3:6: coheredes, concorporales, conparticipes.

configures humans to himself so as to make them sons of God. Hilary, as we have seen, describes this configuration to Christ as the Son's inheritance: that humans become sons is actually the result of his request and of the desire that motivated his assumption of humanity and his passion. Once humans have been configured to Christ, then the Father can reign in them as he does in Christ. Within the framework of 1 Cor. 15, it is human filiation *in Christ*, who is the kingdom, that allows Christ to give humanity to the Father as the kingdom. Christ handing the kingdom over to the Father is nothing other than the final stage of the assumption of all humanity: he is the kingdom and he assumes all humanity into the kingdom through his body. He hands this kingdom over to the Father just as he hands everything he is to the Father because he has received it from him.

The Eternal Priesthood of Christ

Christ's reign is the exercise of his mediation, that is, his priesthood, between humanity and the Father. Because Christ never relinquishes his humanity, nor ceases to reign, Christ's priesthood is truly eternal. Christ's heavenly priesthood consists of two things: 1) offering the Father his humanity (and in it the whole human race); 2) restoring man to the royalty he lost in the Fall. Christ makes humans into kings with whom he co-reigns in the Father's kingdom.

Jesus Christ is the one person in all of history who is able to fulfill the Law by making the sacrifices it calls for.[48] Only he is entirely free and able to sacrifice his whole self. Hilary says in his commentary on Psalm 53 that the sacrifices of animals were not voluntary, that is, done with a completely free will, because these animals were offered by those who, having violated the Law, were under the sentence of malediction.[49] All humanity was under this sentence of malediction until Jesus became this curse for humanity and nailed it, in himself, to the cross. "*This he did once for all, offering himself as a sacrifice to God* (Heb. 7:27), in order to redeem the entire salvation of humanity by the oblation of this holy and perfect sacrifice."[50] This is the one and only sacrifice that fulfills

48 See the discussion on sacrifice in Hilary's thought in Chapter 4 "Latin Atonement Theory? The Importance of the Suffering and Death of Christ in Hilary's Soteriology."

49 See *Tr. ps*. 53.13 (CCL 61 138.1–4).

50 *Tr. ps.* 53.13 (CCL 61 138.18–20): *Hoc enim fecit semel se ipsum offerens hostiam Deo* (Heb. 7:27), omnem humani generis salutem oblatione sanctae huius et perfectae hostiae redempturus.

the Law, for it is the one free sacrifice.[51] However, the incorporation of all humanity into Christ's body makes humans offerers as well of the one true sacrifice that he offered. Because, in his body, humans have participated in the only acceptable sacrifice of the Law, they are enabled, in a lesser and less perfect way, to offer their own sacrifices.

Only in Christ and as co-reigners with Christ do humans become able to sacrifice truly to God. As reigners over the kingdom, humans possess a certain royalty. They become, in Hilary's words, "kings." This kingship originally allowed Adam to reign over the whole universe, now it helps humans rule over their carnal nature and sin. Reigning with Christ is the power that in this life allows humans to dominate sin; they become "*Kings*, not of peoples, but of *the earth*, that is each one is king over his own body when the reign of sin ceases in him."[52] Furthermore, human reigning has a priestly function because it is offering oneself as a living sacrifice to God and allowing oneself to become his temple. In this way, royalty and priesthood are connected for Christ and for humans. Priestly unction is Christ's communication of this royal divine power to his humanity and, in it, all humanity.[53]

In Christ humans are made eternal kings. Reigning as kings is, in this life, the ability to rule over one's own body and so offer oneself as a sacrifice to God—an offering that is only possible because humans participate, in Christ's body, in his one true sacrifice. Christ's communication of royalty to humanity, however, is mainly an eschatological reality. The resurrection of Christ is the possession, by his humanity, and so by all of humanity, of all the privileges of divinity. Humans become, in Christ, the reign of Christ. Christ's reign has a mediating function, for, as we have seen, his reign is the means through which he brings his inheritance, namely humanity, to the Father and the Father's reign.

The Resurrection of the Body: From Corruption to Incorruption

Hilary envisions the end of the dispensation according to 1 Corinthians 15:28: God will be all in all. Christ's assumption of all humanity in the incarnation is,

---

51 See Orazzo's discussion of the sacrifice of Christ as the one free sacrifice in *Salvezza in Ilario*, 65–68.

52 *Tr. ps.*137.12 (CCL 61B 187.8–9): . . . *reges* non gentium, sed *terrae*, id est sui uniuscuiusque corporis regem desinente a se regno peccati. See also *Tr. ps.* 135.6 (CCL 61B 165.13–15): Reges sunt, in quos non regnat peccatum, qui dominantur corporis sui, quibus est iam huius subditae et subiectae sibi carnis imperium; and *Tr. ps.* 67.30.

53 See Lécuyer, "Sacerdoce royal," 320–321. See *De Trin*. 11.19 and *Tr. ps*. 132.5.

essentially, the incorporation of humanity into his kingdom. This incorporation entails humanity's participation in divine sonship and the participation in the paternal glory that this entails. This incorporation also brings about a transformation of human nature itself. The transformation of human nature is achieved primarily at the moment of resurrection, though its fulfillment is not achieved until the final handing over of the kingdom when God will be all in all.

In his masterful, and now standard study, *Sobre la gloria en San Hilario*, Alfredo Fierro has demonstrated the importance of "glory" as a category for integrating Hilary's thought.[54] Hilary gives a partial definition of glory in D*e Trinitate* 8.12: honor (translating the δόξα of John 17:22) is "the form or the dignity of nature."[55] Fierro explains that Hilary understands glory to have a two-sided meaning: glory is both nature and appearance.[56] Glory is a particular attribute of the divine that connotes light and splendor, but it also signifies the sum of all the divine perfections in that it is identified with the nature of God. When man is glorified, he receives divine splendor and all the other realities with which it is tied, most notably life and spirit.[57] Glory, because it is a divine reality is, for humans, a purely eschatological reality: therefore the earthly man is inglorious.[58]

The defining characteristics of this life, and principally of this body, are to be done away with "then, when the infirmity of bodies, that is, their fall and tears, is taken away; then, when incorruption will devour corruption; then,

54 Fierro argues that Hilary's teaching concerning glory is a systematic argument with four main points: 1) Glory constitutes a reality of the divine order that corresponds to the Father and is communicated to the Son in its plentitude. 2) When the Son is made man, his human flesh is able to participate in this divine reality at the moment of Christ's glorification. 3) Christ will make humans participators in his glory by configuring individual bodies to his glorious body. 4) Then humans will be able to see God face to face and contemplate the glory of God. See Fierro, *Sobre la gloria*, 85.

55 *De Trin.* 9.12 (CCL 62 324.15): honor naturae species aut dignitas.

56 Fierro says that there is a two-fold notion of glory in the Bible. The first is glory as the incorruptible light that humans hope to contemplate (both in this life and the next). The second is glory as incorruption that is communicated through Christ to men in order to renovate them into glorious ones themselves. Fierro says that Origen has both these aspects in his theology but Ambrose focuses exclusively on the first and Hilary focuses heavily, though not entirely, on the second (Fierro, *Sobre la gloria*, 182–183).

57 See Fierro, *Sobre la gloria*, 260.

58 See Fierro, *Sobre la gloria*, 68–69. Fierro says: "La ausencia de gloria alcanza proporciones de un abismo de tragedia" (69).

when immortal power will absorb death; then when God will be all in all."[59] The earthly form has the main attributes of *humilitas, infirmitas, corruptio*, and *mors*.[60] These are the particular attributes of the body in this life. However, the soul, though itself of a heavenly nature, is marked by the body in which it dwells so that it too partakes of these attributes. The entire human person, therefore, needs to be transformed.

Since the moment of transformation is the resurrection, and the qualities of corruption and death pertain properly to the body, Hilary often speaks of the transformation of human nature principally in terms of the transformation of the body that now is corruptible, humble, and infirm, but shall be changed into the glory of incorruptibility.

> The resurrection of corruptible bodies into the glory of incorruption does not destroy the nature through annihilation, rather it changes the nature with respect to the condition of its state. . . . Therefore, a change happens, but it does not bring about a destruction. And when that which it was rises into that which it was not, it has not lost its origin, but it has progressed towards honor.[61]

Hilary is adamant that this transformation does not entail the destruction of human nature.

In order to understand how Hilary envisions this non-destructive transformation of human nature, we should recall Hilary's conception of the incarnation and exaltation of the Son of God. *Forma* provides the category for

---

59 *Tr. ps.* 55.12 (CCL 61 159.15–18): . . . tum, cum infirmitas corporum detrahetur, id est lapsus et lacrimae, tum, cum corruptionem incorruptio deuorabit, tum cum mortem potestas immortalis absorbet, tum cum sit Deus omnia in omnibus.

60 Fierro lists these attributes and shows that these are the reverse of glory and eternal life. Fierro also argues that unlike most of the Fathers who cite 1 Cor 15:42–44,53 for these attributes, Hilary uses Phil. 3:21. See Fierro, *Sobre la gloria*, 55. See also Iacoangeli's listing of these four attributes and his description of Hilary's use of *humilitas* and *infirmitas* in "Linguaggio soteriologico," 126–132. For Hilary, *humilitas* is directly tied to humanity's origin from earth (*humus*), and so *humilitas* is humanity's essentially earthly condition. Whereas *humilitas* is a relatively neutral term, *infirmitas* has much more negative weight. *Infirmitas* points both to human creation from earth and the fallen condition: human infimity is signaled, for example, in the *fragilitas* of the will and the *corruptio* and *mors* of the body.

61 *Tr. ps.* 2.41 (CCL 61 66.15–17,21–23): Ut corruptibilium corporum in incorruptionis gloriam resurrectio non interitu naturam perimat, sed qualitatis condicione demutet. . . . Fit ergo demutatio, sed non adfertur abolitio. Et cum id quod fuit in id quod non fuit surgit, non amisit originem, sed profecit ad honorem.

understanding Christ's incarnation and resurrection: the Son is able to move from *forma dei* to *forma serui* while retaining his divine nature and power because Hilary is using *forma* to refer not to nature but to the fundamental condition of the respective natures. Likewise, the movement from *forma serui* to *forma dei* for both Christ and all humanity in his body is again not a change from human to divine nature but a change in the *habitus*, the condition, of the existence of this nature; it is a change in what the nature *has*, not in what it *is*. Man remains man but ceases to be characterized by humility and infirmity and instead is a participant in the glory and majesty of the *forma dei*. In the quotation above, Hilary does not use the term *forma*; however, he seeks to convey the same meaning when he speaks about the change affecting not the nature itself but the "condition of its state" (*qualitatis condicio*). The change affects human nature not by changing it into a different nature but by altering its mode of existence: humanity moves from corruption to incorruption, glory, and honor.[62]

Salvation is of Both Body and Soul

Hilary speaks of the transformation of human nature in bodily terms not only because this transformation is tied to the resurrection but also because this transformation is the human entrance into the glory of the divine *habitus*, an entrance that is obtained only in and through the body of Christ. Christ conforms humanity to himself, making humans coheirs of the kingdom and offering divine filiation. This conformation occurs in the place of humanity's meeting with the Son of God, that is, in his body.

> This is the entire praise that is in his saints: that he drove off the corruption of flesh and blood from them, that they have been reformed according to the image of their creator, that they have begun already to be conformed to the glory of the body of God, that they are filled unto the whole fullness of God. . . .[63]

---

62 This movement from corruption to glory is the purpose of the incarnation and is rendered by Hilary, as we see in the above quotation, with the word "*profectus*" or "*proficio.*" Fierro says that in Hilary *profectus* means the benefit and progress that glory effects on the flesh and that is signified by salvation. This is a favorite term of Hilary but is common among other Latin theologians to express what is in Greek προκοπή: the progress toward divine perfection (*Sobre la gloria*, 205).

63 *Tr. ps.* 150.2 (CCL 61B 309.23–27): Quae laus omnis in sanctis e[st, quod ab h]is corruptionem carnis sanguinisque depelleret, quod ad imaginem creatoris [sui sint re]formati,

Hilary speaks of reformation into God's image and conformation to Christ, with all that such a conformation entails for the whole human person, in terms of conformation to his body. Nevertheless, Hilary occasionally clarifies explicitly that salvation is of both body and soul: "But we who have been instructed in spiritual teachings know that the salvation of both soul and body is given by God . . ."[64]

Salvation is of both body and soul, but Hilary feels a special need to argue for the salvation of the body to counter those who disparage the body and envision salvation for the soul alone.[65] In his commentary on Psalm 62, Hilary explains the verse—*my soul has thirsted for you, as simply as does my flesh*[66]—by showing that soul and body alike need salvation and alike are able to receive salvation. It can seem, he says, that whereas the soul, always reaching upwards to its divine origin, can be saved, the body, dragging downwards to its origin in earthliness and vice, cannot be saved.

> And indeed the mind of each one is directed to the knowledge and hope of eternity by a sort of natural instinct, because to judge that our souls have a divine origin is, as it were, innate and impressed on all. For the mind recognizes in itself no small kinship with heavenly things. However, on the other hand, these earthly bodies, which are hardened with a disposition toward vices, while they are infected by those vices by which they are as it naturally delighted, have no hope of being able to attain the heavenly consortium and gift. It is as if the vices of the body, to which it is attracted, do not infect the nature of the soul, or as if although the delight of the body flows into the mind, the body does not pull the mind down with it to the affect of the mind. But the condemnation of pleasure must fall upon both because the pleasure is in both. But we who have been instructed in spiritual teachings know that the salvation of both

---

quod conformes iam esse gloriae corporis Dei coeperint, quod in om[nem dei ple]nitudinem inpleantur. . . .

64 *Tr. ps.* 62.3 (CCL 61 206.17–18): Sed nos spiritalibus doctrinis eruditi scimus et animae et corporis salutem a Deo esse donatam. . . . See also *Tr. ps.* 61.2 (CCL 61 199.43–45), where Hilary asserts that eternity is predicated of both body and soul: Quid enim ultra ignorantioni anxietatique hominum est relictum, cum aeternitas animae et corporis, id est totius hominis praedicetur . . .?

65 The compatability and complementarity of body and soul is a Stoic theme that contrasts with the dichotomy between the two found more often in the Platonic tradition. See Chapter 3 "The Complementarity of Body and Soul" for greater detail on Hilary's appropriation of this aspect of Stoic anthropology.

66 *Tr. ps.* 62.3 (CCL 61 206.24–25): *Sitiuit tibi anima mea, quam simpliciter et caro mea . . .*

> soul and body is given from God, if, after the grace of the regeneration, the sense of the body is imbued with the joy of the mind, that is, if we will have conquered not according to the flesh, but according to the spirit. For the works of the spirit and the flesh, according to the apostle, are distinguished by the zeal either for vices or continence. Therefore it is difficult, though entirely right, to hope for the eternity of the body just as the eternity of the soul.[67]

Hilary argues that Christian teaching shows that there is no such thing as a pure soul imprisoned in a vice-ridden body. The unity of the human person does not allow such a division, nor does the nature of salvation. Hilary shows the temptation to believe that the soul is not "pulled down" by the body from its "divine origin." This soul, untouched by the sins of the body, should then, by right, return to its origin. In other words, Hilary suggests that while people never doubt the salvation of the soul, they do doubt that of the body. But Hilary says that as Christians we know that salvation is given as a gift from God. The notion that the soul is naturally divine and will return to its origin renders void the dispensation; so too does the notion that the body is naturally degraded and incapable of salvation. In such a picture, the incarnation has nothing to do with the salvation of either soul or body because the soul needs no saving and the body can never be saved. To believe and to teach that the body can be made eternal is something that Hilary perceives as particularly difficult because of the human desire to place the blame for all sins on the body. This difficulty is all the more reason, in Hilary's mind, to insist upon the salvation and the glorification of the body.[68]

---

67 *Tr. ps.* 62.3 (CCL 61 206.9–23): Et quidem uniuscuiusque mens ad cognitionem spem que aeternitatis naturali quodam fertur instinctu ueluti insitum impressumque omnibus sit diuinam inesse nobis animarum originem opinari, cum non exiguam caelestis in se generis cognationem mens ipsa cognoscat. Porro autem terrena haec corpora, quae ad uitiorum concreta materiam sint, dum his quibus quasi naturaliter delectantur infecta sunt, desperant sibi consortium munusque caeleste, quasi non et animae naturam uitia corporis, quibus oblectatur, inficiant aut, cum delectatio corporis redundet ad mentem, non et mentem se cum corpus retrahat ad oblectationis adfectum. Necesse est autem ut in eadem condemnatione sit uoluptatis, quod in eadem est uoluptate. Sed nos spiritalibus doctrinis eruditi scimus et animae et corporis salutem a Deo esse donatam, si modo post regenerationis gratiam mentis gaudiis sensus corporis imbuatur, id est si non secundum carnem, sed secundum spiritum uixerimus, quia spiritus carnis que opera secundum apostolum uitiorum et continentiae studiis distinguitur. Arduum autem, sed maxime uerum est aeternitatem ita corporis ut animae sperare.

68 Nevertheless, some scholars are troubled by what seems an imbalance in Hilary's theological system. See, for example, Fierro who recognizes that for Hilary, unlike for Origen

In eternal life the body will not be destroyed, rather it will cease from its earthly condition and become spiritual: the saints will see "the flesh of their nature transformed into the substance of eternal salvation."[69] As we noted in the previous chapter, Hilary's double creation narrative leads him to see the creation of the human being as a harmonious joining of complements. This harmony was upset with the introduction of sin, but is renewed and surpassed in the resurrection. There will still be both body and soul, and thus a certain duality, but Hilary highlights the unity that will exist between the body and soul because they will have a communion of nature: spiritual nature.[70] Christ's joining of the heavenly and the earthly in his sinless body, is, because of humanity's presence in his body, a joining also of the heavenly and the earthly in each individual. The transformation of human nature in the resurrection allows it to partake (in a modified fashion) in the simplicity of the divine nature.

The Heavenly City of Jerusalem; The Celestial Zion

Hilary's development of the Stoic theme of the universal city, discussed in Chapter 3, influences his use of the biblical figure of the city of Jerusalem. In the *Tractatus super Psalmos*, Jerusalem often serves as the scriptural prompt that leads Hilary to speak about heaven and eschatological life. Hilary's exegesis of the Psalms relies on his belief that "the Psalms do not speak about things of their time alone nor are they fitting only to the ages in which they were written, rather the word of God, which is itself most useful for the progress of

---

or Eusebius of Caesarea, human conformity to Christ centers in the corporeal. This centrality, Fierro says, gives Hilary some strengths: most notably that the resurrection of the body is always a central part in Hilary's theology. But on the other hand, according to Fierro, this centrality gives Hilary some weaknesses, the greatest of which is that the preeminence of the soul in the makeup of the individual is not reflected in Hilary's presentation of the individual's eschatological fulfillment in which the glorious transformation applies largely to the body with little talk about the soul (*Sobre la gloria*, 253–254). Critiques of Hilary's strangely exclusive treatment of the resurrection of the body are ironic in light of the accusations of docetism that we saw in "Pain vs. Suffering" in Chapter 3 and "Latin Atonement Theory? The Importance of the Suffering and Death of Christ in Hilary's Soteriology" in Chapter 4.

69 *Tr. ps.* 143.18 (CCL 61B 264.21–22): naturae suae carnem in aeternae salutis substantiam transformatam esse.

70 See Fierro, *Sobre la gloria*, 275–276.

each age, advises all who come into life."[71] Jerusalem, the source and center of Israel's devotion and hope, is then for Hilary the center of Christian hope as well. Hilary says that in the Psalms, "The prophet *puts forth Jerusalem as the beginning of his joy* . . . because having been received in Jerusalem he will be immortal after having been mortal; he will be mixed in with the gathering of the companies of the angels, he will be received into the reign of the Lord to whose glory he will be conformed."[72] Since Hilary also says that "the entire hope of our rest is in the body of Christ," human entrance to the heavenly Jerusalem depends not only on conformation to the body of Christ but existence *in* the body of Christ.[73] Because of its association with the body of Christ, Jerusalem is both the earthly Church (which we will discuss at greater length in the next chapter) and the eschatological goal of humanity.

Though Hilary most often refers to Zion and Jerusalem together as the heavenly destiny of humanity, at times he distinguishes between the two to show that human nature has a special place in the heavenly Jerusalem.[74] Humans have the honor, not available to the angels, of living not only in the heavenly Jerusalem but on Mt. Zion, the place of the temple of that city.

When Hilary explicitly distinguishes between Jerusalem and Mt. Zion, he does so in a consistent fashion based on the geography of the physical city of Jerusalem. Mt. Zion is, geographically, the temple hill. Hilary associates the temple with the Church, which is, according to St. Paul, the body of Christ. In his commentary on Psalm 64, Hilary says: "Mt. Zion indeed is near Jerusalem;

---

71 *Tr. ps*. 119.4 (CCL 61B 5.11–15): Psalmi enim non sui tantum temporis res enuntiant neque in eas solum aetates conueniunt, quibus scripti sunt, sed uniuersis, qui in uitam uenirent, Dei sermo consuluit, uniuersae aetati ipse aptissimus ad profectum.

72 *Tr. ps*. 136.11 (CCL 61B 178.17–179.22): Sed propheta *Hierusalem sibi initium laetitiae praeponit* . . . quod in Hierusalem receptus immortalis ex mortali erit, quod angelorum frequentium coetu admiscebitur, quod in regno domini recipietur, quod conformis gloriae ipsius fiet.

73 *Tr. ps.* 14.5 (CCL 61 84.25–26): ergo requiei nostrae spes omnis in Christi est corpore. Chromatius also connects Jerusalem with the body of Christ, though, unlike Hilary, he explicitly understands the relationship of Jerusalem to the body of Christ as typological. See, for example, Chromatius, *Tractatus in Matthaeum* 24.3 (CCL 9A 312.99–102): *Neque*, inquit, *per Hierosolymam, quia ciuitas est magni Regis*, id est typus corporis Christi, quod est spiritalis illa et caelestis ecclesia. However, Chromatius does say that the Church is properly called the city of Christ: . . . ecclesiam suam, quae proprie Christi ciuitas nuncupatur (*Tractatus in Matthaeum* 43.7 [CCL 9A 409.131]).

74 For a more detailed delineation of the distinctions between Jerusalem and Mt. Zion in Hilary's eschatological thought, see Ellen Scully, "Jerusalem: Image of Hilary's Christocentric Eschatology in the *Tractatus super Psalmos*," *Vigiliae Christianae* 66 (2012): 269–282.

but we have always accepted that this mountain and its name mean this city's Church, which is Christ's body. . . ."[75] Hilary associates Mt. Zion with Christ and, specifically, his body.[76] Mt. Zion is the body of Christ, the holy temple or Church of the heavenly Jerusalem.[77]

In addition, Hilary uses the etymology of the name Zion to explain that Zion is the body of Christ in which humans exist. Zion is *speculatio*, that is, "a lookout." Humanity looks at (*speculare*) its eschatological future in Mt. Zion, the body of Christ. Hilary says:

> For although Zion is the little hill associated with the temple that was in Jerusalem, nevertheless it is called "lookout" according to the translation of the word from Hebrew into Latin and Greek. Therefore, we look at our hope and our life in this body of the Lord, in which he was resurrected from the dead, in which he sits at the right hand of power, and in which he is in the glory of God the Father.[78]

When Hilary uses the word "look" in this passage he is playing on the etymology of Zion. Zion, the temple mount, as Hilary says, is the place in which humans *look at* their hope and their life, and this life, according to Hilary, is in the body of Christ. This body is the hope of humanity because it is by Christ's assumption and redemption of a human body that humanity is saved. Humans, then, are to dwell in Mt. Zion, the body of Christ, the temple of the heavenly Jerusalem.

Heavenly Jerusalem and Mt. Zion are Hilary's figurative and scriptural manner of speaking about the eschatological future of humanity that takes place in the body of Christ.[79]

---

75 *Tr. ps.* 64.2 (CCL 61 221.12–14): Sion mons quidem Hierusalem adiacens est; sed montem hunc eius que nomen atque etiam urbis ipsius ecclesiam, quae corpus est Christi, nuncupatam semper accepimus. . . .

76 For Mt. Zion as the body of Christ in which humans dwell, see *Tr. ps.* 124.3.

77 The Jerusalem that is associated with Christ, and therefore God's continual presence, is, as Hilary says in *Tr. ps.* 121.2 "certainly not that earthly and fallen Jerusalem, mourning on account of the penalty of its impiety, but that free and heavenly Jerusalem . . ." ([(CCL 61B 27.7–]: . . . non utique, ut diximus, hanc terrenam et caducam et poenas impietatem suae luentem, sed illam liberam et caelestem Hierusalem . . .).

78 *Tr. ps.* 68.31 (CCL 61 316.7–12): Sion enim, licet colliculus templo, quod in Hierusalem fuit, iunctus sit, tamen secundum interpretationem ex hebraeo in latinum graecumque sermonem speculatio dicitur. In hoc ergo corpore Domini, quo resurrexit ex mortuis, quo a dextris uirtutis consedit, quo in gloria Dei patris est, spem nostram uitamque speculamur.

79 See also *Tr. ps.* 13.4 and 118 Koph 12.

> It is fitting that we remember the apostolic words that we who believe in our Lord Jesus Christ have come to Mt. Zion and the heavenly Jerusalem (Heb. 12:22). In his glorious body, which has been transformed into heavenly glory, we look upon the honor of our hope since our body should be conformed into the glory of his body.[80]

In expanding the meaning of Jerusalem to include Jerusalem as the heavenly city of human hope, and Mt. Zion to signify the temple of the Lord's body, Hilary is not simply "spiritualizing" these realities. Hilary never forgets that the words of Scripture speak of Jerusalem and Mt. Zion as physical realities.[81] Jerusalem, as the city of the temple, was the place to which the Jews would go up to meet God, for the temple was the place of mediation. The temple (and its location on Mt. Zion) remains the place of mediation that it always was and, for Hilary, the one true and eternal place of mediation is the body of Christ.

Heaven and the Divine Indwelling

Jerusalem is the heavenly home of humanity, and Mt. Zion is the place of Christ's eternal mediation. Mt. Zion is Christ's glorified body in which humans are to dwell forever. However, humanity is already dwelling in the city of Christ's body as a result of his assumption of all humanity. As Hilary said in the *In Matthaeum*,

> He calls the flesh that he had assumed a city because, as a city consists of a variety and multitude of inhabitants, so there is contained in him, through the nature of the assumed body, a certain assembly of the whole human race. And thus he becomes a city from our assembly in him and we become the dwelling of this city through consort with his flesh.[82]

---

80 *Tr. ps.* 128.9 (CCL 61B 94.7–13): . . . dicti apostolici meminisse nos conuenit, ad montem Sion et Hierusalem caelestem accessisse nos in Dominum nostrum Iesum Christum credentes (Heb. 12:22): in cuius glorifico corpore, quod in caelestem gloriam transformatum est, spei nostrae honorem speculamur, humilitatis nostrae corpore in gloriam corporis sui conformando (Phil. 3:21).

81 Hilary's association of Mt. Zion and Jerusalem, for example, depends upon their physical proximity.

82 *In Matt.* 4.12 (SC 254 130.3–9): Ciuitatem carnem quam adsumpserat nuncupat, quia, ut ciuitas ex uarietate ac multitudine consistit habitantium, ita in eo per naturam suscepti corporis quaedam uniuersi generis humani congregatio continetur. Atque ita et ille ex

Christ's body is the city of all humanity. Hilary often speaks of the reverse side of this relationship: not only do humans dwell in Christ, but Christ and, through Christ, the Father, dwell in humans.[83] For example, Hilary says that the Son of God is the heaven in which the Father dwells.

> Therefore, let us seek what the dwelling place of the Lord is. Surely it is that of him, who said: *For the Father is in me, and I am in the Father* (Jn. 10:38); and again: *I and the Father are one* (Jn. 10:30); and about whom it was said: *God was in Christ, reconciling the world to himself* (1 Cor. 5:19): the Son in whom the Father lives through the same power of nature being worthy and sufficient . . . Therefore, God *lives in this heaven*, a worthy dwelling place of his majesty and divinity.[84]

The Son is eternally the dwelling place of the Father for the nature of the Son's generation is such that "the unbegotten God, begetting the only-begotten God, remains, by the very property of generation, in him whom he begot."[85]

In the incarnation, not only does the Son take all humanity into himself, but he also dwells in humans.[86] The proper dwelling place of God is in heaven. Christ, in making humans heavenly in his body, transforms them into worthy dwelling places for himself and the Father.

---

nostra in se congregatione fit ciuitas et nos per consortium carnis suae sumus ciuitatis habitatio.

83 See also *Tr. ps*. 67.17, in which Hilary uses the image of Christ as Mt. Zion to speak of the Son as God's chosen dwelling place.

84 *Tr. ps*. 122.2 (CCL 61B 35.6–36.11, 18–20): Quaeramus ergo, quae habitatio Dei sit, nempe eius qui dixit: *Pater enim in me, et ego in Patre* (Jn. 10.38); et rursum: *Ego et Pater unum sumus* (Jn. 10.30), et de quo dictum est: *Deus in Christo erat mundum reconcilians sibi* (2 Cor. 5.19), digno et sufficiente Filio, in quo Pater per eamdem naturae habitet uirtutem . . . *In* hoc ergo *caelo* Deus *inhabitat*, digno maiestatis suae et diuinitatis habitaculo.

85 *Tr. ps*. 122.2 (CCL 61B 36.14–16): . . . Et Deus innascibilis, unigenitum Deum gignens manet in illo, quem genuit proprietate generandi.

86 In *De Trin.* 8.13–17, Hilary emphasizes the Eucharist as the privileged means of Christ's indwelling in believers by distinguishing between humans dwelling in Christ, which is the result of the incarnation, and Christ dwelling in humans, which is the result of reception of the Eucharist. However, in the *Tractatus super Psalmos* what little Hilary says about the Eucharist is related to the theme of the Eucharist as an eschatological preparation: he does not return to the idea of Christ's indwelling through the Eucharist. See Wild, *The Divinization of Man*,111–13, and *Tr. ps*. 64.14 and 135.15.

> Therefore, if we who have been mud in Adam are now heavenly in Christ and Christ dwells in us, then through Christ's dwelling in us, that one [the Father] also dwells in us, for his dwelling place is Christ *dwelling* in us.[87]

The Son makes humans heavenly and incorruptible so that they are worthy dwelling places for God. Yet the Son is the eternal mediator: Christ serves as the mediator through whom or in whom the Father dwells in humanity. The Father dwells only in the heaven that is his Son begotten with the same power of nature. Apart from Christ, humans cannot be dwelling places of the divine. The Son, in conforming humanity to himself, allows humans also to become heavens in which the Father, in him, can dwell.[88]

Conclusion

The details of Hilary's eschatology depend heavily upon his understanding of the incarnation as Christ's assumption of all humanity. The end of the dispensation, Christ's subjection and handing over of the kingdom, are understood by Hilary as the fulfillment of the process of assuming humanity into the divine life that was begun in the incarnation. Hilary's eschatology, shaped by 1 Corinthians 15:21–28, envisions humanity itself as the kingdom of God, a kingdom whose place, literally, is in the body of Christ. For this reason, human hope is entirely centered in this body. Christ is the longed-for Jerusalem: he is heaven itself, and as he also conforms humans to what he is, they too become heavens. The hope and peace of humanity remain always in the body of Christ; there is no time when humanity is finally able to bypass the Son and participate in the Father directly. Humans become the Father's kingdom because the Son subjects himself to the Father and they are in the Son. Humans are transformed into worthy dwelling places of God, but still the Father dwells in them only through the Son. Christ enables humanity to become what he is, but this is a transformation that depends upon contact with Christ. Eternal transformation is secured through eternal participation in Christ's glorious body.

---

87 *Tr. ps.* 122.3 (CCL 61B 36.13–17): Ergo si, qui in Adam limus fuimus, nunc caelestes sumus in Christo et Christus habitator est nostri, per habitantem Christum in nobis etiam ille quoque habitator est nostri, cui est *habitans* in nobis Christus habitatio.

88 See also *Tr. ps.* 118 Lamed 4 (CCL 61A 110.15–16): In his enim tamquam in caelo uerbum Dei permanent.

Typically, the moment of primary relevance in the physicalist model of redemption is understood as the incarnation.[89] Hilary's eschatology depends upon this redemption model that teaches Christ's physical assumption of all humanity. Yet while it is not incorrect to say that the moment of primary relevance in Hilary's model of redemption is the incarnation, it is even more accurate to say that the moment of primary relevance for Hilary is Christ's glorification. In Christ's glorification, humans are glorified and raised to be sons of God. Perfect fulfillment still awaits the end and Christ's subjection and handing over of the kingdom, but in Christ's glorification the incarnation bears its intended fruit.

89 See Wild, *Divinization of Man*, 57–65; McMahon, *De Christo Mediatore*, 63–64; and Jossua, *Salut: Incarnation ou mystère pascal*, 22–23.

CHAPTER 8

Ecclesiological Ramifications: The Church is the Body of Christ

The eschatological fulfillment of humanity takes place in the body of Christ. It is begun in Christ's assumption of all humanity in the incarnation and accomplished in the eternal dwelling of humanity in the temple of Christ's glorified body. Between the beginning and the end stands the Church that, as the body of Christ, is the temporal extension of the incarnation and the preparation for the final glorification. One of the main points of this chapter will be to show that when Hilary speaks of the Church as the body of Christ, this connection is not purely spiritual or metaphorical as it is for many patristic authors. Rather, Hilary teaches that the Church can literally be the body of Christ because all believers are present physically in Christ's incarnate body.

I noted in the previous chapter that in the *Tractatus super Psalmos*, there is an increased attention to both eschatology and Christ's assumption of all humanity. In Hilary's theology these are twin themes because eschatology is the supratemporal extension of Christ's assumption of all humanity. Ecclesiology too has much greater prominence in the *Tractatus super Psalmos* than in Hilary's earlier works for a similar reason: the Church, as body of Christ, is the temporal extension of the assumption of all humanity. Hilary includes the Holy Spirit within this temporal process of human sanctification. As Hilary expands his understanding of salvation to include growth in the Church, he also allows room for the working of the Holy Spirit unto this end. With the unity of these three themes in the *Tractatus super Psalmos*—incarnational theology (in the manner of Christ's assumption of all humanity), ecclesiology, and eschatology—Hilary demonstrates a remarkably coherent physicalist doctrine of redemption.

The Development of Hilary's Ecclesiology and Its Dependence on the Assumption of All Humanity

The development of Hilary's ecclesiology from the *In Matthaeum* to the *Tractatus super Psalmos* is described by Albert Charlier.[1] Charlier advances the

1 Charlier, "L'Église corps du Christ."

© KONINKLIJKE BRILL NV, LEIDEN, 2015 | DOI 10.1163/9789004290815_010

argument that Hilary's ecclesiology evolves throughout his career towards a realization that human unity with Christ, founded in Christ's assumption of all humanity in the incarnation, is a progressive unity that depends upon participation in the faith and sacramental life of the Church.[2] For our purposes, Charlier's study is especially interesting in its method. Although his explicit purpose is a study of Hilary's ecclesiology, Charlier begins with the study of a different theme: the union of humanity with Christ.[3] According to Charlier, Hilary develops this theme of humanity's union with Christ apart from ecclesiological considerations until his final works, the *Tractatus mysteriorum* and the *Tractatus super Psalmos*. Charlier highlights the changing nature of Hilary's ecclesiology: Hilary does not theologically tie the body of Christ, which he recognizes as the place of God's union with humanity as early as the *In Matthaeum*, to the Church until his later writings.

The importance of the Church in the *Tractatus super Psalmos* must be seen in light of Hilary's understanding of the manner of salvation. In the *Tractatus super Psalmos*, Hilary's emphasis on the assumption of all humanity in the incarnation leads to a soteriology that is far more christocentric than that found in the *In Matthaeum*.[4] As Hilary's soteriology becomes more christocentric

2 Charlier, "L'Église corps du Christ," 475–477.

3 In the *In Mattheum*, according to Charlier (See "L'Église corps du Christ," 475–477), the union of men with Christ is envisaged essentially on the level of the incarnation. There are two aspects to this: 1) Christ assumed all of humanity; 2) he accomplishes in his body all the mysteries of human salvation (baptism, death, resurrection, etc.). In the *De Trinitate* human incorporation is founded on the incarnation but is achieved through faith, baptism and the Eucharist. Union with Christ is explicitly extended vertically to the Father and horizontally to other men. Charlier says that already by the first three books of *De Trinitate*, Hilary has all these themes in place: 1) Christ is unified to all humanity in the incarnation, 2) the union of God and man takes place in the body of Christ, 3) the effects of this incorporation are human sanctification, divinization and adoption as sons of God. What Hilary does not yet have is a treatment of the role of the Church in human union with the body of Christ and in divinization. In the *Tractatus super Psalmos* and the *Tractatus mysteriorum*, Hilary explicitly talks about the role of the Church in this union. Charlier says that Hilary began with the intuition that humans are all incorporated into Christ (immediately) on account of the incarnation. Little by little, Hilary becomes conscious of the progressive nature of this union: 1) Christ's redemptive actions (and not simply the fact of the incarnation) have something to do with it; 2) It can be refused through disbelief; 3) It is ratified through faith, baptism and Eucharist; 4) It is only fully realized in human glorification; 5) The Church has a role in this incorporation into Christ.

4 However, even where Hilary's soteriology in the *In Matthaeum* is a development of the incarnational principle of Christ's assumption of all humanity, there is the surprising lack of an extension of this principle into ecclesiology. Burns asserts that the extension of the

over his writing career, so too does his ecclesiology. In other words, since the role of the Church is to help believers attain salvation, when salvation is centered in Christ, so is the Church.

The Relationship of Soteriology and Ecclesiology in the *In Matthaeum*

The soteriology of Hilary's *In Matthaeum* has met with scholarly criticism that judges it to be inconsistent and not sufficiently christological. Fierro has asserted that in the *In Matthaeum*, Hilary's soteriology models human glorification not on Christ but on the angels and is not, therefore, sufficiently christocentric.[5] Burns, though he argues for a christocentric reading of Hilary's soteriology, acknowledges that this christocentrism is not fully or consistently accomplished in the *In Matthaeum*.[6] Alongside of, or perhaps instead of, a christocentric soteriology, Burns, like Fierro, demonstrates that Hilary employs an angelomorphic soteriology.[7] According to both Fierro and Burns, Hilary rectifies this weakness in his later writings by incorporating his soteriology more consistently into a christological context.[8]

The inconsistent christological emphasis of the soteriology of the *In Matthaeum* is, I suggest, the result of the limited presence of a teaching on Christ's assumption of all humanity. In Chapter 4 I argued that Hilary already teaches Christ's assumption of all humanity in the *In Matthaeum*. However, in the *In Matthaeum* the presence of this teaching is occasional, and its role limited, as opposed to his consistent use of Christ's assumption of all humanity

---

incarnation to all men is never directly associated with ecclesiology in the *In Matthaeum* (*Christology in Hilary*, 113).

5 Fierro, *Sobre la gloria*, 281. See also Burns' response to this critique (*Christology in Hilary*, 128–129). Orazzo (*Salvezza in Ilario*, 184) has a slightly modified version of Fierro's critique: he believes that Hilary has the same principle of salvation in both the *In Matthaeum* and *Tractatus super Psalmos*—namely the unification of soul and body—but he changes the end goal. In the *In Matthaeum* the body will be transformed according to the spiritual nature of the soul. In the *Tractatus super Psalmos*, the body will be transformed, but now according to the glory of Christ's body. According to Orazzo, this shift in the *Tractatus super Psalmos* unifies, for the first time, christology and anthropology.

6 Burns highlights *In Matt*. 18.6 as the key passage in which Hilary links the three elements of man, angels and Christ (*Christology in Hilary*, 130).

7 Burns, *Christology in Hilary*, 127–131.

8 This incorporation, according to both scholars is tied to Hilary's use of Philippians 3:21 in his later works. See Fierro, *Sobre la gloria*, 281; and Burns, *Christology in Hilary*, 135.

as a predominant theme that we find in the *Tractatus super Psalmos*. Hilary does not demonstrate a firm, consistent, incarnational theology in the *In Matthaeum*, and as a result he uses different, sometimes poorly integrated, soteriological models.

Later in life, as Hilary becomes more insistent on Christ's assumption of all humanity bodily in the incarnation, his soteriology becomes increasingly coherent and christocentric in its emphasis on the body of Christ. The angelomorphic soteriology present in the *In Matthaeum* is absent from the *Tractatus super Psalmos*. The model of eschatological transformation shifts from the angels to Christ, offering a more christocentric vision of human salvation. In the *Tractaus super Psalmos* Hilary insists that humans will never be fully like the angels because the angels cannot share in Christ's human body.[9] In this soteriological vision, the human body is given pride of place in the eschaton: Christ's body is not something *through* which humans are saved, but the very thing *in* which they are saved.

Ecclesial Images in the *In Matthaeum*

There are two major changes between the *In Matthaeum* and the *Tractatus super Psalmos* that affect Hilary's ecclesiology. The first is that as Hilary teaches Christ's assumption of all humanity more consistently in his later works, the centrality of the body of Christ serves to organize and unify his thought. Soteriology becomes christocentric because human salvation happens, from beginning to end, in the body of Christ. The role of the Church in Hilary's thought expands, for Hilary understands the Pauline teaching about the Church as the body of Christ in an increasingly physical fashion. The second major change between the *In Matthaeum* and the *Tractatus super Psalmos* is that Hilary integrates the Church into the process of salvation by understanding the incarnation as the beginning rather than the fulfillment of the process of integration into the divine life. Hilary's understanding of salvation and also of the Church becomes more eschatologically focused.[10]

---

9 For a more complete treatment of the role of the angels in Hilary's soteriology in the *Tractatus super Psalmos*, see Ellen Scully, "Jerusalem: Image of Hilary's Christocentric Eschatology in the *Tractatus super Psalmos*," *Vigiliae Christianae* 66 (2012): 269–282.

10 Both Doignon (*Hilaire de Poitiers: Disciple*, 167) and Michael Figura (*Das Kirchenverständnis des Hilarius von Poitiers*, Freiburger theol. Studien 127 [Freiburg: Herder, 1984], 154–158) assert that Hilary's conception of the Church in the *In Mattheaum* does not have an eschatological dimension.

The body of Christ is already for Hilary in the *In Matthaeum* the place of the union between Christ and humanity and so the place of integration into the divine life. We can refer again to a text we have studied several times:[11]

> He calls the flesh that he had assumed a city because, as a city consists of a variety and multitude of inhabitants, so there is contained in him, through the nature of the assumed body, a certain assembly of the whole human race. And thus he becomes a city from our assembly in him and we are the dwelling of this city through consort with his flesh.[12]

Christ's body is the city in which all humanity dwells. Furthermore, Hilary says that Christ accomplishes the salvation of humanity in this body:

> In Jesus Christ there was all humanity (*homo totus*) and therefore a body having been assumed as a servant of the Spirit, he accomplished in himself the whole sacrament of our salvation.[13]

However, only once in the *In Matthaeum* does Hilary connect this place of salvation, namely the body of Christ, with the Church.

> For why was it important to swear by heaven, the seat of God, to swear by earth, the footstool of his feet, to swear by Jerusalem, a city which was soon to be destroyed on account of the insolence and sins of its inhabitants? Was it not because it [Jerusalem] was founded as a pre-formation of the Church, that is the body of Christ, which is the city of the great king?[14]

---

11 See Chapters 2 "What Does Hilary Mean by the Assumption of All Humanity?" and 4 "The Physicalist Model in the *In Matthaeum*."

12 *In Matt*. 4.12 (SC 254 130.3–9): Ciuitatem carnem quam adsumpserat nuncupat, quia, ut ciuitas ex uarietate ac multitudine consistit habitantium, ita in eo per naturam suscepti corporis quaedam uniuersi generis humani congregatio continetur. Atque ita et ille ex nostra in se congregatione fit ciuitas et nos per consortium carnis suae sumus ciuitatis habitatio.

13 *In Matt*. 2.5 (SC 254 108.3–5): Erat in Iesu Christo homo totus atque ideo in famulatum Spiritus corpus adsumptum omne in se sacramentum nostrae salutis expleuit.

14 *In Matt*. 4.24 (SC 254 144.11–12): Quid enim momenti erat iurare per caelum Dei sedem, iurare per terram scabellum pedum eius, iurare per Hierusalem urbem breui ob insolentiam et peccata inhabitantium destruendam, cum prasertim in praeformationem Ecclesiae, id est corporis Christi, quae magni regis est ciuitas, esset constituta ? Chromatius

Hilary clearly calls the Church the body of Christ in this text. However, in this context he is trying to make a point about swearing oaths, not about the Church.

At no point in the *In Matthaeum* does Hilary attempt to enlarge upon the image of the Church as the body of Christ, and it is clear that, as yet, this connection has no major role in his thought. Instead, he has two favorite images for the Church in the *In Matthaeum*, both of which support the unified theme of the commentary, namely, the transference of salvation from the Jews to the gentiles.[15] Hilary's monothematic exposition is supported by his use of the dialectic between the Law and faith, the Jews and the gentiles, the synagogue and the Church, and unbelievers and believers.[16] Hilary's favorite image for the Church in the *In Matthaeum* is, by far, that of the Church as a ship.[17] This image allows Hilary to emphasize that, unlike Israel, the Church is open to all peoples and depends on faith rather than lineage.[18] The image of the Church as a ship prevents Hilary from identifying the Church with the body of Christ because Jesus is not himself the boat but rather, as in gospel pericopes, one who steps in or out of the boat. Hilary's second image is his consideration of various women of the Bible—for instance, Rachel, the Queen of the South and the daughter of the Canaanite woman—as prefigurements of the Church.[19] In the case of the Queen of the South, and the daughter of the Canaanite woman,

---

makes exactly the same connection (see Chromatius, *Tractatus in Matthaeum* 24.3 [CCL 9A 311–312]).

15 Burns acknowledges this as the main theme of the *In Matthaeum* (*Christology in Hilary*, 48). See also Newlands, *Study in Theological Method*, 78: "The focal point of the movement from the law to faith which is the main theme of the work, is, as we have seen above, Jesus Christ himself."

16 See Newlands, *Study in Theological Method*, 56–57.

17 About one third of Hilary's references to the Church in the *In Matthaeum* follow the analogy of the Church as a ship: see *In Matt*. 7.9, 7.10, 8.1, 8.4, 13.1, 14.9, 14.14, and 15.10. Chromatius also frequently uses this analogy: see his *Tractatus in Matthaeum* 41.3, 42.5–6, 52.5. The image of the Church as a ship is quite common in the third-century (for example, in Origen, the Didascalia, and Cyprian).

18 See *In Matt*. 4.24 (SC 254 188.6–10): Ecclesia enim instar est nauis—et plurimis locis ita nuncupata est—quae, diuersissimi generis et gentis uectore suscepto, subiecta est omnibus et uentorum flatibus et maris motibus, atque ita illa et saeculi et immundorum spirituum uexatur incursibus. See also *In Matt*. 15.10 (SC 258 46.20–22): Et quia omnibus diebus uitae nostrae nobis cum Dominus manet, nauem, id est Ecclesiam, credentium plebe comitatus ingreditur.

19 See *In Matt*. 1.7 (Rachel), 12.20 (Queen of the South), and 15.4,6 (daughter of Canaanite woman).

these women, as Church, represent the Gentile faith as opposed to Jewish Law and unbelief.[20]

Hilary's ecclesiology in the *In Matthaeum* is determined by his focus on the historical stages of salvation: in this view the final stage begun at the incarnation is the Church, which supplants the Jews. While this historical emphasis remains an aspect of Hilary's ecclesiology in the *Tractatus super Psalmos*—especially in his image of the younger supplanting the elder, which we will discuss later in this chapter—Hilary's later works consider salvation historically but also supra-historically, that is eschatologically. This new eschatological emphasis in turn makes Hilary's ecclesiology more christocentric because the end of salvation is now seen as eternal life in Christ's body.

The ecclesiology of the *Tractatus super Psalmos*, which is a consistent system centered in Christ's body, is a later development of the incarnational principle of Christ's assumption of all humanity that is found in all Hilary's works, even the pre-exilic *In Matthaeum*. However, the most recent monograph on Hilary's ecclesiology, the work of Guillermo Colautti, makes the opposite argument. Colautti argues that the doctrine of the assumption of all humanity follows upon, and is not the basis for, Hilary's understanding of the Church as the unity of all humanity.[21] Hilary does, as Colautti suggests, understand in the *In Matthaeum* that there is a unity of humanity which precedes the incarnation. Colautti's mistake is in thinking that Hilary identifies this unity of humanity with the Church in his early works, when, in fact, he does not make this identification until later. While Colautti argues that Hilary's understanding of the Church preceded and inspired his understanding of the incarnation as Christ's assumption of all humanity, Colautti's textual support for the "privileged" theme of Hilary's ecclesiology—that is, the Church as the

20 Hilary does not use the image of Rachel to juxtapose faith and Law, but she still serves to put Christians in a favorable light and Jews in an unfavorable light. See *In Matt.* 1.7.

21 Colautti argues that for Hilary, the Church, existing as the unity of humanity and the body of Christ, is one of the first designs of the Father. To fulfill this design Christ both mediates in creation and assumes all of humanity in the incarnation. This identification of all humanity with the Church is not actually founded in the incarnation according to Colautti, rather it is founded even before creation, is present in creation through Christ, in the unity of all in Adam's sin, and in the history of Israel. This identification of humanity with the Church is not made fully manifest until the incarnation and does not reach its perfection until the resurrection and the final glorification (Colautti, *Figuras eclesiológicas*, 267).

body of Christ—nearly all come from the *Tractatus super Psalmos*.[22] If Colautti is correct, as I believe he is, that Hilary's primary image for understanding the Church is the body of Christ, he cannot then be correct that Hilary's full understanding of the Church precedes his perception of the incarnation as Christ's assumption of all humanity.

The Younger Supplants the Elder in the *Tractatus super Psalmos*: The Universality of the Church

Hilary's understanding of the Church in the *In Matthaeum* was conditioned by his historical understanding of salvation in which the age of the Church succeeds the age of the Jews. Hilary's images of the Church in the *In Matthaeum* invariably supported the dialectic of synagogue vs. Church, Law vs. faith, Jews vs. gentiles, etc. While Hilary's vision of salvation becomes wider and more eschatological in the *Tractatus super Psalmos*, he continues in his belief of historical stages in God's plan of salvation. However, he has an entirely new set of images to convey the dialectic of Jews vs. gentiles and his end is to show the universality of the offer of salvation in this new age of the Church.

While Hilary uses the image of the younger supplanting the elder in both the *In Matthaeum* and the *Tractatus super Psalmos* he uses it for different purposes in these two commentaries. The image of the younger supplanting the elder is an image from anti-Jewish polemic and in the *In Matthaeum*, Hilary uses this image to support his own anti-Jewish argument. However, in the *Tractatus super Psalmos*, Hilary repurposes this image to show the move from Jewish particularism to universality.

In order to show the universality of salvation and of the Church, Hilary is quite fond of using the image of the younger who supplants the elder to designate the election of the Church in the *Tractatus super Psalmos*.[23] Salvation no

22 See Colautti, *Figuras eclesiológicas*, 213, where he says that the conception of the Church as the body of Christ is the point of convergence for all Hilary's ideas and ecclesiological figures. It is worth noticing that in his chapter on this "privileged" image (*Figuras eclesiológicas*, 213–259), Colautti has very little to say about the *In Matthaeum*: Hilary's ecclesiology does not find its central image until the *Tractatus super Psalmos*. The *In Matthaeum* displays Hilary's awareness of the unity of humanity and the assumption of all humanity in the incarnation, but, while Hilary may use other ecclesiological images, in the *In Matthaeum* he has yet to solidly identify the unity of all humanity with the Church through the medium of Christ's body.

23 Hilary also uses this theme of the younger supplanting the elder as a guide for a typological interpretation of Old Testament events based upon the distinction between law and truth. See *Tr. ps.* 118 Zade 7–8.

longer depends on Jewish lineage but on the lineage of Christ (which everyone now has as a result of the incarnation), and participation in Christ on earth, namely the Church. In his commentary on the verse "Ephrem is the strength of my head," Hilary changes the word "strength" (*fortitudo*) to "assumption" (*adsumptio*).[24]

> The holy one is the head of the whole body of Christ, therefore the *assumption of his head is Ephrem* because against the order of generation, in Ephrem being put before Manassah, the younger is placed before the elder to present the sanctification of the Church. Therefore, Ephrem is the assumption of his head, that is, in Ephrem, Scripture prefigures the people, or rather the Church that is assumed in the body.[25]

Hilary still uses this verse to show that the preference of the younger, Ephrem, over the older, Manassah, is a prefigurement of the preference of the Church over the Jews. But his change of the word *fortitudo* to *adsumptio* allows him now to tie this preference of the Church into the incarnation.[26] The "Church" is not simply the body of people who believe in Christ, but rather the "Church" here signifies the people who were *assumed* into Christ's body in the incarnation.

Hilary paradoxically uses this theme of the preference of the younger over the elder to highlight the universality of the Church. Hilary especially dwells on the figure of Jacob, as the archetype of the younger who receives the inheritance of the elder.

> *The name of God is sweet*, not only to one people, itself irreligious, but now to all peoples and tongues. For [*God*] *chose for himself Jacob*, who supplants his elder brother, buys the primogeniture with food and the desperation of a venal person, seizes the benediction . . . and, after his struggle, sees God and is named Israel. For first he was Jacob and then Israel. Let us think of the body of the Church, which holds in itself, through a difference in faith, both Jacob and Israel. And this gathering

24 In *Tr. ps.* 59.6 (CCL 61 187.4–5), Hilary quotes the verse as *Ephraem foritudo capitits mei.* . . . When he proceeds to comment on the verse in 59.9 (CCL 61 188.1), he says *Ephraem* autem *adsumptio capitis eius.* . . .

25 *Tr. ps.* 59.9 (CCL 61 188.8–189.14): . . . omnis sanctus caput est corporis Christi, idcirco adsumptio capitis eius Ephrem est, quia contra generationum ordinem ad praeferendam ecclesiae sanctificationem in praelato Ephrem et postposito Manasse minor maiori est antelatus. Adsumptio itaque capitis sui est Ephrem, id est populi quem in Ephrem praefigurauit, uel potius ecclesia in corpus adsumitur.

26 Hilary's interpretation of *sancto suo* in *Tr. ps.* 59.6 (CCL 61 186.2–187.11) also introduces the incarnation as means of demonstrating the preference of the younger to the elder.

> supplants the people of the law by faith, receives its primogeniture and steals its benediction. . . .[27]

The Church is the younger brother who takes the inheritance from his elder brother, the Jews. But as we can see by the way Hilary began this passage, this supercessionism is not intended to limit the inheritance to the Church, but rather, it opens the inheritance to all those who are part of the Church, that is, in potential at least, to every single person. Every single human person, taken into the body of Christ at the incarnation, can, through faith, remain in this body and receive the inheritance and the benediction of the firstborn. For the Church, though the younger in relation to the Jews, is the firstborn in Christ because it lives by faith instead of by observance of the Law.

The image of the supplanting younger brother is, like all of Hilary's images for the Church in the *Tractatus super Psalmos*, primarily an eschatological vision. Like Jerusalem, the younger brother Jacob, renamed Israel, is made to be the place of the eternal hope of humanity.

> The will of God is peculiarly in Jacob and Israel: not in that Israel nor in that Jacob who bear this name in a bodily sense, as a kind of consolation for their noble descendants, but that Jacob who supplanted the elder, who bought the primogeniture with his hope of eternity, whose name is Israel on account of his seeing God, who himself is Jerusalem and the city of peace. . . .[28]

Jacob is only truly Israel, and younger can only supplant the elder, if his hope is eternal. The Jews sought to be "Jacob" according to a lineage that was physical to the exclusion of eschatological. The Church does not lack physical lineage: it is truly Jacob according to physical lineage in Christ. However, the Church's

---

27 *Tr. ps.* 134.6 (CCL 61B 146.6–15): *Dei nomen suave est*, non uni tantum genti atque ipsi inreligiosae, sed omnibus iam gentibus atqui linguis. *Iacob* enim *sibi elegit* maiorem natu supplantatem, ementem primitias cibo et desperatione uenalis, abripientem benedictionem . . . deinde post luctam deum uidentem et Israhel nuncupatum. Ante enim Iacob est et sic Israhel. Circumspiciamus ecclesiae corpus, quae in se per differentiam fidei et Iacob et Israhel habet. Et hic coetus populum legis fide supplantat, primitias eius accipit, benedictionem eius diripit. . . .

28 *Tr. ps.* 147.7 (CCL 61B 295.8–296.13): Peculiaris haec in Iacob et Israhel dei uoluntas est: non in eum Israhel neque in eum Iacob, qui hoc corporis nomen ad solatium ueluti generosae in se stirpis amplectitur, sed eum Iacob, qui subplantauit priorem, qui primogenita spe aeternitatis emit, cui Israhel Deum uidendo cognomen est, qui ipse Hierusalem et pacis est ciuitas. . . .

lineage in Christ, while physically Jacob, is also eschatologically Jacob, for Jacob succeeded his brother on account of his "hope of eternity," and he himself sees God and, as Israel, is "Jerusalem and the city of peace": this Jacob/Israel is Christ himself and so the Church.[29] Jacob's eternal hope, then, is the hope of existing eschatologically in Christ.

The Church as Jacob is both a Church in history and a Church whose foundation and end is outside of history. The historic understanding of the Church found in the *In Matthaeum* is expanded in the *Tractatus super Psalmos* where Hilary, in placing the foundation of ecclesiology in the body of Christ, presents a consistent christocentric and eschatological ecclesiology.

The Creation of Eve as Prefigurement of the Church in the *Tractatus mysteriorum* and the *Tractatus super Psalmos*

While, in the *Tractatus super Psalmos*, Hilary's references to the Church are brief and scattered amongst various commentaries, in the *Tractatus mysteriorum*, written around the same time as the *Tractatus super Psalmos*, Hilary has a small section dedicated to the Church. It will be useful for us to look at this section before we proceed to a study of Hilary's ecclesiology in the *Tractatus super Psalmos*.[30] In the *Tractatus mysteriorum* Hilary reads the Genesis creation of Eve as a prefigurement of the Church.[31]

---

29 For Hilary's eschatological use of Israel as the image of the Church, see also *Tr. ps.* 134.21 (CCL 61B 156.16–20): Hic est *Israel*, cui *terrae* beatae huius contingent *hereditas*, cui conglorificati in Domino terreni corporis sui erit aeterna possessio. Hoc Christianis est proprium, qui hoc in se nomen incolume per caelestis imaginem usque ad finem retinuerint.

30 The standard view for the dating of the *Tractatus mysteriorum* is to place its composition in the last few years of Hilary's life contemporaneous with the completion of the *Tractatus super Psalmos*: 364–367 AD. Brisson and Feder see in the fuller passages at *Tr. ps.* 138.4 and 146.12, which deal with "sufferings of the patriarchs and Moses" and "the flight of the raven," references back to the *Tractatus mysteriorum*. They thus believe that Hilary composed the *Tractatus mysteriorum* between his commentaries on Psalms 138 and 146 (see *S. Hilarii Episcopi Pictaviensis Opera Pars IV*, ed. Alfred Feder, CSEL 65, [Vienna: F. Tempsky, 1916], xiv; Hilaire de Poitiers, *Tractatus Myteriorum: Traité des Mystères*, ed. J.-P. Brisson, Sources chrétiennes 19 [Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1967], 13, no. 2). See the summary of scholarship in Burns, *Model for the Christian Life*, 23–24.

31 Surprisingly, Cyprian, known for his ecclesiology, never uses Eve as a figure for the Church. Cyprian's view of Eve is rather low: she is, for him, representative not of the Church but of meddling and destructive women (see Michael Fahey, *Cyprian and the Bible: A Study in Third-Century Exegesis* [Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1971], 559).

> For when the Lord, who made male and female, said that she was of bone of his [Adam's] bones and flesh of his flesh, the Lord himself announced through Adam that which was to be wholly accomplished in Adam. . . . for since the Word was made flesh, the Church also was a member of Christ. . . .[32]

Hilary ties the creation of Eve to the birth of the Church. Eve's birth from the rib of Adam is a type of the Church's birth from the body of Christ. As Hilary draws out the prophetic and figurative nature of Eve's creation, he demonstrates a tension that we have already seen in his thought. Humanity's existence in the body of Christ, that is, the Church, is both a present and an eschatological reality. As a present reality, the Church depends upon the incarnation, as we see in this passage; as a future reality, it depends upon the resurrection.

The eschatological reality of the Church leads Hilary to explain the creation of Eve as a type of the resurrection. Adam's sleep is a prefigurement of Christ's three days in the tomb and the manner of Eve's creation prefigures the manner of human resurrection.

> For in this [the sleep of Adam and the creation of Eve] the faith and the order of the resurrection of the body are contained. Indeed in the creation of the woman dust is not taken hold of, nor is earth formed, nor is an inanimate material aroused into a living soul by the inspiration of God, but the flesh is added to the bone and the perfection of the body is given to the flesh and spiritual vigor follows upon the perfection of the body. This is the order of resurrection. . . .[33]

---

32 *Tr. mys.* 1.3 (SC 19 p. 78): Cum enim haec Dominus, qui fecit masculum et feminam, dixerit, quod ex osse eius os et ex carne ipsius caro (est), locutus ipse per Adam id, quod totum in ipso Adam erat factum. . . . Cum enim uerbum factum sit caro et ecclesia membrum sit Christi. . . .

33 *Tr. mys.* 1.5 (SC 19 82): . . . in eo enim corporeae resurrectionis fides et ratio continetur. Namque in creatione mulieris non iam limus adprehenditur neque terra in formam describitur neque Dei inspiratione in animam uiuentem materies inanimis commouetur, sed ossi caro adcrescit et carni perfectio corporis datur et perfectionem corporis uigor spiritalis insequitur. Hunc resurrectionis ordinem. . . . See also Jean Doignon, "Deux approches de la résurrection." Doignon emphasizes that for Hilary the creation of Eve from the bone of Adam is viewed much more as a work of resurrection than as a work of creation (ibid., 6). In this, Doignon believes Hilary follows Tertullian. See also the explanation of de Margerie, *Latin Fathers*, 71–73.

While Adam's creation demonstrates the *creation* of humanity, Eve's creation manifests the *resurrection* of humanity. Eve, unlike Adam, is not created from dust; rather her creation builds upon a previous creation, in the same way that the resurrection of believers builds upon the creation of the Church. When Adam awakes, he recognizes Eve as "bone of his bones." In the same way, Hilary says that when Christ, the heavenly Adam, wakes from the sleep of his passion and death, he recognizes the Church of resurrected believers as bone of his bones.[34] Eve, then, is a prefiguration of the eschatological, risen, Church.

In the *Tractatus super Psalmos*, Hilary twice, in *Tractatus super Psalmos* 52.16 and 138.29, makes the same use of Adam's words concerning the creation of Eve in Genesis 2—"bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh"—as he did in the *Tractatus Mysteriorum* to refer to the creation of the Church. In *Tractatus super Psalmos* 138.29, Hilary comments on the verse "my bone, which you made in secret, was not hidden from you," saying:[35]

> Both prophetic and apostolic authority attest that the bone of Christ is the Church. For while the apostle treats Adam and Eve according to those things which are said in Genesis, he says, *Now this is bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh*, and to expand this saying he has added, *This is a great mystery, but I speak of Christ and the Church*.[36]

---

34 *Tr. mys*. 1.5 (SC 19 84): Agnoscit ergo post somnum passionis suae caelestis Adam resurgens (de) ecclesia suum os, suam carnem non iam ex limo creatam neque ex inspiratione uegetatam, sed adcrescentem ossi et in corpus ex corpora spiritu aduolante perfectam. Tertullian uses a similar image in *De anima* 43 (CCL 2 847.62–65): Si enim adam de christo figuram dabat, somnus adae mors erat christi dormituri in mortem, ut de iniuria perinde lateris eius uera mater uiuentium figuraretur ecclesia. Tertullian and Hilary's contemporaries such as Zeno of Verona and Gregory of Elvira, focus on the image of Christ's wounded side, and the blood and water that flow out of it, as the source of the Church. See Zeno, *Tractatus* 1.3.10.19–20 (ed. B. Löfstedt, CCL 22 [Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 1971], 28.157–29.175); Gregory of Elvira, *Tractatus Origenis* 15.13 [CCL 69 115]). Hilary, by contrast makes little of this image. Furthermore, Figura argues that while Hilary follows the traditional line of interpretation that viewed Eve's creation from Adam's side as a figure of the Church, he adds a new eschatological element in viewing Eve's creation as a figure of the Church of the *resurrection* (Figura, *Das Kirchenverständnis des Hilarius*, 121).

35 *Tr. ps*. 138.29 (CCL 61B 208.3–4): *Non est occultatum os meum a te, quae fecisti in occulto*.

36 *Tr. ps*. 138.29 (CCL 61B 208.4–209.9): Os Christi ecclesiam esse et prophetica et apostolica auctoritas est. Nam cum secundum ea, quae in Genesi dicta sunt, de Adam atque Eua apostolus tractaret, ita ait: *hoc nunc os de ossibus meis et caro de carne mea*, ad expositionem dicti huius adiecit dicens: *Hoc mysterium magnum est, ego autem dico in Chirsto et in ecclesia*.

Here, as in *Tractatus super Psalmos* 52.16, Hilary connects "bone of my bones" with Paul's commentary in Ephesians 5:32 that these things refer to the mystery of Christ and the Church. Hilary made the same connection in the *Tractatus Mysteriorum*.[37] From these three references, it seems that Hilary's manuscript of Ephesians has Genesis 2:23 (this is bone of my bones . . .), rather than the usual Genesis 2:24 (therefore a man leaves his father and mother and clings to his wife, and they become one flesh) as the Old Testament verse that Paul proclaims "the mystery of Christ and the Church."[38] Hilary's scriptural variant may well have motivated his understanding both of the Church as body of Christ and of humanity's integration into Christ as an integration into his body. For Hilary, following his version of Paul's letter to the Ephesians, the mystery of Christ and the Church is the physical, bodily connection between the two: the Church is bone of Christ's bones.

---

37 In *Tr. mys*. 1.3 (SC 19, 77–78) Hilary cites the entire verse of Gen. 2:23 along with the last six words of Genesis 2:24 as the subject of Paul's comment: *Hoc nunc os de ossibus meis et caro de carne mea, haec uocabitur mulier, quia de uiro suo sumpta est, et erunt duo in carne una*. Hic nihil mihi laboris est; apostolus enim, cum huius ipsius prophetiae meminisset, ait: *Hoc mysterium magnum est, ego autem dico in Christo et in ecclesia*.

38 In the five times Hilary cites Eph. 5:30–32 in his corpus (*In Matt*. 19.2, 22.3, *Tr. mys* 1.3, and *Tr. ps*. 52.16 and 138.29), he never manifests any knowledge of the marriage section of Gen. 2:24 (for this reason a man shall leave his father and mother and cling to his wife) being a part of this passage. Either Hilary's theology, focused on the Church as the physical body of Christ leads him to pass over Ephesians' quotation of Gen. 2:24, or his version of Ephesians, lacking this quotation, is one of the factors leading him to such a strong assertion of the bodily connection between Christ and the Church.

There is a strong manuscript tradition, in both Greek and Latin, in which "of his bones and of his flesh" have been added on to the end of Eph. 5:30. Hilary's version of Ephesians shares this variant. However, I have been able to find no other evidence of a manuscript that lacks Eph. 5:31's quotation of Gen. 2:24 (a man shall leave his father and mother and cling to his wife).

Hilary's use of Ephesians therefore does not focus on the marriage analogy to describe the relationship of Christ and the Church. Rather his interest is in the creation of Eve (the Church) from the flesh and bones of Adam (Christ).

On the contrary, Tertullian witnesses both to the presence of Gen. 2:24 in Ephesians 5 and a use of Ephesians that emphasizes the marital connection between Christ and the Church. For Gen. 2:24 as the citation in Ephesians, see, for example, Tertullian, *Aduersus Marcionem* 3.5.4 (CCL 1 513.2–514.5): . . . et suggerens Ephesiis quod in primordio de homine praedicatum est relicturo patrem et matrem et futuris duobus in unam carnem, id se in Christum et ecclesiam agnoscere. See also Tertullian, *De monogamia* 5.7 (ed. E. Dekkers, in *Tertulliani Opera, pars 2: Opera Montanistica*, CCL 2 [Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 1954], 1235.44–52), where the mystery of Christ and the Church is that of marital monogamy.

The Church as Body of Christ in the *Tractatus super Psalmos*

Paul's influence on Hilary's ecclesiology is also found in Hilary's use of Paul's teaching on the Church as the body of Christ.[39] The image of the Church as the body of Christ, because it finds its origin in Pauline thought—as found in 1 Corinthians 12:12–27 and Colossians 1:18, 24—is omnipresent in patristic thought.[40] However, Hilary's use of this image is different from the common use. We'll return to the example that was offered in Chapter 2. Tertullian here shows the difference between two uses of the word "body" in Scripture.

> But wherever [the apostle] says that the Church is the body of Christ—as here he declares that he fills up in his flesh what is lacking of the afflictions of Christ for the sake of his body, which is the Church (Col. 1:24)—he is not, therefore, in every passage, transferring the naming of the body away from the substance of the flesh. For he says above that we are reconciled in his body through his death (Col. 1:22), namely, in that body in which he was able to die; that is, he was dead as regards the flesh and not as regards the Church: clearly [he died] for the sake of the Church by exchanging body for body, fleshly for spiritual.[41]

The first use of the word body is tied to the physical "substance of flesh" and the second is not. Tertullian argues that Paul's declaration of the Church as the

---

39 See, for example, *Tr. ps*. 68.7, 118 Nun 4,124.3, 125.6, and 128.9. See also Orazzo's list (*La Salvezza*, 97).

40 Compare, for example, Gregory of Elvira, *In Canticum Canticorum libri quinque* 5 (CCL 69 209.63–64): inuenerunt . . . ecclesiam in Christi corpore natum; Ambrose, *De apologia prophetae David* 13.60 (*Ambroise de Milan: Apologie de David*, ed. Pierre Hadot, trans. Marius Cordier, Sources chrétiennes 239 [Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1977], 162.17–18): . . . sumus membra corporis Christi de carne ipsius et de ossibus eius; Jerome, *Commentarii ad Ephesios* 3.5 (in *Opera omnia*, vol. 7, ed. J.-P. Migne, PL 26 [Paris: Garnier Fratres, 1884], 564 C): Quoniam propinquior atque inferior est a substantia christi natura ecclesiae, propterea eam corpus christi aestimo nominatam: cuius corporis saluator est christus iesus, id est uerbum, sapientia, caeterae que uirtutes in quibus intelligitur filius dei; Tertullian, *Aduersus Marcionem* 5.19.6 (CCL 1 721–722).

41 Tertullian, *Aduersus Marcionem*. 5.19.6 (CCL 1 722.18–3): Sicubi autem et ecclesiam corpus christi dicit esse—ut hic ait adimplere se reliqua pressurarum christi in carne pro corpore eius, quod est ecclesia -, non propterea et in totum mentionem corporis transferens a substantia carnis. Nam et supra reconciliari nos ait in corpore eius per mortem, utique in eo corpore, in quo mori potuit, per carnem mortuus et non per ecclesiam, plane propter ecclesiam corpus commutando pro corpore, carnale pro spiritali. See also the treatment of this passage in Chapter 2 "Case Study: Hilary vs. Tertullian."

body of Christ is an example of the second use of term "body" because Paul is taking away the "substance of the flesh" from the name "body." The "body" of the Church is not a fleshly body that consists of arms, legs, and innards. However, Tertullian warns us that just because the Church is not physically the body of Christ, this does not mean that Paul never speaks of the physical body of Christ. Tertullian wants to make clear that there are two different scriptural uses of the term Christ's body: one physical and one non-physical.

However, the distinction between physical and non-physical referents is not as clear for Hilary as it is for Tertullian. While Hilary would agree that the Church is not, strictly speaking, the arms, legs, and innards of Christ, Hilary insists that there still is a connection between Christ and the Church that is tied to the physical substance of the flesh of Christ. Hilary agrees with Tertullian that Scripture speaks about the body in different ways. Sometimes the body of Christ is the physical body in which Christ was born, suffered, died, and rose from the dead. However, when Scripture speaks about the body of Christ in other ways, it does not necessarily, as Tertullian said, offer a connection that excludes the true substance of Christ's flesh. These other uses of the body are not, according to Hilary, merely spiritual or metaphorical in the sense of non-physical. The body of Christ is not, in its most basic sense, the Church. Yet the Church is this body in a way that is both spiritual and physical.

As we saw in Chapter 7 with reference to heaven, in the *Tractatus super Psalmos*, the Church as body of Christ becomes the premier dwelling place of God, the place of the temporal and eternal relationship of God and humanity. Hilary speaks often of dwelling places using the image of the house or the city.[42] The importance of these images is that the dwelling place is the place where God and man meet: it is the physical place of their relationship.[43] God dwells in heaven, but he also dwells in Jerusalem, in Mt. Zion, in the Church, and in the saints. The incarnation unites all these places and images into one: the body of Christ. The body of Christ is the perfect dwelling place of the Father.[44] Christ's body is also, because of the assumption of all humanity, the dwelling place of humanity. The body of Christ is the new tabernacle, the new temple, the new

42 For an extensive analysis of these images in Hilary's thought, see Collauti, *Figuras eclesiológicas*. Chapter 2 (43–108) is on the image of the house, while Chapter 3 (109–180) is on the image of the city in Hilary's writings. For the importance of the "city" in the *Tractatus super Psalmos*, see Burns, *Model for the Christian Life*, esp. 34, 71, 100, 102, 138.

43 Compare with Chromatius who says that the Church is properly called the city of Christ: . . . ecclesiam suam, quae proprie Christi ciuitas nuncupatur (*Tractatus in Matthaeum* 43.7 [CCL 9A 409.131]).

44 For God dwelling in Christ as in heaven, see *Tr. ps.* 122.3.

Mt. Zion, and the new heaven because it is the true and perfect meeting place of God and man.[45] While Hilary continues to use all these images—especially as, in his *Tractatus super Psalmos*, they are often the scriptural impetus for his commentary—the body of Christ becomes the privileged image of the place of God's dwelling and meeting with man and, as such, is the Church. The Church is God's dwelling place on account of its physical connection (and identification) with the body of Christ.

The image of the Church as the body of Christ is the image of the Church found most often in the *Tractatus super Psalmos*, and Hilary uses it to tie his ecclesiology into his soteriology and eschatology. The centrality of the body—the physical body of Christ, which, both as the Church and the eschatological goal, contains all humanity—is the defining feature of these three aspects of Hilary's thought. Hilary's comment on the Psalm verse, "*When the Lord prevented the captivity of Zion, we were like people consoled*," declares that the true Zion is the Church.[46]

> . . . [God] is renewing us into new life and transforming us into a new man, constituting us in the body of his flesh. For he himself is the Church, containing all things in himself through the sacrament of his body. For it was not Zion before it was liberated; but this, which has been liberated, is Zion.[47]

The Zion that is liberated by the Lord is not the city of the Jews but the Church, for liberation depends exclusively upon the body of the Lord. Christ is the Church because he contains it in his body, and it is only in his body that humans are renewed into new life and transformed. In this passage Hilary uses the Scripture prompt of Zion to speak about the Church—as the sacrament of Christ's body—and soteriology and eschatology—as the process of incorporation into Christ that renews and transforms humanity.

---

45 See *Tr. ps.* 52.18 (CCL 61 126.13–15): Haec caro [Christi] et Sion et Hierusalem est, ciuitas nobis pacis et speculatorium nostrum. Hinc salutaris, hinc Iesus. See also *Tr. ps.* 13.4, 64.2.

46 *Tr. ps.* 125.6 (CCL 61B 61.17–18): *In auertendo Dominum captiuitatem Sion facti sumus sicut consolati.*

47 *Tr. ps.* 125.6 (CCL 61B 62.23–26): . . . nos in uitam nouam renouans et in nouum hominem transformans, constituens nos in corpore carnis suae. Ipse est enim ecclesia, per sacramentum corporis sui in se uniuersam eam continens. Non erat Sion ante, quam liberaretur; sed Sion est, quae liberata est. Compare with Gregory of Elvira, *Tractatus Origenis* 20.12 (CCL 69 144.87): . . . ipse est corpus integrum totius ecclesiae

Zion is a scriptural prompt that nearly always leads Hilary to discussions of Christ and eschatology. Hilary glosses Isaiah 28:16, which refers to the stone in the foundations of Zion—"*Behold, I lay a stone in the foundations of Zion, a splendid stone, an elect stone, a corner stone, a precious stone in its foundations; and he who believes in this stone shall not be confounded*"[48]—as referring to Christ, and particularly to Christ as the eschatological destiny of humanity:

> It is clear that the apostle indicates that Christ is the foundation, through which that blessed Church of the Lord's body, whose foundation is Christ, is indicated by "mountain". . . . Therefore, we accept that the "mountain" in Daniel (Dan. 2:34–35) is the Lord, [moving] from mountain into stone and back from stone into mountain. . . . because of the infirmity of the flesh he was emptied from mountain into stone; because of the glory of the passion he was made a mountain out of stone: the supereminent and lofty mountain, in whom we see ourselves through the assumption of our flesh and body.[49]

The Lord, the Son of God, is the mountain. In emptying himself into the form of the slave he becomes merely a stone.[50] Yet this stone is the foundation of the "blessed Church of the Lord's body." Through his passion and resurrection, Christ resumes again the glory of the God and so becomes once again the mountain. Only now, because of the assumption of the flesh, the mountain is

---

48 *Tr. ps.* 124.3 (CCL 61B 52.10–12): *Ecce mitto in fundamenta Sion lapidem praeclarum, electrum, angularem, pretiosum in fundamenta eius; et qui credit in eum, non confundetur*.

49 *Tr. ps.* 124.3 (CCL 61B 52.12–15, 20–21, 52.25–53.28): Et non ambiguum est apostolum fundamentum Christum significasse, per quod beata illa dominici corporis ecclesia, cuius fundamentum est Christus, significari uidetur in monte. . . . Sic ergo montem Dominum in Danielo accipimus, ex monte in lapidem et rursum ex lapide in montem. . . . propter infirmitatem carnis e monte in lapidem exinanitus, propter gloriam passionis ex lapide rursum effectus in montem, mons supereminens et excelsus, in quo ipsi nosmetipsos per adsumptionem carnis nostrae corporisque speculamur.

50 Commentary on this passage from Daniel (Dan. 2:34–35) can be found in many patristic authors. See, for example: Irenaeus, *Aduersus Haereses* 3.21.7 (SC 211 420); Cyprian, *Ad Quirinum* 2.16–18 (ed. R. Weber, in *Sancti Episcopi Opera, pars 1*, CCL 3 [Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 1972], 51–57); Hippolytus, *In Danielem* 2.13 (*Commentaire sur Daniel*, ed. Maurice Lefèvre, Sources chrétiennes 14 [Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1947], 144–146); Tertullian, *Aduersus Marcionem* 3.7.3 (CCL 1 516). See also Ladaria, *Cristología de Hilario*, 251. Hilary is unique in using this passage to support an understanding of Christ's assumption of all humanity.

the eschatological hope of humanity, the place in which "we see ourselves," the eternal dwelling of humans. Through the equation of the mountain with both Christ and the Church, Hilary's explanation here includes his incarnational doctrine of Christ's assumption of all humanity, eschatological hope in Christ's body, and present existence in the Church of Christ's body.

The Church, like the body of Christ, is a reality that came into being in time but is destined for the age beyond all time. Since Christ is the foundation stone of the Church, those in the body of Christ likewise become living stones for the building of the Church.

> For we are built, according to blessed Paul, *upon the foundation of the prophets and apostles*, in whom the testimonies of God have been founded unto eternity, where that heavenly and royal holy city of Jerusalem is built. This city is the house of the multitude of angels and of the first-fruits of the elect, and its foundations are living stones and precious gems, living, rising, and reigning in Christ, who is blessed forever.[51]

We see that Hilary again connects the Church with eschatology. The Church is here the holy city of Jerusalem. The Church is the community of believers, but Hilary lays special emphasis on the believers who are already in heaven: the "first-fruits of the elect." While Hilary says elsewhere, following Ephesians 2:19, that "we also are citizens of the company of saints and members of the household of God,"[52] Hilary stresses here that the living stones are those who "live, rise, and reign in Christ." Just as the incarnation was paving the way for its fruition in the glorification, so the earthly Church is a preparation for the eschatological Church, the heavenly Jerusalem.

The "blessed Church of the Lord's body" continues temporally what was begun in the incarnation: the assumption and the assimilation of humanity into divine life. As we saw in the previous chapter, eschatological hope is eternally *in* the body of Christ. Likewise, Hilary's image of the Church as the body of Christ shows that temporal hope is also *in* Christ's body.

---

51 *Tr. ps.* 118 Koph 12 (CCL 61A 185.22–186.28): Aedificamur enim secundum beatum Paulum *super fundamentum prophetarum et apostolorum*, in quibus testimonia Dei fundata sunt in aeternum, ubi exstruetur caelestis illa et regia ciuitas sancta Hierusalem, quae domus angelorum frequentiantium et electorum primitiuorum est, cuius fundamenta sunt uiui lapides pretiosaeque gemmae in Christo uiuentes, resurgentes, regnantes, qui est benedictus in saecula saeculorum.

52 *Tr. ps.* 121.2 (CCL 61B 27.10–11): nos quoque ciues sanctorum et domestici Dei sumus.

Hilary's soteriological vision of incorporation into divine life, including, as it does, life in the temporal Church, is not, as we have seen, fully automatic. While the incarnation wrought an ontological change in every single human person, this change still needs the growth and transformation that results from personal adherence to Christ and participation in the life of his body the Church. Hilary is clear that one's eschatological fate depends not only on the incorporation into Christ's body that all experience as a result of the incarnation, but also on faith:

> . . . he shows that in Zion is the dwelling of those who love the name of the Lord, so that the election might be according to piety rather than lineage (*genus*). . . .[53]

Faith outside the Church is considered impossible by Hilary. The impious and heretics have separated themselves from the Church and, since the Church is the body of Christ, they have separated themselves from Christ himself. Hilary goes so far as to say that "Those who are cast out of the body of the Church, which is the body of Christ, just as foreigners and aliens from the body of Christ, are handed over to the domination of the devil."[54]

The Church has an interesting role in Hilary's theology: it is, at the same time, exceedingly important and relatively ignored. Membership in the Church, which is membership in the body of Christ, serves both as an extension of the incarnation and as a foretaste of eschatological existence.[55] Hilary's understanding of the Church as the midpoint in the progressive incorporation of humanity into Christ, begun in the incarnation and to be completed at the end of time, makes the Church a prominent feature in any discussion of soteriology or eschatology, as we have seen. However, the Church as an actual historical institution occupies little of Hilary's attention in the *Tractatus super Psalmos*. There is some discussion of the sacraments—Eucharist and baptism especially—but there is little about Church polity or hierarchy, and unity is a theme that Hilary deals with mystically (all are in the one body of Christ) rather than practically.[56]

---

53 *Tr. ps.* 68.33 (CCL 61 317.3–5): . . . eorum habitationem in Sion esse demonstrat, qui nomen Domini diligant, ut pietatis magis sit, non generis electio. . . .

54 *Tr. ps.* 118 Ain 5 (CCL 61A 151.16–18): Qui enim ab ecclesiae corpore respuuntur, quae Christi est corpus tamquam peregrini et alieni a Dei corpore dominatui diaboli traduntur.

55 See Orazzo's treatment of the Church as an extension of the incarnation in *Salvezza in Ilario*, 77–140.

56 For the Eucharist, see *Tr. ps.* 64.14, and 135.15. For baptism, see, for example, *Tr. ps.* 118 Gimel 5, and Samech 6 where Hilary, setting baptism in an eschatological light, insists that even after baptism humans await the perfect washing.

There is a tension inherent in Hilary's incarnational theology of Christ's assumption of all humanity. Since the incarnation has already drawn all humanity into Christ's body, the "when" of individual salvation is unclear. Despite Hilary's insistence on faith and participation in the Church for salvation, yet there are many places in the *Tractatus super Psalmos* that speak of human salvation as if it has already happened in Christ's resurrection.[57] There is also a tension as regards the "where" of individual salvation. The place of salvation is the body of Christ, and the Church is the body of Christ, but there is confusion as to the manner in which the Church is this body. Is the Church Christ's temporal body—an extension of his earthly body—or is it Christ's eschatological body—a participant already in future hope? The assumption of all humanity does not resolve these tensions, rather it forces them. These tensions in fact manifest Hilary's dependence on the incarnational principle of Christ's assumption of all humanity as the premise for his soteriology, eschatology, and ecclesiology.

As a result, Hilary's eschatological focus generally leads him to identify the temporal Church with the supratemporal body of Christ; however, at times he is careful to distinguish the two. For instance, when Hilary speaks of the heavenly Jerusalem as "that to which we ascend through our house of the Church and of gathering,"[58] the heavenly Jerusalem is not identical to the earthly Church; rather it is attained *through* the Church. As we saw earlier, Hilary speaks of Christ, in the form of God, as a mountain. The Church, in that passage, shows its connection to both the *forma dei* and *the forma serui* of Christ. The Church is the mountain, but a mountain founded on Christ's humble form of a stone. In another place, Hilary distinguishes between the mountain, which is the eschatological or heavenly reality, and the tabernacle, which is the temporal reality. He says: "Therefore, the first and greatest step for those who are ascending to heaven is to dwell in this tabernacle . . . because from it is access to the mountain. . . ."[59] Hilary is here clearly distinguishing between the mountain

57 See the section "The Contours of Hilary's Eschatology" in Chapter 7 for a discussion of one manifestation of this strand of proleptic eschatology, namely Hilary's alteration of the *transfigurabit* to *transfiguravit* in his citation of Philippians 3:21. See also Burns, *A Model for the Christian Life*, 173–179, and Michael McCarthy, "*Expectatio Beatitudinis*: The Eschatological Frame of Hilary of Poitiers' *Tractatus super Psalmos*," in *In the Shadow of the Incarnation: Essays on Jesus Christ in the Early Church in Honor of Brian E. Daley S.J.*, edited by Peter Martens, 63–66 (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 2008).

58 *Tr. ps.* 133.2 (CCL 61B 140.14–15): ad quam per hanc ecclesiae et conuentus nostri domum scanditur.

59 *Tr. ps.* 14.4 (CCL 61 83.1–2, 11): Primus itaque et maximus gradus est ad celestia ascendentibus habitare in hoc tabernaculo . . . quia ex eo in montem esset ascensus. . . .

and tabernacle: though they both partake in the body of Christ, nevertheless, because humans ascend from one to the other, they are not identical.

Though present reality is not identical to future reality, Hilary feels the need to show the unity that exists between these two realities: they are both, he insists, the body of the one Christ. Hilary's distinction between the temporal Church and the eschatological Church serve to show that the one is on the path to the other. The distinction between the temporal and eschatological dimensions of the Church, while important, must not outweigh understanding the Church—in its temporal or eschatological form—as the body of Christ. In the previous citation, Hilary was careful to show that the Church, as tabernacle, is merely the entrance to the eschatological mountain of Christ. In his commentary on the Psalm verse "*mountains surround it* [*Jerusalem*]*, and the Lord surrounds his people, now and forever*,"[60] Hilary, far from differentiating, rather, identifies the mountain with the Church:

> For since we read that the Church, that is the Lord in the body, is signified by "mountain," and since we find the *mountains* of God *exulting* and rejoicing—for it is written: *the mountains have rejoiced as rams* (Ps. 113.4)—how can we understand mountains as having signified something other than those who, glorious beyond earthly nature, exult already in the glorious things of God?[61]

Individuals are capable of being "mountains" once they participate in the eschatological reality.[62] The Church, like its individual believers, is largely seen by Hilary in light of the future. The Church is defined by its participation in the body of Christ and, through this body, in the life of the Trinity.

Hilary's eschatological interest in the Church does not make him insensible to the daily demands of living a Christian life. Large parts of the *Tractatus super Psalmos* are dedicated to moral exhortation. In fact, Hilary explains in the *Instructio* that the Psalms are inherently structured in three groups of fifty,

---

60 *Tr. ps.* 124.5 (CCL 61B 54.2–4): *Montes in circuitu eius, et Dominus in circuitu populi sui ex hoc et usque in saeculum.*

61 *Tr. ps.* 124.5 (CCL 61B 54.6–11): Cum enim et montem significari ecclesiam, id est Dominum in corpore legimus, et inueniamus *montes* Dei *exultare* atque laetari—scriptum enim est: *montes exultauerunt ut arietes*—quomodo possumus montes non eos significatos esse intellegere, qui super terrenam naturam gloriosi iam in Dei rebus exultant?

62 In so doing they become like the angels whom Hilary describes as mountains in *Tractatus super Psalmos* 120.4. See also *Tr. ps.* 118 Sameck 8–9, where Hilary says humans become like the angels.

the second of these groups pertaining to the rigors of living the post-baptismal Christian life.[63] Hilary never tires of denouncing long lists of vices and encouraging their opposing virtues.[64] Living in the body of Christ is a process of increasing conformity to Christ and the qualities of Christ: "whoever persists in justice, will participate in him [Christ], because he himself is justice; whoever persists in truth, will participate in him, for he himself is truth. . . .[65] However, since virtue is a process of increasing participation in Christ, Christian living in the Church is eschatologically oriented and motivated.

The Expansion of Hilary's Christocentric Soteriology to Include the Holy Spirit

As I mentioned earlier in this chapter, as Hilary progresses through his career, he comes to see that salvation (that is humanity's union with God in the body of Christ), while definitively begun through the immediate effect of the incarnation on all humanity, is a process that takes place through the temporal church. Hilary consciously makes room in his physicalist model of redemption for temporal human transformation. The place of this transformation, as we have seen, is the body of Christ, namely the Church. The one who brings about this transformation in time is the Holy Spirit. In particular, Hilary use the term *spiritus* in a multivalent fashion—to refer both to divine nature in general (and particularly to the divine nature of Christ) as well as to the Holy Spirit—in order to show that the Holy Spirit helps humans to participate not only in the flesh of Christ but also in his *spiritus*. Hilary dilates the moment of salvation, then, to make room for both the Church and the working of the Holy Spirit.

---

63 The first fifty Psalms pertain to life prior to, and immediately succeeding, baptism; the third fifty concern post-resurrection life. For Hilary's discussion of this division of the Psalms, see *Tr. ps. Instr*. 11. The connection between Hilary's tripartite division of the psalter and his ordered exegesis of the psalms to address these three stages is the subject of Paul Burns' recent monograph *A Model for the Christian Life: Hilary of Poitier's Commentary on the Psalms* (see especially 31–52).

64 See, for example, *Tr. ps*. 118 Mem 13, where Hilary catalogues vices and virtues. For example: Diligamus ergo iustitiam, modestiam, frugalitatem, misericordiam, et oderimus rixas et ebrietates, caedes, superbias, stupra, cum quibus necesse et diabolum oderimus (CCL 61A 126.14–17).

65 *Tr. ps*. 118 Heth 16: (432.12–14): et particeps eius, quisque in iustitia manet, quia ipse iustitia est: particeps eius erit, quisque in veritate persistit, ipse est enim veritas. . . .

In the early books of the *De Trinitate*, Hilary gives the Holy Spirit the special role of "gift."[66] When called upon to defend the existence of the Holy Spirit as one to be believed in with the Father and Son, Hilary argues that humans know that the Holy Spirit exists because they receive him: "And indeed I think there should be no discussion of whether [the Holy Spirit] exists. He exists since he is given, accepted, and obtained."[67] The Holy Spirit is the gift of the divine to humanity. Because humans receive him, they know the Holy Spirit exists, but Hilary does not make significant effort to show the Holy Spirit as an existent distinct from the Father and the Son. He calls the Holy Spirit "this third thing," but then is unconcerned when Father or Son is also called Holy Spirit.[68] Hilary's definition of the Holy Spirit as gift shows that his thought concerning the Holy Spirit is largely within the realm of salvation history.[69]

However, Hilary's concept of the Holy Spirit as gift is also what allows the Holy Spirit to be distinguished from Hilary's other, and sometimes confusing, uses of the word *spiritus*. Hilary uses *spiritus* with three different meanings. First, the term designates the divine nature: God is spirit, thus both the Father and the Son are called *spiritus*.[70] Second—and this is an extension of

66 See Ladaria, *Espíritu Santo en san Hilario*, 281–292.

67 *De Trin*. 2.29 (CCL 62 64.4–6): Et quidem puto an sit non esse tractandum. Est enim, quandoquidem donatur accipitur obtinetur.

68 *De Trin*. 2.30 (CCL 62 65.1–5): Manere autem hinc quosdam in ignorantia adque ambiguitate existimo, quod hoc tertium, id est quod nominatur Spiritus sanctus, uideant pro Patre et Filio frequenter intellegi. In quo nihil scrupuli est: siue enim pater siue filius et spiritus sanctus est. The term "Holy Spirit" in Hilary's writings sometimes refers to the Holy Spirit proper and sometimes refers to the Father or the Son (who are both Spirit and holy). Smulders argues that Hilary's use of the one term *spiritus* to designate different things, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit proper, does not mean that he in fact conflates these things and is binatarian as Loofs, Turmel and Beck say (*Doctrine trinitaire*, 271–273). See also Giamberadini's discussion of Hilary's use of *spiritus* ("De Incarnatione Verbi," 35–56).

69 Another example of the Holy Spirit's role in salvation history is Hilary's occasional ascription of the words of Scripture to the voice of the Holy Spirit who helps revelation come to all peoples. See *Tr. ps*. 13.5 (CCL 61 79.7–13): Omnibus igitur gentibus reuelatum est et ab omnibus cognitum est. Et rursum in psalmis Spiritus sanctus exclamat: *Cantate Domino canticum nouum, quia mirabilia fecit. Ostendit Dominus salutare suum, in conspectu gentium reuelauit iustitiam suam* (Ps. 97.3) et rursum: *Adnuntiate in gentibus gloriam eius et in omnibus populis salutare eius* (Ps. 95.3) et rursum: *Ostende nobis, Domine, misericordiam tuam et salutare tuum da nobis* (Ps. 84.8). See also *Tr. ps*. 9.1.

70 According to Jn. 4:24, God is Spirit. Hilary, using this text from John as his starting point, says God is Spirit four times in the *De Trinitate* and once in the *Tractatus super Psalmos*.

the first—it refers to the divine nature in Jesus in contraposition to his human nature (*spiritus* is opposed to *carnis*).[71] For example, Hilary says:

> For when [Scripture] says *how shall I flee from your spirit*, it shows forth that time in which he, who is himself spirit, was remaining in the spirit of the paternal glory before the assumption of humanity. For he who is spirit cannot depart, to any place, from the spirit: because neither can he be driven away [from the spirit], nor can he lack [it].[72]

Third, *spiritus* is the Holy Spirit as the third member of the Trinity. What makes Hilary's pneumatology confusing—namely, the different applications of the word *spiritus*—is, according to Ladaria, also what makes it interesting. Ladaria argues that Hilary's use of the single word *spiritus* to signify these three

---

See *De Trin*. 2.31, 7.14, 7.30, 12.8 and *Tr. ps*. 129.3. *Spiritus* as a synonym for divine substance has a long history in Western theology: see Burns, *Christology in Hilary*, 69–73.

71 The question of whether Hilary has a pneumatic christology continues to be actively debated among scholars. Ladaria presents a good summary of the issue in *Espíritu Santo en san Hilario*, 89–111. Ladaria follows Simonetti's classification (the basis of his article "Note di cristologica pneumatica") of the different kinds of pneumatic christology found in the early authors:

1) Spirit is the divine nature of the preexistent Christ.
2) Spirit is the personal name of the preexistent Christ.
3) A confusion between the Holy Spirit and the preexistent Christ centered especially in Luke 1:35.

Options 2 and 3 are problematic for Trinitarian theology because they often lead to binitarianism. Thus, pneumatic christology is sometimes tied to binitarianism (as, Ladaria says, is the case for Lactantius: *Espíritu Santo en san Hilario*, 97). On the other hand, Ladaria brings forth Tertullian as a representative for a theology which demonstrates both the second and third types of pneumatic christology while making clear Trinitarian professions. Although Simonetti argued that some of Hilary's texts belong to the third category, Ladaria disagrees. Ladaria asserts that in the *In Matthaeum* when Hilary calls Jesus *spiritus* or even *spiritus sanctus*, Hilary is simply contrasting the spirit and the flesh, or the divine and the human in Christ. Despite Ladaria's defense, and a clear distinction in *Tractatus mysteriorum* between the Son and the Holy Spirit in the incarnation, other passages, such as *De Trin*. 2.24 explicitly define the overshadowing of the Holy Spirit in the incarnation as the overshadowing of the power of the Son. See also the discussion in Burns, *Christology in Hilary*, 70.

72 *Tr. ps*. 138.21 (CCL 61B 203.4–8): Cum enim ait: *Quo ibo a spiritu tuo*, tempus illud, quo et ipse spiritus in spiritu paternae gloriae ante adsumptionem hominis mansit, ostendit. Non enim potest a spiritu quoquam abesse qui spiritus est, quia nec hic falli potest nec ille deficere. Since the Son is always *spiritus*, in the incarnation, *spiritus* is the eternal, divine part of the person Jesus Christ.

different realities is his demonstration of the intrinsic relationship that exists between all its distinct significants: Father, Son and Holy Spirit can all, according to Hilary, be called "Holy Spirit" because they are all holy and are all spirit.[73]

Hilary's understanding of *spiritus* as essentially the divine power (*uirtus*)[74] informs his conception of the relationship of the Father and the Son, of the Son's participation in divinity during his incarnational life, and of the nature of human integration into the divine life. *Spiritus* has all the notions of infinitude, immensity, simplicity, eternity, strength, life, impulse: it is the *uirtus* of God.[75] The Son fully participates in this *spiritus* or *uirtus* from all eternity for he is one nature and one power with the Father.[76] The incarnation is an emptying of the form—that is the state of glory—but not the nature of God, as we discussed in Chapter 5.[77] Having emptied himself and come to live in the humble state of humanity, the *forma serui*, Christ lacks the divine glory. He—that is, essentially his humanity—receives this glory fully only in the resurrection and ascension. In the resurrection, the Son of God gives to his lowly humanity full possession of the divine spirit (*spiritus*) so that Christ, God and man, may be fully glorified and worthy to sit at God's right hand.[78]

---

73 See *De Trin.* 2.30 (CCL 62 65.1–5): Manere autem hinc quosdam in ignorantia adque ambiguitate existimo, quod hoc tertium, id est quod nominatur Spiritus sanctus, uideant pro Patre et Filio frequenter intellegi. In quo nihil scrupuli est: siue enim pater siue filius et spiritus sanctus est. See also Ladaria, *Espíritu Santo en san Hilario*, 328: "... debemos concluir que no hay confusión entre las diversas acepciones de la palabra «Spiritus» e incluso «Spiritus sanctus» en san Hilario. Dios es espíritu, el Hijo es espíritu desde toda la eternidad, espíritu y carne desde su encarnación, y es el que otorga a los hombres el don del Espíritu Santo, «tercero» en la Trinidad."

74 For example, *De Trin.* 7.27 (CCL 62 294.13–15): Totum in eo quod est unum est, ut quod Spiritus est, et lux et uirtus et uita sit; et quod uita est, et lux et uirtus et Spiritus sit.

75 See Burns, *Christology in Hilary*, 69–72; and Ladaria, *Espíritu Santo en san Hilario*, 326–327.

76 For the Son as one nature and one power with the Father, see *De Trin.* 7.18 (CCL 62 279.6–7): Adque ita in natura eadem est, cui eadem omnia posse naturae sit. For the Son as participating in the divine *spiritus*, see *De Trin.* 3.4 (CCL 62 75.4–5): ... quia ut Spiritus Pater, ita et Filius Spiritus ...

77 See *Tr. ps.* 68.25 (CCL 61 311.3–8): In forma enim serui ueniens euacuauit se ex Dei forma. Nam in forma hominis existere manens in Dei forma qui potuit, aboleri autem Dei forma, ut tantum serui esset forma, non potuit. Ipse enim est et se ex forma Dei inaniens et formam hominis adsumens, quia neque euacuatio illa ex Dei forma naturae caelestis interitus est. ...

78 The process of human glorification, including Christ's divine nature glorifying his human nature (and so all humanity in that human nature) is the topic of Chapter 7. See also Ladaria, *Espíritu Santo en san Hilario*, 327.

There is a strict correlation between Christ, his spirit, and the gift of the Holy Spirit: when the glory of the resurrected Christ fills the earth, then the Holy Spirit is diffused over all flesh. In his commentary on Psalm verse 56.2—"*Be exalted, O God, above the heavens and your glory over the earth*"[79]—Hilary explains that Christ, who has descended in the incarnation in order to ascend, will be exalted in such a way that his glory, namely the Holy Spirit, will be poured out upon flesh.

> *He who descended will be the same one who will ascend above the heavens so that he may fill all things*. . . . And because *he has been exalted above the heavens*, [the text] shows that the glory of his holy spirit *shall fill* the whole earth in what follows: *his glory over the whole land*, and it asserts that when the Lord *has been exalted above the heavens*, the gift of the spirit has been poured out *upon all flesh*.[80]

Christ's glory is the glory of his divinity, his *spiritus sanctus*. But this same divinity is present in the Holy Spirit. Therefore Hilary equates the glorification of the resurrected Lord with the gift of the Holy Spirit.[81] The filling of the earth, and in particular, all flesh, with the Holy Spirit, is the direct result of Christ's descent in the incarnation and re-ascent in his ascension and glorification.

The descent of Christ in the incarnation is the divine *spiritus* becoming enfleshed. When Christ assumes all humanity into his body at his incarnation, he seeks to share not only his body, but also his *spiritus* with humanity.

> . . . in the same way that all are established in him through his wanting to be corporeal, so he himself will again return into all through that element of him that is invisible.[82]

The invisible element of Christ is his divine *spiritus*. The invisible means of the implantation of Christ in the hearts of men is also the work of the Holy Spirit.

---

79 Hilary's quotation of the Psalm verse reads: Exaltare super caelos, Deus, et super omnem terram gloria tua (*Tr. ps*. 56.6 [CCL 61 163.3–4]).

80 *Tr. ps*. 56.6 (CCL 61 163.12–13, 164.16–20): *Qui descendit, ipse est qui ascendit super omnes caelos, ut adimpleat omnia*. . . . Et quia *exaltatus super caelos impleturus* esset in terris omnia sancti Spiritus sui gloria, subiecit: *et super omnem terram gloria tua*, cum effusum *super omnem carnem* spiritus donum *gloriam exaltati super caelos* Domini protestaretur.

81 See Fierro's commentary on this passage (*Sobre la gloria*, 157–158).

82 *De Trin*. 2.24 (CCL 62 60.9–12): . . . quemadmodum omnes in se per id quod corporeum se esse uoluit conderentur, ita rursum in omnes ipse per id quod eius est inuisibile referretur.

The gift of the Holy Spirit is the integration of humanity into the divine; it is humanity's possession of the divine *spiritus*.[83]

The Holy Spirit, then, participates in the unique mediation of the Son.[84] Hilary speaks of the Holy Spirit as God's gift (*donum*) to humanity. We can also look at Hilary's understanding of the gift of the Holy Spirit as the other side of Christ's assumption of all humanity: both these things accomplish the integration of humanity into the divine life. Hilary's understanding of the effects of Christ's assumption of all humanity alter somewhat in the course of his life in that Hilary comes to understand these effects as gradual, allowing the Church a necessary part in the progressive appropriation of the gift offered in the incarnation. The Holy Spirit is a significant actor in Hilary's progressive model of redemption, for the Holy Spirit is both the gift of the divine *spiritus* and the gift that makes humans more receptive to this *spiritus*: "... unless the soul of man has drunk the gift of the Spirit through faith, although it will have a nature made to understand God, it will not have the light of knowledge."[85]

Conclusion

Hilary's ecclesiology in the *Tractatus super Psalmos* is consistently tied both to his soteriology centered in Christ's assumption of all humanity and to eschatology. All three of these subjects are centered in the body of Christ. The result of Hilary's commitment to the belief that Christ physically assumed all humanity into his body at the incarnation is that his primary understanding of the Church as the body of Christ has a physical, material dimension that is absent in other Latin authors. Because the Church is Christ's body, it is an extension of the incarnation and a reality that, while now existing in time, is

83 See *De Trin*. 2.35 (CCL 62 71.15–72.3): Munus autem quod in Christo est omne omnibus patet unum. Et quod ubique non deest, in tantum datur, in quantum quis uolet sumere, in tantum residet, in quantum quis uolet promereri. Hoc usque in consummationem saeculi nobis cum, hoc expectationis nostrae solacium, hoc in donorum operationibus futurae spei pignus est, hoc mentium lumen, hic splendor animorum est. Hic ergo Spiritus sanctus expetendus est, promerendus est, et deinceps praeceptorum fide adque obseruatione retinendus. See also Ladaria, *Espíritu Santo en san Hilario*, 158.

84 Burns notes that Hilary seems to attribute a greater role to the Holy Spirit in the *Tractatus super Psalmos* than he had in his earlier *In Matthaeum*. Burns argues that in the *Tractatus super Psalmos*, Hilary connects the Holy Spirit to the Word's inherent *ordo* and its universal impact. See Burns, *Model for the Christian Life*, 83.

85 *De Trin*. 2.35 (CCL 62 71.11–14): ... animus humanus nisi per fidem donum Spiritus hauserit, habebit quidem naturam Deum intellegendi, sed lumen scientiae non habebit.

destined to be beyond time. The destiny of the Church, like that of the physical body of Christ, is to be glorified and to reign at the right hand of the Father. The Church's position in time is explained by Hilary with the analogy of the younger son supplanting the elder. The Church has taken the birthright and the election of the Jews. However, Hilary's supercessionist vision is not exclusionary. One of Hilary's main critiques of the Jews is that they limit salvation to those of the proper lineage. The Church, on the other hand, as the body of Christ, includes all humanity: all now have the proper lineage if only they will accept it and continue in Christ's body through faith and the sacraments. The temporal Church is the place for the working out of this salvation for it is the place of deeper integration into Christ's body. The integration of individuals into Christ's *spiritus* is accomplished by the Holy Spirit. Since Christ already waits in heaven for the measure of his body to be filled, the Church's existence is neither fully in this world or the next: its eyes are fixed on its own eschatological fulfillment.

CHAPTER 9

Hilary's Patercentric Theology: The Relationship between Physicalism and Trinitarian Theology

Discussion of the Trinity is logically prior to discussion of salvation history in as much as the eternal precedes the historical. However, in the previous chapters I have paved the way for understanding Hilary's conception of the eternal relationship of the Father and the Son. We have learned in the previous chapters that for Hilary, the body of the incarnate Son of God (which contains all of humanity), is the center of everything that has to do with creation and the dispensation. As we have seen, Hilary is adamant that transformation of the human person happens only in the body of Christ, whether that body is the temporal body of the Church or Christ's eternal glorified body in which humans will exist for all eternity. In summary, our study of Hilary's soteriology, eschatology, and ecclesiology have shown that Hilary envisions salvation history as an upward movement for humanity, a movement taking place always in the body of Christ, in which humanity comes to participate in divinity. Hilary's eschatology is precise: at the end, the Son will hand the kingdom over to the Father, that is to say, all those who exist eschatologically in the Son will be taken into the Father, though still and always in the Son. The pinnacle, then, of the upward movement of salvation is the Father, though, as we have seen, the mediatory role of the Son never ceases.

The purpose of this chapter is first to outline, by no means exhaustively, the general aspects of Hilary's understanding of the eternal relationship of the Father and the Son and secondly, to show the connection in Hilary's thought between this eternal relationship and the economic stages of salvation. We will find that Hilary's model of the relationship of the Father and the Son is essentially that of revelation. As revelation approaches humanity, Hilary firmly holds that divine revelation should lead to human transformation. The incarnation, as the greatest revelation, is also the greatest transformer of humanity. As we shall see, Hilary believes that Christ's assumption of all humanity in the incarnation is the means by which Christ reveals God to all and so opens all to transformation.

Hilary has a soteriological system that consistently upholds his Trinitarian theology. This upward movement of salvation, accomplished through Christ, that ends at the Father, is, for Hilary, a reflection of the eternal relationship of the Father and the Son in which the Son is the eternal mediator of the

© KONINKLIJKE BRILL NV, LEIDEN, 2015 | DOI 10.1163/9789004290815_011

Father.[1] Hilary, in both his soteriology and his Trinitarian theology, speaks far more about the mediator, namely the Son, than the mediated, namely, the Father. Yet it is clear that Hilary considers that all focus on the middle term of the Son is for the sake of the beginning and the end, namely, the Father. The purpose of the Son is the Father.

The Holy Spirit also participates in the upward movement of salvation that ends in the Father. The Holy Spirit is the divine "gift" who both prepares the way for the Son's incarnation and spreads its effects. The work of the Holy Spirit is integrated into the revelation and mediation of the Son. Scholars such as Loofs, Hanson, and Simonetti term Hilary's theology binitarian because he never uses the term *persona* to speak of the Holy Spirit.[2] We will find, in our discussion of Hilary's Trinitarian vocabulary, that neither does Hilary use *persona* as a title for the Father or Son. Nevertheless, it is certainly true that Hilary's Trinitarian theology is largely a treatment of the relationship of the Father and Son.

Hilary's Trinitarian theology is fully engaged in the fourth century Trinitarian polemics of both East and West. Hilary's exile in the East and his association with Basil of Ancyra and the homoiousians leads him to fully appreciate the dangers both of the "Arian" theology of the homoians and the monarchian theology of Photinus.[3] Hilary's friendly relationship with the homoiousians, his

1 For Hilary, all revelation of the Father comes through the Son: humans know the Son first, and, through him, the Father second (see *De Trin*. 2.6 [CCL 62 43.29–31]: Et quia Patrem nemo nouit nisi Filius, de Patre una cum reuelante Filio qui solus *testis fidelis* est sentiamus.) Albeit in a different context, namely in his argument against Marcion for the unity of Scripture and salvation history, Tertullian argues for a very different "order" (*gradus*) in which the Father always comes before the Son, both in terms of generation and in terms of human recognition: they know the Father before they know the Son. See Tertullian, *Aduersus Marcionem* 3.2.2 (CCL 1 510.12–15): Suspectum habebitur omne quod exorbitarit a regula rerum, quae principales gradus non sinit posterius agnosci, patrem post filium et mandatorem post mandatum et Deum post Christum.

2 Friedrich Loofs, "Hilarius," in *Realenzyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche*, ed. J.J. Herzog, vol. 8 (Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs, 1900), 60. Hanson, *Search for the Christian Doctrine of God*, 505. Simonetti, "Note di Cristologica pneumatica," 230. See Smulders discussion wherein he recognizes the "problem" of Hilary's non-use of *persona* for the Holy Spirit, as well as his use of the term "Holy Spirit" to refer sometimes to the Holy Spirit proper and sometimes to the Father or the Son (who are both Spirit and holy). Smulders concludes that Hilary does not conflate the Holy Spirit with either Father and Son and is not binitarian (*Doctrine trinitaire*, 271–273).

3 Weedman offers the most comprehensive account of Hilary's indebtedness to homoiousian anti-homoian polemics (*Trinitarian Theology of Hilary*). For Hilary's anti-Photinian Trinitarian polemics and their indebtedness to the homoiousians, see Beckwith, *Hilary of*

De Synodis, and his *De Trinitate* all attest to his determination to fight against those who teach "unlikeness" between the Father and Son. When he returns from his exile, Hilary swiftly turns this anti-homoian polemic against Latin homoians.[4] On the other side of the spectrum, Hilary recognizes and refutes the monarchian paradigm of Photinus.[5] Hilary is consistently careful to avoid a modalist overidentification of the Father and Son.

Hilary's theology, as a careful polemic against the dual dangers of the subordinationism of the homoians and the modalism of the monarchians, can be simplified to contain three points (which I will explain at greater length in the course of the chapter).[6] First, the Son is the same as the Father. Second, the Son is different from the Father.[7] Third, the Son reveals the Father by both his sameness and his difference. (1) Hilary argues that the Father and the Son share the same substance, power, honor and glory. Since the Son is from the Father, he receives what the Father is. (2) However, the names "Father" and "Son" are names that, at the simplest level, point to a difference between the two. "Father" and "Son" define a relationship: a Father can only be a Father to his Son; he is not Father, for example, to himself. Likewise, a Son is distinguished from his Father by his begottenness; a Son cannot be his own Son. For

---

Poitiers on the Trinity, 66–68, 118–122, 199–202. However, Beckwith also shows that Hilary is engaged in anti-Photinian polemics even before his exile and contact with the homoiousians (see Carl Beckwith, "Photinian Opponents in Hilary of Poitiers's *Commentarium in Matthaeum*," *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 58 [2007]: 611–627).

4 In 364, Hilary tries, and fails, to oust Auxentius, the homoian bishop of Milan. Hilary recounts his failure in the *Contra Auxentium*. See also Daniel Williams, "Anti-Arian Campaigns of Hilary of Poitiers and the 'Liber Contra Auxentium'," *Church History* 61 (1992): 18–22.

5 For the centrality of Photinus as the heretical dialogue partner of Latin pro-Nicenes in the 4th century, see Daniel Williams, "Monarchianism and Photinus of Sirmium as the Persistent Heretical Face of the Fourth Century," *Harvard Theological Review* 99 (2006): 187–206.

6 For Hilary's explicit desire to chart a course between these two heresies, see *De Trin*. 7.3.

7 As we will see in the next section, Hilary says that the Son must be confessed to be one (*unum*) with the Father, but not one (*unus*) with the Father. Through his grammatical use of *unus* and *unum*, Hilary shows a consistent awareness of both the sameness and difference of the Father and the Son: (*De Trin* 7.31 [CCL 62 299.34–35]: . . . per natiuitatem et generationem uterque potius unum confitendus sit esse, non unus.)

Hilary's use of *unus* and *unum* likely manifests an awareness of the monarchian use of the masculine rather than neuter (*unus* rather than *unum*) to signify the personal unity of the Godhead.

There is one exception to this use of *unus* and *unum*: in *In Matt*. 16.4 (SC 258 52.11–12) Hilary says the Son is *unus* with the Father: Est ergo filius Dei ex Deo Deus, unus in utroque. See the discussion of this passage in Burns, *Christology in Hilary*, 78–80.

Hilary, as we shall see, the names Father and Son "are applied to divine things in accordance with the understanding of their nature."[8] The names "Father" and "Son" applied to God (the first member of the Trinity), and God (the second member), truly define something about the nature of each and the relationship of the two. (3) The Son's existence as eternally generated from the Father is a revelation of the Father. Hilary explains that since, as Matthew 11:27 says " 'no one knows the Father except the Son,' we should think about the Father together with the Son who reveals him and who alone is a reliable witness."[9] Because his temporal work is a fulfillment of his eternal role, Hilary says "the greatest work of the Son was that we might know the Father."[10] In order to truly reveal the Father, the Son must reveal both his own sameness with the Father and his difference from the Father, for each reveals something true about the Father. We will see that Hilary considers the Son's eternal generation the revelation *par excellence* of both the Son's sameness with, and difference to, the Father because it reveals both his nature and his relationship to the Father.[11]

With creation, the Son's temporal revelation and mediation begins, for now the Son has someone to whom he can reveal the Father. The incarnation is the temporal perfection of the Son's eternal role of revealer of the Father. For Hilary, the universal effect of the mediation of the incarnation is dependent upon Christ's assumption of not one man only, but of all humanity. Christ, beginning in the incarnation, integrates humanity into his body so that the glorification of his humanity is the glorification of all humanity. Christ's body is the place of salvation, both now, in the Church, and eschatologically, in his glorified body, where humans will eternally participate in divine life.

---

8 *De Trin*. 3.22 (CCL 62 94.18–19): Secundum naturae intellegentiam nomina diuinis rebus aptata sunt.

9 *De Trin*. 2.6 (CCL 62 43.29–31): Et quia Patrem nemo nouit nisi Filius, de Patre una cum reuelante Filio qui solus *testis fidelis* est sentiamus.

10 *De Trin*. 3.22 (CCL 62 93.3–4): Adquin hoc maximum opus Fili fuit, ut Patrem cognosceremus. See also *Tr. ps*. 137.7 (CCL 61B 185.14–21): Est autem et nomen aliud deo, quod in euangeliis cognoscimus, Domino dicente: *Pater, uenit hora, honorifica Filium tuum, ut Filius honorificet te*; et post multa alia sequitur: *Manifestaui nomen tuum hominibus*. Et quod nomen esset, superius ostendit dicens: *Pater, uenit hora, honorifica Filium tuum*. Huius ergo nomen adorat, qui et secundum legem Deus Abraham et Deus Isaac et Deus Iacob sit et secundum euangelia unigeniti Dei Pater est.

11 See Smulders' discussion of the Son's generation in *Doctrine trinitaire*, 140–178.

Hilary's Trinitarian Vocabulary: *Persona, Nomen*, and *Natura*

In the *Aduersus Praxean*, Tertullian uses the Latin word *persona* to distinguish between the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Though Tertullian never actually used the formula commonly credited to him—*unus substantia in tribus personis*—he does use *persona* in the nominative case as a term or title to distinguish between the Father, the Son, and the Spirit.[12] In the narrative of Genesis, he says:

> It is because the Son, a second person (*persona*), his Word himself, was already attached to him—and a third person (*persona*), the Spirit in the Word—that he [the Father] said in the plural "Let us make" and "ours" and "to us."[13]

Novatian, like Tertullian, uses *persona* for the Father and the Son, though, unlike Tertullian, he does not use it for the Holy Spirit.[14]

Hilary is certainly aware of this Latin tradition of the technical usage of *persona* within the Trinitarian realm, however while Hilary does give *persona* ontological weight in the Trinitarian realm, he distinguishes himself from his predecessors by using *persona* exclusively in the genitive and never as a predicative nominative serving as a title for each of the members of the Trinity as Tertullian and Novatian had done.[15] Hilary uses *persona* in the context of

---

12 There is remarkably little embarrassment about the false attribution of this proto-Chalcedonian formula. For example, Evans says: "*Una substantia in tribus personis*, an expression with which Tertullian is commonly credited, sufficiently represents his position, for though *tres personae* does not seem actually to occur, it is certainly there by implication" (Ernest Evans, trans., *Tertullian's Treatise Against Praxeas* [London: S.P.C.K., 1948], 36).

13 Tertullian, *Aduersus Praxean* 12.3 (CCL 2 1173.12–14; Evans 101.29–31): quia iam adhaerebat illi Filius, secunda persona, sermo ipsius, et tertia, Spiritus in sermone, ideo pluraliter pronuntiavit « faciamus » et « nostram » et « nobis ».

14 In the twenty-four occurrences of any form of the word *persona* in Novatian's work, not one is in reference to the Holy Spirit. He does, however, clearly use *persona* in a Trinitarian context in the nominative case as a technical term of ontological weight to distinguish between the Father and the Son. For example, see Novatian, *De Trin*. 27.3–4 (CCL 4 64.10–16): Vnum enim neutraliter positum societatis concordiam, non unitatem personae sonat. Vnum enim, non 'unus' esse dicitur, quoniam nec ad numerum refertur, sed ad societatem alterius expromitur. Denique adicit dicens sumus, non 'sum', ut ostenderet per hoc, quod dixit 'sumus', et 'pater', duas esse personas.

15 Hilary, we shall see, prefers a prosopological use of *persona*. Tertullian also uses *persona* prosopologically, which is why Rondeau says Hilary's Trinitarian use of this word is in line

"distinction of persons" by which term he signals whatever is two (or three) in the divine, rather than one (like substance or power). "Person" in this context is always found in the genitive (*personae* or *personarum*) and is paired with words like *significatio, distinctio* or *discretio*. For example, in trying to explain why the Son should be given the apparently subordinationist title of "angel of God," one of Hilary's explanations is that "He is called angel of God so that the distinction of persons (*personarum distinctio*) might be absolutely clear. For he who is God from God, is also an angel/messenger of God."[16] Whatever distinction exists in the Godhead, is a distinction of persons, *not* a distinction of substance or kind in the Godhead: "[the Lord] distinguishes the one dwelling in him from he in whom he dwells, nevertheless only by a distinction of persons (*personae distinctio*) not of kind."[17]

While Hilary's genitive use of *persona* serves, like Tertullian and Novatian's nominative use, to explain what is different between the members of the Trinity, nevertheless two points must be made about Hilary's participation in this traditional use of Trinitarian technical vocabulary. First, Hilary does not ever, as we have said, use *persona* in the nominative form to speak of the Father, Son, or Holy Spirit.[18] There may be a "distinction of persons" but Hilary avoids *persona* as a nominative title or descriptor of the Trinitarian members. Second, *persona* is only once paired in Hilary's writings with the term *natura*.[19]

---

with Tertullian (see Rondeau, *Commentaires patristiques*, vol. 2, *Exégèse prosopologique*, 324–326). Likewise, Tertullian's formula in *Aduersus Praxean* 25.1 (CCL 2 1195.9; Evans 121.10): Qui tres unum sunt, non unus . . ., where Father, Son and Spirit are said to be one neuter thing but not one masculine thing, is nearly repeated by Hilary, *De Trin.* 7.31 (CCL 62 299.35): . . . unum confitendus sit esse, non unus. Hilary's preferred manner of differentiating between the plural and the singular in the divinity is by this use of neuter and masculine referrents. Nevertheless, the point being made here is that Tertullian makes another use of *persona*, as does Novatian, by which he can speak of the *persona Patris* or the *persona Filii*. This use of *persona* Hilary does not share with his predecessors.

16 *De Trin*. 4.23 (CCL 62 126.23–25): Vt personarum distinctio absoluta esset, angelus Dei est nuncupatus. Qui enim est Deus ex Deo, ipse est et angelus Dei.

17 *De Trin* 4.40 (CCL 62 145.14–18): Quod autem sequitur: In te est Deus, non solum eum qui praesens est, sed etiam eum qui manet in praesente demonstrat: habitantem ab eo in quo habitet discernens, personae tamen tantum distinctione, non generis.

18 Smulders (*Doctrine trinitaire*, 287–288) is overstating when he argues that Hilary never uses *persona* in the *De Trinitate* to designate the Father and the Son.

19 Lewis Ayres states, "At a number of points in the *De Trinitate* Hilary pairs *natura* and *persona*, but only after book 3" (Lewis Ayres, *Nicaea and its Legacy*, 183). This statement is problematic for a two reasons. First, other than this single example that he offers in the footnote to this quotation from *De Trin.* 5.10 ([CCL 62 160.8–9]: . . . Pater et Filius non persona sed natura unus et uerus Deus uterque est) Ayres is unable to offer any other

Hilary's use of *persona* is not dependent upon the contrast between *persona* and *natura*.[20]

Second, Hilary's dominant use of *persona* is within a prosopological context.[21] Prosopology approaches each text with three basic questions: who is speaking, to whom is he speaking, and what is he speaking about? In the prosopological context a *persona* is a metaphysical subject who can be an "I" talking to a "you."[22] Hilary's prosopological questions—especially in exegetical works like the *Tractatus super Psalmos*, but also in the *De Trinitate*, inasmuch as it is

---

demonstration of Hilary's use of *persona*. Second—again apart from this example—Hilary does not pair *natura* and *persona*. Ayres is not the only one to make this mistake. Simonetti, likewise, believes Hilary pairs the two terms (Simonetti, *La Crisi Ariana nel IV secolo*, Studia Ephemeridis Augustinanum 11 [Rome: Institutum Patristicum Augustinianum, 1975], 300, 305), and Simonetti, working more closely with Hilary's theology, exemplifies what happens when Hilary's technical terminology is misunderstood. Simonetti's misunderstanding of Hilary's use of *persona*, we shall see, leads him to believe Hilary is essentially a binatarian.

20 In the most recent monograph on Hilary's Trinitarian theology—Weedman's *Trinitarian Theology of Hilary*—a cursory look at the index reveals numerous references to "nature" and "name," but "person" does not even show up on the index. This omission reflects, to some extent, Hilary's own thought and terminology: the term that reflects the multiple of the divinity as opposed to the singular of the divinity represented by "nature" is, in Hilary's writings, more likely to be "name" than "person." However, Weedman seems to have been blinded by Smulders' assessment of "person" in Hilary's Trinitarian theology because, while it may not be the parallel term to "nature," Hilary does have other Trinitarian uses for it.

21 Smulders' statement that Hilary never uses *persona* in the *De Trinitate* to designate the Father and the Son overlooks Hilary's prosopological use of *persona* (*Doctrine trinitaire*, 287–289). Rondeau corrects his mistake (Rondeau, *Commentaires patristiques*, vol. 2, *Exégèse prosopologique*, 325). Rondeau's study of the prosopological method in Hilary's exegesis is a masterful work that lends insight into both historical and doctrinal areas (*Commentaires patristiques*, vol. 2, *Exégèse prosopologique*, 35–125, 323–364). For the historical, while use of the prosopological method is commonplace in patristic exegesis, it is for the most part limited in scope and technical proficiency. Only Origen and Hilary practice prosopology as a technical science according to the rules of pagan drama (72–74). According to Rondeau, prosopology is one of the greatest proofs of Origenian influence on Hilary. As for the doctrinal, Rondeau highlights the christological clarifications that an understanding of Hilary's prosopology offers to the reader. Especially important is what we will see later: when Hilary uses the formula *ex persona hominis* or *ex perona domini* he is not saying that there are two different "persons" of Christ (the man and the Son) who are speaking but that Christ has two different modes of intervening in a speech event in keeping with his two different natures (333–340).

22 See Rondeau, *Commentaires patristiques*, vol. 2, *Exégèse prosopologique*, 340.

centered on scriptural exegesis—highlight the dramatic actors of Scripture. Hilary uses this prosopology to distinguish between the Father and the Son and the Spirit. Indeed attributing Scripture passages to the wrong divine speaker is often the source of heresies.[23] Hilary's prosopological use of *persona* is almost always introduced by the formula "*ex persona*. . . ."

Hilary's use of *persona* offers insight into the place of the Holy Spirit in Hilary's Trinitarian theology. The scholarly explanations of Hilary's theology as binitarian point to two problematic aspects of Hilary's treatment of the Holy Spirit. The first is that Hilary uses *spiritus* to refer to several different realities, only one of which seems to refer to a distinct hypostasis;[24] the second is that Hilary does not use the word *persona* to designate the Holy Spirit.[25] As I noted in the previous chapter, several useful studies on Hilary's use of *spiritus* have served to clarify this decidedly difficult aspect of Hilary's vocabulary and thought.[26] However, the most recent studies have advanced little in understanding the pneumatological significance of Hilary's use of the word *persona*. Simonetti concludes that Hilary provides ample evidence of the Holy Spirit's actions *ad extra* and so, in this economic sense, can easily be labeled a Trinitarian. However, in the intra-divine relations, Simonetti believes that Hilary is more properly termed a binitarian.[27] The major problem with Hilary's

23 See, for example, *De Trin*. 5.32 concerning the words of Isaiah 65:1–2 (CCL 62 184.1–8): Haec si stultitia adque inpietas heretica ad fallendum ignorantes simpliciores que dicta esse ex persona Dei Patris mentietur, ne in Deum Filium dicti huius intellegentia suscipi possit, audiat mendacii sui ab apostolo et doctore gentium reatum, omnia haec ad sacramentum passionis dominicae et euangelicae fidei tempora praedicante, tum cum infidelitatem Istrahel aduentum Domini in carnem non intellegentis exprobrat.

24 See the discussion in Chapter 8 "The Expansion of Hilary's Christocentric Soteriology to Include the Holy Spirit."

25 Friedrich Loofs ("Hilarius," 60) recognizes that Hilary does distinguish the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son, but implies that this is an impersonal distinction. His argument is followed by Joseph Turmel (*Histoire des dogmes*, vol. 2 [Paris: Rieder, 1932], 183): "Hilaire, après l'exil tient le Saint-Esprit pour un don, mais il lui refuse la personnalité." Hanson likewise argues that Hilary sees the "Spirit as possessing distinct existence from that of the Father and the Son," though "he tended to see the Spirit as an impersonal influence rather than as God encountered in a personal mode . . ." (*Search for the Christian Doctrine of God*, 503). In the end, Hanson says, "We cannot precisely call Hilary a Trinitarian theologian . . ." (ibid., 505).

26 See especially Ladaria, *El Espíritu Santo*, 89–111; Burns, *The Christology in Hilary*, 69–73; Simonetti, "Note di Cristologica pneumatica," 201–232.

27 In many respects, Ladaria's monograph agrees with Simonetti's conclusion, though Ladaria thinks that this unhappy conclusion can be avoided if we approach Hilary's teaching concerning the Holy Spirit not from the dogmatic-Trinitarian point of view but

presentation of the Holy Spirit, according to Simonetti—and the problem that makes Hilary in some sense binitarian—is that he does not describe the Holy Spirit with the term *persona*.[28]

As we have seen, while Hilary uses the word *persona* in a Trinitarian context, he does not use it in the nominative case as a technical term of ontological weight to distinguish between the Father and the Son.[29] Hilary distinguishes between Father and Son most characteristically with his use of the words "one," "two," and "other," or "another." He says that the "two are not one (*unus*), rather the one (*alius*) is in the other (*alius*), because there is not something other (*aliud*) in either of them."[30] By far Hilary's preferred terminology for distinguishing between the Father and the Son is to say that they are one neuter thing, *unum*, but not one masculine thing/person, *unus*. Hilary uses *unus* and *unum* consistently and technically.

> Thus in God the Father and God the Son neither will you name together two gods—because the two are one (*unum*)—nor will you proclaim a single God—because the two are not one (*unus*) . . . so that on account of the birth and generation, the two must rather be confessed as one (*unum*), not one (*unus*).[31]

---

from that of salvation history with an eye to the Holy Spirit's role in it. From here we will find that Hilary has a clear and coherent teaching regarding the Holy Spirit (see Ladaria, *Espíritu Santo en san Hilario*, 24–25).

28 Simonetti highlights the problem of Hilary's failure to use *persona* in reference to the Holy Spirit ("Note di Cristologica pneumatica," *Augustiniaum* 12 (1972): 230).

29 Simonetti, however, criticizes Hilary's failure to use *persona* to speak of the Holy Spirit because he does not recognize that Hilary's use of *persona*, even for the Father and Son, is limited: "il termine tecnico *persona*, adoperato per il Padre e il Figlio, non è mai applicato allo Spirito santo" ("Note di Cristologica pneumatica," 229).

30 *De Trin.* 3.4 (CCL 62 75.13–14): Non duo unus, sed alius in alio, quia non aliud in utroque.

31 *De Trin*. 7.31 (CCL 62 298.21–24, 299.34–35): Ita in Deo Patre et Deo Filio neque duos connominabis deos, quia unum uterque sunt; neque singularem praedicabis, quia uterque non unus es . . . ut per natiuitatem et generationem uterque potius unum confitendus sit esse, non unus. For other examples of Hilary's use of the terminology of *unus*/*unum*, see *De Trin*. 1.17 (CCL 62 17.13–18.19): Sed nos edocti diuinitus neque duos deos praedicare neque solum, hanc euangelici ac profetici praeconii rationem in confessione Dei Patris et Dei Fili adferemus, ut unum in fide nostra sint uterque non unus, neque eundem utrumque neque inter uerum ac falsum aliud confitentes: quia Deo ex Deo nato, neque eundem natiuitas permittit esse neque aliud. See also *De Trin*. 4.33 (CCL 62 137.18–20): Ac sic uterque Deus unus est, cum inter unum et unum, id est ex uno unum, diuinitatis aeternae non sit secunda natura. *De Trin*. 5.11 (CCL 62 121.23–29): Missi autem et mittentis significatio hic non aliud quam Patrem et Filium docet, ceterum ueritatem non adimit naturae,

Hilary says, then, that the Father and the Son are *unus et unus* (one and one, that is two different masculine subjects of predication) or *non unus* (that is, not one masculine subject of predication) but he intentionally does not say that they are each a *persona* or together *personae*.

In this context, the fact that Hilary does not use *persona* to refer to the Holy Spirit says absolutely nothing about whether Hilary considers the Holy Spirit a definite, personal being distinct from the Father and the Son. The point is that Hilary's vocabulary, and his prosopological use of *persona*, in which *persona* is not the counterpoint to substance or nature as it is in both earlier (Tertullian), and later formulations, neither requires or allows *persona* to be the technical qualifier for divine personhood: either of the Father, Son, *or* Holy Spirit.

Hilary's use of *persona* demonstrates that, for Hilary, *persona* is not the paired term, the opposite, so to speak, of *natura* or *substantia*.[32] Part of the difficulty in understanding Hilary's Trinitarian theology is that his use of technical terminology is not consistent either with the tradition or within his writings. As we have seen, Hilary consciously distances himself from the technical use of *persona* in the Latin tradition. Furthermore, Hilary's use of the term *persona* is even more complicated than what we have just outlined. *Persona*, as we have said, is generally used prosopologically by Hilary. One result of this use is that *persona* does not mean "person" in the modern sense (as in a complete human subject), but only "subject" or "speaker." Therefore, Christ can speak from two different *personae: ex persona hominis* (*assumpti*)[33] or

---

neque in Filio perimit natiuae diuinitatis proprietatem, quia nemo ambigat naturam auctoris in Fili natiuitate connasci, ut ex uno consistat in unum quod per unum non discernatur ex uno; adque ita unum sint per quod unus ex uno est. *De Trin*. 8.4 (CCL 62A 317.27–31): Adque ita in hac perfectae natiuitatis beatissima fide uitium omne, et duum deorum et Dei singularis extinguitur: cum qui unum sunt, non sit unus, et qui non unus est, non tamen ab eo qui est ita ex aliquo differat, ut uterque non unum sint. *De Trin*. 9.52 (CCL 62A 430.3–6): Quae utique differentiam non habent ex aequalitate naturae: cum contemplatio Fili uisum conpenset et Patrem, et unus in uno manens unum non discernat ab uno. *Tr. ps*. 122.7 (CCL 61B 39.15–20): Deus enim unus uterque est, non quod unus diuisus in duo sit, aut uterque ipse sit, ut nuncupatio sola fecerit Patrem et Filium, non natura gignendi, sed idcirco Deus unus, quia neque duo innascibiles neque unigeniti duo, sed unus ex uno et ambo unum, non dissimili scilicet aut differente a se substantia diuinitatis in utroque.

32 See Rondeau, *Les Commentaires patristiques*, vol. 2, *Exégèse prosopologique*, 329: "... il ne trace pas une frontière rigide entre *persona* et *natura*. ..."

33 See, for example, *Tr. ps*. 138.5 (CCL 61B 194.2–3): Omnis enim nunc in exordio ex persona eius hominis, quem adsumpsit, oratio est. ... For *ex persona hominis* see *Tr. ps*. 54.2. For *ex persona formae seruilis*, see *Tr. ps*. 53.4.

ex persona domini.[34] Hilary is not saying that there are two complete "persons" in Christ, but that Christ has two modes of speaking according to his two different natures, divine and human. Ironically, then, while *persona* rarely means what we would understand as "person," it can occasionally signal "nature."

To make things more complicated, Hilary's use of *natura* is likewise multivalent and depends upon his understanding—which changes over the course of his writing career—of the relationship between name (*nomen*) and nature (*natura*). In the *De Trinitate*, on the one hand, Hilary professes that "the Father and the Son are of one name and nature in an identical kind of divinity."[35] On the other hand, Hilary says that "the names [plural] of the nature" are the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.[36] Hilary proposes a distinct format for applying names to God in which he shows some signs of awareness of the different positions and debates concerning name theory.[37] He supports a naturalist name theory with statements such as: "The name expresses the nature"[38] or the "name designates nature."[39]

---

34 See, for example, *Tr. ps*. 64.16 (CCL 61 232 10–11): Dictum enim est ex persona Domini: *Spiritus Domini super me* . . . . For *ex persona Filii* see *Tr. ps*. 1.1.

35 *De Trin*. 7.8 (CCL 62 267.6–268.8): unius nominis adque naturae in indissimilis genere diuinitatis Patrem et Filium esse. See also *De Trin*. 5.20 (CCL 62 171.17–19): Aut quae in utroque naturae diuersitas est, ubi eiusdem naturae unum adque idem nomen est?

36 *De Trin*. 2.5 (CCL 62 41.10–13): . . . et editis prout in uerbis habebimus dignitate adque officio Patris Fili Spiritus sancti, non frustrentur naturae proprietatibus nomina, sed intra naturae significationem nominibus coartentur.

37 Nevertheless, Hilary does not demonstrate an intimate knowledge of the details of the ancient language debates. For example, when A.A. Long assesses Platonic and Stoic theories of name-giving, he distinguishes five basic positions: moderate conventionalism, radical conventionalism, formal naturalism, etymological naturalism, and phonetic naturalism (A.A. Long, "Stoic Linguistics, Plato's *Cratylus*, and Augustine's *De dialectica*," in *Language and Learning: Philosophy of Language in the Hellenistic Age*, ed. Dorothea Frede and Brad Inwood [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005], 43). Hilary displays none of these in *De Trinitate*. For Hilary, the name *Deus* (or *Pater* or *Filius*) does not denote the perceptible form of God, nor does its etymological analysis provide insights to God's ineffable nature, nor does the sound of the name capture the properties of God.

38 *De Trin*. 6.44 (CCL 62 249.10–12): Nomen naturam loquitur, ueritatem proprietas enuntiat, fidem confessio testatur.

39 *De Trin*. 7.9 (CCL 62 268.6): Aut numquid nomen non naturae significatio est? Et quia contradictio omnis ex causa est, nunc hic negandi Dei quaero causam. See also *De Trin*. 2.5 (CCL 62 41.11–13): non frustrentur naturae proprietatibus nomina, sed intra naturae significationem nominibus coartentur.

Hilary believes in the *De Trinitate* that when speaking about God there is a correspondence between names and the natures designated by these names.[40] He presents in the *De Trinitate* a naturalist naming theory for a very reduced number of names: "Father," "Son," "Holy Spirit,"[41] "God,"[42] "only-begotten,"[43] "Word," "Wisdom," and "Power."[44] He argues against the conventionalist position that believes names have no tie to nature other than conventional imposition. The conventional position robs us, in Hilary's mind, of our very basis for understanding and belief: "If I do not believe names, if I do not understand the nature from the words, I ask what ought to be believed or understood? There is no other indication left to me."[45] Hilary is particularly interested in defending, as we have said, the names "Father" and "Son." If the sonship of the Son is the result of adoption and not nature, then, Hilary says, the names Father and Son "are useless," and we accept "Christ as God from name but not from nature."[46] A belief that the names Father and Son are conventional makes

40 Weedman contends that Hilary's theology of name "owes nothing to his Latin heritage," "belongs to a tradition of Trinitarian thought that existed exclusively in the East," and is one of "his most original and important contributions to Latin Trinitarian theology" (Weedman, *Trinitarian Theology of Hilary*, 136, 144). Though Weedman is correct that the category of "name" had not been central in previous Latin Trinitarian theology, Hilary is not the only fourth century Latin author to argue for some sort of a naturalist name theory. Hilary shares this conviction with Chromatius, who criticizes Ebion and Photinus for their understanding of the names of Father and Son: . . . cum paterni nominis ueritas sine uera et legitima Filii natiuitate esse not possit . . . (Chromatius, *Tractatus in Matthaeum* 50.3 [CCL 9A 448.119–120]).

41 *De Trin.* 2.5 (CCL 62 42.26–29): [Deus] Posuit naturae nomina Patrem Filium Spiritum sanctum.

42 *De Trin.* 5.24 (CCL 62 176.15–19): . . . ut ad salutarem confessionem in Patre Deo et in Filio Deo Deus semper ostensus, naturae ueritatem ipso naturae nomine edoceret, cum lex Deum utrumque significans ambiguitatem non relinqueret ueritatis. . . .

43 *De Trin.* 6.39: (CCL 62 244.12–14): *Filium* enim et *unigenitum* cognominans, suspicionem paenitus adoptionis exsecuit, cum ueritatem nominis unigeniti natura praestaret.

44 *De Trin*. 7.11 (CCL 62 270.1–4, 24–29): Res existit in uerbo, uerbi res enuntiatur in nomine. Verbi enim appellatio in Dei Filio de sacramento natiuitatis est, sicuti sapientiae et uirtutis est nomen. . . . Sed ex aeterno Deo Patre unigenitus Filius in subsistentem Deum natus, ut non alienus esse a natura paternae diuinitatis posset intellegi, per haec proprietatum nomina subsistens ostensus est, quibus ex quo substiterat non carebat.

45 *De Trin*. 6.25 (CCL 62 226.28–30): Si non credo nominibus, si naturam uocabulis non intellego, quid credendum et intellegendum sit quaero. Non mihi relinquitur alia suspicio.

46 *De Trin*. 8.3 (CCL 62A 315.26–27): . . . ut Deus Christus ex nomine potius quam ex natura sit. *De Trin*. 6.31 (CCL 62 228.29–30): Quid infertur hodie calumniae, ut adoptio nominis sit, ut mendax Deus sit, ut nomina inania sint?

these names "pretenses," and "things spoken rather than proper."[47] Throughout the *De Trinitate* Hilary maps out how eternal generation is the only way to preserve the reality—that is, the natural, rather than conventional, connection—between the names and the nature of the Father and the Son.[48]

During his exile in the East, Hilary was at the Council of Seleucia in 359 where Aetius and Eunomius were present, and Hilary in fact had an exchange with the heteroousians at this conference.[49] In addition, Aetius' work, the *Syntagmation*, is early enough that Hilary might have encountered it.[50] For Eunomius, since "names designate essences,"[51] different names, such as Father and Son or unbegotten and begotten, witness to different essences.[52] Hilary's

47 *De Trin.* 6.42 (CCL 62 247.17–18): Sin uero simulata omnia sunt et potius nuncupata quam propria. . . .

48 See Weedman's chapter on the "Name and Birth of God" for a discussion of the relationship between Hilary's name theology and his theology of birth and his debt, for both of these categories, to homoiousian theology (Weedman, *Trinitarian Theology of Hilary* 136–156).

49 Hilary gives an account of his exchange with the "Anomeans" at this conference in *In Constantium* 12–14. *In Constantium* 12 (SC 334 192.9–16): Orientalium in Seleucia synodum repperi, ubi tantum blasphemorum est quantum Constantio placebat. Nam prima secessione mea deprehendi ut centum quinque episcopi omoeousion, id est similis essentiae, praedicarent et decem et nouem anomoeousion, id est dissimilis essentiae, profiterentur, soli Aegyptii praeter Alexandrinum hereticum omousion constantissime obtinerent. While Rocher, in his notes in the Sources Chretiennes edition identifies the teaching of these "Anomeans" to be Eunomian (SC 334 243), Daniel Williams believes that what Hilary has encountered is not Eunomian teaching but homoian (Daniel Williams, "The Anti-Arian Campaigns of Hilary," 9). Nevertheless, Williams points out that Hilary's encounter with the "Anomeans" at Seleucia is his first contact with a theology of dissimilarity of essence (cloaked behind an ambiguous profession of *similis*).

50 Kopacek gives the date of the *Syntagmation* as between September 28, 359 and December 359 (Thomas Kopacek, *A History of Neo-Arianism*, 2 vols. [Cambridge, MA: Philadelphia Patristic Foundation, 1979], 226).

51 Eunomius, *Apologia* 18, in *Contre Eunome suive de Eunome Apologie*, ed. and trans. Bernard Sesboüé, Georges-Matthieu de Durand, and Lous Doutreleau, Sources chrétiennes 305 [Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1983], 305 270.24–25): . . . εἶναι τῶν οὐσιῶν σημαντικὰς τὰς προσηγορίας.

52 Eunomius, *Apologia* 18 (SC 305 270.17–18): παρηλλαγμένων τῶν ὀνομάτων, παρηλλαγμένας ὁμολογεῖν καὶ τὰς οὐσίας. Eunomius' argues that within a naturalist name framework, the different names Father and Son or Unbegotten and Begotten point to different essences. Basil of Caesarea responds to Eunomius by completely rejecting this understanding of language where names indicate essence or nature. In *Contra Eunomium* 2.9, Basil of Caesarea says there are two categories of names—one presents the thing itself, the other indicates a connection—and neither category of names penetrates to the essence of the

encounter with the heteroousian use of naturalist name theory turns him away from his previous "common sense naturalism."[53] Evidence of the beginning of this turn away from naturalist name theory can be found in the apophatic emphases of Hilary's later interpolations in the *De Trinitate*.[54]

But between the *De Trinitate* and the *Tractatus super Psalmos*, that is, between 360 and 364, Hilary realizes that no amount of apophaticism can save a naturalist name theory from the Eunomian logic and, in the *Tractatus super Psalmos*, he quietly ceases to apply a naturalist name theory. However, he neither explicitly rejects it nor does he try to articulate a more appropriate

---

thing named. Names present qualities, not natures. For this reason, the names Peter and Paul, indicate not that Peter and Paul have different natures (one human and the other something else) but rather the names present different individual characteristics: Ὁ μέντοι οὐχ ὑποστάσεώς τινος ἔννοιαν ἐμποιεῖ, ἀλλὰ μόνην τὴν πρὸς ἕτερον σχέσιν ἀποσημαίνει, τοῦτο οὐσίαν εἶναι νομοθετεῖν πῶς οὐ τῆς ἀνωτάτω παραπληξίας ἐστί; Καίτοιγε μικρὸν ἔμπροσθεν ἐδείκνυτο παρ' ἡμῶν, ὅτι καὶ τὰ ἀπολελυμένα τῶν ὀνομάτων, κἂν τὰ μάλιστα δοκῇ ὑποκείμενόν τι δηλοῦν, οὐκ αὐτὴν παρίστησι τὴν οὐσίαν, ἰδιώματα δέ τινα περὶ αὐτὴν ἀφορίζει (Basil of Caesarea, *Contra Eunomium* 2.9, in *Contre Eunome suive de Eunome Apologie*, ed. and trans. Bernard Sesboüé, Georges-Matthieu de Durand, and Lous Doutreleau, Sources chrétiennes 305 [Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1983], 36.21–38.27). See Kopacek's discussion of Basil's response to Eunomius' name theory in *History of Neo-Arianism*, 385.

53 See Tarmo Toom, "Hilary of Poitiers' *De Trinitate* and the Name(s) of God," *Vigiliae Christianae* 64 (2010): 476. In *De Trin.* 7.17 (CCL 62 278.22), Hilary argues that the equal divinity of the Father and the Son can be derived from the name and the nature of the Son: . . . exaequatio illa per nomen naturamque Fili. . . .

54 Weedman believes that Hilary owes his theology of name and nature to Basil of Ancrya (Weedman, *Trinitarian Theology of Hilary*, 106–107, 150–156). Weedman presents Hilary as the heir of Basil's argumentation against Eunomius' name theology. However, in his presentation of the debate between Eunomius and Basil, Weedman addresses only the question of which names were considered appropriate for the first and second persons: Father and Son according to Basil, Unbegotten and Begotten for Eunomius. Weedman neglects Eunomius' philosophical point that within a naturalist name framework, the different names Father and Son or Unbegotten and Begotten point to different essences.

Weedman argues that Hilary became aware of the potential danger of the claim "the name reveals the nature" sometime between the writing of *De Trin*. 7 and *De Trin.* 12 (Weedman, *Trinitarian Theology of Hilary*, 180). Though this claim begins Weedman's 8th Chapter, he proceeds to talk surprisingly little about name theology throughout the chapter and certainly offers little proof of Hilary's "new awareness." Weedman does, however, argue (following Beckwith) that the apophatic strand present throughout the *De Trinitate*—where Hilary speaks about the limitations of human language and analogies—is a later addition, inconsistent with the positive assertation that "the name reveals the nature." These apophatic insertions, according to Weedman, are the result of Hilary's late recognition of the danger of naturalist name theory (Weedman, ibid., 186).

understanding of the meaning of names. The elimination of natural name theory in the *Tractatus super Psalmos* reveals Hilary's awareness of the Eunomian critique, but Hilary, unlike Basil of Caesarea, for example, never articulates a theological response.

Throughout his changing approach to name theory, Hilary's maintains a consistent, though not uni-dimensional, use of the technical term *natura*. For Hilary, *natura* is a term with two distinct senses. For example, *natura* is that which the Father and the Son share. However, fatherhood and generation are the Father's *natura*, obviously something he does not share with the Son—so how is it that the Father and the Son have the same *natura*? The answer is that sometimes Hilary uses *natura* as an equivalent to *substantia*: it is the underlying divine "stuff" common to all the members of the Godhead.[55] For example, in his commentary on Psalm 144, Hilary places *natura* and *substantia* in apposition as the reasons whereby the Father and the Son are one: ". . . . on account of the similtude of substance and the property of nature, the one is in the other and both are one (*unum*). . . ."[56] At other times, in talking about a member of the Trinity, for example, the Son, he uses *natura* to refer not just

55 In the *De Synodis*, Hilary equates *substantia* and *natura* but distinguishes both these from *essentia*, which seems to lack the concrete quality of the former two. See *De Synodis* 12. See also the discussion in Weedman, *Trinitarian Theology of Hilary*, 103–104, and Simonetti, *Crisi Ariana*, 305.

56 *Tr. ps*. 144.3 (CCL 61B 269.3–4): . . . ex substantiae similitudine ac proprietate naturae alter in altero sit et ambo unum sint. . . . For other examples of *substantia* and *natura* being used interchangeably, see *Tr. ps*. 122.7 (CCL 61B 39.19–20): . . . non dissimili scilicet aut differente a se substantia diuinitatis in utroque. *Tr. ps*. 131.22 (CCL 61B 127.5–15): At quomodo intelligitur, *Ponam super sedem meam*, et: *Sedebunt super sedem tuam*, nisi quod per concordem et non dissimilem a se innascibilis unigenitique naturam et Pater in Filio, et Filius in Patre est deitatis in utroque nec genere nec uoluntate dissidente substantia; cum paternae majestatis gloria Unigenito congenita sit? Atque ob id sedem Filii, *sedem suam* Pater nuncupat: quia et ex se et in gloria indemutabilis diuinitatis suae unigenitus et uerus Deus natus sit nec contumeliam communicatarum cum eo sedium sentiat, cui ex se genito in naturae similitudine nulla diuersitas est. *Tr. ps*. 138.17 (CCL 61B 201.15–202.22): Est enim maior Pater Filio, sed ut pater Filio, generatione, non genere: Filius enim est, et ex eo exiuit. Et licet paternae nuncupationis proprietas differat, tamen natura non differt. Natus enim a Deo Deus non dissimilis est a gignente substantia. Non potest ergo ad eum ex quo est. Nam quamuis alter in altero per uniformem ac similem eiusdem naturae gloriam maneat, tamen ei ex quo genitus est non exaequari in eo uidetur posse, quod genuit. *Tr. ps*. 138.35 (CCL 61B 212.17–21): Est namque genitus ex eo, non est in eo nouae creationis aliena natura. Virtute filius est, diuinitate filius est, substantia filius est, generatione filius est. Opera testantur, potestates loquuntur per naturae progeniem in Filio Patrem esse, et per legitimae originis substantiam Filium in Patre esse.

to the divine "stuff" but to the entirety of the Son's divine way of being. In this way *natura* includes all the particularities that we would usually associate with *persona*. For the Son these particularities include especially his existence as generated, with all the attributes that accompany this generation: not only the special application of the names "Word," "Wisdom," and "Power,"[57] but also the superiority of the Father (without the inferiority of the Son by nature).[58] As with *persona*, Hilary never explains to his reader that he has different uses of *natura*, nor does he forewarn before his frequent switches between the two.

Hilary uses the technical signifiers *persona, nomen*, and *natura* in a way that is unique to him and, in some instances, consciously different from his theological predecessors. Furthermore, Hilary uses each term in multiple ways. If we insist on understanding Hilary's use of technical terminology as rigid and univocal, we will render his theology completely incomprehensible. Hilary uses *persona* prosopologically, where, at least in christological discussions, its meaning is often closer to what we would understand as "nature" than "person." He consciously avoids following in the footsteps of Tertullian and Novatian, who use *persona* in the nominative case to distinguish between Father and Son (and Holy Spirit, in the case of Tertullian). To accomplish the task that *persona* plays for Tertullian and Novatian, Hilary most often uses a grammatical distinction between neuter and masculine genders: the Father and Son are *unum* but not *unus. Natura* was tied together with *nomen* in the *De Trinitate* by Hilary's naturalist name theory in which certain names, such as Father and Son, indicate the essence of the thing spoken of. However, as a result of his contact with heteroousian theology, Hilary seperates *natura* from *nomen* in the *Tractatus super Psalmos*. Hilary applies *natura*—either tied to or disconnected from a naturalist name theory—according to two distinct senses in which *natura* is either the underlying "stuff" of divinity or the distinct compilation of everything that makes each Trinitarian member "himself." An understanding of Hilary's use of these three terms is necessary for any discussion of his Trinitarian theology.

The Place of the Holy Spirit in Hilary's Trinitarian Theology

Following the brief note already made concerning Hilary's theology of the Holy Spirit in connection with his Trinitarian use of *persona*, I wish to add

57 See *De Trin*. 7.11.

58 *De Trin*. 9.56 (CCL 62A 436.7–9): Natiuitas Fili Patrem constituit maiorem. Minorem uero Filium esse natiuitatis natura non patitur.

two more short points. Hilary's pneumatology, not unexpectedly for his time, is eloquent about the economic working of the Holy Spirit and rather silent regarding immanent Trinitarian relations.[59] First, Hilary insists that one must believe in the Holy Spirit along with the Father and the Son and confess him along with the Father and the Son.[60] However, Hilary says that "it is not necessary to speak of the Holy Spirit."[61] In this explicit profession of the Holy Spirit accompanied by relative silence concerning the Holy Spirit in his Trinitarian theology, Hilary differs little from his contemporaries. Second, Hilary does not so much lack a theology of the Holy Spirit as place it almost entirely within the realm of salvation history. We have already addressed the way in which Hilary consciously makes room in his soteriological system for temporal growth of believers into Christ. This temporal growth takes place within the Church and is the work of the Holy Spirit. The whole actualization of the Holy Spirit, before and after the incarnation, is part of the unique mediation of Christ, begun in creation and fulfilled in the incarnation, or better, in the resurrection.

In intra-Trinitarian relations and even in creation, there is no real differentiation between the *spiritus dei* in these contexts and the Father and Son. This spirit is often simply a manifestation of the omnipotent energy of God.[62] In the realm of salvation history, the Holy Spirit's role is directly tied to that of Christ's. The Holy Spirit prepares for the incarnation and, as the *donum* of Christ, spreads its effects.[63] The Holy Spirit, he who is "given and possessed and of God," is the heavenly gift who guides humans in understanding.[64] In the time before the incarnation, he is the inspirer of the prophets; after the incarnation he is the gift of Christ communicating the divine life to believers.

The work of the Holy Spirit is integrated into the one mediation of the Son. In his incarnational assumption of all humanity, the Son takes all humanity

---

59 For this reason, I have placed the bulk of the discussion on the Holy Spirit within the economic chapter on ecclesiology (Chapter 8).

60 See the doxology at *Tr. ps.* 143.23 (CCL 61B 267.32–34): Ipsi gloria, laus, honor, uirtus, imperium. Patri in Filio, Filio in Patre et in sancto Spiritu et nunc et semper et in omnia saecula saeculorum. Amen. See also *De Trin.* 2.29.

61 *De Trin.* 2.29 (CCL 62 64.1–5): De Spiritu autem sancto nec tacere oportet, nec loqui necesse est. Sed sileri a nobis eorum causa qui nesciunt non potest. Loqui autem de eo non necesse est, qui Patre et Filio auctoribus confitendus est. Et quidem puto an sit non esse tractandum.

62 See Ladaria, *Espíritu Santo en san Hilario*, 257.

63 Ladaria, *Espíritu Santo en san Hilario*, 270–271, 334–335. Hilary's most systematic presentation of the Holy Spirit centers upon his understanding of the Holy Spirit as gift. This role as gift seems to be the "personal character" of the Holy Spirit.

64 *De Trin.* 2.29 (CCL 62 65.21): . . . est et donatur et habetur et Dei est.

into his body and makes believers sons in the Son. In so doing, he perfects his revelation of the Father by making the Father not only *a* Father but truly *our* Father. The Holy Spirit works to help each person accept the gift of divine life offered universally in the incarnation. In this way the Holy Spirit mediates and spreads the unique mediation of the Son.

Recent scholarship agrees that Hilary's discussion of the Holy Spirit is economic rather than ontological.[65] Hilary's discussion of the Holy Spirit within the Trinitarian realm is nearly always used to demonstrate the unity of nature between the Father and the Son, not the unity of the Holy Spirit with the Father and the Son.[66] As a result, I have placed my study of the Holy Spirit within the realm of salvation history, and specifically in the previous chapter on ecclesiology, rather than here in the discussions of the eternal relations of the divine persons. This placement more adequately reflects Hilary's own treatment of the Holy Spirit.

The Eternal Relationship of the Father and the Son in the *De Trinitate* and the *Tractatus super Psalmos*

For Hilary, humanity is led to consideration of the eternal relationship between the Father and the Son by the temporal relationship of the incarnate Christ with his Father. Hilary, like all the Fathers, does not see a radical disjunction between what, in modern times, we term the immanent and the economic Trinity. It is self-evident to Hilary that the temporal interactions we witness between the Father and Christ are true, though perhaps analogous, representations of the eternal interaction between the Father and the Son. Furthermore, Hilary reasons that since Scripture tells us that the Son is the only revealer of the Father, a study of the Son is the only way we have of knowing the Father.

65 Ayres, *Nicaea and its Legacy*, 185: "[Hilary's] account of the Spirit's role is, however, entirely economic." The thesis of Ladaria's monograph on the Holy Spirit in Hilary's thought (*Espiritu santo en san Hilario*) is that scholarship has judged Hilary's theology of the Holy Spirit to be confusing and inconsistent because it has wrongly approached Hilary's presentation of the Holy Spirit from the dogmatic-Trinitarian point of view. When approached economically, Hilary's theology of the Spirit is consistent and nuanced.

66 See, for example, *De Trin*. 8.19–33 where Hilary describes the Holy Spirit as both proceeding from the Father and sent from the Son in order to manifest the unity of nature between the proceeder and the sender, namely the Father and the Son, without venturing to discuss whether the Holy Spirit is included in that unity.

> Since no one knows the Father except the Son (Matt. 11:27), let us think of the Father together with the Son who reveals him and is the only *faithful witness*.[67]

Knowledge of the Father is necessary for salvation. Therefore, the relationship between the Father and the Son is the basis of humanity's access to the Father.

What does the Son reveal about the Father? Hilary gives two answers. First, the Son reveals *what* the Father is. That is, the Son reveals the nature and the power of the Father. The Son reveals what the Father is by being the same thing himself. The Son, then, has the same nature (understood as substance) and power as the Father. Second, the Son reveals *who* the Father is. The Son reveals who the Father is by his difference from the Father: he is the begotten Son and his begottenness points to the begetter Father.[68] The name "Father" truly reveals something about the being of the Father. The Son's begetting from the Father, therefore, reveals the truth of the names Father and Son.[69] The what and the who of the Son reveal, by his sameness and difference to the Father, the what and the who of the Father.

Because human understanding of who and what the Father is depends upon an understanding of who and what the Son is, the *De Trinitate* focuses on the Son and defending the nature of the Son from heretical attack. Hilary's lengthy treatment of John 14:9 ("he who has seen me has seen also the Father") in Book 7 of the *De Trinitate* is a defense of the Son's nature that reveals his method of understanding the Father through understanding the Son. In the concluding sections of Book 7 (sections 40–41), Hilary gathers together numerous Johannine texts that delineate the Son's role as revealer of the Father in order to advance the argument that seeing the Son is also seeing the Father only if "God is in God and God is from God."[70] These two motifs (God in God and God from God) taken together serve to protect both the sameness and the

---

67 *De Trin*. 2.6 (CCL 62 43.29–31): Et quia Patrem nemo nouit nisi Filius, de Patre una cum reuelante Filio qui solus *testis fidelis* est sentiamus.

68 See *De Trin.* 2.11 where Hilary argues that the Son's begottenness leads us to understand both that "the nature of the Godhead is not different in one and in the other" and that the Son is "not different in anything" from the Father except that "he is born from him who is unborn." (CCL 62 48.10–49.13): Non natura diuinitatis alia et alia, quia ambo unum. Deus a Deo. Ab uno ingenito Deo unigenitus Deus. Non dii duo, sed unus ab uno. Non ingeniti duo, quia natus est ab innato. Alter ab altero nihil differens, quia uita uiuentis in uiuo est.

69 See *De Trin*. 2.2–6.

70 *De Trin*. 7.41 (CCL 62 310.17): Deum in Deo esse et ex Deo Deum esse. The Johannine texts that Hilary uses concerning the Son's role as revealer of the Father include Jn. 14:11: *Credite mihi, quoniam ego in Patre et Pater in me*; Jn. 14:8: *Ostende nobis Patrem*; Jn. 14:9: *Qui me*

difference, the unity and the distinction, between the Father and the Son. "God in God" safeguards the identity of substance and power between the Father and Son. "God from God" provides more clearly for the distinction between the two, namely the difference between Father and Son.

These two motifs—God in God and God from God—and Hilary's use of them to delineate all the major propositions of his Trinitarian theology, are the subject of a brief but insightful article by Christopher Kaiser.[71] Kaiser explains that each of the two propositions—God in God and God from God—support the unity of the Godhead and the distinction between the Father and Son, however both are needed to establish the complete spectrum of Hilary's Trinitarian propositions. Kaiser outlines five Trinitarian propositions: 1) distinguishing properties, 2) distinctness of persons, 3) common substance and/or attributes, 4) one God, 5) completeness of Godhead in each person. He argues that "God in God" argues primarily for the unity of the Godhead, namely three through five, secondarily for the distinctness of persons, namely number two, and has nothing to say about the distinguishing properties, namely number one. "God from God" primarily supports the distinctness of the persons, namely propositions number one through three, and only secondarily the unity of the Godhead, namely proposition four, and does not address the completeness of the Godhead in each person, namely number five.[72]

The coinherence implied in the unitive account (*x* in *x*) of "God in God" supports Hilary's assertion of the full, ontological unity between Father and Son while allowing for a distinction of persons though not distinguishing properties. For example, in the *De Trinitate* Hilary says "the two are not one (*unus*), but one is in the other, because there is nothing different in either of them."[73] The substance and power of the Father and the Son are the same, though the Father and Son, as members of the Trinity are not the same.

The etiological account (*x* from *x*) of "God from God" while supporting the unity of nature and power—for example, in the *Tractatus super Psalmos*, Hilary asserts, "one from one and both are one, with no difference or dissimilarity in

uidit, uidit et Patrem. Other John texts in this passage include Jn. 10:30: *Ego et Pater unum sumus*; Jn. 14:10: *Ego in Patre et Pater in me*.

71 Christopher Kaiser, "Development of Johannine Motifs in Hilary's Doctrine of the Trinity," *Scottish Journal of Theology* 29 (1976): 237–247. Hilary speaks of the two motifs—"God from God" and "God in God"—as mutually corrective in *De Trin*. 5.37–38.

72 See Kaiser's chart on page 246 of "Development of Johannine Motifs."

73 *De Trin.* 3.4 (CCL 62 67.13–14): Non duo unus, sed alius in alio, quia non aliud in utroque.

the substance of divinity between them"[74]—provides for a distinction of persons more readily than "God in God."

> He is the only-begotten God. Nor does the name "only-begotten" admit a companion, just as the unbegotten, in his unbegottenness, does not allow a participator. Therefore he is one from one. There is neither another unbegotten God besides the unbegotten God nor another only-begotten God besides the only-begotten God. Therefore, each of them is unique and alone, indeed with respect to the property of each of unbegottenness and birth.[75]

The generation of the Son from the Father creates a relationship that distinguishes two entities, "Father" and "Son," with distinctive properties, namely unbegottenness and birth. For example, it is impossible for the Son to have the property of unbegottenness even though he is fully God.

Hilary's Trinitarian logic to this point, combining a unitive account (*x* in *x*) and an etiological account (*x* from *x*) to explain both the sameness and the difference between the Father and the Son, is common in Latin Trinitarian theology. For example, Tertullian, in section 8 of his *Aduersus Praxean*—which deals with the same combination of Johannine passages (John 14:9–11 and John 10:30) as the passage from Hilary's *De Trinitate* 7.41 that we just examined—presents a series of images for thinking about the relationship of the Father and the Son. These images—of root and shoot, spring and river, sun and beam—show two important things about this relationship according to Tertullian: the Father and Son are two things, the one an offspring of the other (*x* from *x*), but they are also conjoined and undivided (*x* in *x*).[76]

---

74 *Tr. ps.* 122.7 (CCL 61B 39.19–20): . . . unus ex uno et ambo unum, non dissimili scilicet aut differente a se substantia diuinitatis in utroque. See also *De Trin.* 7.15 (CCL 62 276.18–20): Quis porro dubitabit, quin indifferntem naturam natiuitas consequatur ? Hinc enim est sola illa quae uere esse possit aequalitas: quia naturae aequalitatem sola possit praestare natiuitas. See also *Tr. ps.* 122.2, where Hilary mentions the "inseperable power" of the Father and Son, and *Tr. ps*. 131.22, where he speaks of the "same substance of deity" in the Father and the Son.

75 *De Trin* 4.33 (CCL 62 136.11–137.18): Est enim *unigenitus Deus*. Neque consortem unigeniti nomen admittit, sicuti non recipit innascibilis, in eo tantum quod est innascibilis, participem. Est ergo unus ab uno. Neque praeter innascibilem Deum innascibilis Deus alius est, neque praeter unigenitum Deum unigenitus Deus quisquam est. Vterque itaque unus et solus est, proprietate uidelicet in unoquoque et innascibilitatis et originis.

76 Tertullian, *Aduersus Praxean* 8.6 (CCL 2 1168.35–39; Evans 97.11–15): igitur secundum horum exemplorum formam profiteor me duos dicere Deum et sermonem eius, Patrem

The distinctiveness of Hilary's Trinitarian theology depends upon the centrality of the category of birth for both the etiological and unitive accounts.[77] Hilary's use of the category of birth derives from his contact with Basil of Ancyra and the homoiousian use of birth in anti-homoian polemic.[78] Birth is the category that provides the foundation for an understanding and confession of the Son's name, nature, and power.[79] Each of these other characteristics only shows one facet of the reality. Name, for example, shows the difference between Father and Son, while nature points to their unity. Hilary uses birth as the category that best accounts for both unity and difference, for birth shows both equality of nature and distinction of persons.[80] Birth gives meaning to both the equality and the differences implied in the titles "Father" and "Son" and "unbegotten" and "only-begotten":

---

et Filium ipsius: nam et radix et frutex duae res sunt sed coniunctae, et fons et flumen duae species sunt sed indivisae, et sol et radius duae formae sunt sed cohaerentes. In this section, Tertullian also demonstrates a theology similar to Hilary's concerning the names "Father" and "Son": he says that the Word of God has received the name Son "in an exact sense" (97.9). However, Simonetti notes that one of the ways in which Hilary follows Novatian in contrast to Tertullian is regarding the use of the traditional images of sun, fire, and fountain to describe the relationship of Son to Father: Tertullian uses these images while Novatian and Hilary do not (Manlio Simonetti, "Ilario e Novaziano," *Rivista di cultura classica e medioevale* 7.2 (1965): 1034–1047).

77 Weedman says that Hilary's theology of "name" and "birth" (*natiuitas*)—an adaptation of Basil of Ancyra's theology—is Hilary's most original and important contribution to Latin Trinitarian theology (*Trinitarian Theology of Hilary*, 136). However, while Hilary uses *natiuitas* over 400 times in the *De Trinitate*, he uses it only 26 times in the later *Tractatus super Psalmos*, and of these 26, only one definitively refers to the Son's eternal generation (*Tr. ps*. 63.3). In the *Tractatus super Psalmos*, Hilary prefers to use *natiuitas* as a term to refer to the incarnation, Christ's resurrection, or the renewal of humans—either in baptism or into eternal life. Hilary occasionally uses *natus* to speak of the Son's eternal birth in the *Tractatus super Psalmos*, but more often he avoids the language of birth altogether preferring *genitus*, the language of generation.

78 Weedman, *Trinitarian Theology of Hilary*, 150–156.

79 See *De Trin.* 7.16 (CCL 62 277.20–26): . . . ut quia Deum esse Dominum nostrum Iesum Christum Dei Filium nomine natiuitate natura potestate professione didicissemus, demonstratio nostra gradus singulos dispositionis propositae percurreret. Sed natiuitatis id natura non patitur, quae in se et nomen et naturam et potestatem et professionem sola conplectitur. Sine his enim natiuitas non erit, quia in se haec omnia nascendo contineat.

80 For birth as proof of equality of nature, see *De Trin.* 7.15 (CCL 62 276.19–20): . . . naturae aequalitatem sola possit praestare natiuitas. For birth as distinguisher of persons, see *De Trin*. 7.20 (CCL 62 282.23–24): Neque aliter potuit aut debuit Filius a Patre distingui, quam ut et natus esse. . . .

> There is one from one, God from God. The unbegotten does not admit of another, so that there would be two, nor does he admit that he is not God because there is one only-begotten. There are not two unbegottens, nor are there two only-begottens. In that which each one is, he is one. While the only-begotten does not have an equal neither does the unbegotten admit an equal, and neither does the only-begotten God subsist from any other than the unbegotten God.[81]

Generation ensures to Father and Son both full divinity and distinctiveness. They are, in Hilary's language, each one (*unus*) God, though they are not together two gods.

While in the *In Matthaeum* Hilary followed Tertullian's two-stage *logos* theory, he consciously rejects this theory in his post-exilic writing.[82] Tertullian says that just as a word can exist interiorly in the mind before, or even apart from, its exterior expression in speech, so the divine *logos* was generated and existed in the mind of God before he was birthed, that is, exteriorized as a distinct person.[83] However, in the *De Trinitate*, Hilary acknowledges Photinus' use of Tertullian's analogy of the *prolatio uerbi* to promote a monarchian agenda. Therefore Hilary rejects Tertullian's model as overly susceptible to forms of modalism:[84]

> . . . why do you complain of what follows: *And the Word was with God*? Did you hear "in God" [rather than "with God"] in order to understand it as the utterance of a concealed thought? . . . For it says, *And the Word was God*. The sound of a voice ceases as does the voicing of a thought. This Word is a thing, not a sound; a nature, not an utterance; God, not emptiness.[85]

---

81 *Tr. ps.* 134.8 (CCL 61B 147.11–148.16): Vnus ex uno, Deus ex Deo est. Non recipit alterum innascibilis, ut duo sint; nec admittit, quod est unus unigenitus, ne Deus sit. Non sunt duo innascibiles, non sunt duo unigeniti. In eo unusquisque quod est, unus est. Dum parem nec unigenitus habet, nec innascibilis admittit neque unigenitus Deus ex alio quam innascibili Deo subsistit.

82 Williams argues that Hilary employs a two-stage *logos* model in the *In Matthaeum* ("Defining Orthodoxy," 160).

83 See, for example, Tertullian, *Aduersus Praxean* 5.4 (CCL 1164.21–24; Evans 93.25–28): Nam etsi Deus nondum sermonem suum miserat, proinde eum cum ipsa et in ipsa ratione intra semetipsum habebat, tacite cogitando et disponendo secum quae per sermonem mox erat dicturus.

84 For a discussion of Hilary's anti-Photinian interpretation of the prologue of John in *De Trin.* 2, see Beckwith, *Hilary of Poitiers on the Trinity*, 118–122.

85 *De Trin.* 2.15 (CCL 62 52.16–18, 52.23–53.24–26): . . . de sequenti quid quaereris: *Et uerbum erat apud Deum*? Numquid audieras "in Deo," ut sermonem reconditae cogitationis

In rejecting Tertullian's analogy of the word, Hilary also rejects its conclusion, namely, that the Son's generation and birth are two sequential steps, one before time and one in time. By the time of *De Trinitate* Book 12, Hilary has entirely repudiated his two-stage logos theory and offers a new theory in which not only the Son's generation but also his "eternal birth is before time."[86] The Son "was born before the eternal ages," so "he is prior to the very time of our thoughts," because "the infinity of the eternal ages consumes whatever pertains to time."[87] The sequence of the two-stage *logos* theory depends upon a temporal distinction between the two steps of generation and birth, but by placing birth before time, Hilary eliminates the possibility of generation and birth happening as a temporal sequence.

Hilary's account of the Son's birth is linked to his understanding of the names "Father" and "Son" within the context of the eternity of God. As we have seen, Hilary believes that the name designates the nature.[88] In this case, the names of "Father" and "Son" require a process of generation in which the Son is begotten of the Father.

> For both are the one God:[89] not because one is divided in two, or because each is himself God, as if the name alone, and not the nature of begetting, might have made Father and Son.[90]

The nature designated by "Father" and "Son," in both cases is a nature defined through the process of generation. A Father is not a Father until he has begotten children. Likewise a son does not exist until he has been begotten of a Father.

---

acciperes? . . . Dicit namque: *Et Deus erat uerbum*. Cessat sonus uocis et cogitationis eloquium. Verbum hoc res est, non sonus; natura, non sermo; Deus, non inanitas est.

86 *De Trin*. 12.54 (CCL 62A 624.1): Natiuitas eius ante aeterna tempora est. Hilary here follows Novatian in seeing both generation and birth as before time. Novatian argues that the relationship of Father and Son demands that the Son be not only generated, but also born before time (see Novatian, *De Trin*. 31.3–7 [CCL 4 75–76]). Smulders (*Doctrine trinitaire*, 82–83) and Burns (*Christology in Hilary*, 76–80, 134) argue that Hilary does not fully integrate Novatian's insight until his later works and so in the *In Matthaeum* still has a two-stage approach to the Son's generation. Simonetti and Doignon disagree. See the discussion in Burns, *Christology in Hilary*, 76–80. See also Simonetti, "Ilario e Novaziano."

87 *De Trin*. 12.31 (CCL 62A 603.15–17): Ergo et infinitas temporum aeternorum quod est temporis . . . consumit.

88 *De Trin.* 7.9 (CCL 62 268.6): Aut numquid nomen non naturae significatio est?

89 Or: "for the one and the other are each God" (Deus enim unus uterque est).

90 *Tr. ps*. 122.7 (CCL 61B 39.16–17): Deus enim unus uterque est, non quod unus diuisus in duos sit aut uterque ipse sit, ut nuncupatio sola fecerit Patrem et Filium, non natura gignendi.

Hilary emphasizes eternity as a divine quality.[91] Since God is eternal, if the Son is God, he too must be eternal. Furthermore, Hilary argues that since God is immutable,[92] and since God only becomes a Father upon the generation *and* birth of the Son (contra the two-stage *logos* theory), we must profess that there was no time before this generation and birth, rather that the Son is generated and born eternally.

> The birth will announce nothing other than the Father, nor will the Father announce anything other than the birth. For this name or nature permits nothing else to be between them. Either the Father is not always Father if the Son is not always the Son, or, if the Father is always the Father, the Son is also always the Son, because however much time is denied to the Son so that he is not always Son, that much time is lacking to the Father so that he is not always Father. The result of this is that although he is always God, he is not always the Father in that infinity in which he is God.[93]

---

91 Burns argues that Hilary recognized "eternity" as an essential divine attribute as early as the *In Matthaeum*. See Burns, *Model for the Christian Life*, 143, where he cites *In Matt*. 31.2: Deus autem sine mensura temporum semper est et qualis est, talis aeternus est. Aeternitas autem in infinito manens, ut in his quae fuerunt, ita in illis quae consequentur extenditur, semper integra, incorrupta, perfecta, praeter quam nihil quod esse possit extrinsecus sit relictum.) However, in the *In Matthaeum*, Hilary says the Son is eternal, not, as he will argue later, because he is eternally generated, but rather because he receives the divine nature, which is eternal (Burns, *Christology in Hilary*, 76).

Weedman demonstrates that Hilary's argument for eternal generation shifts in the course of the *De Trinitate*. In *De Trin*. 7, the name "Father" itself provides the defense for eternal generation; in *De Trin*. 12, it is no longer the name but the eternity of the Father that defends eternal generation (*Trinitarian Theology of Hilary*, 187).

92 For the immutability of God, see, for example, *Tr. ps*. 2.13 (61 45.24–46.26): Ipse est, qui, quod est, non aliunde est; in sese est, secum est, a se est, suus sibi est et ipse sibi omnia est carens omni demutatione nouitatis, qui nihil aliud, quod in se posset incidere, per id quod ipse sibi totum totus est, reliquit.

93 *De Trin.* 12.32 (CCL 62 603.6–604.14): Natiuitas autem nihil aliud quam Patrem, neque Pater aliud quam natiuitatem enuntiabit. Medium enim nihil quicquam nomen ist[ud] aut natura permittit. Aut enim non semper Pater, si non semper et Filius; aut si semper Pater, semper et Filius: quia quantum Filio temporis, ne semper Filius fuerit, abnegabitur, tantum Patri deest, ne Pater semper sit; ut licet semper Deus, non tamen et Pater in ea fuerit infinitate qua Deus est.

For Hilary, the eternity of God means that the names "Father" and "Son" must be eternally applicable since they are names that truly describe the nature, which is eternal for each of them. Because of the ontological weight of these names, they cannot apply to God sometimes but not always. If there was once no Son, God was once not Father. But if the Father is to have the infinity essential to his divinity, he must always be Father.[94] Therefore, the Son must always be Son, which means he must be both generated and born from eternity.

Smulders has shown Hilary's conviction that the prologue of John—"In the beginning was the Word" (*In principio erat uerbum*)—shows the eternity of the Son. Hilary focuses on the imperfect tense of *esse* in this verse. This tense shows that at whatever beginning one might imagine, the Word *was*, which means he was already existing.[95] To underline the eternity of the Son in a way that does not need temporal terms such as "already" or "before," Hilary introduces a periphrastic phrase—*est ergo erans*—that, until the recent Corpus Christianorum critical edition, was rejected because it runs counter to the rules of grammar.[96] Hilary says the Son "is and therefore was be-ing (*erans*) with God."[97] In this short verse, Hilary shows with two predicates that the Son's "be-ing" has a permanent character. First, Hilary creates the neologism *erans*, a participle modeled on the imperfect tense, in order to convey that the Son is always already being and having been before any beginning one can conceive.[98] Second, the Son is *apud Deum*, he is "with God," namely the Son's eternal existence is always an existence of relationship to his begetter.

The names "Father" and "Son" imply a hierarchy (of begetting at least) between the natures they signify, that the unity of nature, guaranteed by the name "God" applied to both the Father and Son, denies. Just as the names "Father" and "Son" point to a proper nature, so too the name "God." Hilary says that if the Son is given the name "God," he is recognized as possessing the nature of God: he is true God.

---

94 For a very good account of Hilary's developing understanding of the Trinitarian concept of generation, see chapters 6 and 8 of Weedman, *Trinitarian Theology of Hilary*, 136–156, 180–195.

95 See *De Trin* 2.13; see Pieter Smulders, "A Bold Move of Hilary of Poitiers: 'Est ergo erans'," *Vigiliae Christianae*, 42 (1988): 125.

96 See Smulders, "Bold Move," 121–122, for a discussion of editorial rejection and manuscript evidence for "est ergo erans."

97 *De Trin*. 2.14 (CCL 62 51.6–7): Est ergo erans apud Deum. . . .

98 For Hilary's use of *erans* within an anti-Photinian polemic, see Beckwith, *Hilary of Poitiers on the Trinity*, 119.

> Either the Son of God is true God in order to be God, or, if he is not true God, then he can not even be that which God is. Because if the nature is not present, the name does not fit the nature; but if there is a name for the nature in him, then the truth of the nature cannot be absent from him.[99]

Nevertheless, though the name "God" applied to both Father and Son means that they share the same divine nature, Hilary teaches that the names "Father" and "Son" do imply a difference, and, indeed, a hierarchical difference, between the two.

> For the Father is greater than the Son, but the Father is greater than the Son in regard to generation and not kind. For the Son is and has come forth from the Father. And although the property of the word "Father" is different [from that of "Son"], nevertheless the nature does not differ. For God born of God he is not dissimilar to his begetter's substance.[100]

Hilary seeks to affirm both that the Father is greater than the Son and that they share the same substance and therefore are equally God.

Eternal generation accounts for the unity, the difference, and even the hierarchical difference between Father and Son. Eternal generation allows the Son to eternally reveal the Father. The infinite and eternal manner of his generation allows the Son both to understand the Father perfectly and to be the perfect image of the Father.

> Indeed the Son will reveal the Father to whomever he wills, but . . . the knowledge of his infinity is proper to him alone who, according to the perfect plenitude of his origin, is himself the image of infinity.[101]

---

99 *De Trin*. 5.14 (CCL 62 163.11–15): Aut Deus uerus est Filius Dei, ut Deus sit; aut si non est uerus Deus, non potest etiam id esse quod Deus est: quia si natura non sit, naturae non conpetit nomen, si autem naturae in eo nomen est, non potest ab eo ueritas abesse naturae.

100 *Tr. ps.* 138.17 (CCL 61B 201.15–19): Est enim maior Pater Filio, sed ut Pater Filio, generatione, non genere; Filius enim est et ex eo exiuit. Et licet Paternae nuncupationis proprietas differat, tamen natura non differt. Natus enim a Deo Deus non dissimilis est a gignente substantiae.

101 *Tr. ps*. 134.7 (CCL 61B 147.6–7, 8–10): Et Filius quidem Patrem, si cui uoluerit, reuelabit, sed . . . Cognitio ergo infinitatis huius ei soli erit propria, qui secundum perfectam originis suae plenitudinem ipse imago est infiniti.

The eternal generation of the Son safeguards the equality of substance and power between Father and Son, for "there is no birth except from the property of the nature."[102] Eternal generation also allows the names of "Father" and "Son" to be true names. In being the eternal Son, the Son reveals the eternal Father. Eternal generation, in essence, allows the Son to reveal both what and who the Father is.

The Temporal Mediation of the Son

The previous section sought to follow Hilary's logic as it moved from temporal examples to a contemplation of the eternal nature and relationship of the Father and the Son. In this section we will follow Hilary as he moves in the opposite direction to show how the eternal relationship of the Father and Son defines their interaction with creation. While this may seem to us to be circular logic, Hilary does not assume a disjunction between the eternal relationship of the Father and the Son and its temporal manifestation.

The Son's revelation of the Father finds expression, not only in his eternal generation, but also temporally throughout creation history. The Son, as revealer of the Father, is mediator of the Father in everything that has to do with creation. All things, from creation to salvation, begin with the Father but are accomplished through the Son. The Son is the actor in salvation history:

> Even if a heretic destroys the faith, he knows that the Son of God has always existed, that he, the Word, Power and Wisdom of God, is separated from the Father by no interval of time, that he was the creator of the world and the founder of man, that he washed away the first crimes of the world with the flood, that he gave the Law to Moses, that he was in the prophets and through them foretold those great sacraments of his incarnation and passion, that he, rising in the body, has brought the clarity of spiritual glory to fallen flesh and has absorbed the origin of earthy corruption into the nature of his divinity.[103]

---

102 *De Trin.* 7.14 (CCL 62 274.13–14): . . . natiuitas non nisi ex proprietate naturae sit . . .

103 *Tr. ps.* 63.10 (CCL 61 218.1–219.2): Iam si fidem haereticus destruet, Dei Filium semper fuisse cognoscet, nullo a Patre interuallo temporis separatum ipsum esse uerbum, uirtutem, sapientiam Dei, hunc mundi opificem fuisse, hunc et hominis conditorem, hunc prima mundi crimina diluuio abluisse, hunc Moysi legem dedisse, hunc in prophetis fuisse et per eos ingentia illa corporationis et passionis suae sacramenta cecinisse, hunc

The Son's mediation in the creation of the world is the beginning of the universal mediation of Christ in the work of salvation that continues in his interactions with the patriarchs and finds its culmination in the resurrection of his incarnate body.[104] In Books 4 and 5 of the *De Trinitate*, where Hilary adduces Old Testament and New Testament proofs, respectively, for the mediation of Christ in the creation of the world, he often makes the distinction, based on 1 Corinthians 8:6, between the Father from whom (*ex quo*) are all things, and the Son through whom (*per quem*) are all things.[105]

> For the Church knows the one God *from whom* (*ex quo*) *are all things*, and she knows also our one Lord Jesus Christ *through whom* (*per quem*) *are all things*, one from whom and one through whom, the origin of all from one, the creation of all through the other. In the one "from whom," she understands the authority of unbegottenness; in the one "through whom" she venerates the power that differs in no way from its author, since there is a common authority between the one from whom and the one through whom.[106]

The Father is the source of all things (*ex quo*) but all things come to be through the Son (*per quem*). This is an economic meaning of mediation. Hilary makes a similar distinction when dealing with the text of Genesis 1:6–7. Hilary demonstrates that the text of Genesis "He spoke and it was made," shows two agents in creation, the one who speaks, namely, the Father, and the one who makes, namely, the Son.[107]

---

in corpore resurgentem caducae carni claritatem spiritalis gloriae intulisse et in naturam diuinitatis suae terrenae corruptionis absorbuisse primordia.

104 See, for example, *De Trin*. 12.46–47.

105 See Ladaria, *Cristología de Hilario*, 6–11. Other key scriptural texts for Hilary's treatment of the mediation of the Son in the creation include Prov. 8:22, Jn. 1:3, and Col. 1:16.

106 *De Trin*. 4.6 (CCL 62 105.4–11): Nouit enim unum Deum *ex quo omnia*, nouit et unum Dominum nostrum Iesum Christum *per quem omnia*, unum ex quo et unum per quem, ab uno uniuersorum originem, per unum cunctorum creationem. In uno ex quo auctoritatem innascibilitatis intellegit, in uno per quem potestatem nihil differentem ab auctore ueneratur: cum ex quo et per quem . . . communis auctoritas sit.

107 See *De Trin*. 4.16. This is an example of Hilary's use of prosopology, which becomes a much more important tool for him in the *Tractatus super Psalmos*. There is ontological import in Hilary's use of prosopology here: things get their being from the Father and through the Son, which means the Father and the Son are distinct in their roles in the origination of created being. See Rondeau's excellent treatment of prosopology in both the East and West with special emphasis on Origen and Hilary in *Commentaires patristiques*, vol. 2,

Hilary's distinction of two agents in creation—the Father who commands, and the Son who enacts the Father's commands—supports two different types of Trinitarian argumentation, both of which appear in his work.[108] Hilary is termed by both Lewis Ayres and Michel Barnes a "pro-Nicene" Trinitarian theologian. Pro-nicene theology understands the Father and Son to share the power of God. As we will see in a moment, this is Hilary's primary use of "power" in Trinitarian argumentation. However, Hilary retains traces, in the *De Trinitate*, though not in the *Tractatus super Psalmos*, of the earlier Trinitarian logic, termed "neo-Nicene" by Michel Barnes. In this theology, the Son is identified as the single, proper power (and therefore property) of God.[109]

These two different Trinitarian argumentations are not always happily combined in Hilary's Trinitarian theology. For example, in *De Trinitate* 12.52, Hilary identifies the Son as the word, wisdom, and power of God. He then proceeds to explain how the Son is not, however, an "interior movement" but rather is generated from the Father as an independent existence, a "perfect God."

> For although in us, word, wisdom, and power are a work of our interior movement, with you there is the absolute generation of a perfect God who is your Word, wisdom, and power.[110]

So far, the argumentation here matches up with that found in *De Trinitate* 7.11, where Hilary offers a clear presentation of pro-Nicene theology. In 7.11, Hilary

---

Exégèse prosopologique. Compare also to Tertullian's treatment of Gen. 1 in *Aduersus Praxean* 12.6 (CCL 2 1173.35–36; Evans 102.14–15), where he, too, distinguishes between the speaker and the doer: . . . habes duos, alium dicentem ut fiat, alium facientem.

108 I follow Michel Barnes' classification of power theologies. For an explanation of the different types of "power theologies," including neo-Nicene and pro-Nicene, in the fourth century, see Michel Barnes, "One Nature, One Power: Consensus Doctrine in Pro-Nicene Polemic," in *Studia Patristica* 29 (1997): 205–223. According to Barnes, neo-Nicene theology presents the Son as the power of God and argues that the Son is co-eternal because God can never be without his power. Pro-Nicene theology argues that God (namely Father, Son, and Holy Spirit) is one power in the sense that God (again Father, Son, and Holy Spirit) is one substance. See also Lewis Ayres' reservations concerning Barnes' classification and, specifically, the possibility of distinguishing neo-Nicene theologies from their Nicene or pro-Nicene counterparts in *Nicaea and its Legacy:* 239–240.

109 However, neo-Nicene and pro-Nicene are not strictly chronological phenomenon. See Michel Barnes, "*De Trinitate* VI and VII: Augustine and the Limits of Nicene Orthodoxy," *Augustinian Studies* 38 (2007): 197.

110 *De Trin.* 12.52 (CCL 62A 622.12–15): Namque cum uerbum et sapientia et uirtus in nobis interioris motus nostri opus nostrum sit, tecum tamen perfecti Dei, qui et uerbum tuum et sapientia et uirutus est, absoluta generatio est.

combines the argument for the Son as an independent existence, rather than an internal property of God, with the statement that even if the Son is the Word, wisdom, and power of God, nevertheless, God the Father still retains possession of these attributes.[111] In other words, power is shared by Father and Son because the Son is an independent entity, not simply a property of the Father: this is the classic pro-Nicene exposition. However, here in 12.52, rather than clarifying a pro-Nicene position as he does in 7.11, Hilary actually uses typical neo-Nicene logic in conjunction with his statement that the Son as Word, wisdom, and power of God is an independent existent.[112] In other words, in 12.52, the Son does not share the power of the Father, but *is* the power of the Father, such that without the Son, the Father has no power. The solution to this problem is that the Son "was born before the eternal ages" so there is never a time when the Father is without his power, namely the Son.[113]

However, most often, and exclusively in the *Tractatus super Psalmos*, Hilary sets forth a consistent pro-Nicene argumentation that emphasizes that the divine power and work are one; in fact, the unity of the divine power is a proof of the unity of the divine nature of the Father and the Son.[114] Hilary continues to insist that the Son as divine wisdom and power is a distinct, subsistent being, but he clarifies that the qualities of wisdom and power continue to exist

111 *De Trin* 7.11 (CCL 62 270.2–6): Verbi enim appellatio in Dei Filio de sacramento natiuitatis est, sicuti sapientiae et uirtutis est nomen: quae cum in Deum Filium cum substantia uerae natiuitatis extiterint, Deo tamen ut sua propria, quamuis ex eo in Deum sint nata, non desunt.

See also Barnes' explanation of Hilary's concern that the Son—as Word, wisdom, and power—be understood as external rather than internal as a reaction against Tertullian's power theology (*The Power of God*, 161–162).

112 *De Trin.* 12.52 (CCL 62A 622.3–9): Neque in id umquam stultitiae adque inpietatis erumpam, ut omnipotentiae tuae sacramentorumque arbiter hunc infirmitatis meae sensum ultra infinitatis tuae religiosam opinionem et significatam mihi aeternitatis fidem erigam, ut te aliquando sine sapientia et uirtute et uerbo tuo unigenito Deo Domino meo Iesu Christo fuisse praefiniam.

113 *De Trin.* 12.52 (CCL 62A 622.17–19): natus autem ita, ut nihil aliud quam te sibi significet auctorem, non etiam fidem infinitatis amittat per id quod a te ante tempora aeterna natus esse memoratur.

114 See Barnes, "Consensus Doctrine," 215–217. Barnes sees Hilary's power theology as pro-Nicene. However, while this is the dominant power theology in Hilary's later works, Hilary's use of both neo-Nicene and pro-Nicene power theologies, at least in his earlier works, reveals his position, historically, in the time period where neo-Nicene theology was ceding to pro-Nicene theology. For an explanation of the pro-Nicene theology of Hilary, see Michel Barnes, *The Power of God: Δύναμις in Gregory of Nyssa's Trinitarian Theology* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2001), 159–162.

in the Father as well.[115] The distinction between speaker and doer, according to this line of argument, serves to distinguish the persons more properly than does the work. In fact, Hilary argues that the work is proper to both Father and Son. In the *De Trinitate* he says:

> For, in what he says, the Father is the cause, while the Son, in what he does, arranges what has been said is to be done. But the distinction of persons is made in such a way that the work should be referred to both.[116]

This is similar to his words in the *Tractatus super Psalmos*:

> But he who was arranging is both generated and born from him with whom he was arranging. However, since the works of the Son are the works of the Father and since the Father was working in the Son, for this reason he said: *The Father, who is in me, is doing his works* (Jn. 14:10), and again: *I do the works of the Father* (Jn. 10:37), the Father alone was working by working through the one whom he generated.[117]

The Son arranges those things that the Father commands. However, the Father works in and through the Son so that the work is that of both Father and Son.[118]

The Son's doing of the Father's commands proves that there is an equality of nature between Father and Son because "he, to whose nature it belongs to be able to do all the same things, is in the same nature."[119] The differing roles in creation do not point to a difference in divinity between the Father and the Son but to the difference in person. In his role as the orderer or the doer of what the Father says is to be done in creation, the Son reveals both his possession of divine power (and so his equality of nature with the Father),[120]

---

115 See *De Trin.* 7.11–12.

116 *De Trin.* 4.21 (CCL 62 123.11–13): Pater enim in eo quod loquitur efficit, Filius in eo quod operatur quae fieri sunt dicta conponit. Personarum autem ita facta distinctio est, ut opus referatur ad utrumque.

117 *Tr. ps.* 135.13 (CCL 61B 169.6–10): Sed qui disponebat, ab eo, cum quo disponebat, et genitus et natus est. Cum autem opera Filii opera patris sint et Pater operetur in Filio et per id enim quod ait: *Pater, qui in me est, ipse opera sua facit* et rursum: *ego opera Patris facio*, solus operatur in eo et per eum operando, quem genuit.

118 For a similar treatment of the works of the Father and the Son centered upon Jn. 5:17–19, see *De Trin.* 7.16–19 and *Tr. ps.* 91.4–7.

119 *De Trin.* 7.18 (CCL 62 279.6–7): Adque ita in natura eadem est, cui eadem omnia posse naturae sit.

120 For example, see *De Trin.* 5.5 (CCL 62 155.20–26): Perfectae enim potestatis est, hoc naturam posse facientis quod possit significare sermo dicentis. Adque ita cum quidquid dici

as well as his distinction from the Father as a distinct agent. The Son's role in the process of creation is a manifestation of his mediatory role between the Father and created beings.

Hilary is careful to use the same verbs to designate the creative activities of both the Father and the Son so that the Son is not seen as a secondary or inferior actor in the work of creation.[121] For example, Hilary uses parallel constructions of the central verbs of working or doing (*operari* and *facere*) to show the application of the verbs to both Father and Son: "because he [the Father] was working (*operaretur*) in [the Son] working (*operaretur*);"[122] and, following John 5:19, "everything that the Father does (*facit*), the Son also does (*faciat*) likewise."[123] In a similar way, Hilary uses the verb *disponere* (to arrange), used in Proverbs 8:30 in reference to Wisdom, for the Son, though in such a way as to include the Father. "But he who was arranging (*disponebat*) was both generated and born from him with whom he was arranging (*disponebat*). . . . The works of the Son are the works of the Father and the Father works in the Son and through him."[124] Having used the verb suggested by Proverbs, Hilary immediately returns to his preferred verb of creation, and the one more easily shared by Father and Son, *operari*: "the Father alone works by working in and through him whom he generated.[125] Hilary applies other verbs of creation—*creare, firmare, ornare*—more loosely, sometimes to the Son, sometimes to the Father, without the same sort of attention to parallel construction. For example, in his

---

potest, idipsum et effici potest, tenet ueritatis naturam ea quae dictis xaequatur operatio. Non est itaque Dei Filius Deus falsus nec Deus adoptiuus nec Deus connuncupatus, sed Deus uerus.

121 Hilary gives the name "Creator" to Christ: Per Dominum enim Christum creata omnia sunt, et idcirco ei proprium nomen est ut creator sit (*De Trin*. 12.4 [CCL 62A 581.3–4]).

122 *De Trin*. 7.17 (CCL 62 278.17–18): . . . quia ipse in se operaretur operante. See also *Tr. ps*. 91.4 (CCL 61B 325.23–25): Verum cum in omnibus Christus operetur, eius tamen opus est qui operator in Christo . . .

123 *De Trin*. 7.18 (CCL 62 279.8–10): . . . ut omnia quae Pater facit, eadem omnia similiter faciat et Filius.

124 *Tr. ps.* 135.13 (CCL 61B 169.6–8): Sed qui disponebat, ab eo, cum quo disponebat, et genitus et natus est. Cum autem opera Filii opera Patris sint et Pater operetur in Filio . . . For parallel verb constructions, see also *Tr. ps*. 53.7 (CCL 61 134.4–10): Vnigenitus Dei filius, Dei Verbum et Deus Verbum, cum utique omnia quae Pater posset omnia ea et ipse posset, sicuti ait: *Quaecumque enim Pater facit, eadem et Filius facit similiter*, et in indiscreto deitatis naturae que nomine indiscreta quoque esset et uirtus, ut absolutissimum nobis humanae humilitatis esset exemplum, omnia quae hominum sunt et orauit et passus est. *Tr. ps*. 138.28 (CCL 61B 208.4–8): Eadem autem et in euangeliis ratio seruata est, ut cum ad demonstrationem uirtutis suae dixerit: *Quaecumque Pater facit, eadem et Filius facit similiter*, et rursum: *Sicut Pater uiuificat mortuos, sic et Filius quos uult uiuificat*.

125 *Tr ps*. 135.13 (CCL 61B 169.9–10): . . . solus operatur in eo et per eum operando, quem genuit.

commentary on Psalm 149, Hilary applies *firmare*, and *ornare* to the Father.[126] In Psalm 118 Nun, the pair *firmare*, and *ornare* are now applied to the Son.[127]

Christ's mediation in revelation continues throughout salvation history. It is the Son who mediates between God and the Jews because he is the giver of the Law: "the Lord is the mediator of God and men, in whose hand through the angels, as is said in the Scriptures, the law was given."[128] The Son is the God of the Old Testament theophanies and he continues his role of mediator in his incarnation.[129] He is, as Hilary says, the one mediator between God and men throughout salvation history:

> For there is *one mediator of God and men*, God and man, the mediator both in the making of the Law and in the assumption of the body. Therefore, no one else is to be compared to him. For here is one born from God into God, through whom all things were created both in heaven and on earth, through whom the times and the ages have been made. For

126 *Tr. ps*. 149.1 (CCL 61B 303.1–6): Superior psalmus omnem creationum diuersitatem ad laudem dei creatoris est adhortatus; et ordo a caelestibus coeptus cuncta terrae ac maris et aeris animantia percucurrit uniuerso quoque genere aetatum, sexuum, potestatum ad honorem debitae confessionis admonito, ut gloriam eius, qui se ad uitam animasset, firmasset, ornasset, pius gratiarum sermo celebraret. See also *Tr. ps*. 91.4 (CCL 61 324.1–4): Et haec quidem magna Dei opera sunt, caelum continere, solem cum astris ceteris luminare, sementis terrae incrementa sufficere, hominem firmare, animam reprouehere, sed longe his maiora opera perfecta sunt.

127 *Tr. ps*. 118 Nun 10 (CCL 61A 133.19–21): Caelum ex praecepto Dei ipse firmauit, mundum ex paterno jussu in hanc speciem tanti decoris ornauit, terram et quae in ea sunt creauit.

128 *Tr. ps.* 67.18 (CCL 61 275.14–16): . . . mediator Dei hominumque sit dominus, in cuius manu per angelos, ut dictum est, lata lex fuerit.

129 The Latin tradition prior to Hilary argues that the Old Testament theophanies must be of the Son (rather than the Father) because while the Father is invisible the Son is visible. While Hilary continues the argument that the Old Testament theophanies are visions of the Son, he no longer makes this argument based on the inherent visibility of the Son. In fact, Hilary is the first in the Latin tradition to take the position—later used by Augustine against the homoians—that the Son is also invisible (see Hilary, *De Trin*. 2.11 where Hilary identifies the Son as the "invisible one from the invisible one").

For the Latin tradition of the visibility of the Son see Ladaria, *Cristología de Hilario*, 11–22 (see especially note 35 on page 11, where he gives several references to this argument in Latin tradition). Tertullian, for example, citing the passage that "no man can see God and live" says that the Father is invisible while the Son is visible (see Tertullian, *Aduersus Praxean* 14 [CCL 2 1176–77], *Aduersus Marcionem* 5.19.3 [CCL 1 721]). See also Gregory of Elvira, *De Fide orthodoxa contra Arianos* 86–87 (ed. Vincent Bulhart, in *Greogrius Iliberritanus, Faustinus, Luciferianus*, CCL 69 [Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 1967], CCL 69 243–244).

> everything exists through his operation. Therefore, this one is the one who draws up the covenants with Abraham, who speaks to Moses, who bears witness to Israel, who dwells in the prophets who is born of the virgin by the Holy Spirit, who affixes to the wood of his passion the powers opposed and hostile to us, who destroys death in hell, who confirms the faith of our hope by the resurrection, who destroys the corruption of human flesh by the glory of his body.[130]

The Son is the only mediator between the Father and humanity; he is, as Hilary says elsewhere, "the face of God."[131] It is the same "one mediator," namely the Son, who mediates in the giving of the Law and the incarnation.

The incarnation is special among the Son's mediations for in the incarnation the Son makes God "visible and tangible among men."[132] The Son makes himself visible in the Old Testament theophanies but he goes further and makes himself able to be touched in the incarnation, so that humanity might see and approach the Father in him. It is in the incarnation, when the Son of God becomes man and so able to mediate between divinity and humanity in his own body, that the Son's mediation in creation arrives at its perfection.

The Implications of the Assumption of All Humanity in Hilary's Trinitarian Theology: Seeing God

The incarnation is, as I mentioned above, the perfection of the mediation between God and humanity. For Hilary, it is only Christ's assumption of each and every member of the human race that makes the incarnation the perfect mediation because only this universal assumption of humanity allows a direct physical contact between God and every human person. If it is indeed the

---

130 *De Trin*. 4.42 (CCL 61 148.22–37): Vnus est enim mediator Dei et hominum, Deus et homo, et in legis latione et in corporis adsumptione mediator. Alius igitur ad eum non deputatur. Vnus est enim hic in Deum ex Deo natus, per quem creata sunt omnia in caelo et in terra, per quem tempora et saecula facta sunt. Totum enim quidquid est ex eius operatione subsistit. Hic ergo unus est disponens ad Abraham, loquens ad Moysen, testans ad Istrahel, manens in profetis, per uirginem natus ex Spiritu, aduersantes nobis inimicas que uirtutes ligno passionis adfigens, mortem in inferno perimens, spei nostrae fidem resurrectione confirmans, corruptionem carnis humanae gloria corporis sui perimens.

131 See *Tr. ps*. 142.9 (CCL 61B 250.5–6): . . . facies Dei, qui utique Christus est, qui imago Dei inuisibilis est . . . .

132 *De Trin*. 4.42 (CCL 62 147.13–15): Quis ergo iste est, qui est uisus et conuersatus inter homines? Deus certe noster est et uisibilis in homine et contrectabilis Deus.

physicality, or the tangibility, of the incarnation that is salvific, Hilary provides a soteriological model in which every human person can be saved through physical contact with Christ. The Son's role as revealer of the Father, begun in his eternal generation, has, as we have seen, two components: the Son reveals what the Father is (namely, the divine nature and power), and who the Father is (namely, Father) by his sameness and his difference with the Father. In the temporal realm, the Son must reveal both these components to humanity in particular. Revelation to humans must be a revelation specifically adapted to human reception.

The Son's revelation to humanity is a revelation that addresses the two-fold nature of humanity.[133] In the context of the question of who sees God and how God is seen, Scripture says both that no one may see God and live and its seeming opposite, that the pure of heart shall see God.

> But [the prophet who wrote this Psalm] remembers the words of God: *No man will see my face and live* (Ex. 3:20) . . . Nevertheless, he remembers this beatitude reserved for the faith, by which is said: *Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God* (Matt. 5:8). Therefore, since he knows that it is said in the Law that no would see the face of God and live, and it is clearly said in the gospel beatitude that all those who are pure in heart shall see God, [the prophet] has expressed the longing of his desire with the restraint of perfect modesty when he says: *I pray with my whole heart* [*to see your*] *face*. . . . He knows that the glory of God is invisible to the fleshly *eyes*.[134]

---

133 For the two-fold nature of humanity, see the discussion in Chapter 6 "Christ the Mediator and the Double Creation of Man." *Tr. ps.* 129.4 (CCL 61B 101.4–8): . . . primum meminisse debet hominum institutionem naturis duabus contineri, animae scilicet et corporis, quarum alia spiritalis, alia terrena est, et inferiorem hanc materiam ad efficientiam atque operationem naturae illius fuisse potioris aptatam.

134 *Tr. ps.* 118 Heth 7 (CCL 61A 75.4–5, 7–13, 15–16): Sed dictum meminit a Deo: *Nemo hominum uidebit faciem meam et uiuet*. . . . meminit tamen hanc fidei beatitudinem reseruari, qua dicitur: *Beati mundo corde, quoniam ipso Deum uidebunt*. Itaque cum in lege sciat dictum quod nemo faciem Dei uideat et uiuat, et ex euangelica beatitudine non ambigat omnes mundo corde Deum esse uisuros, perfectae modestiae temperamento cupiditatem desiderii sui elocutus est dicens: *Deprecatus sum faciem tuam in toto corde meo*. . . . Scit inuisibilem esse carnalibus *oculis* gloriam Dei. Goffinet argues that Origen, like Hilary, makes the connection between the desire of the psalmist and the beatitude of Matt. 5:8 (Goffinet, *Utilisation d'Origene*, 121–122). However, Harl's work on the Palestinian chain shows that it is Didymus, not Origen, who makes this connection (Harl, *Chaîne palestinienne*, SC 189 280–283).

Hilary says that the prophet recognizes that seeing God is something that is not done with the eyes: "And now since he knows that this is impossible for these eyes of the body, he desires it wholly with his heart."[135] The heart and not the eyes is the instrument for seeing God's glory.

Hilary, however, does not say that the bodily eyes can see nothing of God; rather, revelation is offered to both the eyes and the heart, the physical and the spiritual. While it is impossible for the eyes to see the invisible nature of God, the incarnation makes it possible for humans to know God, both by the sight of the God who has made himself visible, and by his words and works.[136]

> Therefore, the only-begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, has described the God whom no one has seen. Either destroy what the only-begotten has described, or believe the God who is seen. . . .[137]

In taking a physical form the Son is seen and makes the Father seen as well. Seeing Christ leads to belief in Christ; hearing Christ leads to belief in his words that teach not only of himself but also of the Father.

> The Father is seen in the Son and he is seen not through a contemplation of his nature invisible to us, but though the admiration of his works. For the works of the Son are the works of the Father. . . .[138]

The Son's visibility in the incarnation makes the Father visible as well for the Son's visible works point to the invisible divine nature. The works of the Son reveal the works of the Father because they *are* the works of the Father. The physical eyes perceive the works. However, the eyes of the heart direct the light of the intelligence and so are capable of seeing through the works

---

135 *Tr. ps.* 118 Heth 8 (CCL 61A 76.13–14): Et nunc quia id impossibile istis corporis oculis sciat esse, totum istud corde desiderat.

136 Compare with Chromatius of Aquilea (*Tractatus in Matthaeum* 2.1 [CCL 9A 202.31–22]): Sed quia in diuinitatis suae gloria Verbum Deus uideri non poterat, assumpsit carnem uisibilem ut diuinitatem inuisibilem demonstraret.

137 *De Trin*. 5.34 (CCL 62 187.1–3): Deum itaque nemini uisum unigenitus Filius qui in sinu Patris est enarrauit. Aut dissolue unigeniti enarrationem, aut Deum crede qui uisus est. . . .

138 *Tr. ps*. 138.35 (CCL 61B 212.22–25): Pater uidetur in Filio et uidetur non per inuisibilis nobis naturae contemplationem, sed per operum admirationem . . . Filii enim opera opera Patris sunt. . . . See also *Tr. ps*. 138.8 (CCL 61B 197.27):. . . . et sermone et opera Dei in se Patris gloriam praedicabat.

to the nature.[139] The pure heart may now discern the invisible divine nature through these works. The heart may perceive from the visible works the divine power that pertains to Father and Son equally. It may also perceive something of the eternal relationship of Father and Son, wherein the Son does what the Father commands.

The category of sight is limiting in that it necessitates a distance between the perceiver and the perceived. However, for Hilary the sight of God collapses this distance because it brings the perceiver into the perceived. Concerning the perception of God by the pure of heart, Hilary says: "... those who are worthy of seeing God will take on glory from the seeing of glory."[140] The deeper perception of God, which moves from visible to invisible, is transformative, such that seeing the glory of God is entrance into this very glory.[141] The desire to see God is the desire to receive the glory of God.[142]

The incarnation, understood specifically as Christ's assumption of all humanity, opens up a new arena for revelation, one that eliminates the distance between perceiver and perceived and so transforms the perceiver in conformity with the perceived. The incarnate Christ is an object of sight for the bodily eyes. This sight also is the entrance to the deeper perception of the heart, as we have seen. Both the eyes and the heart still perceive God as an external object. However, the incarnation also allows for a perception of God in which there is no distance between man and God. The assumption of all humanity allows for direct contact between the invisible divine nature and every single human person. Hilary says that this direct contact is the foundation of human understanding of God.

---

139 *Tr. ps.* 120.5 (CCL 61B 18.1–19.6): *In* hos igitur *montes* propheta *oculos* cordis *eleuans* horumque intra se omnium monita, ministeria, officia, dona contemplans et in his intellegentiae suae lumen intendens reddidit sensui suo contemplatae speciei integram perfectamque naturam et totum id quod cogitatione uiderat mente continuit sciens unde uenturum esset auxilium ei, dicens: VNDE UENIET AUXILIUM MIHI.

140 *Tr. ps.* 118 Heth 8 (CCL 61A 76.7–8): qui digni sunt conspectu Dei gloriam ex conspectu gloriae esse sumpturos.

141 Gilles Pelland ("Gloriam ex conspectu gloriae (Hilaire, Tr ps 118, heth, 8)," *Gregorianum* 72 [1991]: 758) shows that vision of glory invests the see-er himself with glory. In Hilary's framework of glory, Pelland says the Son has two roles. First, he makes humans able to see glory. Then, because of the nature of glory we just alluded to, he helps humans participate in glory. For these two roles, see *Tr. ps.* 67.19 (CCL 276.23–24): ... ad cognitionem Dei consortiumque esse deductas ...

142 See Jean Doignon, "Une Exégèse d'Hilaire de Poitiers sur le désir de voir la face de Dieu (Hil., *In Psalm.* 118, 8, 7/8)," *Freiburger Zeitschrift fur Philosophie und Theologie*, 41 (1994): 544.

Hilary says not only that human understanding is limited, but that in fact human nature is defined by this limitation of understanding.

> For since God could not be known by man except by means of the assumed man—because our nature could not know the unknowable except through our nature, and man is defined by this manner of understanding—then it is necessary that man be defined by this, namely that he has known God in the one in whom he is conformed to God, because such is the allotment of this knowledge given by grace.[143]

Human nature knows God only "through our nature," that is, "in the assumed man," Jesus Christ. Hilary is insistent that there are no intermediate steps between the divinity of Christ and each individual person: to be properly called "man," each human person has to know God and be conformed to God "*in* the assumed man." That is to say, each member of humanity, in order to be fully human, has to receive the revelation of God and the conformation to God that can be attained only in Christ. We find again the centrality of Christ's body in Hilary's theology.

Hilary's Trinitarian emphasis on the Son's mediation in the revelation of the Father here merges with his vision of human transformation and conformation to the divine nature. Christ's assumption of all humanity into his body in the incarnation, is the hinge of these two systems. Through the assumption of all humanity, the Son presents himself to be known not by one man only but by all humanity, for all are brought into contact with him. Human knowledge of God is directly connected to conformation to God.[144] Since conformation happens in the body of Christ, knowledge too is attained in that body. Only through the assumption of all humanity, and the possibility of universal direct contact with Christ's body, does knowledge of God and conformation to God become possible for all.

For Hilary, human knowledge of God's nature is achieved only through direct physical and spiritual contact with this nature. This contact, and the

143 *Tr. ps.* 143.8 (CCL 61B 259.25–30): Si enim cognitus fieri Deus homini nisi adsumpto homine non potuit, quia incognoscibilem cognoscere nisi per naturam nostram natura nostra non potuit et per hanc cognitionem homo deputatur, necesse est ut in id deputetur, in quo Deum ipse congnouit, scilicet ut conformis Deo fiat, quia haec sit deputatio cognitionis indultae.

144 See *De Trin.* 11.39 where Hilary says that humans will see God only once they have been transformed into the kingdom of God. Being made into the kingdom of God is here understood as being conformed to the glory of Christ's body.

knowledge attained thereby, is transformative: contact with the divine nature glorifies human nature. Human existence in Christ's body is not only knowledge about the divine, but experience of the divine. This experience, when accompanied by faith and sacramental participation, leads to the physical and spiritual glorification of the human person so that "it might be gained by man that he should be God."[145] Christ's assumption of all humanity gives every person the direct contact with God that is necessary for transformation.[146] For this reason Hilary says: "The greatest work of our Lord Jesus Christ, only-begotten Son of God, was to render man, after he had been taught divine knowledge, worthy of the dwelling place of God."[147] Revelation entails transformation, and Hilary assigns transformation, as we have seen in the preceding chapters, to the body of Christ.[148] Salvation, that is, being drawn into the divine life, happens only in the body of Christ: temporally in the Church and eschatologically in Christ's glorified body.

Hilary's increased attention to Christ's assumption of all humanity in the *Tractatus super Psalmos* leads him to become more insistent on the eternal mediation of Christ in the salvation of humanity. Buffer notes that in the *In Matthaeum*, Hilary defines eschatological salvation as communion with the divine nature. In the *Tractatus super Psalmos*, Hilary specifies that this communion is with Christ in his risen glory.[149] Christ's assumption of all humanity

145 *De Trin*. 9.38 (CCL 62A 412.13–14): Id enim homini adquirebatur, ut Deus esset.

146 See Fierro, *Sobre la gloria*, 184: "En la misma línea de 'corporeidad' de la gloria, se halla uno de los pensamientos favoritos de Hilario: el cuerpo de Cristo incluye a todos los hombres, y, por eso, en su gloria seremos todos glorificados. Esta inmersión de la humanidad entera en la carne del Señor, explica perfectamente el porqué de nuestra clarificación y su character cristiforme."

147 *Tr. ps.* 131.6 (CCL 61B 116.1, 3–5): Domino nostro Iesu Christo, unigenito Dei Filio . . . hoc opus maximum fuit, ut hominem ad scientiam diuinam eruditum dignum habitaculo Dei redderet.

148 Pelland makes a very interesting point on this topic ("Gloriam ex conspectu gloriae," 758–759). He notices (following Doignon), that Hilary's citation of 2 Cor. 3:18 follows neither the Vetus latina nor the Vulgate: *Nos*, inquit, *omnes reuelata facie gloriam Dei expectantes in eandem ipsam transferemur a gloria in gloriam, sicut a Domini spiritu* (118 Heth 8 [CCL 61A 76.10–12]). Where the Vetus and Vulgate have *speculantes*, Hilary has *expectantes*. Hilary's framework of glory, centered on the "glory to glory" of 2 Cor. 3:18 seeks to remove the connotation that humans are spectators to a glory that is outside and apart from themselves. Rather, Hilary replaces *speculantes* with *expectantes* to highlight human participation in the divine glory such that they are progressively spiritualized and transformed. Glory is a matter of transformation and transformation is essentially conformation to Christ.

149 Buffer, *Salus in St. Hilary*, 233.

makes his body the locus of salvation and the place of human communion with God.

Hilary's Patercentric Theology

The *De Trinitate* and the *Tractatus super Psalmos* share an obvious emphasis on the Son of God: the *De Trinitate* is written to defend the equality of the Son with the Father, while the *Tractatus super Psalmos* emphasizes the divine *ordo* of the words of Scripture such that, as Hilary says in the *Instructio*, every word is about Christ:[150]

> But it must not be doubted that those things that are said in the Psalms ought to be understood according to gospel prediction, so that no matter what person the spirit of prophecy has spoken through, nevertheless, everything should be referred to the knowledge of the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ—his incarnation, passion and reign—and the glory and power of our resurrection.[151]

Yet it is somewhat misleading to say that Hilary's focus is on the Son. Hilary argues in the *De Trinitate* for the equality of the Son (based on his eternal generation) because the Son's role as mediator and revealer of the Father can only be accomplished when proper understanding of the Son leads to true understanding of who and what the Father is. Thus, the main emphasis of Hilary's Trinitarian speculation leads attention to the Father. Hilary's Trinitarian approach can therefore be called patercentric.

Hilary's understanding of the Son's mediation in the temporal order is also patercentric. The saving dispensation fulfilled in the incarnation is the temporal aspect of the Son's revelation of the Father accomplished in his eternal generation. Though, as Hilary said above in the *Instructio*, every word of the Psalms is about the coming of Christ, his emphasis is not on the figure of Christ

150 For Hilary's understanding of *ordo*, the divine order of Scripture, see Burns, *Christology in Hilary*, 47–65. Though Burns' study concerns the *In Matthaeum*, Hilary's conception of *ordo* remains consistent throughout his exegetical career.

151 *Tr. ps. Instr.* 5 (CCL 61 5.1–6.6): Non est uero ambigendum ea quae in psalmis dicta sunt secundum euangelicam praedictionem intellegi oportere, ut ex quacumque libet persona prophetiae spiritus sit locutus, tamen totum illud ad cognitionem aduentus Domini nostri Ieus Christi et corporationis et passionis et regni et resurrectionis nostrae gloriam uirtuemque referatur.

himself but rather on Christ as him "through whom . . . there is an access for all to the Father."[152] It is true that Christ assumes all of humanity so that humans in turn may receive what he is. However, as we saw in our study of Hilary's eschatology, the essential point is not that humans might be like Christ, but that they might come to share Christ's relationship with the Father.[153] Hilary is quite specific that salvation consists in knowing the Father in the most profound way possible, that is, salvation is knowing him as Father because humans have themselves become sons: "The Lord has *led out from their sepulchers* all those who are regenerated into sons of God."[154] Salvation, like revelation, is through the Son, but it is from the Father and is a coming into the Father's glory as sons.

Christ's assumption of all humanity, including all its weakness, is the means whereby the Son mediates between humanity and the divine nature in his own body. This mediation has negative results on the Son's relationship with the Father. Hilary emphasizes in Book 9 of the *De Trinitate* that this assumption separates the Son in some way from the Father because what he has assumed shares neither the same nature nor the same glory with the Father as his own divine nature does.[155] The incarnation entails something of an estrangement between the Father and the Son because the assumption of the flesh, and all its weakness, is accomplished and experienced by the Son but not by the Father.[156] Hilary tries to capture the pathos of this situation with his language

---

152 *Tr. ps*. 60.6 (CCL 61 195.9–10): . . . per quem . . . sitque omnibus adcessus ad Patrem.

153 For salvation as oriented toward the Father, see, for example, *Tr. ps*. 148.8 (CCL 61B 302.10–15, 21–28): *Prope est Dominus omnibus inuocantibus eum* (Ps. 144.18). Illis ergo proprius hymnus (Ps. 148.14) est, qui *Deo propinquabunt*, qui per hoc sanctae Hierusalem regnum beatum aeterno regno proximi post regnum Domini Iesu Christi in regnum Dei Patris Domino conregnante, transibunt, apostolo docente. . . . Hic ergo *populus* est *propinquans* regno Dei Patris per regnum Filii Dei proximus. Regnat itaque Dominus traditurus Deo Patri regnum, non regni potestate cariturus, sed nos, qui regnum eius sumus, Deo Patri traditurus in regnum. Regni traditio nostra prouectio est, ut, qui in regno Filii erimus, in regno quoque simus et Patris, digni per id regno Patris, quia digni regno erimus et Filii, proximi tum Patris regno, cum filii erimus in regno . . .

154 *Tr. ps*. 67.8 (CCL 61 266.23–24): Sed hos omnes de *sepulcris* Dominus, qui in filios Dei regenerantur, *eduxit*.

155 See, for example, *De Trin*. 9.38 where Hilary says quite explicitly that the incarnation brings about an obstacle to the unity of the Father and the Son (CCL 62A 412.24–26): quia dispensationis nouitas offensionem unitatis intulerat, et unitas, ut perfecta antea fuerat, nulla esse nunc poterat, nisi glorificata apud se fuisset carnis adsumptio. See Ladaria's discussion of this division between Father and Son caused by the assumption of human nature in the incarnation in *Cristología de Hilario*, 73–74.

156 *De Trin*. 9.38 (CCL 62A 411.5–7): . . . sed hanc carnis adsumptionem ea cum qua sibi naturalis unitas erat Patris natura non senserat. . . .

of *forma dei* and *forma serui*.[157] Though the Son never loses his divine nature, the assumption of a human nature is, in a real way, the loss of the *forma dei* because it is the loss of his participation in the divine glory: while the Father and Son continue to share the divine nature, the Son no longer shares in the divine glory.[158]

This separation from the Father has both negative and positive soteriological implications. Negatively, the body and the humanity of Christ serve as an impediment to salvation precisely because the *forma serui* is not consubstantial with the Father and so the humanity of Christ is not, by nature, transparent to the divinity. Christ's humanity in and of itself does not reveal God, rather it is Christ's mode of acting and his divine power—displayed in his works and miracles—that reveals his unity with the Father and so the Father himself.[159] Positively, Christ's assumption of the weakness of human nature demands its transformation. Christ's body is the place where humanity is integrated into the divine and so is the point of access to the Father. Hilary says that "the entirety of the dispensation was this: that now the whole Son, indeed man and God, through the indulgence of the paternal will, would be in the unity of the

157 See *De Trin.* 9.39 (CCL 62A 413.26–414–36): Vt enim in unitate sua maneret ut manserat, glorificaturus eum apud se Pater erat, quia gloriae suae unitas per oboedientiam dispensationis excesserat; scilicet ut in ea natura per glorificationem rursus esset, in qua sacramento erat diuinae natiuitatis unitus, esset que Patri apud semetipsum glorificatus; ut quod apud eum ante habebat, maneret, neque alienaret ab eo formae Dei naturam formae seruilis adsumptio; sed apud semetipsum glorificaret formam serui, ut maneret esse Dei forma: quia qui in Dei forma manserat, idem erat in serui forma.

158 Recall Hilary's multivalent use of *forma* discussed in Chapter 5 "Hilary's Use of *Forma* to Mean Both Nature and Condition." For the most part, *forma* refers not to nature but to the fundamental condition of the respective natures, that is, glory, power and majesty for the *forma dei*, humility and infirmity for the *forma serui*. In this way, when Christ takes on the *forma serui*, the condition of humility which it entails is incompatible with the condition of glory which is the *forma dei*: he must empty himself of the *forma dei*, that is, estrange himself from the paternal glory. Though the Son can empty himself of divine glory, he can never empty himself of his divine nature. Hilary also, however, uses *forma dei* or *forma serui* to refer to the divine or human nature as such. When Hilary uses *forma* in this way, he maintains that even in his emptying, Christ never loses the *forma dei*, that is the nature of God.

159 For example, *De Trin*. 3.15 (CCL 62 86.6–7): Dei Filius homo cernitur, sed Deus in operibus hominis existit. *De Trin*. 2.28 (CCL 62 64.3–5): Tantum illud in uniuersis uirtutum et curationum generibus contuendum est, in carnis adsumptione hominem, Deum uero in gestis rebus existere. See Ladaria's discussion, centered almost entirely around Hilary's *In Matthaeum*, on Christ's revelation of his divinity through the divine power of his miracles (Ladaria, *Cristología de Hilario*, 135–154).

paternal nature. . . ."[160] The foreignness of the *forma serui* to the Father's nature is precisely what necessitates its transformation.

The glorification of the assumed humanity, the *forma serui*, is the resolution of this divide from the Father.[161] Humanity must be glorified so that the Son, now forever bonded to humanity, can be in complete unity with the Father again. The resurrection has a Trinitarian dimension in that it repairs Christ's estrangement from the Father.

> . . . the newness of the dispensation had brought about an obstacle to unity, such that now there could be no unity, where before it had been perfect, unless the assumed flesh were glorified with him.[162]

The reparation of this estrangement is also the beginning of a new relationship for humanity with the Father. Christ's resurrection sets in motion the final glorification of all who reside in his body.[163] This glorification repairs the breach between Father and Son because the glorication of Christ's humanity transforms its existence from the humility of the *forma serui* to the glory of the *forma dei*.[164] Therefore Christ's resurrection allows his humanity and, in it, all of humanity, to be glorified and enter into a new filial relationship with the Father.

Only as sons will humans receive the full revelation of who and what the Father is; therefore, revelation is only fully accomplished in the body of Christ. Revelation, as we have seen, transforms. Revelation and glorification, then, are two sides of the same coin. Glorification is reception of full revelation; full revelation eliminates the barrier between perceived and perceiver.

---

160 *De Trin*. 9.38 (CCL 62A 412.9–12): Sed summa dispensationis haec erat, ut totus nunc Filius, homo scilicet et Deus, per indulgentiam paternae uoluntatis unitati paternae naturae inesset. . . .

161 See Ladaria, *Cristología de Hilario*, 219–264. For the concept of glory in Hilary's theology, Fierro's work is still unsurpassed. Fierro also makes a distinction between resurrection and glorification (though he acknowledges that Hilary does not consistently maintain this distinction): resurrection is to be glorified; glorification is to be glorified specifically in the Father (Fierro, *Sobre la gloria*, 146–149).

162 *De Trin*. 9.38 (CCL 62A 412.24–26): . . . dispensationis nouitas offensionem unitatis intulerat, et unitas, ut perfecta antea fuerat, nulla esse nunc poterat, nisi glorificata apud se fuisset carnis adsumptio.

163 For the eschatological repercussions of Christ's resurrection, see Chapter 7. See also Burns, *A Model for the Christian Life*, 173–224.

164 Hilary does make a clear distinction between the glory of Christ and eschatological human glory. See the explanation in Fierro, *Sobre la gloria*, 158.

We find that, in both the *De Trinitate* and the *Tractatus super Psalmos*, glorification is assumption into the glory of the Father's nature. In Book 9 of the *De Trinitate*, Hilary says:

> And when, after the birth of man and having been glorified in man, he again shines forth in the glory of his own nature, God glorifies him in himself, when he is assumed into the glory of the Father's nature, of which he had emptied himself through the dispensation.[165]

In his comment on the 138th Psalm, we find a nearly identical passage:

> And he is again in the glory of God the Father, that is, when the form of the servant progresses into the glory of him in whose form he was remaining before, that is, when the nature of corruption has been absorbed through the perfection of incorruption.[166]

The Son is glorified in the Father, namely he is assumed into the glory of the Father's nature. When these texts are read in light of Hilary's teaching concerning Christ's assumption of all humanity, we see that they speak not of Christ only, but also of humanity, every individual of which is now present in the body of Christ. Humanity, in Christ, is assumed into the glory of the Father's nature. Flesh, which in the *forma serui* only expressed Christ's human condition, becomes, in the *forma Dei*, the image, expression, and reflection of God. The Son's role in the dispensation is to be the means of humanity's relationship with the Father.[167]

The Son's role as instrument or mediator of humanity's relationship with the Father reflects the Son's eternal relationship with the Father. The Father

---

165 *De Trin.* 9.41 (CCLB 418.48–51): Et cum post natiuitatem hominis glorificatus in homine, in naturae suae rursum gloriam clarescit, in se eum Deus clarificat, cum in naturae paternae gloriam, ab ea per dispensationem euacuatus, adsumitur.

166 *Tr. ps.* 138.19 (CCL 61B 202.11–14): Et rursum in gloria Dei Patris est, forma uidelicet seruili in gloriam eius, cuius in forma ante manebat, proficiente, corruptionis scilicet natura per perfectum incorruptionis absorta. *Proficiente* is a form of *proficiere*: according to Fierro, this is a favorite term of Hilary but is common among other Latin theologians to express προκοπή, the Greek word, used first by Athenagoras and then commonly, to express a progress toward divine perfection. The *profectus* of glory has as its object a better nature, because glory is the "form or dignity of nature" (see Fierro, *Sobre la gloria*, 205, 217). See also Buffer, *Salus in St. Hilary*, 186.

167 See Fierro, *Sobre la gloria*, 176: "El ser humano de Cristo tiene la función de hacer sensible y accesible a los hombres la luz y la gloria de Dios."

is greater in that he is the generator; he is the source and the end of all things. Nevertheless, the Father shares all that he is with the Son through generation. Though the Son receives, he receives all. Integration into the body of Christ and participation in his divine nature is participation in full divinity. However, just as the Son, himself true God, is yet also defined by his relationship to the Father, so also glorified humanity, existing in the body of Christ, participates fully in divinity by looking toward, and being defined by, its relationship with the Father.

Our discussion in Chapter 7 of Hilary's use of the word *adsumere* sheds light on the patercentric nature of Hilary's soteriology. Hilary, we saw, expands the range of the word *adsumere* to include the incarnation in addition to its traditional theological use in reference to the ascension. The incarnation, in Hilary's thought, is man "assumed" by Christ. The ascension is Christ "assumed" by the Father. The Father, in "assuming" Christ, "assumes" also the man Christ has assumed. The ascension is therefore a prolongation of the incarnation in Hilary's thought.[168] *Adsumere* highlights the two movements of salvation. The first is the movement of kenosis in which the Son moves from the glory of the Father to existence as man. The second, which is both the reverse and the fulfillment of the first, is the movement of glorification: humanity, in the Son, moves into the glory of the Father. Hilary's soteriological model is one in which Christ participates in humanity so that humanity may participate in him, not as an end in itself, but as the only means of knowledge of, and relationship with, the Father; for no one knows the Father but the Son—and those who have been made sons in the Son.

Conclusion

Hilary's theological system is patercentric. This centrality of the Father is consistently born out in Hilary's Trinitarian theology and in his soteriological system, including eschatology and ecclesiology. Hilary's apparent focus on the Son is the necessary means to the beginning and the end, namely the Father. The

168 For the semantic range and theological import of *adsumere* in Hilary's work, see Chapter 7 "Hilary's Use of *Adsumere* Manifests the Connection between Soteriology and Eschatology." See also Doignon, " 'Adsumo' et 'adsumptio';" Orazzo, "Ilario di Poitiers e la *universa caro*," 409–414; and Iacoangeli, " 'Sacramentum Carnis, Sanguininis, Gloriae'," 523–524. Hilary's use of the same word—*adsumere*—for the two mysteries of the incarnation and the ascension shows his theological unification of the two.

Son has no other purpose than to reveal the truth of the Father and to bring creatures into union with the Father. The Son fulfills his role in several ways.

1) His eternal generation reveals the eternal Father.
2) He is the mediator in the act of creation and so reveals the Father as the ultimate origin of all things.
3) He accomplishes the revelation of the Father to humanity, first through his interactions with Israel: giving the Law, inspiring the prophets, etc.
4) The most perfect mediation of the Father to humanity is accomplished in the incarnation. For Hilary, the incarnation is the best way because it requires no other mediation than the Son himself, that is, it does not require the Law or the prophets etc. Christ's assumption of all humanity is the real perfection of the incarnation, because it allows the Son direct contact with each human person.

The Son glorifies that which he assumes. In a system where Christ assumes an individual human nature, the Son would glorify (and save) that individual human nature. This glorification would then need to be transferred from the Son's individual human nature to all other humans. In this type of system, salvation moves from the Son to his humanity and from his proper humanity to the rest of humanity in a process containing two distinct levels of mediation.[169] Hilary's desire to eliminate this extra step between Christ and the salvation of all individuals is one of the reasons we cannot say his theology of the incarnation is Platonic. If Christ assumed the universal Form of humanity, this universal Form would be glorified in Christ's glorification, but then the glorification of individuals would come, not directly from Christ, but through this universal Form. Only if each individual is assumed in the incarnation can each individual be glorified without additional mediation. In other words, for Hilary, if the Son only saves what he assumes, he must assume each individual to save each individual.

169 Buffer's presentation of Hilary's conception of salvation is marred precisely because he does not assimilate Hilary's teaching of Christ's assumption of all humanity; rather he presents Hilary as teaching a two-step salvation: first Christ, then the rest of humanity. In this presentation Christ is primarily an exemplar: "…Jesus Christ is the examplar of human salvation. The mysteries of salvation, first accomplished in his death and resurrection, are the pattern for the fulfillment of those same mysteries in believers" (Buffer, *Salus in St. Hilary*, 179). Because Buffer portrays Hilary's Christ as an exemplar and teacher, he understands salvation as dependent upon faith, and the Church primarily as a transmitter of saving knowledge (211–222).

The mediation of the incarnation is so perfect that it becomes the eternal way for humanity. All humanity's presence in Christ's body gives humans contact with, and so knowledge of, the Son and leads to contact with, and knowledge of, the Father. Humans can never bypass the Son and be in direct contact with the Father because the end reflects the beginning, and if the Son becomes nonessential in the end, then he is also nonessential in the beginning.

We see then that Hilary's soteriology and Trinitarian theology are perfectly balanced, one reflecting the other. For Hilary's soteriology there is only one road—the Son—that leads only one place—the Father. This salvific movement in the Son toward the Father reflects the Father's eternal revelation of himself through the Son.

Conclusion

This book has dealt with Hilary's controversial redemption model in which Christ saves humanity by assuming every single person into his body in the incarnation. Because of a misinterpretation of his understanding of Christ's assumption of all humanity, Hilary, along with several Greek Fathers, has been accused of heterodoxy resulting from Platonic influence. In the course of this work, I demonstrated that Hilary is not influenced by Platonism; rather, though his redemption model is unusual among the early Latin Fathers, he derives his theology from a combination of Latin-influenced biblical exegesis and classical Roman themes. The implications of this aspect of Hilary's thought expand into nearly every realm of his theology: I addressed the areas of soteriology, christology, eschatology, ecclesiology, and Trinitarian theology. In the two parts of this book, I have sought to make two points. First, Hilary's teaching concerning Christ's assumption of all humanity is an unusual and noteworthy development of Latin sources. Second, this teaching is a prominent part of Hilary's entire theological system and so illustrates the unified nature of his theology.

Hilary's Teaching of Christ's Assumption of All Humanity is Neither Imported from the East nor Inherited from the West

Hilary's redemption model, and specifically his teaching that Christ assumes all of humanity in the incarnation, is neither inherited from the West nor imported from the East. Even though the physicalist redemption model is unusual in the Latin West, Hilary's teaching *is* thoroughly Latin in that it is his personal, theological development of Latin sources.[1] While similar teaching existed in the East, Hilary does not derive his model from Eastern influence whether theological or philosophical. I have shown through a historical study of Hilary's education, his knowledge of Greek, and the status of Latin

1 Furthermore, though Hilary is almost immediately after his death considered a Father and read as an authority, his distinctive redemption model is not appropriated, except, perhaps, by Gregory of Elvira. Even Augustine, who uses Hilary's *Tractatus super Psalmos* for his own *Enarationes in Psalmos*, does not assimilate Hilary's model of Christ's assumption of all humanity into his own theological system. We must await a future comparative study of the Psalm commentaries of Hilary and Augustine to know whether Augustine is even aware of this aspect of Hilary's thought.

© KONINKLIJKE BRILL NV, LEIDEN, 2015 | DOI 10.1163/9789004290815_012

Platonism, as well as through textual study of Hilary's pre- and post-exilic works, that before Hilary had access to Greek theology or philosophy, he was teaching Christ's assumption of all humanity.

The uniqueness of Hilary's teaching of Christ's assumption of all humanity and the mystery of his independent development of a teaching that in other authors is dependent upon different sources (most notably the works of the Platonists) is cause enough for a study on this aspect of Hilary's teaching. Furthermore, Hilary's teaching on Christ's assumption of all humanity is more than a curious side note in Hilary's theology. However Hilary originally developed this teaching, it becomes, throughout his career, a more and more integral piece of his entire theological system. The physicalist redemption model dependent upon Christ's assumption of all humanity is not only present in Hilary's thought, but becomes determinative of his thought.

Hilary's Teaching of Christ's Assumption of All Humanity Demonstrates the Unified Nature of His Theological System

Study of Hilary's teaching on Christ's assumption of all humanity is both a neglected and a fruitful entrance into Hilary's entire theological system in that it provides a window into the matrix of interconnectedness among all areas of Hilary's thought.

Hilary scholarship has long been content to break his theology into specific themes and the result of this method is a distinct sense that each segment of Hilary's theology is unaffected by the others. However, through my study of Hilary's teaching concerning Christ's assumption of all humanity, I have found that Hilary's teaching is unified. This ostensibly soteriological teaching cannot even be fully explicated without delving into Hilary's christology, eschatology, ecclesiology, and Trinitarian theology.

While the division of chapters in this book follows the standard delineation of the theological enterprise into the doctrinal categories of christology, soteriology, eschatology, ecclesiology, and Trinitarian theology, I use this division to further highlight the interdependence of all these categories in Hilary's thought. I have shown, for example, that a study on Hilary's ecclesiology must take into account Hilary's presentation of the Church as the body of Christ. To understand this presentation one must understand Hilary's christological assessment of the body of Christ. As we now know, Hilary has a christological understanding of the body of Christ that defines his soteriology as he believes that it is a body that physically contains all humanity in a relationship that is

only fully fulfilled in the eschaton. This eschatological fulfillment of humans in Christ's body is the eschatological Church, a Church that manifests the eternal Trinitarian relationship of the Father and the Son, for the Son is the eternal mediator between God and his creation. Ecclesiology contains christology, soteriology, eschatology, and Trinitarian theology in Hilary's thought. The same is true for all the other areas; they are not self-sufficient. A rigid separation of Hilary's theology into the traditional doctrinal areas, such that a single area is exclusively pursued, renders Hilary incoherent.

The Standard Scholarly Perception of Hilary is Driven by a Divisive Method of Study

There is a standard scholarly opinion about the value of Hilary's theology that, until recently, has dominated the field, namely, that Hilary's only major theological contribution is in the field of Trinitarian theology. On the basis of this rather exclusive interest, Hilary receives two different distinctions in the realm of modern scholarship. Hilary is most often considered either traditional—and therefore important only as a historical marker—or hopelessly incomprehensible, a muddle of East and West, joined by sloppy language. These two designations—that Hilary is historically unimportant and that he is incomprehensible—are coupled together in a recent commentary on Hilary's theology by Lionel Wickham:

> Yet Hilary's doctrine of God, and most of his own arguments, would have looked crude to his Greek contemporaries, did appear irrelevant to Augustine and always receive apologetic qualification from the modern historians who mention them. . . . The culminating *De Trinitate* is a work whose incoherences . . . are matched by obscurity of expression.[2]

The most disturbing thing about Wickham's presentation of Hilary's theology is that Wickham is himself the author of a book on Hilary. Some Hilary scholars are the first to undercut their chosen field.

---

2 Lionel Wickham, review of *The Trinitarian Theology of Hilary of Poitiers* by Mark Weedman, *Journal of Ecclesiastical History*, 60.2 (2009): 330–331. See also Carl Beckwith, who says that scholars "struggle to assess Hilary's own contribution to the history of Christian thought," and "are reluctant to credit Hilary with his own theological and exegetical creativity" (Beckwith, *Hilary of Poitiers on the Trinity*, 210).

These rather low perceptions of Hilary's theological contribution are based on, and driven by, a method of studying Hilary. In this method, Hilary's theology is divided according to the categories of modern systematic theology. There are, as a glance at any bibliography of Hilary scholarship will demonstrate, studies of Hilary's ecclesiology, his soteriology, his eschatology, and predominantly his Trinitarian theology. With this method of study, it is inevitable that Hilary's theology becomes either traditional or unintelligible. Either Hilary is historically uninteresting because we insist on categorizing his theology according to modern judgment and assimilating him to his peers—in so doing eliminating all his individuality—or we recognize Hilary's individuality only to throw up our hands at Hilary's "incomprehensibility" because we no longer know how to classify or study him.

This low perception of Hilary exists even despite his famous title as "The Athanasius of the West," a name given to him by the German scholar K. Hase in 1836.[3] However, Hase's title for Hilary shows the nineteenth-century German, not the modern, perception of Hilary's theological contribution. In the classic German doctrinal histories, Hilary is the Western counterpart to Athanasius: the promoter and protector of Nicea.[4] However, the title "Athanasius of the West" for Hilary has recently lost scholarly, if not popular, impetus.[5] Furthermore, "Athanasius of the West" is not as praiseworthy a designation as it once was. Scholarship is demonstrating that Athanasius' historical influence is much smaller than initially supposed. As Athanasius is stepping down from his role as the post-Nicea theological giant in the East, Hilary seems to be losing his role as the corresponding giant in the West. As scholarship brings to light more of the smaller theologians of the late fourth century, Hilary's Trinitarian theology no longer seems so distinctive. Hilary is certainly distinct from Tertullian and Novatian, on the one hand, and Augustine, on the other, but as his own contemporaries receive more scholarly treatment, Hilary's Trinitarian theology is seen to have several parallels. Therefore, Hilary's title as "Athanasius of the West" does little to raise the modern scholarly perception of his historical contribution.

---

3 K. Hase, *Kirchengeschichte*, 2nd edition (Leipzig, 1836), 137: "des Athanasius des Abenlandes."

4 For example, Harnack says of Hilary: "He was the first theologian of the West to penetrate into the secrets of the Nicene Creed, and with all his dependence on Athanasius was an original thinker, who, as a theologian, far surpassed the Alexandrian Bishop" (*History of Dogma*, vol. 4, 73).

5 See Mark Weedman's article: "Not the Athanasius of the West: Hilary's Changing Relationship with Athanasius," *Studia Patristica* 42 (2006): 411–415.

A New (Unified) Method Leads to a New Perception

This book is intended as a corrective to modern scholarly perceptions of Hilary. The modern perception, as we have said, is based on a method of studying Hilary. This book is the result of the conscious application of a different method, a method that leads to a remarkably different, and more positive, perception of Hilary's theological contribution.

Instead of dividing Hilary's thought according to modern codifications of theology (for example, into Trinitarian theology or soteriology), I use a method that begins with a single idea found in Hilary's work—namely that Christ assumes all of humanity into his body at the incarnation—and traces the repercussions of this idea throughout Hilary's theology. As we have seen, this idea led me into the supposedly distinct areas of soteriology, eschatology, ecclesiology, and Trinitarian theology. Throughout this work, I have shown that Hilary's theology does not neatly divide into these categories. Any division of Hilary's thought needs to accomplished according to a criterion that comes from Hilary's own thought, not from modern systematics.

My method of pursuing a single idea throughout Hilary's theological corpus results in a new appreciation of Hilary's theological contribution. First, scholars need to question their exclusively Trinitarian interest in Hilary. I show that Hilary's teaching of Christ's assumption of all humanity influences his Trinitarian understanding, and yet this teaching of Christ's assumption of all humanity is often relegated to the realm of soteriology. This sort of relegation has made scholars blind to the presence of Christ's assumption of all humanity as a unique aspect, not only of Hilary's soteriology, but of his Trinitarian teaching. Hilary's Trinitarian theology is impoverished when it is studied according to the modern systematic classification.

Furthermore, my study of Hilary found him neither historically uninteresting nor incomprehensible. Hilary has been considered historically uninteresting because scholars have systematically denied to Hilary the presence of unique or historically unexplained thoughts. In the first chapter, I dealt with the history of scholarly denial that has accompanied the theological presence of Hilary's teaching concerning Christ's assumption of all humanity. For the sake of "protecting" Hilary from heterodoxy or out of genuine confusion as to its origins, the scholarly pattern up until recently has been to ignore or deny that Hilary teaches that Christ assumes all of humanity. I would argue that Hilary's teaching of Christ assumption of all humanity is among the most interesting of Hilary's theological contributions. When this contribution is denied him, Hilary becomes, not surprisingly, much less historically interesting.

Hilary's perceived incomprehensibility is often simply a question of vocabulary. A large section of this book has been dedicated to clarifying Hilary's use of key technical terminology like *similis, similitudo, uniuersitas, persona*, and *natura*. Hilary has a style of writing that is not reader-friendly because he has a tendency to use technical vocabulary in a way that allows, and even fosters, several meanings for each term. Furthermore, Hilary makes no effort to signal to his reader which of his meanings he is using at any given time. However, difficulty does not equal incomprehensibility. More vocabulary studies are needed to aid in understanding Hilary's theological project. The vocabulary studies we have are of limited usefulness because they follow the method I delineated above that divides Hilary's theology into modern systematic areas. The trick to understanding Hilary's Trinitarian use of the term *persona*, for example, is to look at his prosopological use of *persona* to refer to the two "natures" of Christ. Understanding Hilary's technical use of *persona* in the Trinitarian realm depends upon his technical use of *persona* in the exegetical and christological realms. The point is that, notwithstanding the difficulties of Hilary's theology—of which there are several—much of the "incomprehensibility" of Hilary's theology can be alleviated through a wider and less divisive appropriation of his thought.

What does Hilary Have to Offer?

Studied properly, Hilary is neither historically uninteresting nor incomprehensible. The question is: What does Hilary offer? This is a question that needs to be addressed in two different ways. More, and more sympathetic, study of Hilary is valuable both to the historian and to the theologian.

Hilary's Contribution to the Historian

As historians, we are always seeking greater historical accuracy. I will offer three points to consider. First, Hilary's reception history indicates that Hilary was considered almost immediately as one of the doctors and Fathers of the Church. To say, as we read in Wickham, that Hilary was irrelevant to his successors, including Augustine, is simply false. Second, Hilary sheds light on the theology of his contemporaries. Third, with his teaching of Christ's assumption of all humanity in the incarnation, Hilary offers to the West a unique theological insight. An account of the theology of the fourth century must include not only Hilary's Trinitarian theology but also his soteriology in order to be complete.

First, the immediate reception of Hilary illustrates the historical weight of Hilary's theology upon his successors. Augustine has the highest regard for

Hilary and his theology. He calls Hilary a "distinguished doctor of the Church"[6] and says that Hilary "must be venerated."[7] Obviously, Augustine recognizes that Hilary made significant theological contributions to the Church. Augustine's veneration makes no sense if Hilary is historically insignificant or unintelligible; rather it is historical evidence that Hilary's theology was significant—and significantly influential to Augustine, among others.[8]

Second, Hilary sheds light on his contemporaries. In studying Hilary's teaching on Christ's assumption of all humanity, I came into contact with the, as yet unaccounted for, parallels between Hilary and Gregory of Elvira. A study of Hilary also may contribute to greater understanding of Gregory of Elvira and to the historical question of the dating of his *Tractatus Origenis*. Gregory is another fourth century Latin author who has hints of a teaching of Christ's assumption of all humanity. Furthermore, word-for-word parallels between Gregory's *Tractatus Origenis* and Hilary's *Tractatus super Psalmos* manifests direct appropriation.[9] Greater study of both Hilary and Gregory is needed to show the direction of this appropriation. I can only imagine that Gregory of Elvira is not the singular example of the clarification that can be gained in the studies of other fourth century theologians through comparison with Hilary.

Third, I have shown that Hilary has at least one theological insight—that Christ assumes all of humanity bodily in the incarnation—that he shares with no other Latin theologian. In this teaching, Hilary is not just a representative of the fourth century West; rather, he adds something distinctive to the Western tradition. A historical account of the theology of the fourth century must include Hilary's teaching of Christ's assumption of all humanity. Hilary's teaching of Christ's assumption of all humanity is a new take on the Latin tradition; for this reason it is of historical interest. In particular, why Hilary developed this understanding and why no one else followed him in it, are two questions that should pique historians' curiosity.

---

6 Augustine, *Contra Iulianum* 2 (in *Opera omnia*, ed. J.-P. Migne, 641–876, PL 44 [Paris, 1865], col. 693.12): Catholicus loquitur, insignis ecclesiarum doctor loquitur, hilarius loquitur.

7 Augustine, *Contra Iulianum* 2 (PL 44 col. 678.44): et ideo uenerandus hilarious. Augustine also speaks highly of Hilary's exegetical skills (*De Trinitate* 6.10): et quia non mediocris auctoritatis in tractatione scripturarum et assertione fidei uir exstitit, (hilarius enim hoc in libris suis posuit) . . .

8 Augustine admits that he has some trouble following Hilary's thought. This difficulty, however, neither diminishes his respect for Hilary nor prevents him from usefully appropriating Hilary's thought. See Augustine, *De Trinitate* 6.11.

9 See Chapter 3 "Latin Theological Context for Hilary's Physicalist Model of Redemption" for a lengthier discussion of the parallels between Hilary and Gregory of Elvira.

Hilary's Contribution to the Theologian

Hilary's teaching of Christ's assumption of all humanity opens up a new panorama for soteriology in the Western Church, one that can also aid in the ecumenical effort. In teaching Christ's assumption of all humanity, Hilary begins in the West a way of thinking about salvation that already at that time, and still today, holds great weight in the East. Though Hilary does not use the term "divinization" or "deification" to speak of the manner of human redemption, it should be clear that Hilary's physicalist redemption model leads to an understanding of human eschatological life wherein humans share the divine life in a divinized or deified existence. Hilary says that the goal of the incarnation is that "it might be gained by man that he should be God."[10] Harnack includes the doctrine of divinization in his critique of the Hellenic corruption of the original purity of Christianity.[11] The divinization model of redemption—taught by several Greek Fathers, recently given new life by Vladimir Lossky,[12] and a pillar of the Orthodox Church—is, according to the logic of those who still follow Harnack's theory, a corruption of true Christianity. However, Hilary's teaching of Christ's assumption of all humanity with its corresponding mystical, physical, or divinization-type model of redemption, is dependent neither on Platonism nor the Alexandrian tradition. Hilary's divinization model cannot so easily be classified as Hellenic and so cannot, by modern Harnackians, be rejected as such.[13] In this way Hilary gives the favored understanding of redemption in the Orthodox Church some unexpected Western support. Hilary's teaching of divinization also offers Western Christians an entrance into this redemption model through one of their own. In all this, study of Hilary can assist ecumenical efforts between Eastern and Western Churches.

The non-Platonic nature of Hilary's physicalism manifests a theology that has far outpaced its philosophical foundation. We can view this imbalance between theological and philosophical depth as either a weakness or a

---

10 *De Trin*. 9.38 (CCL 62A 412.13–14): Id enim homini adquirebatur, ut Deus esset.

11 Divinization is the result of the "progress of Christian Hellenism," (Harnack, *History of Dogma*, vol. 2, 10).

12 "Considered from the point of view of our fallen state, the aim of the divine dispensation can be termed salvation or redemption. This is the negative aspect of our ultimate goal, which is considered from the perspective of our sin. Considered from the point of view of the ultimate vocation of created beings, the aim of the divine dispensation can be termed deification," (Vladimir Lossky, "Redemption and Deification," in *In the Image and Likeness of God*, ed. John Erickson and Thomas Bird [Crestwood, NY: St Vladimir's Seminary Press, 2001], 110).

13 Except, of course, insofar as Hilary follows Paul, and is influenced by the Latin Stoic tradition.

strength. It is very possible that physicalism did not outlive the fourth century in the West precisely because it lacked metaphysical support, making it seem unattractive and incomplete to later theologians. However, it is equally true that Hilary was able to come up with a soteriology that resembles what the smartest Greeks of the *next* generation (for example, Gregory of Nyssa) were able to offer, even though Hilary completely lacked the metaphysical resources that made their physicalist soteriology possible. We could say that Hilary is teaching the same thing as Nyssa but in a deficient fashion, because he is lacking the essential philosophical categories to explain how physicalism works. However, we can say with equal accuracy that Hilary is exceptional because he was the one in a million who could conceptualize physicalism without a philosophical system to stand on.

That Greek physicalists expanded the philosophical foundation of physicalism by providing the metaphysical support of Platonism does not require, either historically in Hilary's case, or today in modern systematic formulation, that physicalism be inextricably tied to Platonic thought. For theologians in a post-Platonic world, Hilary's theology of the assumption of all humanity is uniquely intriguing because is is open to being filled in by a modern metaphysical system.

Bibliography

Hilary of Poitiers

Treatise on the Psalms

S. Hilarii episcopi Pictaviensis. *Tractatus super Psalmos*. Edited by Anton Zingerle. CSEL 22. Vienna: F. Tempsky, 1891.

Hilaire de Poitiers. *Commentaire sur le psaume* 118. Edited and translated by Marc Milhau. Sources chrétiennes 344 (aleph-heth) and 347 (teth-tau). Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1988.

———. *Commentaires sur les Psaumes*. Edited and translated by Patrick Descourtieux. Sources chrétiennes 515. Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 2008.

Sancti Hilarii Pictaviensis episcopi. *Tractatus super Psalmos: Instructio Psalmorum, In psalmos I–XCI*. Edited by Jean Doignon. CCL 61. Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 1997.

———. *Tractatus super Psalmos: In psalmo CXVIII*. Edited by Jean Doignon with Roland Demeulenaere. CCL 61A. Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 2002.

———. *Tractatus super Psalmos: In psalmo CXIX–CL*. Edited by Jean Doignon with Roland Demeulenaere. CCL 61B. Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 2009.

Ilario di Poitiers. *Commento ai Salmi*. Edited and translated by Antonio Orazzo. Collana di testi patristici 185–187. Rome: Città Nuova, 2006.

On The Trinity

De Trinitate. Edited by Pieter Smulders. CCL 62 (books 1–7) and 62A (books 8–12), Brepols Publishers: Turnhout, 1979–1980.

The Trinity. Edited and translated by Stephen McKenna. Fathers of the Church 25. New York: Catholic University of America Press, 1954.

Commentary on Matthew

Sur Matthieu. Edited by Jean Doignon. Sources chrétiennes 254 (ch. 1–13) and 258 (ch. 14–33). Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1978–1979.

Commentary on Matthew. Edited and translated by Daniel Williams. Fathers of the Church 125. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2012.

Treatise on the Mysteries

Hilaire de Poitiers. *Tractatus myteriorum: Traité des mystères*. Edited by Jean-Paul Brisson. Sources chrétiennes 19. Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1967.

Minor Works

Contra Auxentium. In PL 10, edited by Pierre Coustant, 609–618. Paris, 1845.

De Synodis seu de Fide Orientalium. In PL 10, edited by Pierre Coustant, 479–546. Paris, 1845.

Liber I ad Constantium, Liber II ad Constantium, Fragmenta historica, Hymni, Fragmenta minora. In *S. Hilarii Episcopi Pictaviensis Opera Pars Qvarta*. CSEL 65, edited by Alfred Feder, 43–251. Vienna: F. Tempsky, 1916.

Contre Constance. Edited by André Rocher. Sources chrétiennes 334. Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1987.

Wickham, Lionel. *Hilary of Poitiers: Conflicts of Conscience and Law in the Fourth-Century Church*. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1997.

Other Primary Sources

Ambrose. *De Apologia prophetae David. Ambroise de Milan: Apologie de David*. Edited by Pierre Hadot. Translated by Marius Cordier. Sources chrétiennes 239. Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1977.

———. *Expositio euangelii secundum Lucam*. In *Ambrosii mediolanensis opera pars 4*. Edited by M. Adriaen, 1–400. CCL 14. Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 1957.

Ambrosiaster. *In Epistulam ad Romanos. Commentarius in epistulas Paulinas, pars 1*, ed. Heinrich Vogels. CSEL 81. Vienna: Hoelder-Picheler-Tempsky, 1966.

Athanasius. *De Incarnatione. Sur l'incarnation du verbe*. Edited by Charles Kannengiesser. Sources chrétiennes 199. Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1973.

Augustine. *Contra Iulianum*. In *Opera omnia*, ed. J.-P. Migne, 641–876. PL 44. Paris, 1865.

Basil of Caesarea. *Contra Eunonium*. In *Contre Eunome suive de Eunome Apologie*, ed. and trans. Bernard Sesboüé, Georges-Matthieu de Durand, and Lous Doutreleau, vol. 1 and vol. 2, 10–75. Sources chrétiennes 299 and 305. Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1982–1983.

Chromatius of Aquileia. *Tractatus in Matthaeum*. In *Chromatii Aquieleiensis Opera*, ed. R. Étaix and J. Lemarié, 184–498. CCL 9A. Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 1974.

Chalciduis. *Commentarius in Platonis Timaeum. Timaeus a Calcidio translatus commentarioque instructus*. Edited by J.H. Waszink. Corpus philosophorum medii aevi corpus Platonicum. Plato Latinus, vol. 4. London: E.J. Brill, 1962; 1975.

Cicero. *De Divinatione*. In *De Senectute, De Amicitia, De Divinatione*, trans. William Falconer, 222–539. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1953.

———. *De Finibus bonorum et malorum*. Translated by H. Rackham. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1931.

———. *De Natura deorum*. In *De Natura Deorum; Academica*, trans. H. Rackham, 2–398. Loeb Classical Library. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1933.

———. *De Officiis*. Translated by Walter Miller. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1913.

———. *Tuscalan Disputations*. Translated by J.E. King. Loeb Classical Library. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1927.

Cyprian. *Ad Demetrianum*. Edited by Manlio Simonetti. In *Praefatio ad libellos ad Donatum, De Mortalitate, Ad Demetrianum, De Opere et eleemosynis, De Zelo et liuore, De Dominica oratione, De Bono patientiae*, 34–51. CCL 3A. Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 1976.

———. *Ad Quiriunum*. Edited by R. Weber. In *Sancti Episcopi Opera, pars 1*, 1–179. CCL 3. Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 1972.

———. *Cato Maior*. In *De Re publica, De Legibus, Cato Maior de senectute, Laelius de amicitia*, ed. J.G.F. Powell, 267–315. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.

———. *De Dominica oratione*. Edited by C. Moreschini. In *Praefatio ad libellos ad Donatum, De Mortalitate, Ad Demetrianum, De Opere et eleemosynis, De Zelo et liuore, De Dominica oratione, De Bono patientiae*, 87–113. CCL 3A. Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 1976.

———. *De Ecclesiae catholicae unitate*. Edited by M. Bévenot. In *Sancti Episcopi Opera, pars 1*, 248–268. CCL 3. Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 1972.

———. *De Legibus*. In *De Re publica, De Legibus, Cato Maior de senectute, Laelius de amicitia*, ed. J.G.F. Powell, 155–266. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.

———. *De Re publica*. In *De Re publica, De Legibus, Cato Maior de senectute, Laelius de amicitia*, ed. J.G.F. Powell, 1–154. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.

———. *Epistualae*. Edited by G.F. Diercks. CCL 3B, 3C. Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 1994, 1996.

Epiphanius. *Panarion.* In *Epiphanius*, vol. 3, ed. Karl Holl (2nd. ed., ed. Jürgen Dummer), 1–496. Die Griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten Jahrhunderte. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1985.

Erasmus. *Letter to John Carondolet*. In *Opus Epistolarum Des. Erasmi Roterodami*, vol. 5, ed. P.S. Allen, H.M. Allen, and H.W. Garrod, 172–192. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1924.

Eunomius. *Apologia*. In *Contre Eunome suive de Eunome Apologie*, ed. and trans. Bernard Sesboüé, Georges-Matthieu de Durand, and Lous Doutreleau, vol. 2, 234–299. Sources chrétiennes 299 and 305. Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1982–1983.

Eusebius of Vercelli. *Epistula 2 ad presbyteros et plebem Italiae*. In *Eusebius Vercellensis, Filastrius Brixiensis, Appendix ad Hegemonium, Isaac Iudaeus, Archidiaconus Romanus, Fortunatianus Aquileiensis, Chromatius Aquileiensis*, ed. Vincent Bulhart, 104–110. CCL 9. Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 1957.

Faustinus. *De Trinitate*, ed. M. Simonetti. In *Greogrius Iliberritanus, Faustinus, Luciferianus*, 289–353. CCL 69. Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 1967.

Gregory of Elvira. *De Fide orthodoxa contra Arianos*, ed. Vincent Bulhart. In *Greogrius Iliberritanus, Faustinus, Luciferianus*, 217–247. CCL 69. Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 1967.

———. *In Canticum Canticorum libri quinque*, ed. J. Fraipont. In *Greogrius Iliberritanus, Faustinus, Luciferianus*, 165–210. CCL 69. Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 1967.

———. *Tractatus Origenis*, ed. Vincent Bulhart. In *Greogrius Iliberritanus, Faustinus, Luciferianus*, 1–146. CCL 69. Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 1967.

Gregory Nazianzus. *Oratio* 33. In *Opera quae exstant omnia*, ed. J.-P. Migne, 214–238. PG 36. Turnhout: Brepols, 1857.

Hippolytus. *In Danielem. Commentaire sur Daniel*, ed. Maurice Lefèvre. Sources chrétiennes 14. Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1947.

Irenaeus. *Aduersus Haereses* 3. *Contre les heresies: Livre 3*. Edited by Adelin Rousseau and Louis Doutreleau. Sources chrétiennes 211. Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1974.

Jerome. *Commentarii in epistolam ad Ephesios*. In *Opera omnia*, vol. 7, ed. J.-P. Migne, 467–590. PL 26. Paris: Garnier Fratres, 1884.

———. *Commentariorum in Hiezechielem*. Edited by Francisci Glorie. CCL 75. Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 1964.

———. *Epistulae*. Edited by Isidore Hilberg. CSEL 54. Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1996.

Justin Martyr. *Iustini Martyris Dialogus cum Tryphone*. Edited by Miroslav Marcovich. Patristiche Texte und Studien 47. New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1997.

Lactantius. *Divinae institutiones.* In *Opera omnia*, ed. Samuel Brandt, 1–672. CSEL 19. Prague: F. Tempsky, 1890.

Macrobuis. *Commentarii in somnium Scipionis*. Edited by Jacob Willis. Bibliotheca scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana. Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1963.

Marius Victorinus. *Adversus Arium*. In *Marii Victorini Opera*, ed. P. Henry and P. Hadot, 54–277. CSEL 83.1. Vienna: Hoelder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1971.

Novatian. *De Trinitate*. In *Novatiani Opera*, ed. G.F. Diercks, 11–78. CCL 4. Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 1972.

Philo. *De aeternitate mundi.* In *Stoicorum veterum fragmenta*, vol. 2, ed. Hans von Arnim. Leipzig, 1903.

Pliny. *Naturalis historia*. Edited by H. Rackham. 10 vols. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1942.

Salvian. *De Gubernatione dei. Œuvres*. Vol. 2: *Du Gouvernement de dieu*, ed. Georges Lagarrique. Sources chrétiennes 220. Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1975.

Seneca. *Ad Lucilium epistulae morales*. Translated by Richard Gummere. 3 vols. Loeb Classical Library. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1925.

———. *De Constantia sapientis*. In *Four Dialogues*, ed. C.D.N. Costa, 100–131. Warminster: Aris & Phillips Ltd., 1994.

———. *De Otio*. In *De Otio; De Brevitate uitae*, ed. G.D. Williams, 37–43. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Tertullian. *Aduersus Marcionem*. Edited by A. Kroymann. In *Tertulliani Opera, pars 1: Opera Catholica; Aduersus Marcionem*, 437–726. CCL 1. Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 1954.

———. *Aduersus Praxean*. Edited by A. Kroymann and E. Evans. In *Tertulliani Opera, pars 2: Opera Montanistica*, 1159–1205. CCL 2. Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 1954.

———. *Apologeticum*. Edited by E. Dekkers. In *Tertulliani Opera, pars 1: Opera Catholica; Aduersus Marcionem*, 77–171. CCL 1. Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 1954.

———. *De Anima*. Edited by J.H. Waszink. In *Tertulliani Opera, pars 2: Opera Montanistica*, 781–869. CCL 2. Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 1954.

———. *De Carne Christi*. Edited by A. Kroymann. In *Tertulliani Opera, pars 2: Opera Montanistica*, 873–917. CCL 2. Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 1954.

———. *De Monogamia*. Edited by E. Dekkers. In *Tertulliani Opera, pars 2: Opera Montanistica*, 1229–1253. CCL 2. Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 1954.

———. *De Paenitentia.* Edited by J. Borleffs. In *Tertulliani Opera, pars 1: Opera Catholica; Aduersus Marcionem*, 319–340. CCL 1. Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 1954.

———. *De Resurrectione mortuorum*. Edited by J. Borleffs. In *Tertulliani Opera, pars 2: Opera Montanistica*, 921–1012. CCL 2. Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 1954.

Zeno of Verona. *Tractatus.* Edited by B. Löfstedt. CCL 22. Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 1971.

Secondary Sources

Anyanwu, Akannamdi Gerard Stephen. *The Christological Anthropology in St. Hilary of Poitiers' Tractatus on the Psalms*. Rome: Olimpica, 1983.

Ayres, Lewis. *Nicaea and its Legacy: An Approach to Fourth-Century Trinitarian Theology*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.

Baldry, H.C. *The Unity of Mankind in Greek Thought*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965.

Balthasar, Hans Urs von. "Die Hiera des Evagrius." *Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie* 63 (1939): 86–106, 181–206.

Bardy, Gustave. "Un Humaniste chrétien. Saint Hilaire de Poitiers." *Revue d'histoire de l'église de France* 27 (1941): 5–25.

Barnes, Michel René. "One Nature, One Power: Consensus Doctrine in Pro-Nicene Polemic." *Studia Patristica* 29 (1997): 205–223.

———. "*De Trinitate* VI and VII: Augustine and the Limits of Nicene Orthodoxy." *Augustinian Studies* 38 (2007): 189–202.

———. "The Fourth Century as Trinitarian Canon." In *Christian Origins: Theology, Rhetoric and Community*, edited by Lewis Ayres and Gareth Jones, 47–67. London and New York: Routledge, 1998.

———. *The Power of God: Δύναμις in Gregory of Nyssa's Trinitarian Theology*. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2001.

Beck, Anton. "Die Lehre des hl. Hilarius von Poitiers über die Leidensfähigheit Christi." *Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie* 30 (1906): 108–122, 295–310.

———. *Die Trinitäslehre des Heiligen Hilarius von Poitiers*. Forschungen zur christlischen Literatur und Dogmengeschichte 3.2–3. Mainz: Franz Kirchheim, 1903.

Beckwith, Carl. *Hilary of Poitiers on the Trinity: From* De Fide *to* De Trinitate. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

———. "Photinian Opponents in Hilary of Poitiers's *Commentarium in Matthaeum*." *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 58 (2007): 611–627.

———. "Suffering without Pain." In *In the Shadow of the Incarnation: Essays on Jesus Christ in the Early Church in Honor of Brian E. Daley, S.J.*, 71–96. Edited by Peter W. Martens. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2008.

Beumer, J. "De Eenheid der menschen met Christus in de theologie van den H. Hilarius van Poitiers." *Bijdragen tijdschrift voor philosophie en theologie* 5 (1942): 151–167.

Blaising, Craig, and Carmen Hardin. *Psalms 1–50*. Ancient Christian Commentary on Scripture: Old Testament 7. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2008.

Blasich, Gottardo. "La Risurrezione dei corpi nell'opera esegetica di S. Ilario di Poitiers." *Divus Thomas* 69 (1966): 72–90.

Bouyer, Louis. "La Notion Christologique du Fils de l'homme a-t-elle disparu dans la patristique grecque?" In *Melanges Bibliques: Rediges en l'honneur de Andre Robert*, edited by Henri Cazelles, 519–530. Travaux de l'institut Catholique de Paris. Paris: Bloud & Gay, 1956.

Briggman, Anthony. "Irenaeus' Christology of Mixture." *Journal of Theological Studies* 64 (2013): 516–555.

Buckley, Francis. *Christ and the Church according to Gregory of Elvira*. Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1964.

Buffer, Thomas. *Salus in St. Hilary of Poitiers*. Rome: Pontificia Università Gregoriana, 2002.

Burns, Paul. *The Christology in Hilary of Poitiers' Commentary on Matthew.* Studia Ephemerides Augustinianum 16. Rome: Institutum Patristicum Augustinianum, 1981.

———. *A Model for the Christian Life: Hilary of Poitiers' Commentary on the Psalms*. Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2012.

Casamassa, Antonio. "Appunti per lo studio del 'Tractatus super Psalmos' di S. Ilario." *Studia Anselmiana* 27–28 (1951): 231–238.

Charlier, Albert. "L'Église corps du Christ chez saint Hilaire de Poitiers." *Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses* 41 (1965): 451–477.

Colautti, Guillermo Bruno. *Las Figuras eclesiológicas en San Hilario de Poitiers*. Rome: Pontificia Università Gregoriana, 2005.

Colish, Marcia. *The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages*. 2 vols. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1985.

Congar, M.-J. "Sur l'inclusion de l'humanité dans le Christ." *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 25 (1936): 489–495.

Coustant, Pierre. *Praefatio generalis*. In *Patrologia Latina*, edited by Jacques-Paul Migne, vol. 9, edited by Pierre Coustant, 11–126. Paris, 1845.

———, ed. *Sancti Hilarii Pictavorum episcopi opera ad manuscriptos codices gallicanos, romanos, belgicos, nec non ad veteres editiones castigata, aliquot aueta opusculis*. Paris: Excudebat Franciscus Muguet, 1693.

Daley, Brian. *The Hope of the Early Church: A Handbook of Patristic Eschatology*. Peabody, Massachussets: Hendrickson Publishers, 2003.

Daniélou, Jean. "Saint Hilaire, évêque et docteur." In *Hilaire de Poitiers: Évêque et docteur*, 9–18. Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1968.

———. "Hilaire et ses sources juives." In *Hilaire et son temps: Actes du Colloque de Poitiers*, 143–147. Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1969.

Descourtieux, Patrick. Introduction to *Hilaire de Poitiers: Commentaires sur les Psaumes.* Sources chrétiennes 515. Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 2008.

Doignon, Jean. " 'Adsumo' et 'adsumptio' comme expression du mystère de l'Incarnation chez Hilaire de Poitiers." *Archivum Latinitatis Medii Aevi* 23 (1953): 123–135.

———. "Comment Hilaire de Poitiers a-t-il lu et interprété le verset *Philippiens* 3,21," *Vigiliae Christianae* 43 (1989): 128–137.

———. "De l'absence à la présence d'Origène dans l'exégèse d'Hilaire de Poitiers: Deux cas typiques." In *Origeniana Sexta*, edited by Gilles Dorival and Alain Le Boullouec, 693–699. Leuven: University Press, 1995.

———. "Deux approches de la résurrection dans l'exégèse d'Hilaire de Poitiers." *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 54 (1987): 5–12.

———. "Une Exégèse d'Hilaire de Poitiers sur le désir de voir la face de Dieu (Hil., *In Psalm.* 118, 8, 7/8)." *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 41 (1994): 542–545.

———. "L'Hapax 'sapientifico' chez Hilaire de Poitiers, In psalm. 145, 8: Un vestige des 'Vieilles-Latines' du Psautier ou un calque de la Septante d'Origène." *Lectures anciennes de la Bible*, 253–260. Cahiers de Biblia Patristica 1. Strasbourg: Brepols, 1987.

———. *Hilaire de Poitiers avant l'exil: Recherches sur la naissance, l'enseignement et l'épreuve d'une foi épiscopale en Gaule au milieu du IVe siecle*. Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1971.

———. *Hilaire de Poitiers: Disciple et témoin de la vérité* (*356–367*). Edited by Marc Milhau. Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 2005.

———. "Les Premiers Commentateurs latins de l'Écriture et l'œuvre exégétique d'Hilaire de Poitiers." In *Le monde latin antique et la Bible*, edited by Jacques Fontaine and Charles Pietri, 509–519. Bible de tous les temps 2. Paris: Beauchesne, 1985.

———. "Notes critiques pour une édition améliorée du Psautier dans les 'Tractatus super Psalmos' 51 à 69 d'Hilaire de Poitiers." In *Mémorial J. Gribomont* (*1920–1986*) edited by Y. de Andia, 181–194. Studia Ephemeridis Augustinianum 27. Rome: Institutum Patristicum Augustinianum, 1988.

———. "Ordre du monde, connaissance de Dieu et ignorance de soi chez Hilaire de Poitiers." *Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques* 60 (1976): 565–578.

———. "La Scène évangélique du baptême de Jésus commentée par Lactance (*Divinae institutiones* 4,15) et Hilaire de Poitiers (*In Matthaeum* 2,5–6)." In *Epektasis: Mélanges patristiques offerts au cardinal Jean Daniélou*, edited by Jacques Fontaine and Charles Kannengiesser, 68–73. Paris: Beauchesne, 1972.

———. " 'Spiritus sanctus . . . usus in munere' (Hilaire de Poitiers, *De Trinitate* 2, 1)." *Revue Théologique de Louvain* 12 (1981): 235–240.

Dorner, Isaak August. *History of the Development of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ*, vol. 2. Translated by D.W. Simon. Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1889.

Dunn, Geoffrey. "A Survey of Tertullian's soteriology." *Sacris Erudiri* 42 (2003): 61–86.

Durst, Michael. *Die Eschatologie des Hilarius von Poitiers: Ein Beitrag zur Dogmengeschichte der IV Jahrhunderts*. Hereditas 1. Bonn: Borengässer, 1987.

Evans, Ernest, trans. *Tertullian's Treatise Against Praxeas*. London: S.P.C.K., 1948.

Fahey, Michael. *Cyprian and the Bible: A Study in Third-Century Exegesis*. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1971.

Favre, Raphaël. "La Communication des idiomes dans les œuvres de saint Hilaire de Poitiers." *Gregorianum* 17 (1936): 481–514.

Fierro, Alfredo. *Sobre la gloria en San Hilario: Una síntesis doctrinal sobre la noción bíblica de "doxa."* Analecta Gregoriana 144. Rome: Libreria editrice dell'Universita Gregoriana, 1964.

Figura, Michael. *Das Kirchenverständnis des Hilarius von Poitiers*. Freiburger theologische Studien 127. Freiburg: Herder, 1984.

Fiorenza, Francis Schüssler. "Redemption." In *New Dictionary of Theology*, edited by Joseph A. Komonchak, Mary Collins, and Dermot A. Lane, 836–857. Wilmington, DE: Michael Glazier, 1987.

Galtier, Paul. "La *Forma Dei* et la *forma servi* selon Saint Hilaire de Poitiers." *Recherches de science religieuse* 48 (1960): 101–118.

———. *Saint Hilaire de Poitiers; Le premier docteur de l'Église latine*. Bibliothèque de théologie historique. Paris: Beauchesne, 1960.

Gariglio, Adelina. "Il Commento al salmo 118 in S. Ambrogio e in S. Ilario." *Atti della Accademia delle Scienze di Torino* 90 (1955–56): 356–370.

Gastaldi, Néstor. *Hilario de Poitiers exégeta del Salterio: Un estudio de su exégesis en los Comentarios sobre los Salmos*. Paris-Rosario: Institut Catholique de Paris, 1969.

Gersh, Stephen. *Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism: The Latin Tradition*. 2 vols. Publications in Medieval Studies 23/1–23/2. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1986.

Giamberardini, Gabriel. "De Incarnatione Verbi secundum S. Hilarium Pictaviensem." *Divus Thomas* 50 (1947): 35–56.

———. "De Incarnatione Verbi secundum S. Hilarium Pictaviensem." *Divus Thomas* 51 (1948): 3–13.

Goffinet, Émile. *L'Utilisation d'Origène dans le commentaire des Psaumes de saint Hilaire de Poitiers*. Studia Hellenistica 14. Louvain: Publications universitaires de Louvain, 1965.

Grillmeier, Aloys. *Christ in Christian Tradition*. Vol. 1, *From the Apostolic Age to Chalcedon (451)*. Translated by John Bowden. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1965.

Gross, Jules. *La Divinisation du chrétien d'après les Pères grecs*. Paris: J. Gabalda, 1938.

Hanson, R.P.C. *The Search for the Christian Doctrine of God: The Arian Controversy 318–381*. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1988.

Harl, Marguerite. *La Chaîne palestinienne sur le psaume 118* (*Origène, Eusèbe, Didyme, Apollinaire, Athanase, Théodoret*). Sources chrétiennes 189, 190. Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1972.

Harnack, Adolph von. *History of Dogma*. Vol. 2. Translated from the 3rd ed. by Neil Buchanan. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1907.

———. *History of Dogma*. Vol. 3. Translated from the 3rd ed. by Neil Buchanan. Boston: Roberts Brothers, 1897.

———. *History of Dogma*. Vol. 4. Translated from the 3rd ed. by Neil Buchanan. New York: Russell and Russell, 1898.

Herrmann, Wilhelm. *Gregorii Nysseni sententiae de salute adipiscenda*. Halle, 1875.

Heidl, György. *Origen's Influence on the Young Augustine: A Chapter of the History of Origenism*. Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press, 2003.

Heine, Ronald. "The Christology of Callistus." *Journal of Theological Studies* 49 (1998): 56–91.

Holl, Karl. *Amphilochius von Ikonium seinem Verhältnis zu den grossen Kappadoziern*. Tübingen and Leipzig: J.C.B. Mohr, 1904.

Iacoangeli, Roberto. "Il Linguaggio soteriologico in Ilario di Poitiers." In *Cristologia e catechesi patristica*, vol. 1, edited by Sergio Felici, 121–148. Biblioteca di scienze religiose 31. Rome: Libreria Atneo Salesiano, 1980.

———. " 'Sacramentum Carnis, Sanguinis, Gloriae' in S. Ilario di Poitiers." In *Sangue e Antropologia biblica nella Patristica*, edited by Francesco Vattioni, 503–527. Rome, 1982.

Jacobs, J.W. "The Western Roots of the Christology of St. Hilary of Poitiers: A Heritage of Textual Interpretation." *Studia Patristica* 13 (1975): 198–203.

Jeannotte, Henri. *Le Psautier de saint Hilaire de Poitiers*. Paris: Gabalda, 1917.

Jossua, Jean-Pierre. *Le Salut. Incarnation ou mystère pascal, chez les Pères de l'Église de saint Irénée à saint Léon le Grand*. Paris: Le Cerf, 1968.

Kaiser, Christopher. "Development of Johannine Motifs in Hilary's Doctrine of the Trinity." *Scottish Journal of Theology* 29 (1976): 237–247.

Kannengiesser, Charles. "La Bible dans les controverses ariennes en Occident." In *Le Monde latin antique et la Bible*, edited by Jacques Fontaine and Charles Pietri, 543–564. Bible de tous les temps, vol. 2. Paris: Beauchesne, 1985.

———. "L'Exégese d'Hilaire." In *Hilaire et son temps: Actes du Colloque de Poitiers*, 127–142. Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1969.

———. "L'Héritage d'Hilaire de Poitiers." *Recherches de Science Religieuse* 56 (1968): 435–456.

———. "Hilaire de Poitiers (saint)." In *Dictionnaire de spiritualité: Ascétique et mystique, doctrine et histoire*, vol. 6, 466–499. Paris: G. Beauchesne et ses fils, 1937–1967.

Kelly, J.N.D. *Early Christian Doctrines*. 5th ed. London: Adam and Charles Black, 1977.

Kinnavey, Raymond. *The Vocabularly of St. Hilary of Poitiers as Contained in the* Commentarius in Matthaeum, Liber I Ad Constantium, *and* De Trinitate: *A Morphological and Semasiological Study*. Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America, 1935.

Klibansky, Raymond. *The Continuity of the Platonic Tradition during the Middle Ages* together with *Plato's Parmenides in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance*. Munich: Kraus International Publications, 1981.

Kopecek, Thomas. *A History of Neo-Arianism*. 2 vols. Cambridge, MA: Philadelphia Patristic Foundation, 1979.

Ladaria, Luis. "Adán y Cristo en los *Tractatus super Psalmos* de san Hilario de Poitiers." *Gregorianum* 73 (1992): 97–122.

———. "Adán y Cristo: Un motivo soteriológico del *In Matthaeum* de Hilario de Poitiers." In *Pléroma: Salus carnis: Miscelánea en homenaje al P. Antonio Orbe*, edited by Eugenio Romero Pose, 443–460. Santiago de Compostela: Publicaciones Compostellanum, 1989.

———. " 'Dispensatio' en S. Hilario de Poitiers." *Gregorianum* 66 (1985): 429–455.

———. *El Espíritu Santo en san Hilario de Poitiers*. Madrid: Eapsa, 1977.

———. "Gregorio de Elvira y el paralelismo Adán-Cristo." *Gregorianum* 80 (1999): 677–695.

———. *La Cristología de Hilario de Poitiers.* Rome: Pontificia Università Gregoriana, 1989.

Lécuyer, Joseph. "Le Sacerdoce royal des chrétiens selon saint Hilaire de Poitiers." *L'Année théologique* 10 (1949): 302–325.

Lemaire, Jean-Louis. "Histoire et exégèse dans l'*In Mattheum* d'Hilaire de Poitiers." In *Penser la foi: Recherches en théologie aujourd'hui; Mélanges offerts à Joseph Moingt*, edited by Joseph Doré and Christoph Theobald, 437–447. Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1993.

Lenz, Johann. *Jesus-Christus nach der Lehre des hl. Gregor von Nyssa*. Trier: Verlag der Paulinus Druckerei, 1925.

Lévy, Carlos. "Cicero and the *Timaeus*." In *Plato's* Timaeus *as Cultural Icon*, edited by Gretchen Reydams-Schils, 95–110. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003.

Limongi, P. "Esistenza ed universalità del peccato originale nella mente di S. Ilario di Poitiers." *La Scuola Cattolica* 69 (1941): 127–147.

Long, A.A. and D.N. Sedley. *The Hellenistic Philosophers*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987.

Long, A.A. "Stoic linguistics, Plato's *Cratylus*, and Augustine's *De dialectica*." In *Language and Learning: Philosophy of Language in the Hellenistic Age*, edited by Dorothea Frede and Brad Inwood, 36–55. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Loofs, Friedrich. "Hilarius." In *Realenzyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche*, edited by J.J. Herzog, vol. 8, 57–67. Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs, 1913.

———. *Theophilus von Antiochien Adversus Marcionem*. Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs, 1930.

Lossky, Vladimir. "Redemption and Deification." In *In the Image and Likeness of God*, edited by John Erickson and Thomas Bird, 97–110. Crestwood, NY: St Vladimir's Seminary Press, 2001.

Malevez, Leopold. "L'Église dans le Christ." *Recherches de science religieuse* 25 (1935): 257–297.

Margerie, Bertrand de. *The Latin Fathers*. Vol. 1 of *An Introduction to the History of Exegesis*. Preface by M.-J. Rondeau. Translated by Pierre de Fontnouvelle and Paul Duggan. Petersham, MA: Saint Bede's Publications, 1994.

McCarthy, Michael. "*Expectatio beatitudinis*: The Eschatological Frame of Hilary of Poitiers' *Tractatus super Psalmos*." In *In the Shadow of the Incarnation: Essays on Jesus Christ in the Early Church in Honor of Brian E. Daley, S.J.*. Edited by Peter Martens, 50–70. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2008.

McDermott, John. "Hilary of Poitiers: The Infinite Nature of God." *Vigiliae Christianae* 27 (1973): 172–202.

McHugh, John. *The Exaltation of Christ in the Arian Controversy: The Teaching of St. Hilary of Poitiers*. Shrewsbury: Pontificia Università Gregoriana, 1959.

McMahon, John. *De Christo mediatore: Doctrina Sancti Hilarii Pictaviensis*. Mundelein: Pontificia Facultas Theologica seminarii sanctae Mariae ad Lacum, Dissertationes ad lauream 15, 1947.

Mercer, Jarred. "Suffering for Our Sake: Christ and Human Destiny in Hilary of Poitiers's *De Trinitate*." *Journal of Early Christian Studies* 22 (2014): 541–568.

Mersch, Émile. *The Whole Christ: The Historical Development of the Doctrine of the Mystical Body in Scripture and Tradition*. Translated by John Kelly. Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Company, 1938.

———. *Le Corps mystique du Christ: Études de théologie historique*. 2 vols. Louvain: Museum Lessianum, 1933.

Milhau, Marc. "Différentes versions de titres ou de versets de psaumes rapportées par Hilaire de Poitiers 'Tractatus super psalmos'." *Revue bénedictine* 102 (1992): 24–43.

———. "Le Grec, une 'clé pour l'intelligence des psaumes.' Étude sur les citations grecques du Psautier contenues dans les *Tractatus super psalmos* d'Hilaire de Poitiers." *Revue des Études Augustiniennes* 36 (1990): 67–79.

———. "Sur la division tripartite du Psautier (Hilaire de Poitiers, *Tr. ps. Inst.* 11)." In *Le Psautier chez les Pères*, edited by P. Maraval, 55–72. Cahiers de Biblia Patristica 4. Strasbourg: Centre d'analyse et de documentation patristique, 1993.

———. " 'Ta loi est ma méditation' (Ps. 118, 77.92.97.174), d'Origène à Hilaire de Poitiers." In *Cristianesimo latino e cultura greca sino al secolo IV*, edited by A. Marcone, 153–164. Studia Ephemeridis Augustinianum 42. Rome: Institutum Patristicum Augustinianum, 1993.

———. "Un Texte d'Hilaire de Poitiers sur les Septante, leur traduction et les 'autres traducteurs' (*In psalm.* 2, 2–3)." *Augustinianum* 21 (1981): 365–372.

Moingt, Joseph. "La Théologie trinitaire de S. Hilaire." In *Hilaire et son temps. Actes du Colloque de Poitiers*, 159–173. Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1969.

Moreschini, Claudio. "Il Linguaggio teologico di Ilario di Poitiers." *La Scuola Cattolica* 103 (1975): 339–375.

Mühlenberg, Ekkehard. *Psalmenkommentare Aus Der Katenenuberlieferung*. Vol 1. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1975.

Nautin, Pierre. *Origène: Sa vie et son œuvre*. Christianisme antique 1. Paris: Beauchesne, 1977.

Newlands, G.M. *Hilary of Poitiers: A Study in Theological Method*. Bern; Las Vegas: Peter Lang, 1978.

Orazzo, Antonio. "Ilario di Poitiers e la *universa caro* assunta dal Verbo nei *Tractatus super Psalmos*." *Augustinianum* 23 (1983): 399–419.

———. *La Salvezza in Ilario di Poitiers: Cristo Salvatore dell'uomo nel Tractatus super Psalmos*. Naples: M. D'Auria, 1986.

Pascual Torró, Joaquín. *Comentario al Cantar de los Cantares y otros tratados exegéticos de Gregorio de Elvira*. Fuentes Patristicas 13. Madrid: Editorial Ciudad Nueva, 2000.

Pelland, Gilles. "Gloriam ex conspectu gloriae (Hilaire, Tr ps 118, heth, 8)." *Gregorianum* 72 (1991): 757–763.

———. "La 'Subiectio' du Christ chez saint Hilaire." *Gregorianum* 64 (1983): 423–452.

———. "Le Thème biblique du Règne chez Hilaire de Poitiers." *Gregorianum* 60 (1979): 639–674.

Peñamaria de Llano, Antonio. *La Salvación por la fe: La noción "fides" en Hilario de Poitiers: Estudio filológico—teológico*. Burgos: Ediciones Aldecoa, 1981.

Pettorelli, Jean-Pierre. "Le Thème de Sion, expression de la théologie de la rédemption dans l'œuvre de saint Hilaire de Poitiers." In *Hilaire et son temps: Actes du Colloque de Poitiers*, 213–233. Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1969.

Pitra, Jean-Baptiste. *Analecta sacra spicilegio Solesmensi*. Vol. 2. Frascati, 1884.

Powell, J.G.F. "Cicero's Translations from Greek." In *Cicero the Philosopher*, edited by J.G.F. Powell, 273–300. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995.

Ritschl, Albrecht. *A Critical History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation*. Translated by H.R. Mackintosh and A.B. Macaulay. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1900.

Rondeau, Marie-Josèphe. *Les Commentaires patristiques du Psautier* (*IIIe–Ve siècles*). Vol. 1, *Les travaux des Pères grecs et latins sur le Psautier; Recherches et bilan*. Vol. 2, *Exégèse prosopologique et théologie.* Rome: Pont. Institutum Studiorum Orientalium, 1982–1985.

———. "Le Commentaire sur les Psaumes d'Évagre le Pontique." *Orientalia Christiana Periodica* 26 (1960): 327–348.

———. "Remarques sur l'anthropologie de saint Hilaire." *Studia Patristica* 6 (1962): 197–210.

Saffrey, H.D. "Saint Hilaire et la philosophie." In *Hilaire et son temps: Actes du Colloque de Poitiers*, 247–265. Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1969.

Saxer, Victor. "La Bible chez les Pères latins du IIIe siècle." In *Le monde latin antique et la Bible*, edited by Jacques Fontaine and Charles Pietri, 339–369. Paris: Beauchesne, 1985.

Schofield, Malcolm. *The Stoic Idea of the City*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999.

Schwager, Raymond. "Salvation." In *Encyclopedia of Christian Theology*, vol. 3, edited by Jean-Yves Lacoste, 1421–1434. New York: Routledge, 2005.

Scully, Ellen. "Jerusalem: Image of Hilary's Christocentric Eschatology in the *Tractatus super Psalmos*." *Vigiliae Christianae* 66 (2012): 269–282.

———. "The Soteriology of Hilary of Poitiers: A Latin Mystical Model of Redemption." *Augustinianum* 52 (2012): 159–195.

Sedley, David. "The Stoic Criterion of Identity." *Phronesis* 27 (1982): 255–275.

Simonetti, Manlio. *La Crisi Ariana nel IV secolo*. Studia Ephemeridis Augustinanum 11. Rome: Institutum Patristicum Augustinianum, 1975.

———. "Ilario e Novaziano." *Rivista di cultura classica e medioevale* 7 (1965): 1034–1047.

———. "Note di Cristologica pneumatica." *Augustiniaum* 12 (1972): 201–232.

———. "Note sul Commento a Matteo di Ilario di Poitiers." *Vetera Christianorum* 1 (1964): 35–64.

Smulders, Pieter. "A Bold Move of Hilary of Poitiers: 'Est ergo erans'." *Vigiliae Christianae* 42 (1988): 121–131.

———. *La Doctrine trinitaire de s. Hilaire de Poitiers: Étude précédée d'une esquisse du mouvement dogmatique depuis le Concile de Nicée jusqu'au règne de Julien* (*325–362*). Analecta Gregoriana 32, Series Theologica, Sectio B 14. Rome: Pontificia Università Gregoriana, 1944.

———. *Hilary of Poitiers' Preface to his* Opus historicum: *Translation and Commentary*. Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae, vol. 29. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995.

Sorabji, Richard. *Matter, Space, and Motion: Theories in Antiquity and their Sequel*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988.

Steenson, Jeffrey. "Basil of Ancryra on the Meaning of Homoousios." In *Arianism: Historical and Theological Reassessments*, edited by Robert Gregg, 267–279. Phildadephia: Philadelphia Patristic Foundations, 1985.

Taormina, Daniela. *Jamblique, critique de Plotin et de Porphyre: Quatre etudes*. Paris: Librairie philosophique J. Vrin, 1999.

Tixeront, Joseph. *History of Dogmas*. Vol. 2. Translated by Henry. L. Brianceau. St. Louis: Herder, 1914.

Todd, Robert. *Alexander of Aphrodisias on Stoic Physics: A Study of the* De Mixtione *with Preliminary Essays, Text, Translation and Commentary*. Leiden: Brill, 1976.

Toom, Tarmo. "Hilary of Poitiers' *De Trinitate* and the Name(s) of God." *Vigiliae Christianae* 64 (2010): 467–479.

Torrance, Thomas. "Transition to the West: The Interpretation of Biblical and Theological Statements according to Hilary of Poitiers." In *Divine Meaning: Studies in Patristic Hermeneutics*, 392–427. Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1995.

Turmel, Joseph. *Histoire des dogmes*. Vol. 2. Paris: Rieder, 1932.

Turner, H.E.W. *The Patristic Doctrine of Redemption: A Study of the Development of Doctrine during the First Five Centuries*. London: A.R. Mowbray, 1952.

Weedman, Mark. "Martyrdom and Docetism in Hilary's *De Trinitate*." *Augustinian Studies* 30 (1999): 21–41.

———. "Not the Athanasius of the West: Hilary's Changing Relationship with Athanasius." *Studia Patristica* 42 (2006): 411–415.

———. *The Trinitarian Theology of Hilary of Poitiers*. Supplements to Vigliliae Christianae 89. Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2007.

Werner, Martin. *The Formation of Christian Dogma: A Historical Study of its Problem*. Translated by S.G.F. Brandon. London: Adam & Charles Black, 1957.

Whealey, Alice. "Prologues on the Psalms: Origen, Hippolytus, Eusebius." *Revue Bénedictine* 106 (1996): 234–245.

Wild, Philip. *The Divinization of Man according to St. Hilary*. Mundelein: Pontificia Facultas Theologica seminarii sanctae Mariae ad Lacum, Dissertationes ad lauream 21, 1950.

Wille, Wilhelm. *Studien zum Matthäuskommentar des Hilarius von Poitiers*. Hamburg, 1969.

Williams, Daniel H. "The Anti-Arian Campaigns of Hilary of Poitiers and the 'Liber Contra Auxentium'." *Church History* 61 (1992): 7–22.

———. "Defining Orthodoxy in Hilary of Poitiers' *Commentarium in Matthaeum*." *Journal of Early Christian Studies* 9 (2001): 151–171.

———. "Hilary of Poitiers and Justification by Faith According to the Gospel of Matthew." *Pro Ecclesia* 16 (2007): 445–461.

———. "Monarchianism and Photinus of Sirmium as the Persistent Heretical Face of the Fourth Century." *Harvard Theological Review* 99 (2006): 187–206.

———. "A Reassessment of the Early Career and Exile of Hilary of Poitiers." *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 42 (1991): 202–217.

Index

Adam 4, 6, 18, 68–70, 88, 135, **138–144**, 145–147, 153–154, 158–159, 163, 180, 191, 199, 204–206
adsumere 17, 89, 150, **165–166**, 267
Anyanwu, Akannamdi Gerard Stephen 13–14, 16, 25n1, 79, 92n3
assumption of all humanity (see physicalism)
atonement 24, 26, 43, 87, 92, 94n8, **107–115**, 121, 124, 134, 179n48
Ayres, Lewis 53, 54n43, 58n63, 227n19, 239n65, 251

baptism 1, 3, 89, 94–95, 97–100, 126n20, 151, 153, 194n3, 212, 215, 243n77
Barnes, Michel René 175ns35–36, 251–252
Basil of Ancyra 32, 53n41, 54, 125n14, 223, 243
Beckwith, Carl 44ns4–5, 63n84, 71n114, 72, 108n49, 223n3, 235n54, 244n84, 247n98, 272n2
birth
  eternal from the Father 127n20, 230, 234n48, 242–246, 249
  incarnation 32, 35, 95, 114, 127, 136–137, **145–147**, 174, 266
  resurrection 114, 126–127
body of Christ
  as Church 193–221 (see also ecclesiology)
  eternal existence in 165–192 (see also eschatology, eternal: human life in Christ)
  assumption of all humanity into (see physicalism)
Buffer, Thomas 14, 25n1, 92, 109n54, 261, 266n166, 268n169
Burns, Paul 4, 12, 16n32, 17–18, 20, 23, 31n11, 43n1, 48n21, 54n44, 59–60, 63–65, 67, 69n104, 70–72, 90, 94, 103n35, 108ns49–51, 119n1, 122n7, 124n13, 125n14, 161n94, 169n19, 194n4, 195, 198n15, 203n30, 208n42, 213n57, 215n63, 217ns70–71, 218n75, 220n84, 224n7, 229n26, 245n86, 246n91, 262n150, 265n163

Charlier, Albert 11, 43n1, 104, 119n1, 193–194
christology **119–134**, 271–272 (see also Docetism, mixture theory, Grillmeier)
  use of Phil. 2:6–11 4, 34, 114, 121, 124–134
  three-stage 114, **124–128**
  relationship to soteriology 6, 119–124
  similitudo 34–35
  pneumatic 217n71
Chromatius of Aquilaea 86, 140n13, 145n36, 187n73, 197n14, 198n17, 208n43, 233n40, 258n136
Church (see ecclesiology)
Cicero 17, 30, 46, 48–50, 52, 62–66, 69–70, 73n121, 80–81, 157–159, 161n94
Collauti, Guillermo 18, 144n34, 149n48, 153n58, 208n42
concorporeal 4, 110, 151, 173, 178n47
Coustant, Pierre 11, 18–20, 23, 43n1, 170
Cyprian 41n37, 47n21, 53, 67–68, 84–85, 91, 110n59, 148n46, 155n66, 166n8, 167n13, 198n17, 203n31, 210n50

De Trinitate 2, 16, 18–19, 27, 30–31, 33–35, 38, 40, 44, 52, 64, 66–67, 71–79, 84, 89–90, 96, 98, 101, 104, 106, 125–133, 145, 148, 154, 163, 165, 168–173, 175, 180–181, 190, 194, 216–220, 223–256, 258, 260–266, 272, 276–277
  dating 44
De Synodis 34, 45n6, 224, 236
  dating 45
Docetism **71–72**, 108, 123n11, 131, 186
Doignon, Jean 12–14, 25n1, 27n3, 28n6, 38, 43n2, 44n3, 47–48, 53–55, 57, 59–60, 63n84, 71n114, 72, 89n186, 90, 92, 103–104, 165–166, 169n19, 171n25, 196n10, 204n33, 245n86, 259n142, 148n261, 267n168

ecclesiology **193–221** (see also Jerusalem)
  use of 1 Cor. 12:12–27 4, 207
  use of Col. 1:18, 24 4, 207
  Church as body of Christ 4, 6, 37–40, 42, 54n45, 67, 78, 83–88, 98, 101, 107,

144n34, 152–153, 187–188, **193–221**, 225, 271–272
creation of Eve as prefigurement of the Church 203–206
role of the Holy Spirit 193, 215–221, 238
eschatology **165–192** (see also Jerusalem, *adsumere*, eternal: human life in Christ)
use of 1 Cor. 15:20–28 3–4, 132, **174–179**, 180, 191
use of Ephesians 3:6 4, 173, 178 (see also concorporeal)
use of Philippians 3:21 127–128, 168–171, 182, 189, 213
conformation to Christ's body 156, 169, 172, 183–184, 187, 260–261
subjection of the Son 132, 175–178, 191–192
eternal
mediation of Christ 6, 154–156, 168, 174–180, 189, 222, 225, 249–251, 261, 268–269
generation 53n42, 126n20, 190, 225, 234, **242–249**, 252, 257, 262, 268
human life in Christ 145, 149, **165–192**, 199, 208, 211, 222, 269 (see also eschatology)
Eucharist 1, 19–20, 41, 84, 98, 100, 148, 190n86, 194n3, 212
Eunomius 234–235
Eusebius of Caesarea **57–58**, 91, 128n26, 186n68
Eusebius of Vercelli 54, 58, 88, 89n183, 91
Eve 203–206

Fierro, Alfredo 13–14, 70n108, 126, 128n26, 165n1, 169n19, 170, 171n25, 172n26, 181, 182n60, 183n62, 185n68, 186n70, 195, 219n81, 261n146, 265n161, 265n164, 266ns166–167
forma 35n25, 109–110, 121n5, **124–133**, 178, 182–183, 213, 218, 264–266

Gastaldi, Néstor 13–14, 44n2, 55n49, 57n59, 58–59, 61, 62n81
generation (see birth; eternal: generation)
glory 35n25, 109–110, 114, 125–126, 128–129, 132, 165n1, 168–171, 177–178, **181–183**, 210, 218–219, 224, 258–267
Goffinet, Émile 31n11, 55, 59, 156, 257n134
Gregory of Elvira 56–57, **87–89**, 91, 144n35, 205n34, 207n40, 209n47, 255n129, 270n1, 276
Greek language
Hilary's knowledge of 47–48, 53, 57–58, 81, 102

Hanson, R.P.C. 54, 71, 108n49, 123, 131n48, 223, 229n25
Harnack, Adolph von 2, 5, 11, **14–18**, 21–24, 26, 43, 52, 71, 79, 92–94, 96, 101, 108, 110n59, 135, 145, 273n4, 277
Heidl, György 56–57, 156, 159n83
Holy Spirit 1–5, 193, **215–221**, 223, 226–233, **237–239**, 251n108
homoians 32–34, 120, 223–224, 234n49, 243, 255n129
homoiousians 30n9, 32–34, 93, 125n14, 223, 234n48, 243
homoousios 19, 32–34

Iamblichus 51–52
In Constantium 234n49
In Matthaeum 14, 27, 30, 38–39, 43–45, 52–54, 59–61, 64, 70–71, 76–77, 83, 90, 92, 97–107, 121, 125, 132, 138, 140, 143, 146, 165–168, 189, 193–200, 203, 206, 217, 220, 224, 244–246, 261–262, 264
dating 44

Jerusalem 101, 186–189, 191, 196n9, 202–203, 208, 211, 213
Jossua, Jean-Pierre 16, 23, 79, 86ns171–172, 93n7, 94–95, 99–101, 115, 192n89

Kannengiesser, Charles 13n24, 44n2, 55n49, 60n69, 61n78, 93n5
Kelly, J.N.D. 2n3, 16–17, 79, 93n7, 110n59, 121ns2–4

Ladaria, Luis 2n1, 4, 12, 18, 43n2, 73n119, 88, 94, 119n1, 124n13, 125n15, 126n16, 132n51, 133n54, 138n6, 140n13, 141ns15–16, 143, 176n38, 210n50, 216–218, 220n83, 229ns26–27, 238ns62–63, 239n65, 250n105, 255n129, 263n155, 264n159, 265n161
Lécuyer, Joseph 11, 15, 17, 48n21, 52–53, 119n1, 155ns66–67, 180n53

Marius Victorinus 7, 48n22, 90–91, 165n3
Mersch, Émile 11, 15, 17–18, 20, 23, 43n1, 45, 52, 94, 103, 119n1, 145, 170n21
monarchianism 74, 120, 175, 223–224, 244

neo-Nicene 251–252
Newlands, G.M. 58, 63n84, 70n108, 198ns15–16
name theory 224–225, 240, 243, 245–249 (see also *nomen*)
natura 33n21, 64n88, **226–237**, 275 (see also name theory)
natural unity 68n101, 97, 148–149, 168
nomen **226–237**
Novatian 5, 47n21, 53, 56–57, 159n83, 165, 226–227, 237, 243n76, 245n86, 273

Orazzo, Antonio 4, 12, 17–18, 54n45, 59n66, 65n90, 108n52, 112n64, 119n1, 140n13, 141, 150n50, 153n60, 156n69, 165n2, 166n6, 173n31, 180n51, 195n5, 207n39, 212n55, 267n168
Origen 31n11, 45–46, 47n21, 53n41, **54–62**, 91, 125n14, 128n26, 155n65, 156–159, 166, 167n11, 171n25, 181n56, 185n68, 198n17, 228n21, 250n107, 257n134

Pauline influence 3–4, 18, 83
  Adam-Christ parallel 138–145 (see also Adam)
  Church as body of Christ (see ecclesiology: Church as body of Christ)
  Christ's handing over the kingdom and subjection 174–179
  forma dei / forma servi 124–133 (see also *forma*)
  "bone of my bones" 205–206
  transformation of the body 127–128, 168–171, 182, 213 (see also eschatology: use of Phillipians 3:21)
Pelland, Gilles 13–14, 25n1, 170, 172n26, 176n37, 178n45, 259n141, 261n148
Pettorelli, Jean-Pierre 11, 17–18, 63–66, 70, 119n1, 140n13, 153n59
Platonism (see also Stoicism: transmission of Platonism)
  universal, common, or general nature (Form of humanity) 7–8, 14n27, 21–23, **79–82**, 90, 95, 100–101, 115, 137, 268
  Harnack 11, 14–18, 21–24, 26, 43, 79, 92–94, 101, 145
  Hilary's knowledge of 44–52
persona 61n76, 223, **226–237**, 275
physicalism
  terminology 2–3, 94–95
  definition 1–4, 95–100
  in secondary scholarship 11–24
  as "Greek" 14–18, 21–26, 43–45, 79–82, 90, 92–95, 100–105, 115, 137, 145, 167n13
  as Hilary's soteriological model 92–115, 135–164
  relationship to christology 119–134
  eschatological ramifications 165–192
  ecclesiological ramifications 193–221
  relationship to Trinitarian theology 222–269
  non-metaphorical 25–42
pro-Nicene 19, 54, 48, 224n5, 251–252

Rhetorica ad Herennium 29–32
Rondeau, Marie-Josèphe 12, 26n2, 55n49, 60n74, 61, 64n88, 109n55, 119n1, 156n72, 159n84, 160n91, 163n101, 226n15, 228ns21–22, 231n32, 250n107

similis 30–36, 234n49, 275
similitudo **30–37**, 38, 147, 275
soul
  salvation of 86, 156, **183–186**
  complementarity with body **70–71**, 72n118, 74–77, 83n162, 161n94, 182, 186
  (im)materiality of 40, 71, 77n145, 78, 161n94
  Christ's possession of 54n43, 90, 104, 108n49, 119, 124, 134
  creation of **154–164**
sacraments (see baptism, Eucharist)
Seneca 17, 48n22, 50, 52, 62, 64n87,69–70, 82, 161n94
Simonetti, Manlio 59, 68n101, 144n35, 217n71, 223, 228n19, 229–230, 236n65, 243n76, 245n86
Smulders, Pieter 2n1, 27n4, 45n9, 53n41, 108n50, 122–123, 216n68, 223n2, 225n11, 227n18, 228ns20–21, 245n86, 247

soteriology **135–164** (see also physicalism, atonement)
use of 1 Cor. 15:20–22, 45–49 4, 138
use of Rom. 5:12–21 4, 69, 138, 141
Adam-Christ parallel **138–145** (see also Adam)
necessity of faith and sacraments 3, 97, 99, 110, 135–136, **147–154**, 163, 174, 194, 202, 212, 221, 261
Stoicism 6, 17, 50, 60, 62–63, 90–91, 102, 137, 178n45, 232n37
human unity 44, **63–70**, 91, 136n1, 186
anthropology **70–72**, 83n162, 161n94, 167n11 (see also soul: complementarity with body)
psychology **70–72**, 108
mixture theory 41, **73–79**
transmission of Platonism **79–82**, 106

Tertullian 5, 6, 37–40, 41n37, 42, 44, 47n21, 52–53, 55, 60–62, 63, 67–68, 70–71, 73n119, 74–76, 78n148, 83, 90, 110–112, 126n17, 142n26, 144–145, 155n66, 157–159, 161n94, 165n4, 166n8, 167, 204n33, 205n34, 206n38, 207–208, 210n50, 217n71, 223n1, 226–227, 231, 237, 242–245, 251n107, 252n111, 255n129, 273
Tractatus mysteriorum 194, 203–206, 217n71
dating 203
Tractatus super Psalmos 5, 28–31, 33, 36, 38–39, 43–45, 51–61, 64–65, 68, 70n108, 71, 76–79, 83, 87–90, 92, 96–99, 101–102, 105–115, 124–133, 136, 138–139, 141–143, 147–162, 165–180, 182–191, 193–196, 199–220, 225, 228, 231–232, 235–239, 241–246, 248–263, 266, 270, 276
dating 44–45
Trinitarian theology **222–269** (see also eternal: mediation of Christ; eternal: generation; birth: eternal from the Father; Holy Spirit; name theory)
use of John 4, 240–241, 247, 253
vocabulary (see *persona, nomen, natura, similis*)

Weedman, Mark 32n15, 34ns23–24, 36n29, 38n32, 44n4, 63n84, 71n114, 72, 108n49, 121n5, 124n14, 223n3, 228n20, 233n40, 234n48, 235n54, 236n55, 243ns77–78, 246n91, 247n94, 272n2, 273n5
Williams, Daniel 32n16, 45, 53, 121n5, 224ns4–5, 234n49, 244n82

Scripture Index

Genesis

1:6–7 250
1:26 30–31, 33, 157–160
2:7 157–160
2:23 206
2:24 206
3:17 68

Exodus

3:20 257

Isaiah

28:16 210
65:1–2 229

Daniel

2:34–35 210

Proverbs

8:22 250
8:30 254

Matthew

5:8 257
9:2–8 140
11:27 225, 240
26:64 125

Luke

1:35 217

John

1:1 247
1.3 250
1:14 39
4:24 216
5:17–19 253–254
10:30 4, 190, 241–242
10:37 253
10:38 190
14:8–11 4, 167, 172, 240–242, 253
15:1–8 97, 148, 151–152
17:5 125–126
17:22 181

Romans

8:3 35, 125
5:12–21 4, 69, 138, 141

1 Corinthians

5:19 190
8:6 250
12:12–27 4, 207
15:20–28 3–4, 132, 138, **174–179**, 180, 191
15:42–44 182
15:45–49 4, 138
15:53 182

2 Corinthians

3:18 261

Ephesians

2:14 162
2:19 211

3:6 4, 173, 178
5:30–32 206

Colossians

1:15 125
1:16 250
1:18–24 4, 207
2:10 169

Philippians

2:6–11 4, 34, 114, 121, 124–125, 133–134
3:21 35–36, 127–128, 168–171, 182, 189, 195, 213

Hebrews

7:27 179
12:22 189